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INTRODUCTION	  
	  The	  proliferation	  of	  unmanned	  aerial	  vehicles	  (UAVs)	  in	  the	  US	  Department	  of	  Defense	  (DoD)	  over	  the	  last	  15	  years	  marks	  one	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  ongoing	  developments	  in	  military	  aviation	  in	  decades.	  Yet	  while	  the	  US	  military	  has	  been	  researching	  and	  flight-­‐testing	  UAVs	  almost	  as	  long	  as	  piloted	  aircraft,1	  the	  history	  of	  UAVs	  has	  been	  marked	  by	  a	  tendency	  to	  all	  but	  completely	  drop	  the	  technology	  after	  periods	  of	  significant	  investment.	  Today	  many	  of	  the	  same	  factors	  that	  impacted	  the	  trajectory	  of	  earlier	  US	  military	  UAV	  programs	  —	  ranging	  from	  changes	  in	  the	  threat	  environment	  to	  technology	  maturity	  questions,	  federal	  budget	  pressure	  and	  inter-­‐service	  rivalry	  —	  are	  once	  again	  emerging	  as	  live	  issues.	  	  The	  US	  Air	  Force	  (USAF)	  has	  historically	  been	  a	  leader	  in	  UAV	  technology,	  but	  also	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  DoD-­‐wide	  tendency	  to	  employ	  it	  in	  fits	  and	  starts.	  With	  the	  delivery	  of	  the	  last	  MQ-­‐1	  Predator	  to	  the	  USAF	  in	  March	  2011,	  a	  new	  research	  opportunity	  has	  emerged	  to	  examine	  the	  service’s	  decision-­‐making	  process	  for	  UAV	  innovation	  as	  a	  complete	  analytical	  unit	  with	  a	  beginning,	  middle,	  and	  end.	  It	  is	  too	  early	  to	  say	  whether	  the	  Predator	  and	  its	  successor,	  the	  MQ-­‐9	  Reaper,	  have	  finally	  managed	  to	  do	  what	  previous	  UAVs	  have	  not;	  namely,	  earn	  a	  lasting	  place	  in	  the	  USAF’s	  force	  structure.	  But	  the	  end	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  Predator	  acquisition	  program,	  and	  the	  passage	  of	  several	  years	  since	  then,	  has	  created	  a	  unique	  opportunity	  to	  analyze	  how	  the	  USAF’s	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  technology	  have	  evolved	  over	  time.	  	  Researchers	  have	  offered	  a	  variety	  of	  competing	  explanations	  about	  why	  UAVs	  to	  date	  have	  not	  consistently	  remained	  a	  prevalent	  part	  of	  the	  US	  military’s	  force	  structure.	  The	  theoretical	  background	  for	  much	  of	  their	  research	  is	  drawn	  from	  military	  innovation	  studies,	  which	  builds	  on	  international	  relations	  theory	  and	  organizational	  theory	  to	  identify	  a	  variety	  of	  factors	  involved	  in	  organizational	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  US	  military	  services	  have	  pursued	  UAV	  development	  since	  1917.	  See,	  for	  example,	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change.	  Some	  schools	  of	  military	  innovation	  theory	  identify	  factors	  internal	  to	  an	  organization,	  such	  as	  structural	  or	  functional	  imperatives,	  or	  cultural	  influences,	  to	  explain	  military	  change.	  Other	  schools	  focus	  on	  external	  factors	  as	  sources	  of	  change,	  such	  as	  civilian	  officials,	  the	  threat	  environment,	  technological	  progress	  or	  budget	  considerations.	  	  While	  scholars	  seem	  to	  agree	  that	  UAV	  innovation	  over	  the	  last	  15	  years	  represents	  a	  potentially	  major	  military	  change,	  they	  have	  not	  come	  to	  a	  consensus	  on	  the	  source	  of	  the	  change.	  Among	  the	  handful	  of	  researchers	  who	  have	  explored	  the	  role	  of	  culture	  in	  spurring	  UAV	  development,	  there	  is	  a	  fundamental	  disagreement	  about	  the	  extent	  and	  nature	  of	  its	  influence.	  One	  view	  is	  that	  culture	  has	  not	  played	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  facilitating	  or	  constraining	  the	  USAF’s	  capacity	  to	  integrate	  UAVs.	  These	  researchers	  have	  found	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  historic	  failure	  to	  integrate	  UAVs	  has	  been	  due	  to	  technological	  immaturity	  and	  poor	  operational	  performance,	  not	  to	  cultural	  resistance.	  In	  the	  few	  cases	  where	  scholars	  concede	  a	  cultural	  influence,	  it	  is	  perceived	  as	  having	  facilitated	  UAV	  innovation	  rather	  than	  having	  blocked	  it.	  But	  this	  view	  has	  started	  to	  come	  up	  against	  critics,	  particularly	  as	  UAV	  technology	  has	  improved,	  and	  the	  US-­‐led	  wars	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq	  have	  allowed	  for	  extensive	  battle	  testing	  of	  UAVs.	  	  Evidence	  of	  the	  operational	  utility	  of	  UAVs	  continues	  to	  be	  borne	  out	  on	  the	  battlefield,	  with	  ground	  commanders	  citing	  an	  “insatiable”	  need	  for	  UAVs	  to	  conduct	  intelligence,	  surveillance	  and	  reconnaissance	  (ISR).2	  Across	  the	  DoD,	  there	  has	  been	  an	  explosion	  in	  the	  US	  military’s	  UAV	  inventory	  from	  167	  in	  2002	  to	  nearly	  11,000	  in	  2013,	  although	  about	  95	  percent	  are	  smaller	  and	  less	  capable	  than	  the	  Predator	  and	  its	  cousins,	  the	  MQ-­‐9	  Reaper	  and	  MQ-­‐1C	  Gray	  Eagle.3	  Today	  UAVs	  have	  reached	  a	  point	  at	  which	  their	  efficiency	  can	  potentially	  match	  that	  of	  other	  weapons	  alternatives	  —	  at	  least	  within	  certain	  contexts	  —	  raising	  anew	  questions	  about	  shortfalls	  in	  technological	  maturity	  and	  operational	  utility	  cited	  in	  previous	  findings.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  See,	  for	  example,	  Abizaid	  (2005).	  	  3	  Gertler	  (Jan.	  3,	  2012)	  2;	  DoD	  (2013)	  4;	  Arkin	  (2015)	  9	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One	  could	  argue	  that	  the	  USAF	  has	  now	  finally	  embraced	  UAVs	  precisely	  because	  they	  have	  reached	  technological	  maturity.	  But	  this	  argument	  is	  undermined	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  UAVs	  performed	  reasonably	  well	  in	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  for	  example,	  and	  were	  still	  dropped	  after	  the	  war	  ended.	  Technological	  maturity	  also	  seemed	  to	  be	  less	  of	  a	  consideration	  than	  other	  factors	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Predator,	  which	  is	  poorly	  equipped	  to	  operate	  in	  bad	  weather	  or	  contested	  airspace.	  Despite	  these	  shortcomings,	  the	  USAF	  nevertheless	  took	  steps	  to	  both	  facilitate	  Predator	  adoption	  and	  also	  to	  hinder	  its	  development,	  suggesting	  that	  other	  factors	  besides	  technological	  maturity	  were	  at	  play.	  In	  light	  of	  these	  considerations,	  several	  authors	  writing	  about	  UAV	  innovation	  more	  recently	  have	  found	  that	  resistance	  to	  modern-­‐day	  UAV	  technology	  may	  hinge	  on	  other	  factors,	  with	  culture	  playing	  at	  least	  a	  peripheral	  role	  as	  a	  source	  of	  resistance	  to	  UAV	  innovation.	  	  My	  research	  aims	  to	  get	  to	  the	  bottom	  of	  this	  debate	  about	  the	  role	  of	  culture	  in	  UAV	  innovation	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  USAF’s	  Predator	  program	  between	  1993	  and	  2015.	  The	  Predator	  serves	  as	  a	  test	  case	  to	  explore	  my	  primary	  research	  question:	  how	  has	  USAF	  culture	  shaped	  –	  and	  been	  shaped	  by	  –	  UAV	  innovation?	  This	  question	  design	  allows	  considerable	  latitude	  to	  explore	  the	  dynamic	  and	  multi-­‐faceted	  relationship	  between	  organizational	  culture	  and	  technology.	  It	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  possibility	  that,	  over	  time,	  elements	  of	  USAF	  culture	  may	  have	  constrained	  or	  enabled	  Predator	  program	  innovation.	  It	  also	  acknowledges	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  Predator	  program	  itself	  spurred	  cultural	  change	  in	  the	  USAF.	  	  This	  approach	  to	  understanding	  the	  role	  of	  USAF	  culture	  in	  UAV	  innovation	  is	  distinct	  from	  previous	  research	  on	  the	  subject.	  While	  scholars	  have	  tended	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  relative	  role	  of	  culture	  versus	  other	  variables	  in	  spurring	  UAV	  innovation,	  I	  see	  culture	  as	  a	  lens	  through	  which	  the	  USAF	  views	  all	  the	  factors	  that	  impinge	  on	  UAV	  development.	  I	  am	  still	  interested	  in	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  USAF	  culture	  triggered	  UAV	  innovation,	  but	  I	  take	  it	  for	  granted	  that	  culture	  mattered	  to	  some	  degree,	  and	  my	  primary	  concern	  is	  to	  understand	  exactly	  how	  it	  mattered,	  for	  reasons	  I	  discuss	  much	  further	  in	  chapter	  one.	  The	  literature	  review	  below	  looks	  at	  how	  other	  scholars	  have	  viewed	  the	  relationship	  between	  USAF	  culture	  and	  UAV	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innovation.	  Chapter	  one	  explores	  the	  theoretical	  background	  for	  my	  view	  of	  culture,	  and	  it	  also	  provides	  a	  justification	  for	  the	  following	  four	  sub-­‐questions,	  which	  each	  explore	  various	  hypotheses	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  USAF	  culture	  to	  answer	  the	  primary	  research	  question	  above.	  These	  questions	  are	  asked	  across	  the	  substantive	  chapters	  that	  follow	  chapter	  one.	  	  	   1. To	  what	  extent	  did	  individuals	  or	  groups	  within	  the	  USAF	  resist	  UAV	  innovation	  out	  of	  a	  concern	  that	  their	  jobs	  and	  status	  might	  be	  threatened	  by	  it?	  	  2. 	  To	  what	  extent	  were	  judgments	  about	  the	  potential	  and	  cost	  effectiveness	  of	  UAVs	  based	  on	  the	  USAF’s	  enthusiasm	  for	  employing	  new	  technology	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  was	  the	  enthusiasm	  from	  outside	  the	  service?	  	   3. To	  what	  extent	  were	  USAF	  judgments	  about	  the	  employment	  of	  UAVs	  driven	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	  to	  friendly	  personnel	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  was	  that	  push	  from	  outside	  the	  service?	  	   4. To	  what	  extent	  were	  judgments	  about	  UAVs	  based	  on	  a	  concern	  about	  maintaining	  the	  USAF’s	  primacy	  over	  air	  assets	  in	  response	  to	  external	  pressure	  from	  the	  US	  Congress,	  civilian	  government	  agencies,	  or	  other	  military	  institutions?	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Literature	  Review:	  Three	  Perspectives	  on	  USAF	  Culture	  and	  UAV	  
Innovation	  	  	  This	  literature	  review	  is	  limited	  in	  scope	  due	  to	  the	  sheer	  volume	  of	  material	  on	  UAVs,	  which	  has	  only	  grown	  in	  recent	  years	  as	  these	  aircraft,	  popularly	  referred	  to	  as	  “drones,”	  proliferate.	  Historical	  surveys,	  such	  as	  Hugh	  McDaid	  and	  David	  Oliver’s	  Smart	  Weapons:	  the	  Top	  Secret	  History	  of	  Remote	  Controlled	  Airborne	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Weapons,	  among	  others,	  provide	  a	  review	  of	  UAV	  developments	  and	  make	  assessments	  about	  their	  likely	  role	  in	  future	  combat.4	  Much	  more	  recently,	  authors	  have	  sought	  to	  explain	  how	  advances	  in	  drone	  technology	  impact	  the	  relationship	  between	  humans	  and	  machines	  in	  warfare.5	  Other	  books,	  particularly	  Chris	  Woods’	  Sudden	  Justice	  and	  Mark	  Mazetti’s	  Way	  of	  the	  Knife,	  explore	  the	  role	  of	  drones	  in	  the	  CIA	  and	  Special	  Operations	  Forces’	  post	  9/11	  shadow	  war	  against	  terrorism.6	  	  Here	  I	  will	  limit	  the	  discussion	  to	  works	  that	  are	  directly	  relevant	  to	  USAF	  culture	  and	  UAV	  innovation,	  many	  of	  which	  go	  beyond	  re-­‐tracing	  the	  USAF’s	  UAV	  history	  to	  offer	  a	  nuanced,	  multi-­‐dimensional	  perspective	  that	  has	  shaped	  the	  research	  design	  of	  this	  thesis.	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  research	  design,	  there	  is	  a	  similarly	  burgeoning	  supply	  of	  literature	  on	  the	  broader	  subject	  of	  military	  innovation	  and	  culture,	  which	  I	  therefore	  have	  left	  for	  the	  theoretical	  discussion	  in	  chapter	  one.	  In	  this	  literature	  review,	  I	  examine	  the	  topics	  of	  USAF	  culture	  and	  UAV	  innovation	  from	  three	  different	  perspectives.	  The	  first	  perspective	  focuses	  on	  agency,	  exploring	  the	  relative	  roles	  of	  the	  USAF	  versus	  other	  actors	  in	  spurring	  UAV	  innovation.	  The	  second	  perspective	  examines	  the	  relative	  roles	  of	  culture	  versus	  a	  range	  of	  other	  factors	  in	  shaping	  the	  course	  of	  UAV	  innovation.	  The	  third	  perspective	  highlights	  how	  UAV	  innovation	  has	  raised	  a	  broader	  question	  about	  USAF	  identity,	  a	  key	  determinant	  of	  the	  service’s	  capacity	  for	  innovation.	  Some	  works	  will	  arise	  more	  than	  once	  in	  the	  discussion	  because	  they	  cut	  across	  multiple	  perspectives.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
The	  First	  Perspective:	  The	  USAF’s	  Role	  in	  UAV	  Development	  	  In	  regards	  to	  the	  first	  perspective,	  authors	  clearly	  disagree	  about	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  USAF	  played	  a	  role	  in	  various	  UAV	  developments.	  The	  most	  contentious	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  McDaid	  and	  Oliver	  (1997).	  See	  also	  Wagner	  (1982);	  Armitage	  (1988);	  Siuru	  (1991);	  Newcome	  (2004);	  Yenne	  (2004);	  Yenne	  (2010)	  5Arkin	  (2015);	  Mindell	  (2015);	  Ramo	  (2011)	  ;Coker	  (2007)	  	  6	  Woods	  (2015);	  Mazetti	  (2013)	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debate	  centers	  on	  USAF’s	  role	  in	  the	  decision	  to	  arm	  the	  Predator	  with	  AGM-­‐114	  Hellfire	  missiles	  in	  the	  early	  2000’s.	  	  	  In	  a	  2011	  paper	  for	  the	  Air	  Force	  Association,	  and	  later,	  in	  a	  2014	  book,	  journalist	  Richard	  Whittle	  argues	  that	  the	  USAF	  —	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  General	  John	  Jumper,	  the	  USAF	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  from	  2001	  to	  2005	  —deserves	  full	  credit	  for	  weaponization.7	  His	  findings	  are	  based	  heavily	  on	  the	  work	  of	  then-­‐USAF	  Lieutenant	  Colonel	  Sean	  Frisbee,	  who	  argues	  in	  a	  graduate	  paper	  that	  Gen.	  Jumper	  made	  the	  critical	  decision	  to	  arm	  the	  Predator.	  8	  In	  contrast	  to	  Whittle	  and	  Frisbee,	  other	  authors	  accuse	  the	  USAF	  of	  obstructing	  weaponization.	  In	  his	  2004	  dissertation	  on	  UAV	  innovation,	  Jon	  Rosenwasser	  argues	  that	  the	  USAF	  weaponized	  the	  Predator	  under	  duress	  from	  the	  CIA,	  desperate	  to	  hunt	  down	  al	  Qaeda	  leader	  Osama	  bin	  Laden.9	  Peter	  Singer,	  a	  Brookings	  Institution	  scholar,	  and	  investigative	  reporter	  Stephen	  Coll,	  also	  claim	  that	  the	  CIA	  took	  the	  lead	  on	  Predator	  weaponization,	  with	  the	  USAF	  following	  along	  begrudgingly.	  10	  	  	  
The	  Second	  Perspective:	  USAF	  Culture	  and	  UAV	  Innovation	  
	  Turning	  to	  the	  second	  perspective,	  scholarship	  on	  culture	  and	  UAV	  innovation	  offers	  a	  range	  of	  views	  regarding	  the	  relative	  influence	  of	  USAF	  culture	  versus	  other	  factors	  in	  shaping	  decisions	  about	  UAV	  development.	  The	  landmark	  work	  on	  the	  subject	  to	  date	  is	  retired	  Col.	  Thomas	  Ehrhard’s	  doctoral	  dissertation,	  which	  offers	  a	  comparative	  study	  of	  UAV	  programs	  across	  the	  US	  armed	  services	  over	  45	  years,	  including	  the	  USAF’s	  Predator	  program.11	  Col.	  Ehrhard’s	  main	  contribution	  is	  to	  clearly	  identify	  a	  variety	  of	  factors	  that	  impinge	  on	  UAV	  innovation.	  He	  forcefully	  concludes	  that	  USAF	  culture	  matters	  far	  less	  than	  other	  material	  factors	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Whittle	  (August	  2011)	  9;	  Whittle	  (2014)	  169	  8	  Frisbee	  (2004)	  84-­‐89.	  9	  Rosenwasser	  (2004)	  390-­‐392	  and	  396-­‐397	  10	  Singer	  (2009)	  35;	  Coll	  (2004)	  534	  11	  Ehrhard	  summarized	  his	  thesis	  in	  a	  2010	  publication	  cited	  heavily	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  See	  Ehrhard	  (2010)	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in	  shaping	  decisions	  about	  UAV	  innovation.12	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  matters	  at	  all,	  he	  adds,	  USAF	  culture	  supports	  UAV	  development.13	  	  	  Col.	  Ehrhard	  cites	  technological	  immaturity	  and	  poor	  operational	  performance	  relative	  to	  weapons	  alternatives	  —	  such	  as	  satellites,	  manned	  aviation	  and	  standoff	  missiles	  —	  as	  the	  main	  reasons	  for	  the	  USAF’s	  historic	  failure	  to	  institutionalize	  UAVs.14	  Secondary	  influences	  cited	  by	  Col.	  Ehrhard	  include	  arms	  treaty	  limitations,	  congressional	  meddling,	  and	  cost	  problems	  after	  the	  National	  Reconnaissance	  Organization	  stopped	  funding	  the	  USAF’s	  UAV	  research.15	  His	  conclusions	  are	  echoed	  by	  USAF	  Lt.	  Col.	  Richard	  M.	  Clarke	  in	  his	  2000	  USAF	  “occasional	  paper.”16	  	  Col.	  Ehrhard	  ‘s	  discussion	  of	  UAV	  innovation	  ends	  in	  2000,	  when	  the	  Predator	  program	  was	  still	  in	  its	  infancy.	  He	  concedes	  that	  the	  “odd	  bird”	  17	  seemed	  to	  have	  “found	  a	  home”18	  in	  the	  USAF	  for	  the	  time	  being,	  but	  he	  argues	  that	  its	  relative	  lack	  of	  technological	  maturity—	  the	  same	  factor	  that	  he	  claims	  had	  held	  back	  UAV	  programs	  historically	  —	  threatened	  a	  “very	  shaky”	  future	  for	  the	  program.19	  Predator	  operations	  in	  Bosnia	  during	  Operation	  Deliberate	  Force	  and	  Kosovo	  during	  Operation	  Allied	  Force	  revealed	  the	  UAV’s	  s	  lack	  of	  capability	  to	  fly	  in	  poor	  weather	  and	  its	  vulnerability	  to	  surface-­‐to-­‐air	  missiles	  (SAMs),	  leading	  Ehrhard	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  Predator’s	  long-­‐term	  viability	  remained	  in	  question.20	  Since	  Ehrhard	  published	  in	  2000,	  however,	  a	  handful	  of	  scholars	  have	  revisited	  his	  conclusions	  about	  the	  relative	  role	  of	  culture	  versus	  other	  factors	  in	  spurring	  or	  stalling	  UAV	  innovation.	  As	  Ehrhard	  concedes,	  his	  study	  was	  completed	  at	  an	  “indeterminate,	  early	  stage”	  in	  UAV	  innovation,	  prior	  to	  any	  UAV	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Ehrhard	  (2000)	  570	  	  13	  Ehrhard	  (2000)	  493	  14	  Ehrhard	  (2000)404-­‐405	  15	  Ehrhard	  (2000)404-­‐406	  16	  Clark	  (2000)	  48-­‐67	  17	  Ehrhard	  (2000)	  52	  18	  Ehrhard	  (2000)	  546	  19	  Ehrhard	  (2000)	  513	  20	  Ehrhard	  (2000)	  546	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having	  an	  enduring	  breakthrough	  into	  military	  operations.21	  More	  recent	  scholarship	  has	  sought	  to	  determine	  whether	  Ehrhard’s	  findings	  about	  UAV	  innovation	  and	  the	  Predator	  program	  still	  hold	  in	  light	  of	  new	  information	  that	  has	  emerged	  in	  the	  15	  years	  since	  he	  examined	  the	  topic.	  	  In	  his	  2004	  dissertation	  on	  UAV	  innovation	  between	  1986	  and	  2002,	  Rosenwasser	  argues	  that	  Ehrhard’s	  claim	  about	  technological	  and	  operational	  performance	  problems	  holding	  back	  UAV	  innovation	  has	  lost	  the	  explanatory	  power	  it	  once	  held.	  Advances	  in	  GPS,	  satellite	  communications,	  and	  other	  technologies	  allowed	  for	  the	  proliferation	  of	  UAVs	  with	  a	  range	  of	  enhanced	  capabilities	  during	  this	  time	  period.22	  He	  also	  argues	  that	  the	  strategic	  environment	  of	  the	  1990’s	  was	  highly	  conducive	  to	  UAVs,	  which	  demonstrated	  their	  operational	  efficiency	  relative	  to	  manned	  systems	  in	  terms	  of	  reducing	  aircrew	  risk	  and	  aircraft	  cost	  during	  conflicts	  in	  the	  Gulf	  (1991),	  the	  Balkans	  (1993-­‐1997),	  Kosovo	  (1999)	  and	  Afghanistan	  (2001-­‐2002).	  Rosenwasser	  also	  casts	  doubt	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  budgetary	  concerns	  or	  arms	  control	  treaties	  limiting	  the	  use	  of	  UAVs.23	  	  	  In	  one	  of	  his	  six	  case	  studies,	  Rosenwasser	  concludes	  that	  the	  USAF	  could	  have	  done	  more	  to	  support	  innovation	  in	  the	  Predator	  program.	  He	  finds	  that,	  contrary	  to	  Ehrhard’s	  findings,	  the	  service’s	  reluctance	  had	  less	  to	  do	  with	  a	  rational	  assessment	  of	  the	  Predator’s	  shortcomings	  than	  with	  three	  problems	  relating	  to	  USAF	  culture,	  including	  1)	  a	  lingering	  perception	  in	  the	  dominant	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  community	  that	  UAVs	  were	  still	  as	  accident-­‐prone	  as	  they	  had	  been	  in	  Vietnam;	  2)	  a	  perception	  that	  the	  Predator	  program	  was	  insignificant	  from	  a	  bureaucratic	  politics	  perspective	  because	  it	  was	  viewed	  as	  a	  “tactical”	  asset	  that	  could	  not	  contribute	  to	  the	  USAF’s	  war-­‐winning	  edge;	  and,	  3)	  an	  	  acquisition	  culture	  that	  focused	  on	  reliability	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  timely	  deployment.24	  Other	  researchers	  have	  since	  highlighted	  USAF	  culture	  as	  a	  significant	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Ehrhard	  (2000)	  633	  22	  Rosenwasser	  (2004)	  20-­‐24	  23	  Rosenwasser	  (2004)	  19-­‐20	  24	  Rosenwasser	  (2004)	  390-­‐391	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barrier	  to	  Predator	  innovation.	  The	  most	  frequently	  noted	  sources	  of	  cultural	  resistance	  are	  the	  USAF’s	  manned	  pilot	  community	  and	  its	  mainstream	  acquisition	  community.	  In	  terms	  of	  acquisition	  culture,	  a	  widely	  cited	  RAND	  Corp.	  study	  conducted	  in	  1997	  found	  that	  the	  USAF	  ‘s	  acquisition	  community	  was	  unprepared	  for	  the	  “major	  cultural	  change”	  required	  to	  accommodate	  the	  Predator,	  which	  was	  purchased	  and	  field-­‐tested	  rapidly,	  requiring	  non-­‐traditional	  acquisition	  practices.25	  In	  a	  2012	  follow-­‐up	  to	  the	  RAND	  study,	  USAF	  Major	  Rojan	  Robotham	  found	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  acquisition	  community	  still	  struggled	  to	  reconcile	  the	  high	  operational	  demand	  for	  the	  Predator	  with	  its	  own	  extremely	  regimented	  acquisition	  practices.26	  	  	  	  	  One	  of	  the	  most	  prolific	  authors	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  bias	  as	  an	  obstacle	  to	  Predator	  innovation	  is	  USAF	  Col.	  Houston	  Cantwell,	  an	  F-­‐16	  Fighting	  Falcon	  pilot	  who	  served	  as	  the	  732nd	  Operations	  Group	  commander	  from	  2012	  to	  2014	  at	  Creech	  Air	  Force	  Base	  (AFB)	  in	  Nevada,	  home	  to	  the	  USAF’s	  only	  UAV	  wing.	  In	  two	  separate	  graduate	  papers	  written	  while	  he	  was	  a	  USAF	  major,	  Col.	  Cantwell	  argues	  that	  the	  USAF	  was	  late	  to	  recognize	  the	  potential	  of	  the	  Predator	  program	  because	  of	  cultural	  biases.27	  	  Col.	  Cantwell	  claims	  that	  misguided	  USAF	  personnel	  policies,	  which	  forced	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  to	  fly	  UAVs,	  have	  slowed	  down	  Predator	  innovation.	  Acceptance	  of	  the	  Predator	  program	  by	  mid-­‐grade	  officers	  has	  been	  “lukewarm	  at	  best,”	  he	  argues,	  because	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  forced	  to	  fly	  UAVs	  missed	  the	  thrill	  of	  flying	  and	  felt	  they	  had	  lost	  status	  within	  the	  USAF.28	  As	  Lt.	  Col.	  Matt	  Martin	  depicts	  in	  his	  book	  on	  Predator	  operations,	  airmen	  flying	  armed	  UAVs	  from	  ground	  control	  stations	  in	  the	  United	  States	  have	  major	  responsibilities	  in	  combat	  but	  carry	  them	  out	  in	  an	  office-­‐like	  environment.29	  Many	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  would	  rather	  face	  the	  visceral	  realities	  of	  physically	  flying	  in	  the	  air	  medium,	  with	  all	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Thirtle	  (1997)	  78	  26	  Robotham	  (2012)	  63	  and	  66	  27	  Cantwell	  (2006)	  and	  Cantwell	  (2007)	  28	  Cantwell,	  (2006)	  25;	  Cantwell,	  (2007)	  81	  29	  Martin	  (2010)	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potential	  for	  risk	  and	  reward.	  30	  The	  USAF’s	  decision	  to	  force	  them	  into	  Predator	  ground	  control	  stations	  has	  slowed	  down	  innovation,	  Col.	  Cantwell	  argues,	  because	  they	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  become	  Predator	  advocates	  as	  they	  are	  promoted	  through	  the	  ranks.31	  	  Col.	  Cantwell	  also	  speculates	  that	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  bias	  at	  the	  policy	  level	  has	  slowed	  down	  Predator	  program	  innovation.32	  He	  stops	  short	  of	  arguing	  the	  case	  conclusively,	  however,	  noting	  that	  “many	  of	  the	  impacts	  on	  policy	  can	  only	  be	  inferred.”33	  Ultimately,	  Col.	  Cantwell	  concludes	  that	  certain	  USAF	  leaders	  such	  as	  Gen	  Jumper,	  the	  USAF	  chief	  from	  2001	  to	  2005,	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  overcoming	  cultural	  resistance	  among	  mid-­‐level	  officers,	  supported	  by	  external	  actors	  including	  the	  US	  Congress,	  the	  DoD,	  and	  Predator	  manufacturer	  General	  Atomics	  Aeronautical	  Systems	  (GA-­‐ASI).34	  	  	  	  	  In	  his	  2009	  book	  on	  robotic	  warfare,	  Singer	  also	  suggests	  that	  USAF	  culture	  might	  be	  an	  obstacle	  to	  UAV	  innovation.	  He	  contends	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  professional	  identity	  is	  tied	  to	  piloting	  manned	  aircraft	  and	  therefore	  the	  service	  has	  resisted	  the	  development	  of	  UAVs	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  they	  pose	  a	  threat	  to	  pilots’	  jobs	  and	  status.	  He	  speculates	  that	  this	  cultural	  bias	  led	  the	  USAF	  to	  cancel	  development	  of	  an	  advanced	  UAV	  known	  as	  the	  Boeing	  X-­‐45	  to	  keep	  it	  from	  competing	  with	  the	  manned	  F-­‐35	  Lightning	  II	  Joint	  Strike	  Fighter.35	  	  
	  
The	  Third	  Perspective:	  USAF	  Identity	  and	  UAV	  Innovation	  	  The	  third	  perspective,	  which	  focuses	  on	  USAF	  identity,	  provides	  further	  insight	  into	  the	  origins	  of	  claims	  about	  USAF	  culture	  constraining	  or	  facilitating	  Predator	  innovation.	  	  A	  common	  theme	  in	  this	  literature	  is	  that	  the	  USAF	  is	  undergoing	  an	  institutional	  identity	  crisis	  centered	  on	  whether	  its	  culture	  is	  tied	  to	  manned	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Cantwell	  (2007)	  115;	  McCurley	  (2015)	  16-­‐17	  31	  Cantwell	  (2007)	  115-­‐118	  32	  Cantwell	  (2006)	  28	  	  33	  Cantwell	  (2007)	  115.	  34	  Cantwell	  (2007)	  44	  35	  Singer	  (2009)	  253.	  
	   15	  
aircraft	  or	  a	  broader	  commitment	  to	  the	  strategic	  employment	  of	  airpower.	  	  In	  the	  late	  1980’s,	  protégés	  of	  then-­‐Col.	  John	  Warden	  —	  a	  key	  architect	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  1991	  Gulf	  air	  campaign	  —	  produced	  a	  white	  paper	  warning	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  lack	  of	  a	  strategic	  vision	  was	  hurting	  its	  long-­‐term	  relevance.36	  The	  white	  paper	  was	  never	  published,	  but	  was	  later	  summarized	  by	  historian	  Carl	  Builder	  in	  his	  landmark	  book	  on	  USAF	  culture,	  The	  Icarus	  Syndrome.	  Builder	  argues	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  preference	  for	  manned	  aircraft	  has	  led	  it	  to	  view	  emerging	  innovations	  as	  a	  threat	  rather	  than	  an	  opportunity.37	  In	  his	  widely	  read	  graduate	  paper,	  Rise	  of	  the	  
Fighter	  Generals,	  then-­‐Col.	  Michael	  Worden	  further	  argues	  that	  the	  homogeneity	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  leadership	  structure	  —	  historically	  dominated	  by	  bomber	  pilots,	  and	  later,	  fighter	  pilots	  —	  has	  reinforced	  these	  tendencies	  toward	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  parochialism	  and	  bias.38	  	  	  	  Airpower	  theorists	  sought	  to	  bring	  a	  renewed	  strategic	  focus	  to	  the	  USAF	  by	  producing	  a	  watershed	  document	  in	  1990,	  Global	  Reach-­‐Global	  Power,	  which	  laid	  out	  broad	  strategic	  aims	  for	  the	  USAF	  that	  went	  far	  beyond	  a	  focus	  on	  manned	  aircraft	  or	  tactical	  missions.39	  The	  document	  pushed	  the	  USAF	  to	  embrace	  any	  technology	  that	  advanced	  the	  strategic	  aims	  of	  airpower.	  One	  of	  the	  architects	  of	  this	  document,	  then-­‐Major	  David	  Deptula,	  became	  the	  USAF’s	  first	  ISR	  chief	  and	  an	  advocate	  of	  taking	  full	  advantage	  of	  UAVs	  to	  achieve	  the	  broader	  aims	  of	  airpower.	  But	  the	  perception	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  main	  contribution	  to	  warfighting	  has	  been	  limited	  to	  the	  technical	  skills	  and	  bravery	  of	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  has	  persisted,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  recent	  scholarship	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  USAF	  identity	  and	  UAV	  innovation.	  	  Several	  scholars	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  proliferation	  of	  UAVs	  has	  only	  deepened	  the	  USAF’s	  identity	  crisis.	  The	  USAF’s	  core	  cultural	  assumptions	  about	  manned	  flight	  have	  led	  to	  “an	  awkwardness,	  even	  unwillingness”	  to	  integrate	  UAVs,	  as	  retired	  Brig.	  Gen.	  Paula	  Thornhill	  explains	  in	  a	  2012	  RAND	  study	  on	  USAF	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Olsen	  (2007)	  133-­‐134	  37	  Builder	  (1994)	  6-­‐7	  38	  Worden	  (March	  1998)	  238;	  Other	  fighter	  pilot	  culture	  studies	  include	  Sherwood	  (1996)	  and	  Anderegg	  (2001)	  39	  Rice	  (June	  1990)	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culture.40	  A	  2009	  Air	  Force	  Research	  Institute	  study	  commissioned	  by	  Gen.	  Norton	  Schwartz,	  then	  the	  USAF	  chief,	  similarly	  finds	  that	  UAVs	  constitute	  “a	  fundamental	  transformation,	  or	  paradigm	  change,	  in	  military	  aviation	  that…creates	  an	  identity	  crisis	  for	  the	  pilot-­‐centric	  Air	  Force.”41	  	  Sounding	  an	  optimistic	  note,	  Jeffrey	  Smith	  argues	  in	  his	  2014	  book	  that	  the	  cultural	  upheaval	  will	  ultimately	  lead	  the	  USAF	  to	  embrace	  a	  broader	  conception	  of	  airpower.	  42	  But	  several	  other	  scholars	  are	  pessimistic.	  Historian	  Martin	  Van	  Creveld	  predicts	  that	  the	  USAF	  will	  struggle	  to	  maintain	  a	  viable	  identity	  as	  pilot	  culture	  dies	  out	  with	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  manned	  aircraft.43	  Robert	  Farley	  similarly	  predicts	  that	  enthusiasm	  for	  an	  independent	  air	  force	  will	  wane	  as	  opportunities	  to	  fly	  manned	  aircraft	  wither	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  UAVs.44	  A	  cross-­‐cutting	  theme	  that	  emerges	  from	  all	  three	  of	  these	  perspectives	  on	  USAF	  culture	  and	  UAV	  innovation	  is	  that	  authors	  have	  not	  yet	  reached	  a	  consensus	  on	  the	  critical	  issues	  surrounding	  the	  relationship	  between	  USAF	  culture	  and	  the	  UAV	  innovation.	  	  They	  disagree	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  USAF	  has	  driven	  UAV	  innovation,	  whether	  or	  how	  culture	  has	  influenced	  USAF	  decision	  making,	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  USAF’s	  identity	  on	  its	  capacity	  to	  embrace	  new	  innovations.	  	  I	  aim	  to	  explore	  these	  questions	  by	  capitalizing	  on	  a	  unique	  opportunity	  that	  has	  emerged	  since	  the	  USAF	  received	  its	  last	  Predator	  in	  March	  2011.	  It	  is	  now	  possible	  to	  use	  the	  Predator	  program’s	  complete	  history	  as	  a	  laboratory	  to	  revisit	  these	  enduring	  questions	  regarding	  the	  relationship	  between	  USAF	  culture	  and	  UAV	  innovation.	  The	  passage	  of	  several	  years	  since	  2011	  allows	  for	  the	  collection	  of	  even	  more	  data	  about	  the	  evolution	  of	  USAF	  culture	  and	  the	  Predator.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Thornhill	  (2012)	  1;	  Also	  see	  Riley	  (Jan.	  2014)	  and	  Sweeney	  June	  2010)	  	  41	  Schultz	  (October	  2009)	  25	  	  42	  Smith	  (2014)	  	  43	  Van	  Creveld	  (2011)	  437-­‐441	  44	  Farley	  (2014)	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Importance	  of	  My	  Research	  	  
	  One	  of	  the	  main	  contributions	  of	  my	  research	  is	  that	  it	  reveals	  new	  insights	  about	  the	  Predator	  program.	  First,	  it	  breaks	  new	  ground	  by	  covering	  recent	  history.	  Whittle’s	  2014	  account	  only	  covers	  the	  Predator	  program	  until	  2002,	  and	  histories	  by	  Col.	  Cantwell,	  Rosenwasser,	  Frisbee	  and	  retired	  Col.	  Ehrhard	  do	  not	  extend	  to	  the	  present	  day.	  By	  covering	  the	  Predator	  program	  through	  2015,	  I	  was	  able	  to	  explore	  several	  Predator	  developments	  with	  significant	  implications	  for	  USAF	  culture,	  including	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  new	  UAV	  career	  field	  and	  the	  debate	  over	  UAV	  pilot	  medals.	  Second,	  my	  research	  sorts	  out	  disagreements	  in	  the	  existing	  literature,	  bringing	  to	  light	  new	  facts	  that	  clear	  up	  discrepancies	  in	  accounts	  of	  major	  milestones	  in	  Predator	  development,	  such	  as	  weaponization.	  While	  the	  USAF	  was	  indeed	  primarily	  responsible	  for	  weaponization,	  I	  found	  that	  the	  service	  as	  a	  whole	  was	  slow	  to	  appreciate	  its	  strategic	  potential.	  My	  research	  also	  reveals	  new	  information	  about	  the	  role	  of	  USAF	  culture	  in	  shaping	  the	  USAF’s	  decisionmaking	  about	  the	  Predator.	  For	  example,	  several	  accounts	  suggest	  that	  the	  USAF	  ignored	  or	  actively	  resisted	  participation	  in	  the	  Predator	  program	  until	  it	  faced	  a	  challenge	  from	  control	  by	  the	  US	  Navy	  and	  US	  Army.45	  However,	  these	  authors	  disagree	  about	  whether	  culture	  or	  other	  factors	  guided	  this	  decision.	  My	  research	  found	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  cultural	  preference	  for	  manned	  aircraft	  played	  a	  significant	  role	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  USAF	  chief	  at	  the	  time,	  General	  Merrill	  McPeak.	  	  	   In	  addition	  to	  revealing	  new	  information,	  my	  research	  also	  attempts	  to	  make	  a	  significant	  policy	  contribution.	  By	  using	  the	  relationship	  between	  USAF	  culture	  and	  the	  Predator	  program	  as	  a	  vehicle,	  I	  aim	  to	  uncover	  important	  information	  about	  the	  USAF’s	  capacity	  to	  pursue	  innovation.	  The	  Predator	  program	  is	  an	  ideal	  focus	  for	  such	  an	  analysis	  because	  it	  is	  the	  first	  UAV	  to	  demonstrate	  truly	  strategic	  potential	  based	  on	  its	  capacity	  to	  operate	  beyond	  line-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  ACC	  History	  Office	  (2006)	  5;	  Ehrhard	  (2000)	  540;	  Cantwell	  (2007)	  21-­‐22;	  Rosenwasser	  (2004)	  390-­‐392	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of-­‐sight.	  By	  incorporating	  the	  latest	  in	  GPS	  technology	  and	  satellite	  communications,	  the	  Predator	  program	  was	  able	  to	  show	  for	  the	  first	  time	  that	  a	  UAV	  pilot	  could	  effectively	  employ	  his	  aircraft	  while	  sitting	  thousands	  of	  miles	  away	  from	  the	  battle	  space..	  The	  USAF	  capitalized	  on	  the	  opportunity	  presented	  by	  beyond	  line-­‐of-­‐sight	  operations,	  developing	  a	  unique	  concept	  for	  Predator	  employment	  known	  as	  Remote	  Split	  Operations	  (RSO).	  Pilots	  in	  theatre	  would	  launch	  and	  recover	  the	  Predator	  in	  the	  line-­‐of-­‐sight,	  but	  then	  hand	  over	  control	  to	  pilots	  in	  ground	  control	  stations	  thousands	  of	  miles	  away	  who	  would	  then	  fly	  the	  aircraft	  remotely.	  	  As	  the	  first	  UAV	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  effective	  employment	  of	  RSO,	  the	  Predator	  has	  raised	  several	  important	  questions	  about	  the	  way	  the	  USAF	  reacts	  to	  the	  challenges	  and	  opportunities	  presented	  by	  new	  technology.	  To	  a	  degree	  unprecedented	  by	  previous	  unmanned	  systems,	  the	  Predator	  has	  thrown	  into	  sharp	  relief	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  physical	  and	  emotional	  disassociation	  of	  the	  warrior	  from	  the	  battlefield.46	  On	  one	  level,	  the	  separation	  of	  the	  pilot	  from	  the	  battlespace	  has	  involved	  technical	  and	  tactical	  changes	  that	  have	  led	  to	  significant	  but	  less-­‐than-­‐revolutionary	  reform	  of	  USAF	  roles,	  missions,	  and	  organizational	  structure.	  On	  a	  deeper	  level,	  however,	  the	  way	  that	  these	  changes	  have	  been	  perceived	  by	  the	  USAF	  as	  an	  institution	  may	  have	  broader	  implications	  for	  how	  the	  USAF	  sees	  itself	  and	  how	  those	  perceptions	  have	  shaped	  —	  and	  may	  continue	  to	  shape	  —	  the	  service’s	  willingness	  and	  capacity	  to	  adopt	  a	  variety	  of	  innovations	  in	  the	  future.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Terms	  and	  Definitions	  	  	  	  	  
	  My	  research	  uses	  a	  DoD	  definition	  of	  UAVs,	  which	  is	  summarized	  in	  a	  2012	  Congressional	  Research	  Service	  Study	  as	  follows:	  “Powered	  air	  vehicles	  that	  do	  not	  carry	  a	  human	  operator,	  use	  aerodynamic	  forces	  to	  provide	  vehicle	  lift,	  can	  fly	  autonomously	  or	  be	  piloted	  remotely,	  can	  be	  expendable	  or	  recoverable,	  and	  can	  carry	  a	  lethal	  or	  nonlethal	  payload.	  The	  definition	  excludes	  ballistic	  or	  semi-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  See,	  for	  example,	  Coker	  (2002)130	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ballistic	  vehicles,	  cruise	  missiles,	  and	  artillery	  projectiles.”47	  One	  weakness	  of	  this	  definition	  is	  that	  it	  only	  rules	  out	  cruise	  missiles	  and	  artillery	  projectiles	  by	  fiat,	  since	  they	  technically	  could	  qualify.	  However,	  the	  advantage	  of	  this	  definition	  is	  that	  it	  is	  narrow,	  unlike	  the	  DoD’s	  newest	  definition,	  amended	  in	  2015,	  which	  is	  so	  broad	  that	  it	  could	  take	  into	  account	  almost	  any	  airborne	  object	  without	  a	  human	  operator.48	  Over	  the	  years,	  a	  variety	  of	  terms	  have	  been	  used	  to	  describe	  UAVs,	  hinting	  at	  the	  sensitivities	  within	  the	  US	  military	  surrounding	  the	  relationship	  between	  human	  operators	  and	  aircraft	  with	  no	  pilot	  inside.	  A	  common	  early	  term	  for	  pilotless	  aircraft	  that	  emerged	  in	  the	  1930’s	  was	  “drone.”	  But	  that	  nomenclature	  was	  eventually	  replaced	  in	  the	  1970’s	  with	  “Remotely	  Piloted	  Vehicle”	  (RPV).	  49	  Chapter	  two	  of	  this	  thesis,	  which	  discusses	  the	  USAF’s	  historical	  approach	  to	  UAV	  innovation,	  uses	  “drone,”	  “RPV,”	  and	  “UAV”	  to	  reflect	  the	  usage	  of	  the	  words	  during	  the	  time	  period	  under	  study.	  	  Today	  “drone”	  has	  resurfaced	  as	  the	  most	  popular	  term	  in	  the	  media,	  although	  there	  has	  been	  some	  resistance	  from	  the	  DoD	  and	  the	  main	  UAV	  lobby	  group,	  the	  Association	  for	  Unmanned	  Vehicle	  Systems	  International	  (AUVSI),	  which	  insist	  that	  the	  term	  is	  misleading	  because	  it	  implies	  UAVs	  are	  entirely	  autonomous,	  when	  in	  fact	  there	  are	  many	  people	  involved	  in	  UAV	  flight	  operations.50	  The	  USAF	  became	  so	  concerned	  about	  a	  misperception	  of	  total	  UAV	  autonomy	  that	  in	  2010	  it	  broke	  with	  DoD’s	  preferred	  nomenclature,	  “UAV,”	  because	  it	  felt	  that	  any	  reference	  to	  “unmanned”	  aircraft	  created	  an	  impression	  that	  a	  pilot	  was	  not	  required	  to	  control	  the	  aircraft	  remotely.51	  The	  USAF	  now	  officially	  embraces	  the	  term	  “Remotely	  Piloted	  Aircraft”	  (RPA)	  to	  convey	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  technology	  is	  manpower	  intensive,	  with	  a	  typical	  MQ-­‐1	  mission	  requiring	  about	  168	  people,	  including	  information	  exploiters,	  maintainers,	  sensor	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  DoD	  definition	  as	  cited	  in	  Gertler	  (Jan.	  3,2012)	  1.	  	  48	  DoD	  (Nov.8,	  2010,	  as	  amended	  through	  Nov.	  15,	  2015)	  256	  49	  For	  a	  history	  of	  UAV	  names,	  see	  Newcome	  (2004)	  3	  50	  Whittle	  (August	  14,	  2013)	  51	  Tirpak	  	  (August	  2010)	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operators	  and	  pilots.52	  Since	  the	  terms	  “UAV”	  and	  “RPA”	  are	  both	  commonly	  used	  today,	  this	  thesis	  uses	  the	  terms	  interchangeably.	  	  	  Even	  the	  terms	  “UAV”	  and	  “RPA”	  do	  not	  capture	  the	  whole	  picture,	  however,	  since	  they	  refer	  only	  to	  individual	  air	  vehicles,	  when	  in	  fact	  the	  entire	  UAV	  “system”	  is	  much	  bigger	  and	  more	  complex.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Predator,	  it	  consists	  of	  four	  air	  vehicles,	  a	  ground	  control	  station,	  a	  Predator	  Primary	  Satellite	  Link	  (PPSL),	  spares,	  equipment	  and	  the	  people	  required	  to	  operate	  the	  system.53	  
“Unmanned	  aerial	  system”	  (UAS)	  and	  “uninhabited	  aerial	  vehicle”	  have	  largely	  replaced	  UAV	  and	  RPA	  in	  the	  international	  community.	  However	  this	  paper	  applies	  the	  term	  UAV	  for	  simplicity	  and	  also	  because	  unmanned	  technologies	  that	  predate	  the	  “UAS”	  term	  are	  frequently	  discussed.	  In	  terms	  of	  military	  designations,	  the	  USAF	  initially	  designated	  the	  Predator	  as	  the	  RQ-­‐1,	  reflecting	  its	  reconnaissance	  role.	  Once	  it	  was	  armed,	  it	  received	  a	  “multi-­‐mission”	  designation:	  MQ-­‐1.	  The	  Predator’s	  successor	  is	  known	  as	  the	  MQ-­‐9	  Reaper.	  The	  Army’s	  Predator	  variant	  was	  first	  known	  as	  the	  Warrior	  Extended	  Range/Multipurpose	  (ER/MP)	  and	  was	  later	  designated	  	  the	  MQ-­‐1C	  Gray	  Eagle.	  This	  research	  uses	  these	  military	  designators	  as	  they	  apply,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  generic	  terms	  “Predator,”	  “Reaper,”	  and	  “Gray	  Eagle.”	  	  One	  last	  point	  of	  clarification	  concerns	  the	  descriptions	  of	  those	  who	  fly	  manned	  aircraft	  versus	  those	  who	  fly	  UAVs.	  My	  research	  follows	  the	  lead	  of	  the	  USAF,	  which	  today	  refers	  to	  flyers	  of	  both	  manned	  and	  unmanned	  aircraft	  as	  pilots.	  	  	  	  
Scope	  and	  Methodology	  	  
	  In	  this	  research,	  the	  USAF’s	  Predator	  program	  serves	  as	  a	  test	  case	  for	  understanding	  how	  culture	  influences	  UAV	  innovation.	  My	  focus	  is	  the	  Predator	  program	  from	  its	  inception	  in	  1993	  to	  2015,	  although	  I	  also	  address	  the	  follow-­‐on	  Reaper	  program	  when	  it	  was	  employed	  alongside	  the	  Predator	  for	  the	  same	  types	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Air	  Force	  Scientific	  Advisory	  Board	  (April,	  2011)	  23	  53	  Air	  Force	  (Undated)	  “MQ-­‐1B	  Predator	  Fact	  Sheet	  “	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of	  missions.	  The	  four	  sub-­‐questions	  above	  provide	  direction	  for	  this	  inquiry	  into	  cultural	  influences	  within	  the	  USAF	  that	  facilitated	  or	  constrained	  Predator	  innovation.	  	  Although	  USAF	  culture	  is	  the	  core	  issue	  of	  my	  research,	  I	  do	  not	  attempt	  to	  assess	  every	  cultural	  attitude	  within	  the	  USAF.	  Instead,	  I	  limit	  my	  investigation	  to	  aspects	  of	  culture	  in	  the	  USAF	  officer	  community	  that	  influenced	  UAV	  innovation.	  In	  every	  military	  innovation	  theory	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  one,	  military	  officers	  play	  a	  major	  or	  even	  central	  role	  in	  determining	  innovation	  outcomes.	  Civilians	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  USAF	  can	  also	  influence	  innovation,	  so	  they	  are	  discussed	  as	  well,	  but	  it	  is	  the	  officer	  corps	  that	  runs	  the	  service	  and	  therefore	  inevitably	  plays	  a	  crucial	  role.	  Constraints	  on	  time	  and	  word	  length	  prevent	  expanding	  the	  investigation	  beyond	  officers	  and	  government	  civilians	  to	  include	  the	  cultural	  attitudes	  of	  several	  other	  important	  UAV	  user	  communities	  within	  the	  USAF,	  including	  enlisted	  Predator	  sensor	  operators,	  the	  Air	  National	  Guard	  (ANG)	  and	  Reserves,	  and	  Air	  Force	  Special	  Operations	  Command	  (AFSOC).	  	  While	  space	  does	  not	  permit	  it	  here,	  the	  role	  of	  sensor	  operators	  in	  Predator	  operations	  is	  particularly	  significant.54	  These	  operators	  play	  a	  critical	  role	  because	  they	  control	  the	  sensor	  ball,	  the	  laser	  designator,	  and	  the	  cameras	  on	  the	  Predator,	  and	  they	  also	  ensure	  communication	  with	  ground	  forces,	  commanders	  and	  intelligence	  specialists.	  Yet,	  ultimately,	  it	  is	  the	  UAV	  pilot	  who	  makes	  executive	  decisions,	  including	  the	  decision	  to	  fire	  a	  weapon.	  The	  pilot	  provides	  direction	  to	  the	  sensor	  operator	  as	  he	  finds	  and	  fixes	  the	  target,	  and	  the	  pilot	  ultimately	  acts	  as	  the	  “trigger	  puller.”55	  Until	  late	  2015,	  the	  USAF	  has	  insisted	  that	  all	  UAV	  pilots	  be	  officers	  owing	  to	  the	  responsibility	  involved	  in	  flying	  in	  complex	  airspace	  and	  potentially	  firing	  weapons.56	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Cullen	  (2011)	  53-­‐69	  	  55	  Wood	  (May	  15,	  2013)	  	  56	  GAO	  (April	  2014)19	  ;	  In	  Dec.	  2015	  the	  USAF	  announced	  enlisted	  personnel	  could	  fly	  the	  Global	  Hawk.	  See	  Hennigan	  (Dec.	  17,	  2015)	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One	  limitation	  of	  much	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  culture	  and	  military	  innovation	  to	  date	  is	  its	  heavy	  reliance	  on	  historical	  documents.57	  Of	  course,	  a	  benefit	  of	  historical	  research	  is	  that	  the	  passage	  of	  time	  gives	  the	  author	  clarity	  and	  distance	  from	  the	  subject.	  But	  a	  frequent	  challenge	  lies	  in	  finding	  a	  way	  to	  accurately	  assess	  the	  impact	  of	  social	  factors	  on	  military	  change	  when	  important	  figures	  have	  passed	  away,	  primary	  source	  documents	  may	  be	  hard	  to	  find,	  and/or	  the	  available	  primary	  and	  secondary	  sources	  of	  data	  are	  infused	  with	  the	  sometimes	  hard-­‐to-­‐decipher	  biases	  of	  their	  authors.	  	  	  My	  research	  topic	  is	  less	  bound	  to	  the	  limitations	  of	  historical	  documents	  because	  it	  focuses	  on	  the	  history	  of	  a	  program	  that	  is	  recent	  enough	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  use	  of	  first-­‐person	  interviews.	  My	  research	  draws	  on	  over	  60	  interviews	  with	  individuals	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  USAF,	  including	  every	  chief	  of	  staff	  between	  1993	  and	  2015,	  as	  well	  as	  Neal	  Blue,	  the	  CEO	  of	  Predator	  manufacturer	  General	  Atomics	  Aeronautical	  Systems	  (GA-­‐ASI)	  Inc.	  These	  interviews	  gave	  me	  the	  opportunity	  to	  ask	  key	  figures	  about	  their	  thoughts	  on	  the	  role	  of	  culture	  in	  shaping	  Predator	  developments.	  	  	  	   The	  principle	  drawback	  of	  doing	  interviews	  is	  that	  individuals	  are	  not	  necessarily	  always	  candid	  or	  honest	  about	  the	  role	  of	  organizational	  culture	  in	  decision-­‐making.	  As	  Builder	  notes	  in	  his	  book	  The	  Masks	  of	  War,	  military	  personnel	  and	  institutions	  may	  not	  admit	  the	  understandable,	  and	  not	  necessarily	  negative,	  tendency	  for	  cultural	  preferences	  rooted	  in	  self-­‐interest	  to	  shape	  their	  decision-­‐making	  about	  national	  security.58	  This	  potential	  bias	  among	  interviewees	  imposes	  two	  limitations	  on	  my	  methodology.	  First,	  because	  interviewees	  now	  have	  the	  benefit	  of	  hindsight,	  knowing	  that	  the	  Predator	  program	  has	  enjoyed	  substantial	  success,	  they	  may	  portray	  themselves	  playing	  a	  bigger	  role	  in	  facilitating	  the	  Predator	  program	  than	  was	  actually	  the	  case.	  Second,	  interviewees	  concerned	  about	  preserving	  their	  status	  within	  the	  USAF	  may	  express	  politically	  correct	  sentiments	  regarding	  UAVs	  rather	  than	  their	  honest,	  personal	  opinions.	  When	  Ehrhard	  published	  his	  thesis	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990’s,	  for	  example,	  the	  USAF	  leadership’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57For	  example,	  Kier	  (1997);	  Legro	  (1995);	  Nagl	  (2002)	  	  	  	  	  58	  Builder	  (1994)	  11.	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strong	  support	  for	  UAVs	  may	  have	  led	  his	  interviewees	  to	  speak	  positively	  about	  UAVs,	  even	  if	  they	  held	  different	  personal	  opinions.	  Conversely,	  there	  were	  major	  morale	  problems	  in	  the	  USAF’s	  UAV	  community	  during	  the	  time	  period	  of	  my	  study,	  which	  may	  have	  led	  	  my	  interviewees	  to	  feel	  pressure	  to	  criticize	  the	  USAF’s	  approach	  to	  Predator	  innovation	  rather	  than	  focus	  on	  the	  bright	  spots.	  	   	  To	  minimize	  the	  potential	  for	  such	  biases,	  I	  conducted	  interviews	  with	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  people	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  highlight	  true	  patterns	  in	  perception	  so	  that	  I	  could	  accurately	  gauge	  how	  USAF	  culture	  influenced	  the	  Predator	  program.	  In	  particular,	  it	  was	  important	  to	  triangulate	  interviews	  with	  uniformed	  and	  civilian	  USAF	  officials	  with	  interviews	  of	  individuals	  outside	  the	  USAF	  who	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  speak	  candidly	  about	  their	  perceptions	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  institutional	  interests.	  	  Further	  triangulation	  with	  official	  histories	  and	  other	  primary	  and	  secondary	  historical	  sources	  also	  helped	  to	  guard	  against	  critiques	  of	  validity,	  and	  to	  ensure	  that	  much	  of	  the	  data	  in	  this	  thesis	  can	  be	  gathered	  and	  reviewed	  by	  future	  authors.	  Historical	  evidence	  about	  the	  role	  of	  USAF	  culture	  in	  UAV	  innovation	  can	  be	  found	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  primary	  sources	  ranging	  from	  official	  histories	  to	  congressional	  testimony	  and	  email	  correspondence.	  In	  particular,	  I	  successfully	  requested	  the	  declassification	  of	  ACC’s	  official	  history	  of	  the	  Predator	  program	  through	  the	  FOIA	  process.59	  I	  also	  obtained	  a	  special	  report	  written	  for	  Gen.	  Schwartz,	  the	  USAF	  chief	  from	  2008	  to	  2012,	  regarding	  the	  cultural	  impact	  of	  UAVs	  on	  the	  USAF.60	  Finally,	  I	  obtained	  a	  variety	  of	  memos	  and	  emails	  about	  Predator	  history	  through	  the	  Air	  Force	  Historical	  Studies	  Office	  at	  Bolling	  AFB	  in	  Washington	  DC.	  In	  terms	  of	  secondary	  sources,	  I	  drew	  on	  the	  USAF’s	  professional	  journals,	  the	  graduate	  papers	  of	  USAF	  students,	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  works	  mentioned	  in	  the	  literature	  review	  and	  chapter	  one.	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  ACC	  History	  Office	  (August	  2006)	  60	  Schultz	  (October	  2009)	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Structure	  	  
	  Chapter	  one	  discusses	  the	  theoretical	  literature	  on	  the	  subjects	  of	  culture	  and	  military	  innovation.	  It	  explains	  why	  I	  chose	  to	  take	  a	  holistic	  view	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  culture	  and	  why	  I	  chose	  the	  four	  sub-­‐questions	  that	  are	  asked	  across	  chapters	  two	  through	  seven	  to	  answer	  my	  research	  question.	  	  Chapter	  two	  paints	  a	  portrait	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  USAF	  culture	  and	  unmanned	  systems	  from	  1917,	  when	  the	  US	  military	  purchased	  its	  first	  UAV,	  the	  Kettering	  Bug,	  until	  1993,	  when	  the	  Predator	  program	  began.	  This	  historical	  portrait	  is	  used	  as	  a	  baseline	  to	  assess	  whether	  USAF	  culture	  changed	  over	  time	  as	  it	  shaped	  	  —	  and	  was	  shaped	  by	  —	  developments	  in	  the	  Predator	  program.	  Chapters	  three	  through	  seven	  explore	  the	  substantive	  history	  of	  the	  Predator	  program.	  Each	  of	  these	  chapters	  is	  divided	  into	  two	  parts.	  The	  first	  part	  presents	  a	  brief	  narrative	  history,	  while	  the	  second	  part	  provides	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  mutually	  shaping	  relationship	  between	  USAF	  culture	  and	  that	  history.	  Chapter	  three	  explores	  the	  reasons	  behind	  the	  USAF’s	  initial	  reluctance	  to	  take	  control	  of	  the	  Predator	  program	  from	  the	  DoD	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Chapter	  four	  discusses	  the	  transition	  of	  the	  Predator	  program	  to	  the	  USAF,	  exploring	  the	  service’s	  initial	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  program	  and	  changes	  that	  had	  to	  be	  made	  to	  accommodate	  Predator	  operations	  in	  Bosnia.	  	  Chapter	  five	  examines	  the	  role	  of	  USAF	  culture	  in	  three	  major	  innovations	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  the	  Sept.	  11	  attacks:	  the	  installation	  of	  a	  laser	  designator;	  the	  arming	  of	  the	  Predator	  with	  Hellfire	  missiles;	  and,	  the	  introduction	  of	  RSO.	  	  Chapter	  six	  explores	  how	  USAF	  culture	  in	  the	  early	  post-­‐911	  period	  influenced	  two	  more	  innovations:	  a	  device	  for	  viewing	  Predator	  imagery,	  the	  ROVER	  system,	  and	  a	  follow-­‐on	  aircraft,	  the	  MQ-­‐9	  Reaper.	  It	  also	  explores	  the	  relationship	  between	  USAF	  culture	  and	  the	  service’s	  wartime	  Predator	  policies.	  Chapter	  seven	  addresses	  recent	  Predator	  developments	  as	  the	  US	  shifts	  its	  strategic	  focus	  beyond	  Afghanistan	  —	  most	  notably,	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  UAV	  career	  field.	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The	  concluding	  chapter	  summarizes	  the	  study’s	  findings	  and	  discusses	  its	  broader	  implications	  for	  the	  USAF’s	  capacity	  to	  pursue	  UAV	  innovations	  in	  the	  future.	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CHAPTER	  ONE:	  
	  The	  Role	  of	  Culture	  in	  Military	  Innovation	  
	  
In	  1945,	  historian	  J.F.C.	  Fuller	  predicted	  that	  the	  inexorable	  progress	  of	  technology,	  regardless	  of	  human	  intervention	  on	  cultural	  or	  moral	  grounds,	  would	  ultimately	  lead	  to	  the	  removal	  of	  humans	  from	  the	  battlespace.	  “With	  the	  discovery	  of	  gunpowder…we	  pass	  into	  the	  technological	  epoch	  of	  war,	  the	  hidden	  impulse	  of	  which	  is	  the	  elimination	  of	  the	  human	  element	  both	  physically	  and	  morally,	  intellect	  alone	  remaining.”61	  Today,	  public	  discussions	  about	  UAV	  innovation	  are	  frequently	  framed	  in	  the	  same	  logic	  of	  technological	  determinism,	  which	  sees	  technological	  developments	  as	  the	  most	  powerful	  determinants	  of	  the	  course	  of	  human	  events,	  regardless	  of	  social,	  political	  or	  cultural	  factors.62	  In	  2014,	  for	  example,	  Richard	  Whittle	  released	  a	  popular	  history	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  Predator	  program	  concluding	  that	  the	  weaponized	  UAV	  has	  spurred	  a	  	  “drone	  revolution.”63	  Now	  ubiquitous	  on	  the	  battlefield	  and	  increasingly	  present	  in	  civilian	  life,	  he	  concluded	  UAV	  technology	  is	  “here	  to	  stay”	  and	  the	  only	  question	  is	  “how	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  implications.”64	  Peter	  Singer,	  a	  Brookings	  Institution	  scholar,	  has	  invoked	  Moore’s	  Law	  —	  which	  states	  that	  the	  amount	  of	  computing	  power	  on	  a	  microchip	  doubles	  every	  two	  years	  —	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  US	  soon	  will	  have	  “tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  tomorrow’s	  robots”	  with	  “amazing	  capabilities	  that	  seem	  like	  they	  are	  straight	  from	  science	  fiction.”65	  And	  in	  2011,	  the	  UK	  Ministry	  of	  Defense	  warned	  “there	  is	  a	  danger	  time	  is	  running	  out	  –	  is	  debate	  and	  development	  of	  policy	  even	  still	  possible,	  or	  is	  the	  technological	  genie	  out	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Fuller	  (1945)	  	  62	  For	  more	  on	  technological	  determinism,	  see	  Marx	  and	  Smith	  (1994)	  ix-­‐xv	  63	  Whittle	  (2015)	  299	  64	  Whittle	  (2015)	  305	  	  65	  Singer	  (March	  8,	  2013)	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ethical	  bottle,	  embarking	  us	  all	  on	  an	  incremental	  and	  involuntary	  journey	  towards	  a	  Terminator-­‐like	  reality?”66	  In	  the	  academic	  literature,	  however,	  the	  view	  of	  technological	  progression	  beyond	  human	  control	  has	  been	  widely	  rejected.67	  Technological	  breakthroughs	  alone	  do	  not	  guarantee	  an	  innovation	  will	  take	  hold,	  as	  Dima	  Adamsky	  observes	  in	  
The	  Culture	  of	  Military	  Innovation.68	  	  The	  consensus	  of	  Adamsky	  and	  other	  military	  innovation	  researchers	  is	  that	  technological	  change	  generates	  opportunities	  for	  innovation,	  but	  the	  main	  determinants	  of	  military	  change	  —	  from	  relatively	  small	  adaptations	  to	  revolutions	  	  —	  are	  political,	  cultural	  and	  social.69	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  fault	  skeptics	  of	  UAV	  technology	  for	  trying	  to	  raise	  a	  broader	  debate	  about	  the	  surrounding	  moral	  and	  legal	  dilemmas.	  But	  to	  suggest	  that	  UAV	  technology	  has	  embarked	  on	  an	  inevitable	  ascent	  is	  to	  overlook	  the	  powerful	  role	  that	  social	  forces,	  particularly	  within	  the	  USAF,	  already	  play	  in	  shaping	  UAV	  development.	  	  	  	  My	  research	  question	  (how	  has	  USAF	  culture	  shaped	  —	  and	  been	  shaped	  by	  —	  	  innovation	  in	  the	  MQ-­‐1	  Predator	  Program?)	  assumes	  that	  social	  forces	  within	  the	  USAF	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  shaping	  UAV	  innovation.	  As	  such,	  the	  question	  rejects	  the	  deterministic	  view	  that	  technological	  innovation	  is	  inevitable,	  acting	  as	  a	  completely	  external	  source	  of	  pressure	  on	  a	  military	  organization	  to	  change.	  Instead,	  my	  question	  takes	  the	  position	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  USAF	  and	  UAV	  innovation	  is	  mutually	  constitutive.70	  Social	  forces	  within	  the	  USAF	  have	  shaped	  the	  Predator	  program,	  which	  in	  turn	  has	  shaped	  the	  USAF	  as	  a	  social	  institution.	  	  	  From	  a	  theoretical	  perspective,	  the	  design	  of	  this	  research	  question	  raises	  two	  complicated	  issues,	  starting	  with	  how	  to	  define	  “social	  forces,”	  which	  I	  refer	  to	  in	  the	  question	  as	  	  “culture.”	  It	  also	  raises	  the	  thorny	  issue	  of	  how	  to	  evaluate	  the	  role	  of	  culture	  in	  military	  innovation.	  The	  latter	  problem	  is	  particularly	  complex	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  UK	  Ministry	  of	  Defense	  (2011)	  5-­‐12	  67	  MacKenzie	  and	  Wacjman,(1999)	  68	  Adamsky	  (2010)	  1	  	  69	  Adamsky	  (2010)	  1-­‐2;	  Rosen	  (1991)128;	  Farrell	  (December	  2013)	  111-­‐113;	  Grissom	  (April	  2015);	  Boot	  (2006)	  9-­‐11;	  White	  (1966)	  28	  70	  This	  view	  is	  derived	  from	  the	  social	  shaping	  of	  technology	  literature,	  discussed	  in	  Section	  3.	  Also	  see	  Mackenzie	  and	  Wajcman	  (1999)	  23	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given	  the	  phrasing	  of	  the	  question,	  which	  assumes	  that	  culture	  pervades	  both	  the	  USAF	  and	  the	  Predator	  program.	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  is	  difficult,	  if	  not	  impossible,	  to	  isolate	  culture	  as	  an	  independent	  variable	  for	  analysis.71	  Fortunately,	  scholars	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  international	  relations	  (IR)	  and	  military	  innovation	  have	  made	  significant	  progress	  toward	  sorting	  out	  these	  theoretical	  challenges.	  	  This	  chapter	  explores	  how	  these	  scholars	  have	  defined	  and	  evaluated	  the	  role	  of	  culture	  in	  military	  innovation	  and	  how	  their	  work	  applies	  to	  my	  study.	  IR	  and	  military	  innovation	  theorists	  have	  examined	  how	  culture	  impacts	  actor	  behavior	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  analysis,	  including	  the	  international	  or	  “system”	  level,	  the	  state	  level,	  the	  organizational	  level,	  and	  the	  individual	  level.	  I	  discuss	  how	  cultural	  influence	  cuts	  across	  these	  different	  levels,	  but	  my	  main	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  organizational	  level,	  because	  military	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  USAF	  are	  critical	  drivers	  of	  military	  innovation,	  as	  I	  discuss	  further	  below.	  	  The	  chapter	  is	  divided	  into	  four	  sections.	  The	  first	  section	  frames	  the	  debate	  about	  culture	  among	  IR	  theorists.	  This	  debate	  has,	  in	  turn,	  influenced	  the	  major	  theoretical	  models	  of	  military	  innovation	  studies,	  which	  are	  discussed	  in	  section	  two.	  Section	  three	  draws	  on	  the	  cultural	  models	  developed	  in	  IR	  and	  military	  innovation	  theory	  to	  explain	  how	  I	  plan	  to	  define	  and	  evaluate	  the	  role	  of	  culture	  in	  the	  USAF’s	  Predator	  program.	  It	  also	  provides	  a	  justification	  for	  my	  four	  sub-­‐questions	  about	  USAF	  culture	  that,	  when	  taken	  together,	  aim	  to	  answer	  my	  broader	  research	  question	  about	  the	  mutually	  shaping	  relationship	  between	  USAF	  culture	  and	  the	  Predator	  program.	  Finally,	  the	  chapter	  closes	  with	  a	  brief	  summary	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  theoretical	  background	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  thesis.	  	  	  	  	  
1.	  Culture	  in	  International	  Relations	  Theory	  	  
	  The	  two	  most	  established	  IR	  theories,	  neo-­‐realism	  and	  neo-­‐liberalism,	  ignore	  the	  role	  of	  culture	  as	  a	  determinant	  of	  behavior	  in	  world	  politics.72	  Both	  theories	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  This	  problem	  is	  discussed	  in	  Farrell	  (2005)	  70	  72	  Legro,	  (1995)	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contend	  that	  the	  behavior	  and	  preferences	  of	  rational,	  self-­‐interested	  states	  can	  be	  deduced	  from	  material	  structural	  constraints	  imposed	  by	  the	  anarchic	  international	  system.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  anarchy,	  these	  theories	  predict	  that	  states	  will	  seek	  to	  maximize	  material	  power,	  security	  or	  wealth	  to	  ensure	  their	  survival.	  While	  there	  are	  debates	  within	  and	  between	  the	  schools	  about	  whether	  power,	  security	  or	  wealth	  matter	  most,	  the	  emphasis	  in	  both	  theories	  is	  on	  the	  role	  of	  material	  interests	  in	  shaping	  preferences	  and	  behavior.	  73	  As	  IR	  theory	  evolved	  in	  the	  mid	  1990s	  and	  early	  2000s,	  however,	  scholars	  increasingly	  recognized	  that	  the	  behavior	  of	  actors	  cannot	  always	  be	  deduced	  from	  the	  distribution	  of	  material	  capabilities	  in	  the	  international	  system.	  Today	  it	  is	  widely	  accepted	  that	  ideational	  interests	  –	  rather	  than	  strictly	  material	  ones	  –	  may	  shape	  states’	  preferences	  and	  behavior.74	  In	  this	  view,	  international	  politics	  is	  not	  a	  pure	  case	  of	  environmentally	  constrained	  competition	  for	  material	  resources.	  Social	  factors,	  including	  norms,	  identity	  and	  culture,	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  determining	  how	  states	  behave.	  75	  	  	  The	  turn	  toward	  social	  factors	  in	  IR	  theory	  has	  been	  described	  as	  both	  “constructivism”	  and	  “culturalism.”76	  Constructivists	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  international	  level	  of	  analysis,	  while	  cultural	  theorists	  focus	  on	  the	  organizational	  level.	  But	  Theo	  Farrell,	  a	  UK	  constructivist,	  argues	  that	  the	  two	  camps	  have	  enough	  in	  common	  to	  be	  grouped	  together	  under	  a	  single	  research	  program,	  which	  he	  broadly	  refers	  to	  as	  “constructivism.”	  77	  The	  common	  bond	  among	  constructivists	  is	  that	  they	  critique	  neo-­‐realism	  and	  neo-­‐liberalism	  for	  failing	  to	  recognize	  that	  the	  structural	  environment	  is	  social	  as	  well	  as	  material.	  More	  specifically,	  material	  structures	  are	  given	  meaning	  only	  by	  the	  social	  context	  through	  which	  they	  are	  interpreted.78	  In	  practice,	  this	  view	  explains	  why	  the	  US	  would	  see	  North	  Korea’s	  possession	  of	  five	  nuclear	  weapons	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  For	  a	  comparison	  of	  neo-­‐realism	  and	  neo-­‐liberalism,	  see	  Baldwin	  	  (1993)	  3-­‐24.	  	  74	  Hurd	  (Aug	  2008)	  301-­‐302;	  Desch	  (1998)	  144	  75	  Katzenstein	  (1996)	  5.	  	  76	  Farrell	  (Spring	  2002)	  49	  77	  Farrell	  (Spring	  2002)	  51	  78	  Checkel	  (1998)	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as	  far	  more	  threatening	  than	  the	  UK’s	  possession	  of	  500.79	  Because	  they	  see	  the	  international	  environment	  as	  inherently	  social,	  constructivists	  also	  assume	  that	  the	  social	  structure	  of	  the	  environment	  provides	  actors	  with	  understandings	  of	  their	  identity	  (the	  structure	  “constitutes”	  their	  identity.)	  In	  turn,	  actor	  identities	  imply	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  preferences	  that	  shape	  actors’	  behavior	  in	  the	  social	  environment.80	  	  	  	  Constructivists	  have	  turned	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  	  “norms’”	  to	  explain	  the	  impact	  of	  social	  factors	  on	  international	  relations.81	  There	  is	  an	  emerging	  consensus	  among	  constructivists	  regarding	  the	  definition	  of	  norms	  as	  “collective	  expectations	  about	  proper	  behavior	  given	  an	  identity.”82	  Constructivists	  look	  at	  norms	  differently	  than	  the	  older	  schools	  of	  IR	  theory,	  which	  are	  rooted	  in	  a	  rationalist	  perspective.	  83	  From	  a	  rationalist	  view,	  norms	  simply	  perform	  a	  “regulatory”	  function,	  providing	  rules	  that	  help	  actors	  with	  given	  material	  interests	  maximize	  their	  utility.84	  In	  contrast,	  constructivists	  see	  norms	  as	  going	  “all	  the	  way	  down”	  to	  constitute	  actors,	  providing	  them	  with	  fundamental	  understandings	  of	  their	  identity	  and	  interests.	  85	  Constructivists	  consider	  both	  regulatory	  and	  constitutive	  norms.	  Together,	  “these	  norms	  establish	  expectations	  about	  who	  the	  actors	  will	  be	  in	  a	  particular	  environment	  and	  about	  how	  these	  particular	  actors	  will	  behave.”86	  Moving	  forward,	  I	  refer	  to	  scholars	  generally	  interested	  in	  the	  role	  of	  norms	  as	  constructivists,	  and	  I	  use	  the	  term	  “culture”	  to	  generically	  refer	  to	  norms,	  identity	  or	  any	  social	  forces	  that	  are	  rooted	  in	  ideas	  rather	  than	  material	  interests.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  Wendt	  (Summer	  1995)	  73	  80	  Farrell	  (Spring	  2002)	  49-­‐50	  81	  Farrell	  	  (Spring	  2002)	  49	  82	  Checkel	  (1998)	  	  83	  Checkel	  (1998)	  	  84	  Farrell	  (2005)	  8;	  Checkel	  (1998)	  	  85	  Wendt	  (1999)	  92-­‐138;	  Farrell	  (2005)	  8;	  Checkel	  (1998)	  	  86	  Jepperson,	  Wendt	  and	  Katzenstein	  (1996)	  54	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Methodology	  Problems:	  The	  Debate	  Over	  the	  Degree	  of	  Cultural	  Influence	  on	  
Actor	  Behavior	  
	  Today,	  most	  proponents	  of	  major	  IR	  theories	  have	  come	  to	  agree	  with	  constructivists	  that	  neorealism	  and	  neoliberalism	  cannot	  explain	  everything.	  To	  varying	  degrees,	  scholars	  seem	  to	  recognize	  that	  a	  cultural	  perspective	  may	  help	  to	  at	  least	  supplement	  these	  older,	  well-­‐established	  structural	  theories	  of	  state	  behavior.	  87	  However,	  neo-­‐realists	  including	  Michael	  Desch	  and	  John	  Mearsheimer	  remain	  skeptical	  of	  constructivists	  for	  failing	  to	  agree	  on	  a	  way	  to	  evaluate	  the	  role	  of	  culture	  in	  shaping	  state	  behavior.88	  	  	  While	  constructivists	  seem	  to	  have	  reached	  a	  consensus	  on	  the	  substance	  of	  cultural	  influence	  –	  norms,	  which	  operate	  at	  the	  various	  levels	  of	  analysis	  to	  constitute	  both	  actor	  identity	  and	  structure	  –	  they	  take	  a	  variety	  of	  stances	  on	  methodology.89	  Differences	  over	  methodology	  may	  seem	  abstract,	  but	  they	  matter	  a	  great	  deal	  to	  scholars	  who	  want	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  role	  of	  culture	  in	  the	  real	  world.	  Students	  of	  culture,	  including	  myself,	  have	  to	  take	  a	  position	  on	  methodology,	  which	  impacts	  how	  culture	  is	  defined,	  the	  kinds	  of	  questions	  we	  ask	  about	  it,	  and	  the	  kinds	  of	  answers	  we	  produce.	  	  	  
Conventional	  Vs.	  Critical	  Constructivism	  	  	  There	  are	  two	  main	  types	  of	  constructivists	  –	  conventional	  and	  critical90	  –	  who	  take	  different	  approaches	  to	  the	  question	  of	  methodology.	  The	  fundamental	  difference	  between	  them	  centers	  on	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  they	  accept	  positivism,	  a	  view	  of	  how	  to	  create	  knowledge	  that	  rests	  on	  four	  principles.	  First,	  positivists	  believe	  that	  the	  methodologies	  used	  in	  the	  natural	  sciences	  can	  be	  used	  in	  the	  social	  sciences.	  Second,	  there	  is	  an	  objective	  reality	  that	  is	  neutral	  between	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  Desch	  (1998)	  144	  88	  Desch	  (1998)145-­‐155;	  	  Mearsheimer	  (1994/1995)	  37-­‐41	  (Mearsheimer	  refers	  to	  constructivists	  as	  critical	  theorists)	  89	  Jepperson,	  Wendt,	  and	  Katzenstein	  (	  1996)	  65-­‐68	  90	  Hopf	  (1998)	  181	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theories.	  Third,	  the	  social	  world	  has	  regularities	  that	  can	  be	  “discovered”	  by	  theories	  to	  make	  predictions	  about	  the	  future.91	  And	  lastly,	  that	  the	  way	  to	  determine	  whether	  theories	  are	  true	  is	  to	  appeal	  to	  the	  objective	  facts,	  adopting	  what	  is	  known	  as	  an	  “empiricist”	  epistemology.92	  Conventional	  constructivists	  are	  willing	  to	  embrace	  a	  positivist	  methodology	  as	  a	  means	  to	  engaging	  mainstream	  IR	  theorists.	  By	  talking	  to	  these	  theorists	  on	  their	  own	  methodological	  terms,	  conventional	  constructivists	  hope	  to	  show	  that	  cultural	  theories	  may	  explain	  behavior	  better	  than	  the	  material	  structural	  theories	  that	  mainstream	  IR	  theorists	  typically	  embrace,	  such	  as	  neo-­‐liberalism	  and	  neo-­‐realism.	  To	  make	  the	  argument	  that	  cultural	  factors	  may	  at	  least	  sometimes	  better	  explain	  actor	  behavior	  than	  material	  factors,	  conventional	  constructivists	  often	  choose	  puzzling	  cases.93	  These	  are	  cases	  in	  which	  rational	  behavior	  does	  not	  explain	  why	  a	  state	  pursued	  a	  particular	  action,	  so	  cultural	  preferences	  become	  an	  obvious	  alternative	  explanation.	  In	  contrast	  to	  conventional	  constructivists,	  critical	  constructivists	  feel	  less	  obligated	  to	  engage	  mainstream	  IR	  theory	  to	  prove	  culture	  matters.	  They	  are	  skeptical	  of	  positivism,	  preferring	  instead	  to	  focus	  on	  interpretivist	  approaches.	  In	  fact,	  many	  critical	  theorists	  take	  the	  post-­‐positivist	  view	  that	  the	  world	  is	  totally	  open	  to	  interpretation,	  so	  they	  are	  highly	  skeptical	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  humans	  can	  attain	  objective	  knowledge	  that	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  baseline	  for	  pitting	  cultural	  theories	  against	  mainstream	  IR	  theories.94	  Since	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  verify	  that	  any	  particular	  theory	  accurately	  explains	  how	  the	  world	  works,	  critical	  constructivists	  question	  why	  rationalist	  theories	  of	  neo-­‐liberalism	  and	  neo-­‐realism	  should	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  Constructivists	  engaged	  in	  causal	  theorizing	  do	  not	  adhere	  to	  the	  3rd	  principle	  of	  positivism.	  Constructivism	  does	  not	  make	  predictions	  about	  future	  behavior	  because	  it	  is	  a	  social	  theory	  –	  similar	  to	  rational	  choice	  theory	  –	  that	  conceptualizes	  the	  relationship	  between	  agents	  and	  structures.	  It	  does	  not	  make	  specific	  claims	  about	  patterns	  in	  world	  politics.	  	  See	  Barnett	  (2014)157-­‐158	  92	  Smith	  (1997)	  168	  93	  Checkel	  (1998)	  328;	  Farrell	  (1998)	  409	  94	  Price	  and	  Reus	  Smit	  (1998)	  271-­‐272	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dominate	  IR	  theory.	  They	  see	  no	  reason	  why	  these	  theories	  should	  be	  held	  up	  as	  the	  main	  theories	  against	  which	  all	  others	  should	  be	  judged.95	  	  With	  that	  said,	  there	  are	  some	  critical	  constructivists	  who	  believe	  it	  is	  important	  to	  engage	  mainstream	  IR	  theories	  as	  part	  of	  the	  process	  of	  questioning	  their	  dominance.	  While	  these	  critical	  constructivists	  acknowledge	  the	  contingent	  nature	  of	  knowledge,	  they	  recognize	  that	  they	  need	  to	  establish	  some	  type	  of	  objective	  criteria	  “to	  distinguish	  plausible	  from	  implausible	  interpretations	  of	  social	  life.”96	  Without	  such	  criteria,	  they	  argue,	  critical	  constructivists	  are	  open	  to	  Mearsheimer’s	  charge	  that	  constructivists	  accept	  “endless	  interpretations	  of	  the	  world	  around	  them.”97	  To	  dodge	  this	  accusation,	  critical	  constructivists	  like	  Richard	  Price	  and	  Christian	  Reus-­‐Smit	  seek	  to	  engage	  mainstream	  IR	  theory	  by	  accepting	  that	  there	  is	  a	  “real	  world”	  —	  albeit	  a	  contingent	  one	  —	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  compare	  their	  interpretation	  of	  actor	  behavior	  to	  other	  theoretical	  accounts.	  98	  	  
Causal	  Versus	  Constitutive	  Theory	  	  
	  There	  is	  a	  cross-­‐cutting	  divide	  between	  conventional	  and	  critical	  constructivists	  regarding	  the	  type	  of	  theory	  they	  employ	  to	  understand	  the	  role	  of	  culture	  in	  IR	  theory.	  The	  first	  type	  of	  theory	  is	  causal	  theory,	  which	  involves	  directly	  pitting	  mainstream	  IR	  theories	  against	  cultural	  theories	  to	  explore	  their	  relative	  strength.	  	  Only	  conventional	  constructivists	  employ	  causal	  theory.	  	  	  The	  second	  type	  of	  theory	  is	  constitutive	  theory,	  which	  does	  not	  seek	  to	  directly	  challenge	  mainstream	  IR	  theory.	  Instead,	  it	  invokes	  description	  to	  show	  how	  culture	  may	  supplement	  or	  complement	  mainstream	  IR	  theory.99	  Both	  conventional	  constructivists	  and	  critical	  constructivists	  employ	  constitutive	  theory.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  Price	  and	  Reus	  Smit	  (1998)	  261	  96	  Price	  and	  Reus-­‐Smit	  (1998)262	  97	  Mearsheimer	  (1994/1995)	  41	  98	  Price	  and	  Reus	  Smit	  (1998)	  	  99	  Jepperson,	  Wendt	  and	  Katzenstein	  (1996)	  68-­‐72	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Causal	  Theory:	  Using	  a	  Narrow	  Definition	  of	  Culture	  	  
	  Causal	  theory	  requires	  thinking	  about	  culture	  in	  a	  relatively	  narrow	  way.	  Causal	  theorists	  accept	  the	  possibility	  that	  another	  theory	  —	  for	  example,	  a	  neo-­‐realist	  view	  that	  privileges	  material	  factors	  and	  ignores	  culture	  —	  might	  better	  explain	  an	  actor’s	  behavior.	  It	  may	  seem	  hypocritical	  for	  constructivists	  to	  employ	  causal	  theory	  since	  they	  profess	  to	  believe	  that	  norms	  always	  matter.	  In	  practice,	  however,	  many	  conventional	  constructivists	  feel	  compelled	  to	  pit	  cultural	  theories	  against	  culturally	  devoid	  mainstream	  IR	  theories,	  believing	  their	  case	  for	  cultural	  explanations	  will	  be	  stronger	  if	  they	  use	  IR	  theory’s	  own	  positivist	  methodology.	  	  	  	  The	  process	  of	  causal	  theory	  testing	  requires	  narrowing	  the	  scope	  of	  culture	  in	  three	  very	  specific	  ways.	  First,	  causal	  theorists	  must	  define	  culture	  independently	  of	  actor	  behavior	  to	  show	  whether	  culture	  or	  something	  else	  caused	  that	  behavior.	  Second,	  causal	  theorists	  must	  assume	  culture	  is	  relatively	  static	  to	  establish	  that	  it	  existed	  prior	  to	  the	  behavior	  they	  are	  trying	  to	  explain.	  Finally,	  cultural	  theorists	  interested	  in	  causal	  theory	  must	  be	  able	  to	  show	  that,	  absent	  culture,	  the	  behavior	  would	  not	  have	  occurred.100	  	  The	  main	  debate	  among	  constructivists	  engaged	  in	  causal	  theory	  testing	  is	  
how	  much	  independent	  causal	  power	  cultural	  theories	  have	  to	  explain	  state	  behavior.101	  Some	  constructivists	  argue	  that	  cultural	  explanations	  are	  paramount	  in	  explanations	  of	  strategic	  behavior,	  and	  material	  structural	  variables	  —	  like	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  or	  international	  institutions	  —	  are	  of	  “secondary	  importance.”102	  Others	  argue	  that	  sometimes	  material	  structural	  variables	  will	  be	  more	  important	  than	  cultural	  variables,	  but	  oftentimes	  cultural	  variables	  will	  matter	  more.103	  Two	  leading	  examples	  of	  conventional	  constructivist	  works	  that	  adopt	  causal	  theory	  testing	  to	  engage	  mainstream	  IR	  include	  Jeffrey	  Legro’s	  Cooperation	  Under	  Fire104	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  Wendt	  (Dec.	  1998)	  105	  101	  For	  more	  on	  this	  debate,	  see	  Jepperson,	  Wendt	  and	  Katzenstein	  (1996)	  37-­‐38	  and	  68-­‐69;	  Kowert	  and	  Legro	  (1996)	  496-­‐497;	  Katzenstein	  (1996)	  506-­‐508	  102	  Johnston	  (1995)	  1	  103	  Legro	  (1995)	  221	  104	  Legro	  (1995)	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and	  Elizabeth	  Kier’s	  Imagining	  War:	  French	  and	  British	  Military	  Doctrine	  Between	  
the	  Two	  Wars.105	  
	  
Constitutive	  Theory:	  A	  Broader	  Interpretation	  of	  Culture	  	  	  
	  Constitutive	  theory	  allows	  for	  a	  broader	  interpretation	  of	  culture.	  Rather	  than	  trying	  to	  establish	  the	  causal	  power	  of	  cultural	  explanations	  versus	  other	  types	  of	  explanations,	  constitutive	  theorists	  take	  for	  granted	  that	  culture	  matters.	  Instead	  of	  asking	  why	  X	  causes	  Y,	  constitutive	  theory	  asks	  how	  X	  causes	  Y.106	  In	  other	  words,	  constitutive	  theorists	  are	  less	  interested	  in	  the	  relative	  roles	  of	  culture	  versus	  other	  factors	  in	  shaping	  actor	  behavior	  and	  more	  interested	  in	  how	  culture	  —	  specifically,	  norms	  —	  operate	  at	  a	  deeper	  level	  to	  constitute	  actors	  and	  meaningful	  action.	  Constitutive	  theories	  look	  at	  how	  norms	  “function	  in	  both	  temporal	  and	  spatial	  settings	  to	  make	  some	  actions	  possible	  and	  other	  actions	  impossible.”	  107	  Constitutive	  theory	  does	  not	  see	  cultural	  preferences	  as	  separate	  from	  actor	  behavior	  or	  necessarily	  existing	  in	  time	  before	  actor	  behavior.	  Instead,	  constitutive	  theory	  tries	  to	  show	  how	  the	  properties	  of	  a	  system	  came	  to	  exist:	  how	  do	  norms	  constitute	  actors	  and	  their	  environment	  to	  make	  meaningful	  behavior	  possible?	  	  Constitutive	  theory	  is	  usually	  not	  associated	  with	  a	  positivist	  methodology,	  because	  it	  assumes	  norms	  are	  pervasive	  and	  therefore	  cannot	  be	  isolated	  as	  independent	  variables	  to	  test	  their	  causality	  relative	  to	  other	  material	  factors	  in	  the	  system.108	  Nevertheless,	  Wendt	  argues	  that	  one	  does	  not	  need	  to	  abandon	  positivism	  completely	  to	  embrace	  constitutive	  theory.	  In	  his	  view,	  a	  conventional	  constructivist	  can	  use	  constitutive	  theory,	  too,	  because	  it	  is	  always	  possible	  that	  alternative	  theories,	  including	  neo-­‐liberalism	  or	  neo-­‐realism,	  might	  also	  explain	  how	  a	  system	  is	  constituted.	  Wendt	  calls	  on	  constitutive	  theorists	  to	  pit	  their	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theories	  of	  how	  a	  system	  is	  constructed	  against	  other	  constitutive	  theories	  to	  determine	  which	  one	  most	  closely	  matches	  what	  is	  happening	  in	  “the	  real	  world.”	  109	  	   Wendt	  acknowledges	  the	  post-­‐positivist	  argument	  that	  such	  “real	  world”	  evidence	  will	  necessarily	  be	  mediated	  by	  the	  researcher’s	  own	  background	  understandings.	  But	  he	  counters	  that	  constitutive	  theories	  can	  and	  should	  be	  compared	  to	  see	  which	  one	  corresponds	  with	  reality,	  even	  if	  that	  reality	  is	  subject	  to	  the	  author’s	  biases.	  The	  alternative	  is	  that	  the	  reader	  is	  left	  to	  accept	  the	  findings	  of	  a	  constitutive	  theory	  with	  no	  indication	  of	  why	  he	  or	  she	  should	  privilege	  that	  account	  over	  any	  other.110	  	  	  
2.	  Culture	  in	  Military	  Innovation	  Theory	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  various	  ways	  of	  viewing	  culture	  in	  IR	  theory	  have	  significantly	  influenced	  military	  innovation	  research.	  Military	  innovation	  theories,	  which	  date	  back	  to	  the	  mid-­‐1980’s,	  initially	  were	  based	  on	  neo-­‐realism	  and	  organizational	  theory,	  taking	  into	  account	  only	  an	  implicit	  role	  for	  culture.	  However,	  just	  as	  IR	  theorists	  acknowledge	  that	  material	  balancing	  dynamics	  fail	  to	  fully	  explain	  state	  behavior,	  military	  innovation	  theorists	  are	  also	  starting	  to	  recognize	  that	  military	  change	  is	  not	  a	  purely	  rational	  phenomenon.111	  This	  section	  frames	  the	  military	  innovation	  research	  program	  and	  reviews	  four	  theoretical	  models	  of	  military	  innovation	  based	  on	  the	  framework	  used	  by	  Adam	  Grissom	  in	  his	  landmark	  2006	  article	  on	  military	  innovation	  studies.112	  	  Military	  innovation	  is	  a	  subfield	  of	  strategic	  studies,	  which	  explores	  the	  issues	  surrounding	  the	  use	  of	  force	  and	  draws	  heavily	  on	  IR	  theory.113	  Strategic	  studies	  researchers,	  who	  have	  long	  been	  interested	  in	  the	  question	  of	  why	  militaries	  innovate	  or	  stagnate,	  have	  reframed	  the	  question	  into	  a	  theoretical	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  (Dec.	  1998)	  106	  110	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  (Dec.	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  107;	  See	  also	  Price	  and	  Reus	  Smit	  (1998)	  	  111	  Grissom	  (Apr.	  2015)	  	  112	  Grissom.	  (2006)	  113	  Grissom	  (2006)	  905.	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inquiry	  into	  how	  and	  why	  military	  processes	  change	  over	  time.114	  The	  result	  has	  been	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  research	  program,	  military	  innovation	  studies,	  which	  puts	  military	  organizations	  at	  the	  center	  of	  analysis.	  	  The	  military	  organization	  is	  a	  logical	  focus	  for	  the	  study	  of	  military	  innovation,	  according	  to	  Farrell	  and	  Terry	  Terriff,	  because	  most	  military	  action	  occurs	  within	  organizational	  structures	  in	  the	  modern	  world.115	  As	  Legro	  explains,	  military	  organizations	  have	  high	  “organizational	  salience”	  —	  or	  influence	  on	  state	  decision-­‐making	  —	  particularly	  during	  wartime,	  because	  militaries	  have	  a	  monopoly	  on	  expertise	  and	  are	  in	  a	  unique	  position	  to	  quickly	  execute	  complex	  operations,	  especially	  in	  time-­‐sensitive	  wartime	  situations.116	  From	  a	  historical	  perspective,	  Williamson	  Murray	  and	  Barry	  Watts	  note	  that,	  in	  the	  past,	  military	  change	  has	  generally	  been	  realized	  when	  existing	  military	  organizations	  undertake	  change	  by	  choice	  or	  under	  pressure,	  sometimes	  even	  creating	  new	  organizations	  to	  handle	  the	  change.117	  Given	  its	  tendency	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  organizational	  level,	  military	  innovation	  theory	  draws	  heavily	  not	  only	  on	  IR	  theory	  but	  also	  on	  organizational	  theory.	  What	  is	  interesting	  about	  organizational	  theory	  is	  that	  it	  is	  based	  on	  the	  rational	  actor	  model,	  but	  it	  also	  acknowledges	  a	  role	  for	  culture	  in	  decision-­‐making.	  Graham	  Allison	  and	  Philip	  Zelikow,	  in	  their	  famous	  models	  of	  organizational	  theory,	  as	  well	  as	  Morton	  Halperin	  in	  his	  model	  of	  bureaucratic	  politics,	  account	  for	  behavior	  driven	  by	  both	  rational	  imperatives	  and	  cultural	  preferences.118	  Therefore,	  one	  thing	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  when	  examining	  “rational”	  models	  of	  military	  innovation	  is	  that,	  to	  the	  extent	  they	  draw	  on	  organizational	  theory,	  they	  often	  implicitly	  recognize	  a	  role	  for	  culture	  in	  military	  change.	  In	  the	  discussion	  of	  military	  innovation	  models	  that	  follows,	  I	  will	  flag	  instances	  in	  which	  military	  innovation	  theorists	  “smuggle”	  cultural	  explanations	  into	  their	  explicitly	  rational-­‐actor	  based	  models.	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Another	  unifying	  theme	  in	  military	  innovation	  studies	  is	  a	  growing	  consensus	  regarding	  three	  major	  characteristics	  of	  military	  change.119	  First,	  military	  innovation	  involves	  actual	  or	  attempted	  alterations	  to	  military	  behavior	  in	  an	  operational	  setting.	  Administrative	  change,	  involving	  acquisition	  or	  personnel	  reform,	  has	  not	  drawn	  the	  attention	  of	  scholars	  without	  a	  clear	  link	  to	  military	  operations.	  Second,	  the	  field	  tends	  to	  focus	  on	  major	  changes,	  rather	  than	  minor	  or	  ambiguous	  ones.	  Third,	  the	  field	  focuses	  on	  cases	  that	  result	  in	  greater	  military	  effectiveness.	  Building	  on	  these	  characteristics,	  Grissom	  developed	  a	  working	  definition	  of	  military	  innovation	  as	  “	  a	  change	  in	  the	  operational	  praxis	  that	  produces,	  or	  is	  intended	  to	  produce,	  a	  significant	  increase	  in	  military	  effectiveness.”120	  	  	  	  While	  military	  innovation	  theorists	  generally	  agree	  on	  the	  characteristics	  and	  scope	  of	  military	  change,	  they	  come	  to	  very	  different	  conclusions	  about	  what	  causes	  it.	  Grissom	  divided	  military	  innovation	  theories	  into	  four	  schools:	  civil-­‐military	  relations;	  inter-­‐service	  politics;	  intra-­‐service	  politics;	  and,	  culture.	  The	  schools	  are	  assessed	  below	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  central	  tenets,	  empirical	  examples,	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  consider	  culture	  in	  decision-­‐making.	  	  The	  first	  three	  schools	  –	  civil	  military,	  inter-­‐service	  rivalry,	  and	  intra-­‐service	  politics	  	  –	  describe	  causes	  of	  military	  innovation	  built	  primarily	  around	  a	  rational	  perspective	  that	  draws	  on	  neo-­‐realism	  and	  organizational	  theory.	  The	  fourth	  school,	  which	  describes	  the	  role	  of	  culture	  in	  military	  innovation,	  mirrors	  the	  constructivist	  perspective	  in	  IR	  theory.	  Obviously	  the	  cultural	  school	  considers	  the	  role	  of	  culture	  explicitly,	  but	  the	  assessment	  below	  attempts	  to	  flag	  any	  implicit	  role	  for	  culture	  in	  the	  other	  three	  models	  as	  well.	  	  
The	  Civil-­‐Military	  Model	  
	  The	  earliest	  theory	  of	  military	  innovation,	  the	  civil-­‐military	  model	  developed	  by	  Barry	  Posen	  in	  his	  1984	  book,	  provides	  a	  widely	  cited	  theoretical	  basis	  for	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explaining	  military	  innovation.121	  In	  The	  Sources	  of	  Military	  Doctrine,	  Posen	  argues	  that	  a	  combination	  of	  “balance	  of	  power”	  theory	  –	  a	  form	  of	  neorealism	  –	  and	  organizational	  theory	  best	  explains	  why	  military	  organizations	  innovate	  or	  fail	  to	  do	  so.122	  In	  Posen’s	  estimation,	  these	  theories	  predict	  that	  states	  and	  military	  organizations	  will	  make	  rational	  decisions	  to	  maximize	  their	  power	  in	  response	  to	  changes	  in	  their	  material	  structural	  environment.123	  In	  practice,	  this	  means	  that	  civilians	  will	  force	  military	  organizations	  to	  change	  in	  response	  to	  shifts	  in	  the	  balance	  of	  power,	  but	  military	  organizations	  will	  resist	  change	  in	  opposition	  to	  their	  own	  organizational	  imperatives.124	  Posen	  tests	  his	  civil-­‐military	  model	  by	  studying	  France,	  Britain,	  and	  Germany’s	  doctrine	  between	  the	  two	  World	  Wars.	  According	  to	  Posen’s	  version	  of	  balance-­‐of-­‐power	  theory,	  civilian	  statesmen	  spur	  military	  innovation	  after	  making	  a	  rational	  assessment	  of	  threats	  to	  state	  security.125	  When	  security	  is	  scarce,	  the	  statesmen,	  preferably	  with	  the	  assistance	  of	  maverick	  military	  officers	  within	  the	  military	  service,	  seek	  to	  maximize	  state	  power	  to	  defend	  the	  value	  of	  state	  security.	  They	  audit	  military	  doctrines,	  determine	  the	  areas	  requiring	  innovation,	  and	  intervene	  directly	  in	  military	  affairs	  to	  spur	  military	  change.	  126	  But	  military	  organizations	  tend	  to	  resist	  military	  innovation,	  Posen	  argues,	  because	  of	  organizational	  theory.127	  	  In	  his	  interpretation	  of	  this	  theory,	  military	  organizations,	  like	  states	  in	  the	  international	  system,	  will	  seek	  to	  maximize	  power	  in	  the	  face	  of	  material	  structural	  constraints.	  Internal	  constraints	  involve	  coordinating	  the	  actions	  of	  large	  numbers	  of	  people	  within	  the	  military	  organization,	  while	  external	  constraints	  may	  include	  civilian	  meddling	  and	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  Other	  empirical	  studies	  that	  reflect	  the	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uncertainty	  about	  future	  conflicts,	  among	  other	  complexities.128	  Drawing	  on	  Allison	  and	  Zelikow’s	  “Model	  II”	  of	  organizational	  behavior,	  Posen	  predicts	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  continue	  functioning	  despite	  these	  material	  constraints,	  military	  organizations	  will	  seek	  to	  maximize	  their	  autonomy	  and	  reduce	  uncertainty.129	  In	  practice,	  these	  imperatives	  require	  the	  organization	  to	  resist	  internal	  or	  external	  attempts	  to	  enforce	  change	  by	  employing	  standard	  operating	  procedures	  (SOPs)	  as	  outlined	  by	  Allison	  and	  Zelikow.130	  	  On	  the	  surface,	  Posen’s	  interpretation	  of	  organizational	  theory	  leaves	  little	  room	  for	  cultural	  explanations	  of	  a	  military	  organizations’	  behavior.	  However,	  his	  decision	  to	  categorize	  organizational	  theory	  as	  a	  fundamental	  alternative	  to	  balance	  of	  power	  theory	  implicitly	  acknowledges	  a	  substantial	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  theories:	  organizational	  theory	  takes	  into	  account	  norms	  rather	  than	  strictly	  focusing	  on	  material	  factors.131	  As	  Allison	  and	  Zelikow	  argue,	  SOPs	  are	  initially	  developed	  out	  of	  functional	  necessity,	  but	  they	  become	  engrained	  in	  organizational	  culture	  over	  time.	  When	  the	  military	  continues	  to	  use	  SOPs	  after	  they	  have	  outlived	  their	  usefulness,	  the	  role	  of	  culture	  holding	  back	  military	  innovation	  becomes	  apparent.132	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  military	  organization	  rejecting	  innovation	  may	  do	  so	  for	  rational	  reasons,	  but	  military	  culture	  eventually	  takes	  over	  as	  the	  dominant	  force	  resisting	  change.	  	  	  
Inter-­‐service	  Rivalry	  Model	  	  Grissom’s	  second	  school	  of	  military	  innovation	  focuses	  on	  inter-­‐service	  rivalry.	  Competition	  between	  the	  services	  is	  fueled	  by	  resource	  scarcity.133	  Military	  organizations	  are	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  the	  distribution	  of	  power	  (in	  the	  form	  of	  material	  resources	  such	  as	  budget	  authority	  and	  force	  size)	  in	  the	  system.	  This	  concern	  arises	  from	  their	  need	  to	  increase	  their	  budget	  and	  size	  to	  ensure	  their	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  Also	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  (2006)143-­‐185.	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  Posen	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  Farrell,	  Price	  and	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autonomy,	  which	  ensures	  they	  can	  carry	  out	  traditional	  missions	  seen	  as	  essential	  to	  their	  continued	  functioning.	  The	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  mission	  area,	  or	  the	  re-­‐opening	  of	  an	  established	  mission	  area,	  is	  therefore	  seen	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  increase	  the	  organization’s	  resources,	  and,	  in	  turn,	  protect	  its	  traditional	  missions.	  Military	  organizations	  scramble	  to	  develop	  the	  most	  appropriate	  capabilities	  to	  fulfill	  the	  new	  or	  re-­‐emergent	  mission	  so	  they	  can	  claim	  it	  as	  their	  own.	  The	  result	  of	  these	  efforts	  is	  innovation.	  134	  	  A	  leading	  example	  of	  this	  theoretical	  model	  is	  Owen	  Cote’s	  doctoral	  dissertation,	  which	  contrasts	  the	  impact	  of	  inter-­‐service	  dynamics	  on	  two	  Navy	  ballistic	  missile	  programs.135	  He	  finds	  that	  significant	  inter-­‐service	  rivalry	  explains	  aggressive	  development	  of	  the	  Polaris	  program	  in	  the	  1950’s,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  rivalry	  in	  the	  1960’s	  explains	  why	  Trident	  II	  innovation	  lagged.136	  	  In	  ascribing	  causal	  power	  to	  inter-­‐service	  competition	  for	  scarce	  resources,	  the	  inter-­‐service	  rivalry	  model	  presents	  an	  apparently	  neo-­‐realist	  view	  of	  organizations.	  Military	  organizations	  seek	  to	  maximize	  resources	  by	  pursuing	  new	  innovations,	  thereby	  ensuring	  their	  traditional	  missions	  continue.	  But	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  his	  model	  reveals	  that	  culture	  does	  play	  an	  implicit	  role.	  Organizations	  compete	  for	  limited	  resources	  to	  develop	  new	  innovations	  because	  they	  want	  to	  protect	  their	  traditional	  missions.	  	  But	  how	  do	  organizations	  decide	  what	  their	  traditional	  missions	  are?	  This	  is	  a	  question	  about	  cultural	  beliefs,	  not	  material	  factors.	  	  Halperin	  explores	  how	  organizations	  develop	  beliefs	  about	  their	  traditional	  missions	  with	  the	  bureaucratic	  politics	  model.	  The	  organization	  makes	  decisions	  and	  takes	  actions	  to	  protect	  its	  “essence”	  –	  the	  dominant	  view	  within	  the	  organization	  of	  what	  its	  missions	  and	  capabilities	  should	  be.	  137	  Organizations	  have	  “considerable	  freedom”	  to	  define	  their	  essence,	  which	  shapes	  convictions	  about	  what	  types	  of	  people	  –	  and	  what	  types	  of	  expertise,	  experience,	  and	  knowledge	  –	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should	  be	  part	  of	  the	  organization.138	  Because	  organizational	  essence	  is	  determined	  by	  people	  within	  the	  organization,	  it	  is	  a	  social	  factor	  rather	  than	  a	  rational	  one.	  	  Halperin	  notes	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  organizational	  essence	  is	  particularly	  powerful	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  inter-­‐service	  dynamics.	  “Fights	  over	  roles	  and	  missions	  are	  particularly	  acute	  when	  they	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  organization,”	  he	  argues.	  	  Conversely,	  organizations	  may	  display	  “indifference”	  to	  missions	  that	  are	  not	  closely	  linked	  to	  their	  organizational	  essence.139	  	  Through	  Halperin’s	  view,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  while	  resource	  scarcity	  drives	  inter-­‐service	  rivalry,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  only	  factor.	  Organizations	  will	  only	  compete	  to	  protect	  things	  that	  are	  considered	  close	  to	  their	  essence.	  In	  a	  budget-­‐constrained	  environment,	  the	  USAF	  competed	  with	  the	  Navy	  for	  control	  over	  ballistic	  missiles.	  But	  the	  USAF	  would	  be	  unlikely	  to	  compete	  with	  the	  Navy	  over	  ships	  or	  carriers,	  regardless	  of	  budget	  constraints,	  because	  these	  weapons	  are	  perceived	  to	  fall	  outside	  the	  USAF’s	  organizational	  essence.	  	  
Intra-­‐Service	  Dynamics	  Model	  Grissom’s	  third	  school	  of	  military	  innovation	  theory,	  intra-­‐service	  dynamics,	  focuses	  on	  competition	  between	  internal	  branches	  of	  a	  military	  service.	  	  Stephen	  Rosen	  wrote	  the	  seminal	  work	  in	  this	  school.140	  As	  Rosen	  explains,	  sub-­‐communities	  within	  a	  military	  service	  compete	  for	  material	  factors,	  such	  as	  budget	  authority,	  power	  and	  promotions,	  to	  advance	  their	  unique	  vision	  for	  change.	  	  Because	  the	  military	  establishment	  must	  constantly	  deal	  with	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  enemy	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  new	  technologies,	  each	  sub-­‐community	  is	  left	  to	  form	  its	  own	  unique	  perception	  of	  the	  threat	  environment.	  Based	  on	  these	  perceptions,	  the	  sub-­‐communities	  —	  led	  by	  senior	  military	  officers	  with	  a	  vision	  for	  a	  new	  way	  of	  warfare	  —	  campaign	  for	  the	  money,	  power,	  and	  promotion	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  140	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authority	  needed	  to	  advance	  their	  innovations.	  The	  officers	  leading	  change	  are	  highly	  respected	  leaders	  who	  may	  be	  able	  to	  recruit	  assistance	  from	  mid-­‐level	  officers	  and	  civilians	  who	  constitute	  a	  sub-­‐community	  willing	  to	  advocate	  for	  change.	  The	  uniformed	  leaders	  marshal	  support	  within	  the	  sub-­‐community	  to	  lead	  an	  “ideological	  struggle”	  within	  the	  military	  service	  built	  around	  a	  “new	  theory	  of	  victory.”	  This	  new	  way	  of	  war	  is	  then	  institutionalized	  as	  the	  senior	  military	  leaders	  create	  new	  critical	  tasks,	  new	  incentives	  to	  do	  the	  tasks,	  and	  new	  career	  paths.	  141	  Rosen’s	  model	  of	  military	  innovation	  is	  rooted	  in	  neo-­‐realism	  because	  decisions	  are	  still	  driven	  by	  the	  external	  threat	  environment.	  Sub-­‐communities	  within	  a	  military	  service	  compete	  for	  power	  based	  on	  their	  own	  assessments	  of	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  in	  the	  international	  system.	  But	  Rosen	  also	  implicitly	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  potential	  role	  of	  culture	  by	  noting	  that	  these	  assessments	  are	  based	  on	  each	  sub-­‐community’s	  unique	  perception	  of	  the	  threat	  environment,	  which	  is	  shaped	  by	  the	  sub-­‐community’s	  unique	  culture	  and	  way	  of	  thinking.142	  Indeed,	  Rosen’s	  model	  looks	  much	  like	  Halperin’s	  concept	  of	  organizational	  essence,	  which	  describes	  how	  subgroups	  within	  an	  organization	  may	  develop	  their	  own	  view	  of	  organizational	  essence,	  and	  conflicts	  may	  arise	  between	  the	  sub-­‐groups	  vying	  to	  define	  organizational	  essence.143	  	  Another	  way	  that	  Rosen	  takes	  culture	  into	  account	  is	  in	  his	  reliance	  on	  organizational	  theory	  to	  describe	  the	  ideological	  struggle	  that	  leads	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  theory	  of	  victory.	  He	  builds	  on	  Allison	  and	  Zelikow’s	  notion	  that	  sub-­‐communities	  will	  struggle	  or	  bargain	  with	  each	  other	  to	  shape	  the	  operational	  objectives	  of	  the	  organization.144	  As	  Allison	  and	  Zelikow	  note	  in	  Model	  II	  of	  organizational	  theory,	  this	  bargaining	  process	  among	  sub-­‐communities	  ultimately	  results	  in	  de	  facto	  agreements	  among	  the	  sub-­‐communities	  that	  impose	  constraints	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on	  the	  organization	  and	  construct	  a	  unique	  organizational	  identity.145	  The	  very	  process	  of	  deciding	  on	  organizational	  objectives	  influences	  the	  organization’s	  culture,	  since	  organizations	  define	  themselves	  as	  they	  make	  decisions.146	  	  	  
Cultural	  Models	  	  Grissom’s	  fourth	  school	  of	  military	  innovation	  explicitly	  identifies	  culture	  as	  a	  powerful	  variable	  to	  explain	  military	  change.	  Scholars	  in	  this	  school	  have	  come	  to	  a	  consensus	  that	  the	  models	  above,	  all	  derived	  primarily	  from	  neo-­‐realist	  accounts,	  are	  too	  narrow.	  Instead	  they	  embrace	  the	  constructivist	  view	  that	  norms	  mutually	  constitute	  actors	  and	  their	  environment.	  Given	  that	  norms	  provide	  actors	  with	  fundamental	  understandings	  of	  their	  identity	  and	  interests,	  they	  have	  potentially	  significant	  power	  to	  explain	  why	  military	  organizations	  innovate.	  	  The	  constructivist	  debate	  over	  how	  to	  view	  culture	  in	  IR	  theory,	  described	  above	  in	  section	  two,	  reflects	  a	  similar	  debate	  in	  strategic	  studies,	  of	  which	  military	  innovation	  is	  a	  subfield.	  The	  debate	  is	  centered	  on	  how	  to	  define	  “strategic	  culture,”	  which	  emerged	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  to	  illustrate	  the	  differences	  between	  US	  and	  Soviet	  policymakers’	  approaches	  to	  nuclear	  strategy.147	  On	  one	  side	  is	  Alastair	  Iain	  Johnston,	  an	  IR	  scholar	  from	  the	  	  “third	  generation”	  of	  cultural	  theorists,148	  who	  argues	  that	  culture	  can	  be	  separated	  from	  behavior	  to	  establish	  a	  falsifiable	  theory.149	  Military	  innovation	  scholars	  who	  side	  with	  Johnston	  employ	  causal	  theory	  testing	  to	  establish	  whether	  culture	  or	  some	  other	  variable	  best	  explains	  military	  change.	  	  On	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  debate	  is	  Colin	  Gray,	  a	  strategist	  from	  the	  “first	  generation”	  of	  cultural	  theorists,	  who	  argues	  that	  culture	  is	  a	  context	  because	  it	  is	  found	  in	  both	  the	  ideas	  and	  behavior	  of	  the	  policymakers	  and	  military	  officers	  who	  embody	  the	  strategic	  culture.	  150	  He	  argues	  that	  “the	  traffic	  between	  ideas	  and	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behavior	  in	  strategic	  affairs	  is	  continuous”	  and	  therefore	  culture	  is	  a	  context	  that	  “weaves	  together”	  ideas	  and	  strategic	  action.151	  Military	  innovation	  theorists	  who	  adopt	  this	  broader	  view	  of	  culture	  espouse	  a	  methodology	  that	  looks	  more	  like	  constitutive	  theory	  to	  explore	  how	  culture	  sets	  the	  context	  for	  military	  change.	  	  
Culture	  as	  a	  Source	  of	  Military	  Change	  	  Causal	  theorists	  are	  interested	  in	  explaining	  culture	  as	  a	  trigger	  for	  military	  change,	  not	  as	  a	  context	  in	  which	  change	  occurs.	  Yet	  the	  very	  idea	  that	  cultural	  norms	  can	  spur	  change	  may	  seem	  counterintuitive	  at	  first	  glance.	  After	  all,	  constructivists	  studying	  military	  innovation	  seem	  to	  agree	  that	  military	  organizations	  tend	  to	  have	  relatively	  stable	  organizational	  cultures.152	  As	  Farrell	  and	  Terriff	  explain,	  “cultural	  norms	  produce	  persistent	  patterns	  of	  behavior	  by	  becoming	  institutionalized	  in	  community	  rules	  and	  routines.	  Once	  institutionalized,	  norms	  are	  either	  taken	  for	  granted	  or	  enforced	  by	  powerful	  sanctions.“153	  But,	  if	  cultural	  norms	  are	  generally	  characterized	  by	  continuity,	  how	  can	  they	  spur	  military	  innovation?	  	  Causal	  theorists	  have	  offered	  two	  different	  ways	  to	  show	  that	  culture	  can	  drive	  military	  change.	  The	  first	  way	  is	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  organizational	  culture	  remains	  relatively	  static	  but	  imposes	  certain	  constraints	  on	  decision-­‐making	  that	  lead	  to	  military	  change.	  Both	  Kier	  and	  Legro	  have	  written	  books	  and	  articles	  attempting	  to	  explain	  how	  a	  static	  organizational	  culture	  can	  spur	  military	  change.154	  They	  argue	  this	  is	  possible	  because	  the	  culture	  of	  a	  military	  organization	  provides	  a	  limited	  world	  view	  that	  shapes	  the	  organization’s	  responses	  to	  external	  changes.	  For	  example,	  Kier	  finds	  that	  French	  military	  culture	  remained	  static	  but	  dictated	  a	  switch	  to	  a	  defensive	  doctrine	  during	  the	  interwar	  period	  in	  response	  to	  a	  change	  in	  French	  public	  opinion.	  155	  Similarly,	  Legro	  finds	  that	  the	  culture	  of	  the	  German	  Navy	  in	  the	  early	  1940’s	  remained	  consistent	  but	  nevertheless	  dictated	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military	  change	  –	  specifically,	  the	  decision	  to	  violate	  the	  international	  norm	  against	  submarine	  warfare	  –in	  response	  to	  the	  outbreak	  of	  World	  War	  II	  (WWII).	  156	  	  	  The	  second	  way	  that	  culture	  can	  drive	  military	  innovation	  is	  through	  cultural	  change	  enabling	  military	  change.	  The	  principle	  causal	  theorist	  who	  has	  explored	  this	  phenomenon	  is	  Farrell.	  He	  argues	  that	  a	  concept	  known	  as	  “norm	  transplantation”	  can	  lead	  to	  cultural	  change	  in	  three	  different	  patterns.	  Two	  of	  them	  are	  relatively	  straightforward	  and	  uncontroversial.	  First,	  under	  an	  incremental	  pattern,	  military	  organizations	  willingly	  engage	  in	  social	  learning	  to	  adopt	  new	  norms	  that	  fit	  within	  existing	  norm	  hierarchies.157	  Second,	  an	  outside	  agency	  compels	  the	  military	  organization	  to	  comply	  with	  a	  norm.	  This	  coercive	  power	  could	  be	  exercised	  either	  through	  power	  hierarchies	  or	  sanctions.158	  Third,	  in	  a	  more	  puzzling	  radical	  pattern,	  a	  community	  undergoes	  radical	  cultural	  change	  freely;	  the	  change	  clashes	  with	  existing	  norms	  but	  no	  coercion	  is	  required	  to	  make	  it	  happen.159	  	  Farrell	  describes	  three	  enabling	  conditions	  that	  could	  apply	  to	  any	  pattern	  of	  change,	  but	  are	  most	  important	  in	  helping	  to	  explain	  radical	  cultural	  change	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  coercion.	  One	  enabling	  condition	  of	  cultural	  change	  cited	  in	  military	  culture	  literature	  is	  external	  shock,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  wars,	  depressions,	  and	  revolutions.160	  For	  example,	  some	  scholars	  argue	  that	  the	  antimilitaristic	  cultures	  of	  postwar	  Germany	  and	  Japan	  were	  a	  result	  of	  the	  searing	  historical	  experience	  of	  defeat	  in	  WWII.161	  This	  enabling	  condition	  alone,	  however,	  cannot	  explain	  cultural	  change,	  according	  to	  Farrell.	  Change	  does	  not	  happen	  automatically	  after	  a	  shock;	  instead,	  it	  involves	  a	  two-­‐stage	  process	  of	  shock-­‐induced	  cultural	  collapse	  followed	  by	  the	  consolidation	  of	  cultural	  change.	  Without	  consolidation,	  new	  norms	  may	  not	  endure	  after	  the	  shock	  has	  worn	  off	  and	  the	  culture	  may	  revert	  to	  its	  former	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state.162	  Farrell	  argues	  that	  the	  consolidation	  of	  cultural	  change	  requires	  human	  agency.	  He	  therefore	  cites	  two	  more	  enabling	  conditions	  needed	  to	  explain	  cultural	  change:	  norm	  entrepreneurs	  and	  personnel	  change.	  In	  the	  norm	  entrepreneur	  model,	  the	  shock	  takes	  effect	  by	  creating	  political	  space	  for	  entrepreneurs	  to	  challenge	  existing	  norms	  in	  a	  process	  of	  “planned	  change.”	  In	  the	  personnel	  change	  model,	  external	  shock	  may	  spur	  turnover	  in	  key	  or	  large	  numbers	  of	  people,	  in	  turn	  leading	  to	  cultural	  change.163	  In	  either	  case,	  people	  are	  needed	  to	  make	  sure	  the	  cultural	  change	  becomes	  permanent	  following	  an	  external	  shock.	  164	  	  
Culture	  as	  a	  Context	  for	  Military	  Innovation	  
	  In	  contrast	  to	  military	  innovation	  theorists	  who	  employ	  causal	  theory,	  there	  are	  other	  scholars	  who	  prefer	  to	  see	  culture	  as	  a	  context	  in	  which	  military	  innovation	  occurs.	  These	  theorists	  are	  less	  concerned	  with	  engaging	  mainstream	  IR	  theory.	  Because	  the	  international	  environment	  is	  socially	  constructed,	  it	  is	  	  “preposterous”	  to	  take	  seriously	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  is	  an	  alternative	  “neo-­‐realist”	  universe	  that	  is	  totally	  bereft	  of	  cultural	  influence,	  just	  as	  it	  would	  be	  impractical	  to	  adopt	  an	  unmodified	  belief	  in	  a	  world	  in	  which	  cultural	  influence	  always	  dominated.	  165	  	  Military	  innovation	  scholars	  who	  take	  this	  contextual	  view	  of	  culture	  are	  far	  less	  concerned	  with	  methodology	  than	  Kier,	  Legro,	  Farrell	  and	  the	  mainstream	  IR	  theorists.	  As	  Gray	  explains,	  the	  “methodologically	  devastating”	  truth	  is	  that	  culture	  cannot	  be	  isolated	  as	  an	  independent	  variable	  to	  explain	  behavior.166	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  only	  thing	  scholars	  interested	  in	  culture	  can	  do	  is	  accept	  that	  culture	  shapes	  both	  actors	  and	  their	  behavior	  and	  leave	  it	  at	  that.	  Sometimes	  culture	  will	  deeply	  impact	  decision-­‐making	  and	  other	  times	  it	  will	  not;	  for	  Gray,	  the	  point	  is	  that	  it	  is	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always	  a	  potential	  influence	  on	  decision	  and	  action.167	  	  Military	  innovation	  scholars	  who	  see	  culture	  as	  context	  come	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  disciplines.	  Some	  are	  strategic	  studies	  scholars,	  while	  others	  have	  a	  background	  in	  social	  history	  and	  the	  social	  shaping	  of	  technology.	  In	  practice,	  however,	  they	  share	  two	  common	  traits:	  they	  adopt	  a	  similar	  methodology,	  and	  they	  are	  not	  limited	  to	  focusing	  on	  culture	  at	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  analysis.	  In	  terms	  of	  methodology,	  they	  tend	  to	  adopt	  approaches	  similar	  to	  the	  constitutive	  theory.	  Because	  they	  see	  culture	  as	  always	  having	  a	  potential	  influence	  on	  military	  change,	  they	  share	  constitutive	  theorists’	  interest	  in	  the	  question	  of	  how	  culture	  matters.	  Some	  scholars	  who	  take	  a	  contextual	  view	  of	  culture	  may	  share	  causal	  theorists’	  interest	  in	  seeking	  to	  engage	  mainstream	  IR	  theories	  to	  some	  degree,	  but	  others	  do	  not.	  In	  terms	  of	  levels	  of	  analysis,	  these	  scholars	  are	  not	  interested	  in	  isolating	  culture	  as	  an	  independent	  variable,	  so	  they	  do	  not	  have	  to	  focus	  exclusively	  on	  organizational	  culture	  or	  strategic	  culture,	  and	  instead	  broaden	  their	  aperture	  to	  consider	  how	  cultural	  norms	  in	  broader	  society	  may	  shape	  military	  change.	  	  One	  discipline	  that	  tends	  to	  take	  a	  contextual	  view	  of	  the	  role	  of	  culture	  in	  military	  change	  is	  social	  military	  history.	  Social	  military	  historians	  are	  interested	  in	  examining	  how	  ideational	  factors	  	  —	  specifically	  myth	  and	  imagination	  —	  mutually	  constitute	  social	  identity	  and	  the	  state’s	  approach	  to	  warfare	  and	  security.168	  A	  classic	  example	  is	  Michael	  Sherry’s	  1976	  book,	  The	  Rise	  of	  American	  
Airpower:	  The	  Creation	  of	  Armageddon.	  He	  explains	  how	  visionaries	  in	  the	  US	  and	  Europe	  imagined	  the	  bomber	  long	  before	  militaries	  could	  start	  building	  them	  and	  bombing	  people.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  arrival	  of	  bomber	  technology	  in	  WWII	  shaped	  how	  military	  and	  political	  elites,	  as	  well	  as	  broader	  society,	  imagined	  war.	  The	  destruction	  of	  strategic	  bombing,	  and,	  later,	  the	  use	  of	  atomic	  bombs	  in	  Japan,	  became	  possible	  because	  the	  bomber	  created	  physical	  and	  emotional	  distance	  between	  the	  Americans	  and	  the	  physical	  consequences	  of	  bombing.169	  	  Another	  literature	  that	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  pervasive	  role	  of	  culture	  in	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military	  change	  is	  the	  social	  shaping	  of	  technology.170	  It	  sees	  technological	  innovation	  as	  the	  result	  of	  a	  social	  process	  in	  which	  different	  interest	  groups	  (consisting	  of	  military	  officers,	  politicians	  and	  scientists)	  put	  forward	  rival	  designs.	  The	  social	  process	  of	  reaching	  consensus	  on	  a	  design	  shapes	  the	  technological	  development;	  design	  efficiency	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  it.	  In	  this	  way,	  technological	  innovation	  is	  seen	  as	  socially	  constructed,	  not	  deterministic.171	  One	  example	  is	  Donald	  Mackenzie’s	  history	  of	  nuclear	  missile	  guidance,	  which	  shows	  how	  a	  lab	  at	  the	  Massachusetts	  Institute	  of	  Technology	  developed	  missile	  guidance	  technology	  that	  ultimately	  shaped	  the	  development	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  counterforce	  strategy	  in	  the	  early	  1960s.172	  Finally,	  in	  the	  field	  of	  strategic	  studies,	  there	  are	  several	  authors	  who	  have	  taken	  a	  more	  contextual	  view	  of	  culture	  to	  explain	  military	  innovation.	  These	  authors	  tend	  to	  draw	  on	  other	  disciplines,	  including	  social	  history	  with	  its	  focus	  on	  the	  mutually	  shaping	  relationship	  between	  culture	  and	  military	  force,	  to	  make	  their	  case.173	  One	  notable	  example	  is	  strategic	  studies	  scholar	  Dima	  Adamsky’s	  book,	  which	  explores	  why	  Russia,	  the	  US,	  and	  Israel	  took	  different	  paths	  to	  pursuing	  the	  revolution	  in	  military	  affairs	  despite	  having	  similar	  access	  to	  technology.	  Adamsky	  adopts	  a	  contextual	  definition	  of	  culture	  that	  sees	  it	  shaping	  both	  the	  cognitive	  styles	  of	  military	  and	  political	  elites	  and	  their	  behavior.	  He	  acknowledges	  that	  material	  factors	  like	  technological	  maturity	  and	  the	  threat	  environment	  also	  influence	  innovation,	  but	  he	  insists	  that	  culture	  always	  sets	  the	  conditions	  for	  how	  these	  material	  factors	  are	  viewed.	  His	  findings	  suggest	  a	  powerful	  role	  for	  strategic	  culture	  in	  setting	  societies	  on	  different	  paths	  to	  RMA	  development.	  Although	  he	  does	  not	  set	  out	  to	  make	  the	  claim	  that	  culture	  spurred	  RMAs	  in	  these	  countries,	  evidence	  of	  its	  powerful	  influence	  is	  bolstered	  by	  his	  use	  of	  three	  comparative	  and	  contrasting	  societies	  that	  took	  different	  approaches	  to	  the	  RMA	  despite	  access	  to	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the	  same	  technology.174	  	  
3.	  Culture	  in	  UAV	  Innovation	  	  	  Clearly,	  the	  concept	  of	  culture	  is	  pervasive	  in	  both	  IR	  theory	  and	  military	  innovation	  theory.	  Even	  scholars	  who	  purport	  to	  adopt	  an	  essentially	  neo-­‐realist	  view,	  rooted	  in	  rational	  actor	  theory,	  tend	  to	  “smuggle”	  cultural	  factors	  into	  their	  accounts	  of	  military	  innovation.175	  Given	  the	  ubiquitous	  nature	  of	  culture	  in	  the	  existing	  literature,	  it	  is	  a	  difficult	  feat	  to	  isolate	  it	  as	  an	  independent	  variable	  that	  exists	  totally	  separate	  from	  material	  factors.	  	  Nevertheless,	  causal	  theorizing	  remains	  the	  mainstream	  methodological	  approach,	  particularly	  in	  the	  United	  States.176	  The	  landmark	  doctoral	  thesis	  on	  UAV	  innovation	  to	  date,	  Col.	  Ehrhard’s	  2000	  comparative	  analysis	  of	  UAV	  innovation	  in	  the	  US	  armed	  services	  over	  45	  years,	  employs	  causal	  theorizing.177	  He	  joins	  other	  causal	  theorists	  in	  separating	  military	  culture	  from	  behavior	  to	  assess	  its	  explanatory	  power	  relative	  to	  material	  factors	  in	  the	  international	  system.178	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  USAF,	  he	  concludes	  that	  technological	  immaturity	  and	  poor	  operational	  performance	  had	  more	  to	  do	  with	  the	  service’s	  failure	  to	  institutionalize	  UAVs	  than	  “the	  cultural	  skepticism	  of	  pilots,	  as	  is	  often	  postulated.”179	  In	  Ehrhard’s	  view,	  the	  USAF	  is	  capable	  of	  assessing	  external	  material	  factors	  that	  influence	  UAV	  innovation	  on	  a	  completely	  rational	  basis,	  devoid	  of	  cultural	  influence.	  After	  applying	  this	  framework	  across	  US	  military	  UAV	  programs,	  Ehrhard	  declares	  that	  his	  “linchpin	  finding”	  is	  that	  military	  service	  culture	  matters	  less	  than	  material	  factors	  in	  terms	  of	  shaping	  decisions	  about	  UAV	  innovation.180	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Ehrhard	  divorces	  culture	  from	  decision-­‐making	  by	  narrowly	  circumscribing	  the	  concept	  of	  culture	  at	  the	  organizational	  level	  of	  analysis.	  He	  divides	  the	  internal	  workings	  of	  the	  military	  organization	  into	  three	  categories:	  structure,	  function,	  and	  culture.181	  Under	  this	  rubric,	  a	  military	  service	  could	  disagree	  with	  outsiders	  about	  the	  cost	  and	  potential	  of	  a	  UAV	  for	  strictly	  rational	  reasons	  related	  to	  structure	  and	  function	  that	  have	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  culture.	  For	  example,	  Ehrhard	  claims	  the	  Army	  and	  the	  USAF	  initially	  ignored	  the	  Predator	  program	  not	  because	  of	  cultural	  concerns,	  but	  because	  of	  its	  lack	  of	  proven	  combat	  capability	  and	  the	  Predator’s	  “functional”	  shortcomings:	  “its	  capabilities	  fell	  in-­‐between	  the	  Army’s	  battlefield	  range	  and	  the	  Air	  Force’s	  preferred	  altitude	  and	  speed	  comfort	  zone,”	  he	  argues.182	  	  	  But	  Ehrhard’s	  strict	  adherence	  to	  causal	  theorizing	  has	  its	  own	  limitations.	  	  Even	  he	  cannot	  totally	  succeed	  in	  divorcing	  culture	  from	  the	  USAF’s	  so-­‐called	  “functional”	  imperatives.	  His	  description	  of	  the	  Predator	  falling	  outside	  the	  USAF’s	  subjective	  preferences	  and	  “comfort	  zone”	  employs	  language	  that	  actually	  implies	  a	  strong	  cultural	  influence.	  This	  example	  highlights	  the	  difficulty	  of	  trying	  to	  put	  up	  barriers	  between	  “rational”	  and	  “cultural”	  influences	  on	  decision-­‐making.	  Of	  course,	  many	  scholars	  understandably	  see	  a	  significant	  methodological	  benefit	  to	  putting	  up	  these	  barriers	  because	  doing	  so	  provides	  a	  clear	  way	  to	  test	  cultural	  theories	  against	  other	  theories	  to	  determine	  which	  one	  explains	  innovation	  outcomes	  the	  best.	  	  But	  I	  believe	  we	  may	  learn	  more	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  cultural	  influence	  on	  UAV	  innovation	  by	  accepting	  it	  as	  a	  context	  for	  change,	  rather	  than	  looking	  at	  it	  narrowly	  as	  one	  variable	  that	  can	  be	  parsed	  from	  others	  to	  determine	  its	  influence.	  To	  this	  end,	  I	  believe	  that	  constitutive	  theory	  may	  prove	  to	  be	  a	  useful	  adjunct	  to	  causal	  theory	  testing.	  It	  allows	  for	  a	  more	  broadly	  encompassing	  view	  of	  culture’s	  influence	  on	  innovation	  while	  still	  accepting	  that	  there	  are	  some	  baseline	  facts	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  judge	  whether	  a	  pervasive	  view	  of	  cultural	  influence,	  illuminated	  by	  constitutive	  theory,	  best	  explains	  innovation	  outcomes,	  or	  whether	  some	  other	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theory,	  like	  neo-­‐realism,	  does	  it	  better.	  	  	  	  	  The	  main	  advantage	  of	  adopting	  a	  broad	  view	  of	  culture	  is	  that	  it	  becomes	  possible	  to	  look	  at	  a	  variety	  of	  facets	  of	  cultural	  influence.	  Most	  importantly,	  we	  can	  see	  culture	  as	  mutually	  shaping	  actors	  and	  their	  environment.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Predator	  program,	  culture	  pervades	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  USAF	  and	  the	  UAV.	  It	  provides	  a	  lens	  through	  which	  the	  USAF	  makes	  myriad	  judgments	  about	  the	  Predator’s	  cost,	  military	  potential,	  and	  technological	  maturity.	  Because	  these	  seemingly	  rational	  factors	  reflect	  USAF	  culture,	  they	  in	  turn	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  change	  that	  culture.	  For	  example,	  chapter	  three	  describes	  how	  the	  USAF	  initially	  rejected	  the	  Predator	  program	  based	  on	  rational	  concerns	  about	  cost	  and	  technological	  maturity	  that	  were	  colored	  by	  a	  prevailing	  cultural	  preference	  for	  manned	  aircraft.	  In	  turn,	  chapter	  four	  describes	  how	  the	  Predator	  program’s	  cultural	  significance	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Revolution	  in	  Military	  Affairs	  (RMA)	  led	  the	  USAF	  to	  take	  a	  more	  optimistic	  view	  of	  UAV	  technology	  over	  the	  long	  term.	  	  	  	  Given	  the	  breadth	  and	  depth	  of	  influence	  that	  I	  attribute	  to	  USAF	  culture,	  it	  makes	  the	  most	  sense	  for	  me	  to	  adopt	  the	  constructivist	  definition	  of	  the	  term.	  As	  described	  in	  section	  one,	  constructivists	  view	  culture	  in	  terms	  of	  “norms”	  that	  mutually	  constitute	  actors	  and	  their	  environment.	  In	  this	  way,	  norms	  operate	  “all	  the	  way	  down”	  to	  define	  actors,	  their	  situations,	  and	  the	  possibilities	  of	  action.	  Farrell	  neatly	  summed	  up	  how	  norms	  impact	  military	  innovation	  in	  his	  2002	  book	  on	  the	  subject:	  “In	  short,	  norms	  make	  meaningful	  action	  possible	  by	  telling	  military	  actors	  who	  they	  are	  and	  what	  they	  can	  do	  in	  given	  situations.	  In	  this	  way,	  norms	  define	  the	  purpose	  and	  possibilities	  of	  military	  change.”183	  Throughout	  my	  research,	  I	  use	  the	  more	  generic	  concept	  of	  “USAF	  culture”	  interchangeably	  with	  the	  constructivist	  concept	  of	  cultural	  norms.	  My	  main	  research	  question	  reflects	  the	  constructivist	  view	  of	  norms,	  drawing	  attention	  to	  the	  mutually	  shaping	  relationship	  between	  USAF	  culture	  and	  the	  Predator	  program.	  Rather	  than	  focusing	  primarily	  on	  causality,	  the	  question	  focuses	  on	  how	  USAF	  culture	  made	  certain	  decisions	  about	  the	  Predator	  program	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possible,	  and	  other	  decisions	  impossible.	  Given	  that	  my	  research	  interest	  is	  closely	  aligned	  with	  military	  innovation	  scholars	  who	  see	  culture	  as	  a	  context	  for	  change,	  I	  adopt	  their	  methodology,	  roughly	  based	  on	  constitutive	  theory.	  In	  practice,	  this	  means	  I	  generally	  stay	  away	  from	  trying	  to	  assign	  a	  specific	  percentage	  of	  influence	  to	  culture	  versus	  some	  other	  material	  factor,	  and	  instead	  I	  focus	  on	  understanding	  how	  culture	  shaped	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  USAF	  and	  the	  Predator	  program.	  	  	  	  Of	  course,	  I	  do	  not	  ignore	  the	  important	  insights	  causal	  theorists	  have	  made	  about	  military	  innovation,	  or	  totally	  dismiss	  their	  interest	  in	  causality.	  As	  Price	  and	  Reus-­‐Smit	  note,	  constitutive	  theory	  is	  actually	  a	  good	  method	  to	  assess	  causality	  because	  it	  helps	  to	  paint	  a	  fuller	  picture	  of	  culture	  that	  may	  ultimately	  provide	  a	  convincing	  case	  for	  its	  causal	  power.184	  This	  insight	  is	  important	  because	  I	  share	  causal	  theorists’	  interest	  in	  understanding	  how	  culture	  shapes	  decisionmaking,	  in	  this	  case,	  how	  USAF	  culture	  shaped	  the	  Predator	  program.	  Also,	  causal	  theorists	  have	  made	  important	  observations	  about	  military	  innovation	  that	  I	  intend	  to	  incorporate	  in	  my	  research.	  Farrell’s	  description	  of	  cultural	  change,	  for	  example,	  is	  useful	  for	  understanding	  any	  apparent	  shifts	  in	  USAF	  culture	  that	  in	  turn	  led	  to	  change	  in	  the	  Predator	  program.	  	  Because	  my	  research	  question	  implies	  a	  pervasive	  role	  for	  culture,	  however,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  pay	  special	  attention	  to	  the	  development	  of	  a	  systematic	  way	  to	  explore	  the	  nature	  of	  cultural	  influence	  on	  the	  USAF’s	  Predator	  program.	  The	  advantage	  of	  causal	  theorizing	  is	  that	  it	  allows	  researchers	  to	  quickly	  and	  efficiently	  isolate	  cultural	  influence	  as	  anything	  that	  cannot	  be	  explained	  by	  rational	  behavior.	  Since	  I	  view	  culture	  as	  a	  mutually	  shaping	  context	  for	  action	  between	  actors	  and	  their	  environment,	  filled	  with	  both	  rational	  and	  cultural	  considerations,	  I	  do	  not	  share	  this	  advantage.	  Therefore,	  my	  solution	  is	  to	  put	  forward	  four	  sub-­‐questions	  that	  are	  asked	  across	  each	  of	  the	  chapters	  that	  follow.	  Each	  question	  inquires	  into	  the	  core	  activities	  and	  distinctive	  stances	  of	  the	  USAF	  to	  develop	  an	  overall	  sense	  of	  USAF	  cultural	  attitudes	  toward	  UAV	  innovation.	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The	  questions	  are	  based	  on	  four	  hypotheses	  about	  USAF	  culture	  that	  are	  derived	  from	  an	  examination	  of	  norms	  flowing	  in	  and	  out	  of	  the	  USAF	  at	  the	  international,	  national,	  organizational,	  and	  individual	  levels	  of	  analysis.	  The	  main	  focus	  of	  my	  examination,	  however,	  is	  on	  norms	  at	  the	  organizational	  level.	  	  As	  noted	  in	  the	  section	  on	  culture	  and	  military	  innovation,	  most	  military	  action	  takes	  place	  within	  organizational	  structures,	  so	  the	  organizational	  culture	  of	  the	  USAF	  itself	  is	  a	  natural	  focus.	  	  Below	  are	  the	  four	  questions,	  each	  followed	  by	  a	  discussion	  that	  forms	  the	  basis	  for	  surmising	  that	  the	  question	  leads	  to	  important	  insights	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  USAF	  culture	  and	  UAV	  innovation.	  	  	  
1. To	  what	  extent	  did	  individuals	  or	  groups	  within	  the	  USAF	  resist	  
unmanned	  technology	  out	  of	  a	  concern	  that	  their	  jobs	  or	  status	  might	  
be	  threatened	  by	  it?	  	  	  	  	  This	  question	  explores	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  USAF	  has	  fractionated	  into	  competing	  factions	  based	  on	  weapons	  system	  affiliation	  rather	  than	  institutional	  affiliation.	  It	  suggests	  that	  USAF	  personnel	  do	  not	  reflexively	  welcome	  emerging	  technologies,	  such	  as	  UAVs,	  as	  a	  means	  to	  advance	  airpower’s	  war-­‐winning	  edge.	  Instead,	  their	  first	  instinct	  is	  to	  size	  up	  the	  technology	  to	  see	  if	  it	  poses	  a	  threat	  to	  their	  jobs	  and	  status,	  built	  around	  existing	  technologies.	  If	  the	  new	  technology	  threatens	  to	  replace	  their	  preferred	  weapon	  system,	  USAF	  personnel	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  resist	  its	  integration	  into	  the	  USAF’s	  force	  structure.	  	  Historian	  Carl	  Builder	  has	  written	  the	  preeminent	  work	  on	  the	  USAF’s	  institutional	  loyalty	  to	  weapon	  systems	  rather	  than	  the	  USAF	  as	  an	  institution.185	  In	  The	  Icarus	  Syndrome,	  he	  argues	  that	  this	  fragmentation	  of	  USAF	  identity	  occurred	  in	  the	  mid-­‐20th	  century	  due	  to	  a	  clash	  between	  USAF	  culture	  and	  airpower	  theory.	  Builder	  explains	  that	  the	  USAF	  was	  established	  after	  WWII	  around	  a	  unifying	  theory	  of	  airpower	  as	  an	  independent	  force	  —	  not	  just	  an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  185	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adjunct	  to	  land	  or	  sea	  warfare	  —that	  could	  be	  used	  to	  bypass	  bloody,	  costly,	  and	  often	  indecisive	  engagements	  to	  strike	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  enemy	  through	  the	  third	  dimension.	  This	  strategic	  view	  of	  airpower	  theory	  initially	  worked	  very	  well,	  providing	  a	  valid	  justification	  to	  the	  outside	  world	  for	  the	  USAF’s	  existence,	  and	  also	  an	  institutional	  touchstone	  for	  the	  USAF’s	  personnel.	  186	  However,	  Builder	  argues	  that	  airpower	  theory	  began	  to	  crumble	  once	  new	  aerospace	  alternatives	  started	  to	  emerge	  in	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s.	  This	  was	  particularly	  true	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  introduction	  of	  intercontinental	  ballistic	  missile	  (ICBM)	  technology	  in	  the	  early	  1950s.	  The	  arrival	  of	  the	  ICBM	  forced	  the	  USAF’s	  bomber	  generals,	  who	  dominated	  the	  service	  between	  1947	  and	  1965,	  to	  reveal	  that	  their	  “true	  affection”	  was	  not	  for	  airpower	  theory	  —	  the	  idea	  of	  using	  whatever	  air	  asset	  could	  most	  readily	  achieve	  strategic	  effects	  —	  but	  rather	  for	  the	  continued	  employment	  of	  manned	  aircraft	  as	  the	  central	  means	  to	  win	  wars.	  	  The	  bomber	  generals’	  preference	  for	  bombers	  above	  all	  else	  was	  rooted	  in	  an	  “emotional	  and	  cultural	  resistance”	  according	  to	  historian	  Kenneth	  Werrell.187	  They	  worried	  that	  ICBMs	  would	  pose	  a	  direct	  threat	  to	  manned	  bombers,	  around	  which	  they	  had	  built	  the	  justification	  for	  an	  independent	  USAF	  and	  their	  future	  prospects	  for	  promotion,	  as	  RAND	  analyst	  Robert	  Perry	  noted	  in	  a	  1967	  report.188	  Fearing	  a	  loss	  of	  control,	  the	  bomber	  generals	  sought	  to	  reinforce	  a	  USAF	  caste	  system	  with	  them	  at	  the	  top	  and	  everyone	  else	  split	  into	  factions	  devoted	  to	  specific	  aerial	  platforms	  competing	  for	  power.	  Following	  the	  arrival	  of	  the	  ICBM,	  a	  broad	  conception	  of	  airpower	  theory	  was	  paid	  only	  “lip	  service”	  while	  the	  bomber	  generals	  focused	  on	  preserving	  the	  centrality	  of	  manned	  aircraft,	  thereby	  ensuring	  their	  continued	  dominance.	  189	  Builder,	  Werrell,	  and	  Perry’s	  assessment	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  reaction	  to	  the	  ICBM	  provides	  an	  indication	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  manned	  pilot	  leadership	  might	  be	  inclined	  to	  balk	  at	  technological	  alternatives	  to	  manned	  aircraft,	  on	  which	  their	  jobs	  and	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  (1994)	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  187	  Werrell	  (1985)	  104	  188	  Perry	  (Oct.	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  Builder	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status	  depend.	  In	  another	  book,	  Builder	  expressly	  argues	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  pilot	  leadership	  culture	  is	  centered	  on	  supporting	  the	  jobs	  and	  status	  of	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  any	  alternatives	  that	  might	  advance	  the	  broader	  causes	  of	  airpower	  theory.190	  	  He	  finds	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  narrow	  focus	  on	  manned	  aircraft	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  tendency	  of	  USAF	  pilots	  to	  affiliate	  themselves	  with	  their	  manned	  aircraft	  rather	  than	  their	  institution,	  referring	  to	  themselves	  as	  “F-­‐16	  drivers”	  rather	  than	  “USAF	  officers,”	  for	  example.191	  He	  also	  finds	  that	  pilots	  tend	  to	  derive	  their	  status	  from	  their	  airframe	  rather	  than	  their	  institutional	  affiliation.	  Fighter	  pilots,	  who	  began	  to	  replace	  bomber	  pilots	  as	  service	  leaders	  starting	  in	  the	  late	  1970s,192	  have	  the	  highest	  status	  in	  the	  USAF193	  owing	  to	  the	  skill	  required	  to	  fly	  fighters	  and	  the	  perception	  that	  fighter	  pilots	  assume	  the	  most	  risk.	  Since	  1982,	  every	  chief	  of	  staff	  —	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  Gen.	  Norton	  Schwartz,	  (2008-­‐2012)	  —	  has	  been	  a	  fighter	  pilot.194	  The	  trend	  was	  worrying	  enough	  to	  prompt	  Gen.	  Lew	  Allen,	  the	  USAF	  chief	  from	  1978	  to	  1982,	  to	  develop	  “Project	  Warrior,”	  an	  effort	  to	  redirect	  airmen	  away	  from	  their	  tendency	  to	  identify	  with	  technical	  communities	  instead	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  broader	  warfighting	  goals.195	  Based	  on	  Builder’s	  research,	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  could	  be	  expected	  to	  see	  the	  emergence	  of	  UAVs	  as	  a	  particularly	  ominous	  threat	  to	  their	  status	  and	  their	  current	  jobs	  flying	  manned	  aircraft.	  In	  terms	  of	  job	  security,	  UAVs	  literally	  take	  flying	  opportunities	  away	  from	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  because	  they	  perform	  some	  of	  the	  same	  missions	  as	  manned	  aircraft.	  Intelligence,	  surveillance,	  and	  reconnaissance	  (ISR)	  missions,	  for	  example,	  can	  be	  performed	  by	  UAVs	  or	  manned	  MC-­‐12W	  Liberty	  aircraft.	  Similarly,	  a	  high	  value	  targeting	  mission	  could	  be	  conducted	  by	  an	  armed	  UAV	  or	  a	  manned	  F-­‐16.	  UAVs	  also	  potentially	  threaten	  the	  leadership	  status	  of	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  because	  they	  can	  perform	  critical	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  Builder	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  Worden	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  1998)	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  Builder	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  194Air	  Force	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airpower	  missions,	  yet	  flying	  them	  does	  not	  require	  the	  elements	  that	  make	  pilots	  elite:	  namely,	  their	  mastery	  of	  traditional	  piloting	  skills	  and	  their	  exposure	  to	  the	  dangers	  of	  the	  air	  environment.	  	  	  	  If	  Builder	  is	  correct	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  culture	  is	  devoted	  to	  manned	  aircraft	  —	  rather	  than	  a	  broader	  conception	  of	  strategic	  airpower	  —then	  USAF	  pilots	  could	  be	  expected	  to	  actively	  resist	  UAV	  integration.	  Several	  authors	  have	  claimed	  evidence	  of	  this	  resistance,196	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  “the	  white	  scarf	  syndrome.”197	  Of	  course,	  the	  USAF’s	  manned	  pilot	  leaders	  may	  not	  be	  the	  only	  sub-­‐community	  to	  resist	  UAV	  integration	  to	  preserve	  their	  own	  jobs	  and	  status.	  As	  Builder	  notes,	  the	  fracturing	  of	  the	  USAF	  into	  affiliations	  based	  on	  weapon	  systems	  means	  that	  other	  sub-­‐communities	  are	  always	  monitoring	  new	  technologies	  to	  ensure	  they	  do	  not	  pose	  a	  threat	  to	  existing	  ways	  of	  doing	  business.	  Under	  Builder’s	  hypothesis,	  it	  is	  entirely	  possible	  that	  multiple	  USAF	  sub-­‐communities	  may	  resist	  the	  introduction	  of	  UAVs	  as	  a	  means	  to	  improve	  on	  existing	  weapons	  technology.	  	  	   If	  the	  USAF	  sees	  its	  future	  as	  tied	  to	  specific	  weapon	  systems	  such	  as	  manned	  aircraft,	  it	  risks	  fueling	  external	  criticism	  that	  could	  ultimately	  contribute	  to	  the	  service’s	  demise.	  As	  noted	  in	  the	  literature	  review,	  several	  scholars	  have	  suggested	  there	  is	  no	  need	  for	  an	  independent	  air	  force	  if	  UAVs	  eventually	  are	  going	  to	  replace	  manned	  aircraft.	  Other	  military	  services	  already	  fly	  UAVs	  effectively	  and	  the	  USAF	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  contribute	  anything	  unique	  to	  UAV	  operations.198	  If	  the	  US	  and	  international	  community	  come	  to	  agree	  with	  these	  authors	  that	  the	  future	  of	  airpower	  rests	  with	  unmanned	  systems,	  then	  the	  USAF	  risks	  contributing	  to	  its	  own	  downfall	  if	  it	  continues	  to	  promote	  manned	  aircraft	  despite	  technological	  advances	  in	  UAV	  technology	  	  and	  growing	  outsider	  support	  for	  UAVs.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  196	  See,	  for	  example,	  Singer	  (2009)	  253;	  Cantwell	  (June	  2007)	  126	  and	  Spinetta	  (July-­‐August	  2013)	  197	  For	  white	  scarf	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  references,	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  Ehrhard	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  and	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  (Apr.	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2. To	  what	  extent	  were	  judgments	  about	  the	  potential	  and	  cost	  
effectiveness	  of	  unmanned	  technology	  based	  on	  the	  USAF’s	  
enthusiasm	  for	  employing	  new	  technology	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  was	  the	  
enthusiasm	  from	  outside	  the	  service?	  	  This	  question	  suggests	  that	  culture	  significantly	  influences	  how	  military	  organizations	  approach	  the	  integration	  of	  new	  technologies.	  Sociologist	  Morris	  Janowitz	  describes	  how	  officers	  in	  Western	  militaries	  tended	  to	  be	  conservative	  about	  technological	  innovation	  through	  WWII,	  overlooking	  innovations	  in	  favor	  of	  what	  has	  worked	  in	  past	  wars	  as	  a	  means	  to	  hedge	  against	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  future	  battles.199	  One	  widely	  cited	  example	  of	  this	  behavior	  is	  Edward	  Katzenbach’s	  description	  of	  the	  persistence	  of	  the	  horse	  cavalry	  in	  the	  US	  and	  Europe	  despite	  major	  changes	  in	  technology	  that	  called	  the	  practice	  into	  question.200	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Janowitz	  finds	  that	  after	  WWII,	  military	  leaders	  increasingly	  incorporated	  technological	  innovations	  into	  their	  war	  planning	  in	  step	  with	  Western	  industrial	  society.201	  The	  post-­‐WWII	  era	  gave	  way	  to	  a	  newfound	  technological	  optimism	  that	  has	  animated	  defense	  planning	  ever	  since.202	  Mahnken	  provides	  a	  colorful	  example:	  Military	  leaders	  spoke	  enthusiastically	  of	  the	  potential	  for	  technology	  to	  provide	  an	  omniscient	  view	  of	  the	  battlefield	  in	  1960,	  and	  were	  still	  making	  the	  same	  unfulfilled	  predictions	  in	  2000.203	  Mahnken	  argues	  that	  these	  competing	  views	  —	  technological	  skepticism	  and	  technological	  enthusiasm	  —	  continue	  to	  pervade	  American	  society.	  But	  both	  sides	  overstate	  their	  case.	  Technophiles	  may	  overlook	  practical	  and	  strategic	  considerations	  to	  see	  technology	  as	  the	  solution	  to	  all	  of	  war’s	  problems.	  Technology	  skeptics,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  may	  understate	  technology’s	  benefits.204	  	  The	  first	  avenue	  for	  exploration	  identified	  in	  the	  question	  above	  is	  based	  on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  199	  Janowitz	  (1960)	  24	  200	  Katzenbach	  (1973)	  406-­‐422	  201	  Janowitz	  (1960)	  27	  202	  Mahnken	  (2008)	  2	  	  203	  Mahnken	  (2008)	  1	  204	  Mahnken	  (2008)	  6	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the	  idea	  that	  there	  is	  a	  strain	  in	  USAF	  culture	  that	  embraces	  a	  deep	  reverence	  for	  new	  technologies,	  regardless	  of	  type,	  because	  they	  are	  seen	  as	  a	  means	  to	  ensure	  the	  future	  progress	  of	  aerospace	  power.	  Technological	  advancement	  is	  viewed	  as	  a	  competitive	  strategy	  to	  make	  airpower	  more	  efficient	  and	  effective,	  thereby	  allowing	  airpower	  to	  become	  more	  dominant	  in	  military	  power	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  In	  Masks	  of	  War,	  Builder	  argues	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  very	  existence	  depends	  on	  continued	  technological	  enthusiasm.	  The	  USAF	  has	  historically	  cherished	  technology	  because	  the	  airplane	  —	  itself	  an	  “expression	  of	  the	  miracles	  of	  technology“	  —	  provided	  a	  central	  justification	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  independent	  air	  forces.	  If	  technology	  is	  to	  ensure	  a	  rosy	  future	  for	  airpower,	  Builder	  argues,	  the	  USAF	  must	  “worship	  at	  the	  altar”	  of	  technological	  progress,	  to	  include	  not	  just	  manned	  aircraft	  but	  alternatives	  like	  spacecraft,	  to	  maintain	  its	  war-­‐winning	  edge.205	  Airpower	  theorist	  Philip	  Meilinger	  confirms	  the	  view	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  institutional	  relevance	  hinges	  on	  its	  embrace	  of	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  technological	  innovations.206	  In	  his	  master’s	  thesis	  on	  the	  characteristics	  of	  independent	  air	  forces,	  RAAF	  Wing	  Commander	  Stephen	  Edgeley	  notes	  that	  the	  RAF	  and	  the	  RAAF	  share	  the	  USAF’s	  reverence	  for	  technological	  innovation.207	  Based	  on	  this	  research,	  we	  should	  expect	  to	  see	  at	  least	  some	  elements	  of	  the	  USAF	  enthusiastically	  embracing	  UAV	  technologies,	  even	  without	  hard	  evidence	  of	  their	  cost	  effectiveness	  and	  military	  potential.	  Ehrhard	  suggests	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  leadership,	  for	  example,	  has	  expressed	  abundant	  enthusiasm	  for	  UAVs,	  while	  the	  Army	  and	  Navy	  aviation	  communities	  have	  been	  the	  ones	  to	  fall	  victim	  to	  “white	  scarf	  syndrome.”208	  Another	  place	  to	  look	  for	  evidence	  of	  enthusiasm	  for	  UAVs	  is	  the	  USAF’s	  research	  and	  development	  community,	  particularly	  its	  Big	  Safari	  organization,	  which	  has	  a	  long	  history	  of	  UAV	  involvement.209	  The	  second	  area	  for	  exploration	  suggested	  in	  the	  above	  question	  leads	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  205	  Builder	  (1989)	  19	  	  206	  Meilinger	  (Spring	  1996)	  13-­‐14	  207	  Edgeley	  (2010)	  93-­‐94	  208	  Ehrhard	  (2000)	  493	  and	  585	  209	  Grimes	  (2014)	  1-­‐3	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down	  two	  separate	  paths.	  First,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  USAF	  and	  outsiders	  have	  been	  equally	  enthusiastic	  about	  UAVs,	  and	  second,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  USAF	  has	  been	  less	  enthusiastic	  than	  outsiders.	  If	  the	  USAF	  has	  been	  less	  enthusiastic,	  then	  it	  becomes	  prudent	  to	  look	  for	  any	  potential	  sources	  of	  technological	  skepticism	  within	  the	  USAF.	  	  In	  the	  event	  that	  the	  USAF	  proves	  less	  enthusiastic	  than	  outsiders,	  the	  USAF’s	  motivation	  to	  pursue	  new	  technologies,	  such	  as	  UAVs,	  would	  depend	  on	  powerful	  individuals	  in	  the	  USAF	  who	  are	  able	  to	  drive	  a	  cultural	  change	  or	  pressure	  from	  outside	  the	  service.	  	  	  	  Outside	  the	  USAF,	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  technological	  enthusiasm	  characterizes	  the	  strategic	  culture	  of	  the	  US,	  and	  therefore	  political	  and	  military	  elites	  would	  be	  likely	  to	  encourage	  the	  USAF	  to	  pursue	  UAVs.	  During	  WWII,	  strategic	  bombing	  and	  the	  ultimate	  use	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  were	  enabled	  by	  a	  technological	  fervor	  among	  political	  and	  military	  elites	  that	  saw	  the	  bomber	  as	  marvel	  of	  military	  effectiveness	  that	  could	  win	  the	  war.210	  Technological	  enthusiasm	  among	  political	  and	  military	  elites	  has	  been	  central	  to	  the	  “American	  way	  of	  war”	  ever	  since.211	  	  Technological	  enthusiasm	  within	  broader	  American	  society	  may	  also	  contribute	  to	  external	  pressure	  on	  the	  USAF	  to	  pursue	  UAV	  technology.	  	  The	  “machine-­‐mindedness”	  of	  American	  civilization	  has	  led	  the	  US	  to	  seek	  air	  superiority	  in	  every	  conflict	  it	  has	  fought	  since	  WW	  I.212	  Air	  warfare	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  means	  to	  win	  wars	  because	  it	  is	  “high-­‐tech,	  cheap	  in	  lives	  and	  (at	  least	  in	  theory)	  quick”	  argues	  strategic	  studies	  scholar	  Eliot	  Cohen.213	  During	  WWII,	  for	  example,	  the	  American	  public	  saw	  the	  introduction	  of	  bomber	  technology	  as	  a	  means	  to	  shorten	  the	  war,	  thereby	  reducing	  Allied	  combat	  losses	  and	  civilian	  casualties.214	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  210	  Sherry	  1987)	  219-­‐255	  211	  Mahnken	  (2008)	  5;	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  (1999)	  147	  212	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3 To	  what	  extent	  were	  USAF	  judgments	  about	  the	  employment	  of	  
unmanned	  technology	  driven	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	  to	  friendly	  
personnel	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  was	  that	  push	  from	  outside	  the	  service?	  	  This	  question	  suggests	  that	  airpower	  puts	  a	  smaller	  number	  of	  personnel	  at	  risk	  than	  does	  sea	  power	  or	  land	  power.	  The	  tyranny	  of	  geography	  requires	  a	  higher	  proportion	  of	  Army	  and	  Navy	  personnel	  to	  serve	  in	  combat	  compared	  to	  the	  USAF,	  and	  provides	  fewer	  opportunities	  to	  mitigate	  risk	  with	  technology.	  	  	  While	  aerial	  attrition	  in	  the	  era	  of	  the	  World	  Wars	  resembled	  ground	  war	  in	  its	  staggering	  proportional	  losses,215	  Western	  air	  forces	  have	  since	  been	  able	  to	  dramatically	  reduce	  air	  combat	  casualties	  through	  technological	  innovation.216	  US	  loss	  rates	  per	  one	  thousand	  sorties	  fell	  from	  9.7	  in	  WWII	  to	  2.0	  in	  the	  Korean	  War	  and	  just	  0.4	  in	  the	  Vietnam	  War,217	  largely	  due	  to	  technological	  progress.	  Jet	  engines,	  precision-­‐guided	  munitions,	  stealth	  technology,	  and,	  of	  course,	  UAVs,	  offer	  examples	  of	  technologies	  that	  have	  reduced	  risks	  to	  aircrews	  and	  other	  combat	  forces.	  	   Scholars	  note	  that	  the	  substitution	  of	  technology	  for	  manpower	  has	  fueled	  an	  emerging	  norm	  in	  Western	  culture:	  a	  growing	  sensitivity	  to	  casualties.	  As	  military	  historian	  Philip	  Sabin	  argues,	  in	  recent	  decades	  Western	  nations	  have	  come	  to	  expect	  minimal	  air	  casualties	  and	  have	  become	  highly	  sensitive	  to	  media	  reports	  of	  manned	  aircraft	  shoot-­‐downs,	  infrequent	  as	  they	  may	  be218	  (recent	  examples	  include	  the	  1995	  shoot-­‐down	  and	  rescue	  of	  F-­‐16	  pilot	  Scott	  O’Grady	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  the	  1999	  shoot-­‐down	  and	  rescue	  of	  an	  F-­‐117	  Nighthawk	  pilot	  over	  Kosovo).219	  Similarly,	  Western	  nations	  have	  become	  increasingly	  sensitive	  to	  ground	  casualties,	  calling	  for	  better	  protective	  measures,	  to	  include	  more	  or	  better	  air	  support,	  whenever	  any	  losses	  are	  suffered.220	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  216	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  100	  217	  Schlight	  (1996)	  103-­‐104	  218	  Sabin	  (2009)	  103	  	  219	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The	  growing	  use	  of	  UAVs	  in	  the	  battlespace	  has	  fueled	  two	  trends	  that	  both	  stem	  from	  the	  casualty	  sensitivity	  norm	  in	  Western	  society.	  First,	  as	  UAVs	  have	  helped	  to	  reduce	  aircrew	  losses	  in	  recent	  decades	  the	  expectation	  of	  “zero	  casualties”	  has	  now	  become	  the	  new	  Western	  expectation,	  so	  there	  is	  even	  more	  pressure	  to	  use	  UAVs	  to	  avoid	  manned	  aircraft	  losses	  in	  the	  future.221	  Second,	  the	  proliferation	  of	  UAVs	  in	  Western	  society	  also	  has	  reduced	  the	  political	  risks	  of	  UAV	  reconnaissance	  and	  strike	  missions	  when	  their	  legitimacy	  is	  in	  question.	  Before	  UAVs	  were	  used	  for	  clandestine	  overflights,	  manned	  aircraft	  had	  to	  do	  the	  mission,	  risking	  great	  embarrassment	  to	  the	  US	  If	  they	  were	  caught.	  The	  Eisenhower	  administration	  was	  humiliated	  in	  1960	  when	  it	  publicly	  claimed	  USAF	  Captain	  Gary	  Powers	  drifted	  over	  Soviet	  territory	  while	  conducting	  a	  weather	  mission	  in	  his	  U-­‐2	  Dragonlady,	  only	  to	  have	  the	  Soviets	  announce	  days	  later	  that	  they	  had	  captured	  Capt.	  Powers	  who	  confessed	  he	  was	  spying	  for	  the	  CIA.222	  Without	  a	  pilot	  onboard,	  UAVs	  make	  it	  possible	  to	  conduct	  clandestine	  overflights	  (reconnaissance	  and	  strike	  missions)	  in	  places	  like	  Pakistan	  with	  far	  less	  political	  risk,	  prompting	  some	  scholars	  to	  argue	  that	  UAVs	  lower	  the	  threshold	  for	  killing.223	  A	  second	  Western	  norm	  to	  emerge	  from	  the	  substitution	  of	  aviation	  technology	  for	  manpower	  is	  a	  growing	  disassociation	  between	  air	  forces	  and	  heroism.	  Scholars	  note	  that	  the	  Western	  perception	  of	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  as	  “knights	  of	  the	  air”	  is	  fading.”224	  The	  flying	  aces	  of	  World	  War	  I	  (WWI)	  were	  considered	  elite	  because	  they	  overcame	  the	  dangers	  of	  flight	  and	  exhibited	  individual	  skill	  and	  bravery	  high	  above	  the	  masses	  of	  infantry	  in	  the	  trenches	  below.225	  These	  airmen	  embodied	  “the	  warrior	  ethos,”	  —	  a	  willingness,	  or	  even	  an	  enthusiastic	  desire,	  to	  put	  one’s	  life	  at	  risk	  in	  combat	  in	  service	  to	  the	  state.226	  Since	  WWI,	  however,	  aviation	  technology	  has	  distanced	  airmen	  from	  the	  glories	  of	  combat.	  Current	  Western	  perceptions	  of	  warfare,	  as	  embodied	  in	  images	  from	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Afghanistan	  and	  elsewhere,	  seem	  to	  be	  that	  “Aircraft	  observe	  and	  kill,	  while	  soldiers	  fight	  and	  die.”227	  The	  growing	  use	  of	  UAVs	  in	  combat	  missions	  has	  further	  fueled	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  military	  aviator’s	  reputation.	  The	  physical	  distance	  of	  UAV	  pilots	  from	  the	  battlespace	  stands	  in	  sharp	  juxtaposition	  to	  traditional	  conceptions	  of	  the	  warrior	  ethos.	  As	  air	  historian	  Seb	  Cox	  put	  it:	  “If	  the	  existential	  elements	  of	  warfare	  relate	  to	  concepts	  relating	  variously	  to	  bravery,	  self-­‐discovery,	  self-­‐	  image,	  action,	  vitality,	  adversity	  and	  trial,	  where	  does	  this	  leave	  the	  literally	  chair	  bound	  warrior	  flying	  a	  UAV,	  whose	  war	  is	  fought	  from	  a	  padded	  seat	  many	  thousands	  of	  miles	  away	  from	  his	  or	  her	  adversary?”228	  The	  question	  above	  seeks	  to	  explore	  how	  far	  these	  cultural	  trends	  regarding	  aircrew	  risk	  have	  shaped	  decisions	  about	  UAV	  integration	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  USAF.	  The	  first	  possibility	  suggested	  by	  the	  question	  is	  that	  the	  USAF	  has	  absorbed	  the	  Western	  cultural	  trend	  toward	  increasing	  casualty	  sensitivity.	  Following	  the	  air	  wars	  over	  Bosnia	  and	  Kosovo	  in	  the	  1990’s,	  some	  authors	  even	  argued	  that	  the	  USAF	  culture	  become	  too	  risk	  averse,	  with	  USAF	  leaders	  putting	  force	  protection	  priorities	  above	  the	  mission.	  229	  But	  other	  scholars	  point	  out	  that	  combatant	  commanders’	  casualty	  aversion	  often	  reflects	  a	  tendency	  in	  broader	  Western	  society	  to	  tolerate	  minimal	  casualties,	  particularly	  in	  limited	  wars	  when	  vital	  interests	  are	  not	  perceived	  to	  be	  at	  stake.230	  If	  USAF	  culture	  has	  embraced	  casualty	  avoidance	  as	  a	  priority,	  at	  least	  in	  contexts	  where	  vital	  interests	  were	  not	  perceived	  to	  be	  at	  stake,	  we	  would	  expect	  to	  find	  evidence	  of	  USAF	  leaders	  advocating	  for	  UAVs	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  they	  keep	  aircrews	  out	  of	  harm’s	  way.	  	  	  The	  second	  possibility	  suggested	  by	  the	  question	  above	  leads	  to	  two	  additional	  avenues	  of	  inquiry.	  First	  is	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  USAF	  and	  outsiders	  have	  been	  equally	  concerned	  with	  reducing	  aircrew	  risk.	  Second	  is	  the	  possibility	  that	  outsiders	  have	  been	  more	  concerned	  than	  the	  USAF.	  If	  casualty	  avoidance	  is	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not	  a	  priority	  for	  the	  USAF,	  then	  we	  need	  to	  look	  for	  explanations	  for	  this	  lack	  of	  interest.	  One	  possibility	  is	  that	  the	  service	  sees	  technologies	  to	  reduce	  risk	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  service’s	  warrior	  ethos.	  In	  the	  event	  that	  the	  USAF	  is	  less	  concerned	  with	  casualty	  avoidance	  than	  outsiders,	  the	  USAF’s	  motivation	  to	  pursue	  UAV	  technology	  would	  become	  more	  dependent	  on	  outside	  pressure	  from	  political	  and	  military	  elites	  or	  broader	  American	  society.	  	  America’s	  most	  senior	  political	  and	  military	  elites	  seem	  likely	  to	  provide	  a	  strong	  source	  of	  external	  pressure	  regardless	  of	  whether	  vital	  interests	  are	  at	  stake.	  Scholars	  note	  that	  US	  strategic	  culture	  is	  highly	  risk	  averse.231	  Military	  strategist	  Jeffrey	  Record	  has	  written	  about	  an	  element	  in	  US	  strategic	  culture	  that	  seeks	  to	  reduce	  risk	  to	  combat	  forces	  at	  almost	  any	  cost.	  He	  argues	  that	  “force	  protection	  fetishism”	  has	  overtaken	  a	  generation	  of	  American	  elites	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  leading	  these	  elites	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  risks	  of	  using	  force,	  both	  in	  the	  physical	  battlespace	  and	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  domestic	  politics,	  usually	  outweigh	  the	  benefits,	  especially	  in	  the	  context	  of	  interventions	  in	  other	  states’	  civil	  wars.	  232	  	  	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  US	  strategic	  culture,	  pressure	  from	  broader	  American	  society	  to	  substitute	  technology	  for	  manpower	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  depend	  on	  the	  circumstances.	  Overall,	  an	  impulse	  to	  minimize	  risk	  to	  US	  forces	  is	  rooted	  in	  American	  culture,	  which	  values	  the	  individual	  much	  more	  than	  the	  state	  and	  has	  therefore	  always	  sought	  to	  substitute	  technology	  for	  lives	  in	  battle.233	  However,	  some	  scholars	  argue	  that	  while	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  sustain	  public	  support	  for	  bloody,	  inconclusive	  wars	  (like	  Vietnam)	  and	  military	  interventions	  (like	  Lebanon	  and	  Somalia),	  Americans	  will	  accept	  greater	  casualties	  when	  vital	  interests	  are	  directly	  threatened.234	  Record	  cites	  the	  1941	  Japanese	  attack	  on	  Pearl	  Harbor	  and	  the	  2001	  terrorist	  attack	  on	  the	  World	  Trade	  Center	  as	  examples	  of	  attacks	  that	  threatened	  vital	  US	  interests	  and	  therefore	  increased	  the	  American	  public’s	  tolerance	  for	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casualties.235	  Given	  the	  contingent	  nature	  of	  casualty	  aversion	  in	  American	  society,	  we	  would	  expect	  to	  see	  Americans	  exert	  more	  pressure	  on	  the	  USAF	  to	  employ	  UAVs	  in	  wars	  that	  do	  not	  impact	  vital	  interests.	  	  	  	  
4. To	  what	  extent	  were	  judgments	  about	  unmanned	  technology	  based	  on	  
a	  concern	  about	  maintaining	  the	  USAF’s	  primacy	  over	  air	  assets	  in	  
response	  to	  competition	  from	  other	  civilian	  and	  military	  institutions?	  	  
	  The	  premise	  underlying	  this	  question	  is	  that	  air	  forces,	  like	  any	  large	  bureaucracy,	  jealously	  guard	  their	  autonomy.	  On	  one	  level,	  this	  question	  is	  different	  from	  the	  previous	  three	  because	  it	  emphasizes	  what	  the	  USAF	  has	  in	  common	  with	  other	  military	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  Army	  and	  the	  Navy	  rather	  than	  what	  makes	  it	  distinctive.	  From	  a	  rational	  perspective,	  organizational	  theory	  tells	  us	  that	  military	  institutions	  of	  all	  stripes	  will	  seek	  to	  maximize	  autonomy	  and	  reduce	  uncertainty	  to	  maintain	  their	  hold	  on	  power.	  	  	  But,	  from	  a	  cultural	  perspective,	  Halperin’s	  concept	  of	  organizational	  essence	  tells	  us	  that	  military	  organizations	  only	  seek	  a	  monopoly	  over	  things	  that	  they	  see	  as	  essential	  to	  fulfilling	  their	  core	  missions.236	  This	  is	  where	  the	  distinctive	  culture	  of	  the	  USAF	  becomes	  relevant.	  The	  USAF	  is	  unlikely	  to	  compete	  for	  things	  that	  it	  does	  not	  believe	  are	  needed	  for	  its	  continued	  functioning	  —tanks,	  for	  example	  —	  but	  it	  is	  far	  more	  likely	  to	  put	  up	  a	  fight	  if	  another	  service	  tries	  to	  control	  an	  aerospace	  asset	  or	  mission.	  By	  looking	  at	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  USAF	  has	  been	  willing	  to	  fight	  for	  control	  over	  UAVs,	  we	  can	  get	  a	  sense	  of	  how	  closely	  the	  USAF	  associates	  that	  technology	  with	  its	  organizational	  essence.	  	  The	  USAF	  has	  been	  particularly	  protective	  of	  assets	  that	  it	  perceives	  as	  close	  to	  its	  core	  functions	  due	  to	  a	  longstanding	  insecurity	  about	  its	  position	  as	  an	  independent	  service.	  Like	  air	  forces	  in	  other	  democratic	  cultures,	  the	  USAF	  has	  a	  long	  history	  of	  challenges	  to	  its	  independence.	  The	  USAF,	  RAF,	  and	  the	  Royal	  Australian	  Air	  Force	  (RAAF)	  were	  all	  established	  much	  later	  than	  their	  respective	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national	  armies	  and	  navies.	  Inter-­‐service	  rivalry	  bedeviled	  the	  birth	  of	  all	  three	  independent	  air	  services,	  as	  older	  armies	  and	  navies	  sought	  to	  protect	  their	  own	  organizational	  power	  by	  seeking	  to	  maintain	  control	  of	  their	  own	  air	  arms.237	  The	  three	  air	  forces	  all	  fought	  for	  their	  independence	  based	  on	  a	  shared	  understanding	  developed	  among	  airpower	  visionaries	  –	  an	  international	  norm	  –	  built	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  independent	  air	  forces	  were	  1)	  efficient	  from	  an	  organizational	  and	  cost	  perspective,	  and	  2)	  capable	  of	  delivering	  war-­‐winning	  effects	  rather	  than	  merely	  providing	  a	  support	  function	  to	  other	  military	  services.238	  Today,	  insecurity	  about	  their	  independence	  still	  leaves	  these	  air	  forces	  vulnerable	  to	  getting	  locked	  in	  a	  “justification	  cycle,”	  in	  which	  air	  force	  leaders	  feel	  compelled	  to	  insist	  that	  airpower	  can	  independently	  win	  wars	  and	  are	  reluctant	  to	  acknowledge	  joint	  or	  supporting	  roles.239	  Given	  their	  perennial	  insecurity	  over	  independence,	  the	  USAF	  and	  like-­‐minded	  air	  forces	  tend	  to	  see	  inter-­‐service	  competition	  for	  greater	  resources	  and	  prestige	  as	  a	  fundamental	  threat	  to	  their	  independence,	  while	  the	  other	  military	  services	  simply	  see	  it	  as	  part	  of	  the	  normal	  political	  turmoil	  within	  the	  defense	  organization.240	  With	  the	  stakes	  so	  high,	  the	  USAF	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  especially	  jealous	  in	  the	  safeguarding	  of	  aerospace	  assets	  and	  missions	  that	  are	  viewed	  as	  essential	  to	  its	  continued	  independent	  functioning,	  just	  as	  Halperin	  predicts.	  One	  notable	  example	  is	  the	  USAF’s	  fight	  with	  the	  Army	  during	  the	  1960’s	  over	  control	  of	  rotary	  wing	  aircraft	  for	  the	  air	  mobility	  mission.	  On	  one	  hand,	  the	  USAF	  took	  little	  interest	  in	  the	  mission	  historically,	  but	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  it	  strongly	  resisted	  the	  Army’s	  eventually	  successful	  efforts	  to	  establish	  an	  organic	  fleet,	  viewing	  the	  move	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  USAF’s	  monopoly	  over	  airpower	  missions.241	  	  Over	  time	  the	  lines	  between	  the	  USAF’s	  core	  missions	  and	  peripheral	  responsibilities	  have	  become	  even	  more	  blurred	  as	  technology	  has	  moved	  from	  air	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to	  space	  and	  cyberspace.	  In	  each	  medium,	  the	  USAF	  has	  to	  make	  decisions	  about	  which	  missions	  and	  technologies	  to	  fight	  for	  and	  which	  ones	  to	  let	  go.	  These	  are	  important	  decisions	  because	  allowing	  a	  core	  mission	  to	  slip	  from	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  USAF	  could	  lead	  to	  the	  marginalization	  of	  the	  service,	  or,	  in	  a	  worst-­‐case	  scenario,	  its	  ultimate	  demise.	  	  	  	  The	  first	  possibility	  suggested	  in	  the	  question	  above	  is	  that	  the	  USAF	  aggressively	  protects	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  aerospace	  assets	  in	  response	  to	  challenges	  from	  outsiders.	  The	  service	  takes	  a	  maximalist	  view	  of	  the	  range	  of	  aerospace	  technology	  and	  missions	  with	  potentially	  war-­‐winning	  effects	  and	  jealously	  guards	  control	  of	  all	  of	  them.	  For	  example,	  the	  USAF	  would	  be	  just	  as	  prone	  to	  resist	  an	  external	  challenge	  to	  its	  control	  satellites	  as	  it	  would	  be	  to	  rebuff	  an	  outsider’s	  bid	  to	  control	  the	  B-­‐52	  fleet.	  In	  this	  view,	  we	  would	  expect	  to	  find	  the	  USAF	  fighting	  for	  control	  of	  UAVS	  in	  response	  to	  outside	  challenges.	  While	  UAVs	  are	  essentially	  a	  tactical	  innovation,	  they	  have	  nevertheless	  delivered	  strategic	  effects	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  potential	  to	  reduce	  acquisition	  costs,	  increase	  the	  pervasiveness	  of	  aerospace	  power,	  and	  reduce	  aircrew	  casualties.242	  In	  this	  sense,	  they	  fall	  within	  a	  maximalist	  definition	  of	  technologies	  with	  potential	  war-­‐winning	  effects	  and	  we	  would	  therefore	  expect	  the	  USAF	  to	  seek	  to	  maintain	  control	  of	  them	  and	  try	  to	  use	  them	  as	  efficiently	  and	  effectively	  as	  possible.	  	  The	  second	  possibility	  suggested	  in	  this	  question	  is	  that	  the	  USAF	  protects	  	  a	  select	  few	  aerospace	  technologies	  and	  missions	  from	  outsider	  incursions	  because	  it	  takes	  a	  relatively	  narrow	  view	  of	  its	  core	  functions.	  Only	  a	  handful	  of	  technologies	  and	  missions	  are	  essential	  for	  achieving	  strategic	  effects.	  In	  particular,	  manned	  aircraft	  and	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  are	  needed	  to	  fulfill	  core	  functions	  of	  the	  service	  such	  as	  air	  superiority	  and	  strategic	  bombing.	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  aerospace	  portfolio	  is	  less	  essential	  because	  it	  is	  not	  seen	  as	  directly	  contributing	  to	  the	  USAF’s	  war-­‐winning	  edge.	  Under	  this	  narrow	  view,	  the	  USAF	  would	  be	  unlikely	  to	  protect	  UAVs	  from	  outsiders	  because	  they	  are	  not	  part	  of	  this	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relatively	  narrow	  conception	  of	  its	  core	  functions.	  	  	  Finally,	  the	  last	  possibility	  suggested	  in	  the	  question	  indicates	  that	  the	  USAF	  engages	  in	  paradoxical	  behavior	  in	  response	  to	  outside	  challenges.	  The	  service	  protects	  its	  authority	  over	  certain	  technology	  or	  missions	  even	  though	  it	  does	  not	  truly	  believe	  that	  those	  assets	  are	  essential	  for	  fulfilling	  core	  functions.	  In	  this	  scenario,	  the	  USAF	  adopts	  a	  narrow	  view	  of	  its	  core	  functions,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  want	  to	  cede	  authority	  of	  a	  mission	  or	  asset	  perceived	  as	  peripheral	  because	  it	  wants	  to	  ensure	  it	  stays	  that	  way.	  	  Two	  examples	  of	  this	  behavior	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  case	  of	  cruise	  missiles	  and	  ICBMs.	  To	  be	  sure,	  Gen.	  Arnold	  and	  his	  followers,	  including	  Gen.	  Bernard	  Schriever,	  genuinely	  embraced	  these	  technologies	  as	  a	  means	  to	  advance	  airpower	  in	  response	  to	  outside	  challenges.	  But	  there	  was	  another	  strain	  in	  the	  USAF	  that	  took	  a	  more	  cynical	  view.	  According	  to	  Edmund	  Beard,	  the	  USAF’s	  early	  approach	  to	  these	  guided	  missiles	  had	  a	  “dual	  nature”	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  “missiles	  were	  downplayed	  within	  the	  Air	  Force,	  while	  they	  were	  urged	  over	  the	  competing	  projects	  of	  other	  services.”243	  If	  the	  USAF	  is	  taking	  this	  same	  approach	  to	  UAV	  development,	  we	  would	  expect	  to	  see	  the	  service	  fight	  for	  control	  of	  UAVs,	  but	  do	  little	  to	  integrate	  them	  or	  use	  them	  efficiently	  and	  effectively	  as	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  airpower	  strategy.	  	  	  
4.	  	  Conclusion	  	  	  	  This	  chapter	  began	  by	  exploring	  the	  thorny	  questions	  of	  how	  to	  define	  and	  analyze	  culture,	  concluding	  that	  it	  is	  best	  understood	  as	  a	  broad	  concept	  that	  shapes	  both	  actors	  and	  their	  environments.	  In	  section	  two,	  I	  discussed	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  pervasive	  nature	  of	  culture	  for	  my	  research.	  The	  main	  point	  is	  that	  I	  need	  to	  consider	  how	  USAF	  culture	  both	  shaped	  –	  and	  was	  shaped	  by	  –	  the	  Predator	  program.	  To	  better	  understand	  this	  mutually	  shaping	  relationship,	  section	  three	  introduced	  four	  sub-­‐questions	  that	  are	  asked	  across	  each	  of	  the	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chapters	  that	  follow.	  Each	  of	  these	  questions	  seeks	  to	  explore	  what	  makes	  USAF	  culture	  distinctive	  and	  invites	  an	  analysis	  of	  how	  that	  culture	  interacted	  with	  UAV	  innovation.	  	  One	  common	  theme	  that	  runs	  through	  these	  sub-­‐questions	  is	  a	  significant	  cultural	  tension	  surrounding	  the	  issue	  of	  USAF	  identity.	  If	  the	  USAF	  largely	  identifies	  itself	  as	  a	  military	  service	  narrowly	  devoted	  to	  the	  continued	  dominance	  of	  manned	  aircraft	  and	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots,	  then	  UAVs	  fundamentally	  threaten	  the	  USAF’s	  sense	  of	  purpose.	  If,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  USAF	  sees	  itself	  as	  an	  institution	  broadly	  interested	  in	  strategic	  mastery	  of	  the	  air	  —	  regardless	  of	  the	  means	  —then	  UAVs	  are	  a	  welcome	  addition	  to	  the	  USAF’s	  arsenal.	  	  	  The	  stakes	  surrounding	  this	  debate	  about	  USAF	  identity	  could	  not	  be	  higher.	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  introduction,	  there	  are	  people	  both	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  USAF	  who	  believe	  the	  service’s	  main	  contribution	  rests	  with	  manned	  aircraft	  and	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots.	  If	  these	  people	  are	  right,	  then	  aerospace	  innovations	  –	  UAVs,	  or	  any	  other	  type	  –	  pose	  a	  fundamental	  threat	  to	  the	  USAF’s	  very	  existence.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  USAF’s	  future	  is	  far	  less	  fraught	  –	  and,	  frankly,	  far	  more	  filled	  with	  potential	  –	  if	  the	  service	  has	  been	  able	  to	  move	  away	  from	  an	  identity	  linked	  mainly	  to	  manned	  flight	  towards	  a	  broader	  conception	  of	  itself	  as	  the	  military	  service	  responsible	  for	  the	  expert	  employment	  of	  strategic	  airpower	  across	  the	  realms	  of	  air,	  space,	  and	  cyber	  space.	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  The	  fight	  for	  an	  independent	  air	  arm	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  which	  began	  during	  the	  interwar	  period,	  centered	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  airpower	  could	  quickly	  and	  decisively	  win	  wars	  through	  offensive	  strikes	  directed	  at	  critical	  sources	  of	  enemy	  power.	  The	  conduct	  of	  such	  a	  strategic	  air	  campaign	  would	  require	  central	  and	  independent	  control	  of	  the	  air.1	  Starting	  in	  the	  1920’s,	  airpower	  proponents	  began	  developing	  a	  strategic	  bombing	  doctrine	  built	  around	  manned	  bombers	  as	  a	  means	  to	  implement	  this	  theory.2	  But	  as	  early	  as	  1917,	  airpower	  advocates	  had	  to	  consider	  the	  possibility	  that	  other	  air	  weapons,	  including	  unmanned	  technologies,	  might	  also	  have	  strategic	  potential.	  	  	  	  This	  chapter	  paints	  a	  historical	  portrait	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  cultural	  attitudes	  toward	  unmanned	  technologies	  between	  1917,	  when	  the	  US	  military	  experimented	  with	  its	  first	  UAV,	  the	  Kettering	  Bug,	  and	  1993,	  when	  the	  Predator	  program	  began.	  Drawing	  on	  the	  four	  sub-­‐questions	  identified	  in	  chapter	  two,	  it	  highlights	  significant	  patterns	  in	  the	  interaction	  between	  USAF	  culture	  and	  unmanned	  innovation	  in	  early	  US	  airpower	  history	  and	  whether	  those	  patterns	  changed	  over	  time.	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  chapter	  is	  to	  determine	  whether	  USAF	  culture	  has	  historically	  nurtured	  a	  broad	  conception	  of	  airpower	  that	  welcomes	  unmanned	  technologies,	  or	  whether	  USAF	  culture	  has	  limited	  the	  service’s	  focus	  to	  manned	  technologies	  with	  war-­‐winning	  capability.	  The	  findings	  will	  serve	  as	  a	  baseline	  to	  assess	  whether	  and	  how	  USAF	  culture	  changed	  between	  1993	  and	  2015	  as	  it	  shaped-­‐	  and	  was	  shaped	  by-­‐	  developments	  in	  the	  Predator	  program.	  	  Like	  the	  substantive	  chapters	  that	  follow,	  this	  chapter	  is	  divided	  into	  two	  sections.	  The	  first	  half	  provides	  a	  brief	  history	  of	  unmanned	  technologies,	  and	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Builder	  	  (1994)	  62	  2	  Wolk	  (2010)	  3236	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second	  half	  provides	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  interaction	  between	  USAF	  culture	  and	  those	  technologies.	  The	  scope	  of	  the	  chapter	  is	  limited	  to	  UAVs	  as	  defined	  in	  the	  introduction.	  There	  is	  a	  wealth	  of	  information	  about	  the	  USAF’s	  cultural	  attitudes	  toward	  other	  unmanned	  technologies,	  including	  ICBMs	  and	  cruise	  missiles,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  addressed	  here	  due	  to	  space	  constraints.3	  	  Even	  within	  the	  history	  of	  UAVs	  as	  defined	  in	  the	  introduction,	  so	  much	  information	  is	  available	  that	  a	  second	  limitation	  on	  the	  scope	  is	  necessary.	  Rather	  than	  conducting	  an	  exhaustive	  survey	  of	  UAV	  history,	  this	  chapter	  only	  highlights	  UAV	  programs	  that	  significantly	  influenced,	  or	  were	  influenced	  by,	  USAF	  culture.	  	  	  
	  Key	  Milestones	  in	  UAV	  Innovation	  
	  America’s	  airmen	  were	  first	  introduced	  to	  UAV	  technology	  in	  1917	  when	  then-­‐Col.	  (temporary)	  Henry	  Harley	  “Hap”	  Arnold,	  the	  executive	  officer	  of	  the	  US	  Army’s	  Air	  Division,	  teamed	  with	  civilian	  scientists	  to	  produce	  the	  Kettering	  Bug.4	  The	  wooden	  biplane	  was	  one	  of	  several	  early	  attempts	  to	  develop	  what	  was	  generically	  known	  as	  an	  “aerial	  torpedo.”5	  Designed	  to	  take	  a	  one-­‐way	  trip,	  the	  ground-­‐launched	  Bug	  carried	  a	  “warhead”	  containing	  300	  pounds	  of	  explosives.6	  By	  1919,	  the	  Army’s	  Air	  Service	  had	  ordered	  100	  copies	  of	  the	  Bug,	  but	  as	  WWI	  came	  to	  an	  end	  and	  flight	  tests	  yielded	  mixed	  results,	  the	  program	  was	  abandoned.7	  	  	  Nevertheless,	  American	  airmen’s	  interest	  in	  one-­‐way	  UAVs	  continued	  into	  the	  late	  1920s	  and	  early	  1930s	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  improving	  aerodynamic	  stability	  and	  guidance	  systems.8	  In	  1923,	  Brigadier	  General	  Billy	  Mitchell,	  the	  deputy	  chief	  of	  the	  Air	  Service,	  proposed	  using	  an	  aerial	  torpedo	  for	  his	  famous	  tests	  of	  aerial	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  On	  USAF	  culture	  and	  ICBMs,	  see:	  Beard	  (1976);	  Builder	  (1994)	  ;	  Mackenzie	  (1990);	  Perry	  (October	  1967);	  Perry	  (May	  1967);	  	  and	  Sheehan	  (2009)	  On	  USAF	  culture	  and	  cruise	  missiles,	  see	  Werrell	  (1985)	  and	  Beard	  (1976)	  4	  Arnold	  (1949)	  74;	  Daso	  (Winter	  1996);	  Hughes	  	  (1989)	  126-­‐135	  5	  Hughes	  (1989)32;	  Schultz	  (2007)	  194	  6	  Daso	  (Winter	  1996);	  Armitage	  (1988)	  3	  7	  Armitage	  (1988)	  3;	  Arnold	  (1949)	  84	  8	  Schultz	  (2007)	  200	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bombardment	  of	  battleships,	  although	  the	  plan	  never	  came	  to	  fruition	  because	  the	  vehicles	  were	  under	  modification	  at	  the	  time.9	  Aside	  from	  the	  advocacy	  of	  then-­‐Col.	  Arnold	  and	  Brig.	  Gen.	  Mitchell,	  however,	  overall	  progress	  on	  the	  aerial	  torpedo	  was	  slow	  during	  the	  interwar	  period.	  The	  program	  was	  even	  briefly	  mothballed	  in	  1932	  because	  there	  was	  no	  institutional	  impetus	  in	  the	  US	  Army	  Air	  Corps	  to	  move	  it	  beyond	  test	  stages	  and	  funding	  was	  scarce.10	  Frustrated	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  progress,	  Arnold	  took	  over	  aerial	  torpedo	  development	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1930s	  as	  a	  major	  general.	  To	  ensure	  the	  program	  did	  not	  overlap	  with	  any	  of	  the	  US	  Army’s	  tactical	  field	  artillery,	  he	  developed	  ambitious	  design	  specifications	  for	  an	  unmanned	  bomber.	  He	  stretched	  the	  range	  requirements	  from	  20	  miles	  to	  100,	  called	  for	  far	  more	  stringent	  accuracy	  of	  a	  one-­‐half	  mile	  diameter	  circle,	  and	  increased	  the	  payload	  capacity	  above	  200	  pounds.11	  	  	   After	  a	  contracting	  competition	  yielded	  little	  interest,	  however,	  then-­‐Maj.	  Gen.	  Arnold	  once	  again	  turned	  to	  Kettering,	  now	  working	  at	  General	  Motors,	  to	  build	  a	  new	  version	  of	  the	  Bug,	  the	  GMA-­‐1.12	  In	  December	  1941,	  the	  improved	  Bug	  demonstrated	  a	  range	  of	  more	  than	  200	  miles	  during	  flight	  tests.13	  It	  included	  an	  autopilot	  system,	  remote	  radio	  control,	  and	  a	  television	  camera	  on	  its	  nose.	  Operators	  could	  use	  the	  television	  system	  to	  guide	  the	  Bug	  via	  radio	  control,	  but	  the	  process	  required	  intensive	  human	  oversight	  and	  the	  range	  still	  fell	  short	  of	  the	  strategic	  reach	  needed	  to	  hit	  Germany,14	  so	  the	  contract	  was	  terminated	  in	  May	  1943.	  	  	  
WWII-­‐Era	  Unmanned	  Technologies	  	  	  Although	  building	  unmanned	  bombers	  presented	  a	  technological	  challenge,	  basic	  UAV	  components	  were	  understood	  well	  enough	  even	  in	  the	  1940s	  to	  allow	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Schultz	  (2007)	  199	  10	  Schultz	  (2007)	  202	  11	  Schultz	  (2007)	  205-­‐	  207	  12	  Schultz	  (2007)	  207-­‐208	  13	  Arnold	  (1949)	  259-­‐260	  14	  Arnold	  (1949)	  261	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widespread	  use	  during	  WWII.	  Shortly	  after	  its	  establishment	  in	  June	  1941,	  the	  US	  Army	  Air	  Forces	  (AAF)	  ordered	  over	  3,800	  target	  drones	  from	  UAV	  manufacturer	  Radioplanes	  to	  train	  American	  antiaircraft	  gunners.15	  The	  use	  of	  UAVs	  was	  so	  widespread	  during	  WWII	  that	  the	  AAF	  created	  the	  Pilotless	  Aircraft	  Branch	  in	  1945	  to	  continue	  post-­‐war	  development	  of	  cruise	  missiles	  and	  target	  drones,	  including	  Radioplane’s	  target	  drones	  and	  the	  Ryan	  Aeronautical	  Q-­‐2.	  The	  latter,	  a	  jet-­‐propelled,	  subsonic	  target	  drone	  for	  anti-­‐aircraft	  and	  air-­‐to-­‐air	  gunnery	  practice,	  was	  the	  progenitor	  of	  a	  series	  of	  Ryan	  Aeronautical	  Firebee	  drones	  that	  would	  serve	  as	  a	  reconnaissance	  workhorse	  in	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  as	  discussed	  below.16	  While	  target	  practice	  was	  the	  primary	  use	  of	  UAVs	  in	  WWII,	  efforts	  also	  continued	  to	  develop	  unmanned	  bomber	  technology.	  In	  June	  1944,	  then-­‐Maj.	  Gen.	  Arnold,	  now	  commanding	  general	  of	  the	  AAF,	  got	  a	  call	  from	  then-­‐	  (temporary)	  Maj.	  Gen.	  Carl	  A.	  Spaatz,	  the	  chief	  of	  the	  AAF	  Combat	  Command	  in	  Washington	  DC,	  seeking	  an	  effective	  solution	  to	  destroy	  hardened	  German	  “V”	  weapon	  sites	  and	  the	  Pas-­‐de-­‐Calais	  electrical	  grid.	  Manned	  bombers	  did	  not	  carry	  a	  sufficient	  explosive	  load	  to	  do	  the	  job	  effectively,	  but	  unmanned	  bombers,	  including	  old	  B-­‐17	  Flying	  Fortresses	  and	  B-­‐24	  Liberators,	  might	  be	  more	  effective	  if	  they	  were	  filled	  with	  explosives	  and	  flown	  directly	  into	  the	  target.17	  The	  Navy	  partnered	  with	  the	  AAF	  on	  the	  War	  Weary	  bomber	  project,	  which	  the	  AAF	  codenamed	  “Aphrodite.”	  In	  the	  end,	  a	  combination	  of	  fatalities	  among	  the	  pilots	  who	  had	  to	  bail	  out	  of	  the	  explosive-­‐laden	  bombers,	  as	  well	  as	  misgivings	  about	  targeting	  accuracy,	  led	  to	  the	  cancellation	  of	  the	  short-­‐lived	  program.18	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  McDaid	  and	  Oliver	  (1997)	  16	  16	  Clark	  (June	  1999)	  17	  17	  Crane	  (1993)	  78-­‐79;	  Boyne	  (Nov.	  2010)	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Cold	  War	  Reconnaissance:	  Figuring	  Out	  How	  to	  Manage	  Drone	  Development	  
	  As	  the	  Cold	  War	  dawned,	  it	  was	  becoming	  increasingly	  apparent	  that	  the	  US	  needed	  to	  prepare	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  nuclear	  war	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Recognizing	  the	  need	  for	  a	  reliable	  way	  to	  conduct	  peacetime	  reconnaissance	  of	  communist	  states,	  the	  US	  began	  to	  fly	  U-­‐2	  surveillance	  missions	  to	  assess	  the	  Soviets’	  missile	  capabilities	  in	  July	  1956.19	  But	  after	  the	  Soviets	  shot	  down	  U-­‐2	  pilot	  Gary	  Powers	  on	  May	  1,	  1960,	  President	  Dwight	  Eisenhower	  halted	  the	  CIA-­‐owned,	  USAF-­‐operated	  U-­‐2	  flights	  over	  the	  Soviet	  Union.20	  	  The	  US	  now	  faced	  a	  serious	  gap	  in	  its	  strategic	  reconnaissance	  capability.	  It	  would	  be	  eighteen	  months	  before	  the	  first	  US	  reconnaissance	  satellite	  would	  be	  operational,	  and	  the	  development	  of	  the	  manned,	  stealthy,	  high-­‐speed	  CIA/USAF	  SR-­‐71	  Blackbird	  had	  just	  begun.	  It	  was	  the	  perfect	  time	  for	  UAVs	  to	  step	  into	  a	  three-­‐way	  competition	  with	  satellites	  and	  manned	  aircraft	  to	  provide	  a	  strategic	  reconnaissance	  capability.21	  The	  days	  of	  using	  drones	  mostly	  for	  target	  practice	  and	  one-­‐way	  suicide	  missions	  were	  coming	  to	  an	  end,	  giving	  way	  to	  a	  growing	  recognition	  that	  the	  technology	  existed	  to	  produce	  recoverable	  drones	  for	  aerial	  reconnaissance.	  	  	  	  	  On	  July	  9,	  1960,	  the	  USAF	  awarded	  Ryan	  Aeronautical	  a	  small	  classified	  contract	  for	  a	  program	  known	  as	  “Red	  Wagon”	  to	  explore	  opportunities	  to	  reduce	  the	  radar	  cross	  section	  of	  its	  Q-­‐2C	  Firebee	  target	  drone	  for	  reconnaissance	  flights	  over	  communist	  territory.22	  After	  a	  successful	  demonstration,	  however,	  the	  USAF	  rejected	  two	  Ryan	  bids	  for	  follow-­‐on	  production	  of	  drones	  built	  for	  the	  strategic	  reconnaissance	  role	  between	  1960	  and	  1962:	  a	  $50	  million	  contract	  for	  a	  follow-­‐on	  production	  effort	  also	  called	  “Red	  Wagon”	  and	  a	  $70	  million	  contract	  for	  another	  production	  run	  codenamed	  “Lucy	  Lee.”23	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  Taubman	  (2003)	  183-­‐184	  	  20	  Taubman	  (2003	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  21	  Wagner	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Fortunes	  for	  UAV	  funding	  would	  begin	  to	  shift	  in	  September	  1961	  when	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  established	  the	  National	  Reconnaissance	  Organization	  (NRO)	  to	  streamline	  overhead	  reconnaissance	  efforts.	  24	  Although	  the	  NRO	  was	  created	  mainly	  to	  corral	  satellite	  programs,	  the	  agency’s	  “Program	  D”	  was	  established	  to	  pay	  for	  both	  unmanned	  reconnaissance	  aircraft	  and	  also	  manned	  versions	  including	  the	  U-­‐2	  and	  SR-­‐71.	  Going	  forward,	  the	  USAF’s	  UAV	  development	  efforts	  could	  be	  pursued	  without	  affecting	  the	  service’s	  own	  budget,	  enabling	  the	  USAF	  to	  develop	  drones	  without	  financial	  constraints	  through	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s.25	  This	  extra	  funding	  source	  would	  remain	  available	  until	  1974	  when	  the	  NRO	  closed	  Program	  D.26	  The	  first	  major	  USAF	  UAV	  to	  benefit	  from	  NRO	  funding	  was	  the	  147A	  Firefly,	  another	  modified	  version	  of	  Ryan	  Aeronautical’s	  Q-­‐2C	  Firebee.	  The	  USAF	  awarded	  a	  $1.1	  million	  contract	  to	  the	  company	  in	  February	  1962	  for	  four	  drones,	  using	  the	  USAF’s	  Big	  Safari	  office	  as	  a	  conduit.27	  Big	  Safari,	  which	  would	  later	  play	  a	  major	  role	  in	  Predator	  development,	  was	  established	  in	  1952	  as	  a	  means	  to	  rapidly	  acquire	  small	  fleets	  of	  highly	  classified	  weapons	  systems.28	  	  The	  147A	  Firefly	  found	  a	  home	  in	  Strategic	  Air	  Command	  (SAC),	  where	  it	  would	  stay	  until	  1976	  when	  Tactical	  Air	  Command	  (TAC)	  took	  control	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  drone	  programs.29	  Variants	  of	  the	  Firefly	  family	  —	  known	  as	  “Lightning	  Bugs”	  after	  March	  1963	  when	  the	  code	  name	  was	  compromised	  30	  —	  became	  prized	  reconnaissance	  assets	  over	  Vietnam	  and	  China	  through	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s.	  	  Standard	  Lightning	  Bug	  operations	  involved	  air-­‐launching	  the	  drones	  from	  beneath	  the	  wing	  of	  a	  DC-­‐130	  Hercules	  airlifter.	  The	  drones	  were	  pre-­‐programmed	  to	  fly	  a	  specified	  route	  before	  returning	  to	  a	  predetermined	  point	  for	  a	  parachute	  recovery.31	  Later	  models	  would	  use	  a	  mid-­‐air	  recovery	  system	  (MARS)	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Berkowitz	  (Sept.	  2011)	  13	  25	  Ehrhard	  (2010)	  6	  26	  Ehrhard	  (2010)	  12;	  Berkowitz	  (Sept.	  2011)	  13	  27	  Wagner	  (1981)	  23	  28	  Grimes	  (2014)	  1-­‐3	  29	  Wagner	  (1981)	  32	  30	  Wagner	  (1981)	  48	  31	  Hall	  (Fall	  2014)	  24	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employed	  a	  winch-­‐equipped	  CH-­‐3	  manned	  helicopter	  to	  catch	  the	  drones	  while	  still	  in	  flight.	  32	  	  	  	  The	  first	  mass	  production	  variant	  of	  the	  Lightning	  Bug	  was	  the	  147B.	  The	  production	  run	  was	  prompted	  by	  the	  Soviet	  SA-­‐2	  shoot-­‐down	  USAF	  Major	  Rudolph	  Anderson	  in	  a	  U-­‐2	  over	  Cuba	  on	  October	  26,	  1962.33	  The	  NRO	  immediately	  paid	  for	  nine	  147B	  drones,	  modified	  to	  fly	  at	  altitudes	  of	  62,500	  feet	  to	  bring	  back	  high-­‐resolution	  pictures	  covering	  large	  swathes	  of	  denied	  territory.34	  On	  December	  20,	  1963,	  the	  USAF	  approved	  an	  NRO-­‐funded	  production	  order	  of	  14	  additional	  147B	  aircraft.	  35	  As	  production	  increased,	  Big	  Safari	  opened	  its	  Detachment	  3	  Operating	  Location	  at	  Naval	  Air	  Station	  Point	  Mugu	  as	  a	  testing	  facility.36	  	  
Lighting	  Bug	  Missions	  over	  North	  Vietnam,	  China	  and	  North	  Korea	  	  	  SAC’s	  147B	  Lightning	  Bug	  unit,	  part	  of	  the	  4080th	  Strategic	  Reconnaissance	  Wing	  (SRW,	  renamed	  the	  100th	  SRW	  In	  1966)	  deployed	  to	  Kadena	  Air	  Base	  (AB)	  in	  Japan	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  in	  August	  1964.37	  The	  Lightning	  Bugs	  flew	  missions	  along	  with	  manned	  U-­‐2	  aircraft	  over	  China	  and	  North	  Vietnam	  under	  the	  code	  name	  “Blue	  Springs,”	  looking	  for	  signs	  of	  a	  military	  build-­‐up	  in	  communist	  territory.38	  	  	  In	  mid-­‐November	  1964,	  the	  Chinese	  Communists	  announced	  they	  had	  captured	  a	  downed	  147B,	  which	  went	  on	  display	  in	  Beijing.	  But	  147B	  missions	  continued	  unabated.39	  In	  fact,	  as	  the	  Chinese	  began	  to	  introduce	  high-­‐altitude	  SA-­‐2’s	  in	  North	  Vietnam	  in	  early	  1965,	  the	  147Bs	  took	  full	  responsibility	  for	  all	  high-­‐altitude	  photoreconnaissance	  missions	  over	  the	  territory,	  leaving	  the	  U-­‐2	  to	  fly	  in	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  Taubman	  (2003)	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  Wagner	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  Wagner	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safer	  airspace	  outside	  North	  Vietnam	  where	  they	  conducted	  signals	  intelligence	  (SIGINT)	  missions.	  40	  	  The	  Lightning	  Bugs	  experienced	  initial	  losses	  due	  to	  rocky	  parachute	  recoveries,	  but	  by	  1966	  the	  situation	  improved	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  MARS.41	  Around	  this	  time,	  the	  Microwave	  Command	  Guidance	  System	  was	  also	  introduced	  to	  allow	  airborne	  remote	  control	  operators	  in	  the	  DC-­‐130	  and	  ground	  recovery	  officers	  to	  take	  over	  and	  fly	  the	  drone	  manually	  in	  an	  emergency.42	  Because	  this	  system	  provided	  a	  means	  to	  allow	  for	  real-­‐time	  flying	  by	  ground-­‐based	  operators,	  drones	  increasingly	  became	  known	  as	  “remotely	  piloted	  vehicles”	  (RPVs).	  43	  SAC’s	  100th	  SRW	  flew	  78	  missions	  with	  the	  147B	  before	  expanding	  its	  inventory	  of	  Lightning	  Bug	  variants	  in	  the	  late	  1960s	  and	  early	  1970s.44	  Aside	  from	  the	  high	  altitude	  types	  like	  the	  147B,	  there	  was	  also	  a	  series	  of	  short-­‐wing	  RPVs	  programmed	  to	  conduct	  photoreconnaissance	  at	  altitudes	  between	  500	  and	  20,000	  feet	  to	  avoid	  SAMs	  and	  cloud	  cover	  during	  monsoon	  season.	  Later	  models,	  equipped	  with	  improved	  engines,	  guidance	  systems,	  and	  barometric	  altimeters	  for	  low-­‐level	  navigation,	  performed	  missions	  ranging	  from	  photographic	  intelligence	  to	  SIGINT	  and	  leaflet	  dropping.45	  Some	  also	  served	  as	  decoys	  to	  distract	  SA-­‐2s	  from	  high-­‐altitude	  RPVs,	  and	  others	  provided	  suppression	  of	  enemy	  air	  defenses	  through	  radar	  jamming	  and	  chaff	  dispensing.46	  In	  anticipation	  of	  growing	  Lighting	  Bug	  production	  rates,	  the	  USAF	  transferred	  management	  responsibility	  from	  Air	  Force	  Logistics	  Command’s	  Big	  Safari	  to	  the	  standard	  acquisition	  channels	  of	  Air	  Force	  Systems	  Command	  (AFSC)	  in	  1969.47	  While	  standard	  acquisition	  procedures	  slowed	  the	  development	  process,	  NRO	  money	  kept	  USAF	  RPV	  programs	  thriving	  until	  1974.48	  Also	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Peebles	  (1995)	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  41	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  (Fall	  2014)	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  42	  Wagner	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  (2014)	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  Peebles	  (1995)	  97-­‐98;	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  (2004)	  86	  47	  Wagner	  (1981)	  146	  48	  Ehrhard	  (2010)	  12;	  Berkowitz	  (Sept.	  2011)	  13	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year,	  Teledyne	  bought	  Ryan	  Aeronautical,	  and	  the	  company	  became	  Teledyne-­‐Ryan	  Aeronautical	  (TRA).49	  	  One	  of	  the	  most	  notable	  Lightning	  Bug	  operations	  to	  take	  place	  after	  the	  management	  transition	  to	  AFSC	  was	  known	  as	  “Combat	  Dawn.”	  After	  North	  Korean	  fighters	  shot	  down	  an	  EC-­‐121	  Super	  Constellation	  SIGINT	  plane	  over	  the	  East	  China	  Sea	  on	  April	  18,	  1969,	  killing	  the	  crew	  of	  30,	  SAC	  grounded	  manned	  aircraft	  in	  the	  area	  and	  substituted	  high-­‐altitude	  Lightning	  Bugs	  carrying	  SIGINT	  packages.50	  From	  1969	  to	  1975,	  these	  RPVs	  flew	  through	  lethal	  airspace	  to	  collect	  radar	  data	  from	  targets	  in	  North	  Korea	  and	  China.	  51	  Starting	  in	  the	  late	  1960s,	  high-­‐altitude	  strategic	  reconnaissance	  RPVs	  began	  to	  fall	  out	  of	  favor	  as	  costs	  grew	  and	  as	  the	  RPVs	  became	  more	  vulnerable	  to	  increasingly	  long-­‐range	  Soviet	  SAMs.	  The	  USAF	  shifted	  its	  focus	  to	  the	  development	  of	  cheaper	  low-­‐altitude	  RPVs	  that	  could	  fly	  below	  Soviet	  SAMs	  and	  bad	  weather	  to	  capture	  high-­‐resolution	  images	  over	  North	  Vietnam.	  Of	  the	  340	  RPV	  missions	  launched	  in	  1968,	  205	  were	  conducted	  by	  low-­‐altitude	  147S	  variants.52	  In	  January	  1969,	  Ryan	  Aeronautical	  introduced	  the	  147SC	  “Buffalo	  Hunter”	  RPV,	  which	  featured	  a	  radar	  for	  improved	  navigational	  accuracy	  and	  a	  camera	  for	  higher-­‐resolution	  images.53	  During	  Linebacker	  I,	  a	  1972	  air	  interdiction	  campaign	  to	  cut	  off	  Vietnamese	  supply	  lines,	  the	  147SC	  provided	  photoreconnaissance	  of	  bridge	  repairs	  in	  Viet	  Cong	  territory.54	  During	  Linebacker	  II,	  an	  attrition	  campaign	  to	  end	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  over	  100	  Lightning	  Bug	  missions	  were	  flown,	  mostly	  to	  conduct	  bomb	  damage	  assessment	  following	  B-­‐52	  Stratofortress	  bomber	  strikes.	  55	  	  Manned	  flights	  were	  suspended	  over	  Vietnam	  in	  1973,	  but	  RPV	  reconnaissance	  missions	  continued	  for	  five	  weeks	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  Saigon	  on	  June	  3,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Wagner	  and	  Sloan	  (1992)	  11	  50	  Wagner	  (1981)	  166-­‐172	  and	  Hall	  (Fall	  2014)	  25	  51	  Ehrhard	  (2010)	  12;	  Wagner	  (1981)	  167;	  Hall	  (Fall	  2014)	  25	  52	  Peebles	  (1995)	  105	  53	  Elder	  (1973);	  Peebles	  (1995)	  105	  54	  Peebles	  (1995)	  110	  55	  Peebles	  (1995)	  111	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1975.56	  Over	  1,000	  147	  Lightning	  Bug	  variants	  flew	  a	  total	  of	  3,435	  operational	  reconnaissance	  sorties	  in	  Southeast	  Asia	  between	  1964	  and	  1975.57	  Despite	  their	  operational	  success,	  however,	  all	  of	  SAC’s	  surviving	  147	  RPVs	  were	  placed	  in	  storage	  after	  the	  100th	  SRW	  returned	  to	  the	  US	  in	  1975.	  Shortly	  thereafter,	  SAC	  consigned	  all	  of	  its	  RPV	  responsibilities	  and	  assets	  to	  TAC.	  58	  Attempts	  to	  develop	  high-­‐altitude	  strategic	  reconnaissance	  RPVs	  that	  would	  be	  less	  vulnerable	  to	  SAMs	  also	  fell	  by	  the	  wayside	  by	  the	  mid	  1970s.	  These	  contractor-­‐driven	  efforts	  aimed	  to	  develop	  stealthy	  RPVs	  that	  flew	  fast	  and	  high	  enough	  to	  evade	  Soviet	  SAMs	  and	  spy	  on	  China’s	  remote,	  secret	  nuclear	  test	  facilities.	  Lockheed	  Martin’s	  D-­‐21	  Tagboard	  and	  follow-­‐on	  Senior	  Bowl	  efforts,	  developed	  with	  NRO	  funding	  and	  USAF	  support,	  involved	  launching	  a	  stealthy	  RPV	  from	  aircraft:	  first,	  from	  an	  SR-­‐71	  flying	  at	  supersonic	  speed,	  and,	  when	  that	  effort	  failed,	  from	  a	  subsonic	  B-­‐52.59	  TRA	  successfully	  pitched	  a	  similar	  NRO-­‐funded,	  USAF	  supported	  effort,	  Compass	  Arrow.60	  These	  programs	  were	  cancelled	  by	  1972,	  however,	  because	  they	  failed	  to	  compete	  with	  satellites	  and	  lost	  relevance	  following	  President	  Nixon’s	  rapprochement	  with	  China	  in	  the	  early	  1970s.	  61	  	  
RPVs	  in	  the	  Post-­‐Vietnam	  Era	  
	  	  As	  the	  USAF	  shifted	  focus	  to	  the	  European	  Central	  Front	  in	  the	  early	  1970s,	  the	  service	  decided	  that	  strategic	  reconnaissance	  drones	  warranted	  more	  consistent	  support	  than	  they	  had	  previously	  received.	  The	  increasing	  sophistication	  of	  Soviet	  SAMs	  pushed	  U-­‐2s	  to	  the	  limits	  of	  their	  flight	  envelope,	  and	  imagery	  from	  satellites	  was	  limited	  by	  their	  position	  in	  orbit	  at	  any	  given	  time.	  In	  part	  due	  to	  these	  constraints,	  an	  effort	  emerged	  to	  develop	  “pseudolites”	  —	  high	  altitude,	  long-­‐endurance	  drones,	  including	  Compass	  Dwell	  and	  Compass	  Cope,	  that	  would	  take	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Hall	  (1995)	  26	  57Wagner	  and	  Sloan	  (1992)	  3	  58	  Hall	  (Fall	  2014)	  26	  59	  Rich	  (1994)	  262-­‐270	  60	  Wagner	  and	  Sloan	  (1992)38	  61	  Wagner	  and	  Sloan	  (1992	  )	  46-­‐47;	  Peebles	  (1995)	  130-­‐131;	  Ehrhard	  (2010)	  11	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off	  and	  land	  like	  a	  conventional	  manned	  aircraft.62	  Their	  mission	  was	  to	  conduct	  photographic	  surveillance	  and	  electronic	  eavesdropping	  missions	  over	  the	  borders	  of	  Warsaw	  Pact	  nations.	  63	  As	  a	  cost-­‐saving	  measure,	  the	  contracts	  were	  competitively	  bid	  through	  AFSC’s	  traditional	  acquisition	  process,	  although	  Compass	  Dwell	  was	  still	  paid	  for	  with	  NRO	  money	  while	  Compass	  Cope	  got	  money	  from	  the	  National	  Security	  Agency.64	  	  The	  USAF	  terminated	  Compass	  Dwell	  in	  1973	  because	  of	  concerns	  about	  European	  air	  traffic	  control	  allowing	  the	  UAV	  to	  fly	  in	  commercial	  airspace,	  and	  also	  because	  the	  aircraft’s	  40,000	  foot	  ceiling	  was	  insufficient	  to	  avoid	  SAMs.65	  Compass	  Cope,	  which	  was	  designed	  to	  accommodate	  a	  USAF	  targeting	  system,	  the	  Precision	  Location	  Strike	  System	  (PLSS),	  was	  terminated	  in	  July	  1977	  because	  the	  PLSS	  got	  so	  heavy	  that	  the	  Compass	  Cope	  could	  no	  longer	  carry	  it	  and	  still	  meet	  its	  altitude	  requirements	  to	  stay	  above	  SAM	  engagement	  zones.66	  TAC,	  which	  had	  assumed	  control	  of	  all	  USAF	  UAV	  programs	  in	  1976,	  argued	  that	  European	  air	  congestion	  remained	  a	  hurdle,	  although	  USAF	  headquarters	  reported	  that	  several	  European	  nations	  felt	  Compass	  Cope	  could	  be	  integrated	  into	  their	  air	  traffic	  control	  systems	  “without	  major	  problems.”67	  	  	  	  By	  the	  mid-­‐1970s,	  the	  USAF	  found	  itself	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  series	  of	  changes	  that	  significantly	  diminished	  the	  prospects	  for	  RPV	  development.	  In	  1974,	  the	  NRO	  stopped	  paying	  for	  the	  USAF’s	  RPV	  programs,	  shifting	  its	  focus	  exclusively	  to	  satellites.68	  In	  1976,	  the	  Vietnam	  drawdown	  forced	  all	  major	  commands	  to	  cut	  their	  budgets	  by	  10	  percent.	  69	  In	  part	  because	  of	  these	  developments,	  TAC	  requested	  that	  all	  USAF	  RPV	  operations	  be	  terminated,	  resulting	  in	  the	  deactivation	  of	  TAC’s	  11th	  Tactical	  Drone	  Squadron	  on	  April	  1,	  1979.	  70	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Newcome	  (2004)101	  63	  Ehrahrd	  (2010	  32;	  Wagner	  and	  Sloan	  (1994)	  110	  	  64	  Ehrhard	  (2010)	  32;	  Newcome	  (2004)	  102	  65	  Ehrhard	  (2010)	  32	  and	  DARO	  (1994)	  	  66	  DARO	  (1994)	  	  67	  GAO	  (1977)	  5	  68	  Ehrhard	  (2010)	  12;	  Berkowitz	  (Sept.	  2011)	  13	  69	  Hall	  (Fall	  2014)	  26	  70	  Hall	  (Fall	  2014)	  26-­‐27	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From	  TAC’s	  perspective,	  it	  was	  unclear	  that	  RPVs	  could	  meet	  the	  challenges	  of	  a	  changing	  threat	  environment,	  competition	  from	  manned	  aircraft	  and	  satellites,	  and	  an	  austere	  budget	  environment.	  TAC	  briefly	  explored	  the	  possibility	  of	  developing	  RPVs	  for	  use	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  nuclear	  war	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  But	  its	  main	  effort,	  the	  BGM-­‐34C	  Multi-­‐Mission	  RPV,	  a	  Lighting	  Bug	  variant	  designed	  for	  missions	  ranging	  from	  air-­‐to-­‐ground	  strikes	  to	  reconnaissance,	  was	  cancelled	  by	  the	  USAF	  in	  1977	  71	  after	  a	  USAF-­‐	  Army	  panel	  questioned	  its	  high	  costs	  and	  limited	  capability	  given	  Europe’s	  cold,	  cloudy	  weather,	  air	  congestion	  issues	  and	  arms	  treaty	  limitations.	  72	  By	  1979,	  the	  USAF	  had	  dropped	  ongoing	  UAV	  operations,	  closed	  TAC’s	  UAV	  unit,	  and	  cancelled	  all	  its	  major	  UAV	  projects.	  Frustrated	  with	  the	  military’s	  perceived	  lack	  of	  interest	  in	  RPV	  programs,	  the	  US	  Congress	  cut	  all	  production	  and	  most	  RPV	  development	  money	  for	  fiscal	  years	  1978	  through	  1982.73	  	  	  
UAVs	  in	  the	  1980s	  	  
	  Ehrhard	  refers	  to	  the	  USAF’s	  lack	  of	  UAV	  development	  during	  the	  1980s	  as	  a	  “UAV	  hiatus”	  invoking	  the	  new	  term	  for	  unmanned	  systems	  that	  emerged	  during	  this	  decade.74	  The	  USAF	  would	  not	  become	  involved	  in	  UAV	  projects	  again	  until	  the	  mid-­‐1980’s,	  and	  even	  then	  it	  would	  play	  a	  secondary	  role	  to	  other	  agencies	  funding	  UAV	  programs.	  The	  USAF’s	  first	  1980s	  foray	  into	  UAV	  development	  was	  the	  Advanced	  Airborne	  Reconnaissance	  System	  (AARS),	  a	  classified	  stealthy	  UAV	  project	  that	  began	  in	  1983	  or	  1984	  after	  the	  NRO	  decided	  to	  revive	  the	  UAV	  business	  and	  provide	  funding.75	  AARS	  was	  envisioned	  as	  another	  “pseudolite”	  designed	  to	  loiter	  for	  long	  periods	  while	  tracking	  the	  movements	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  mobile	  nuclear	  missile	  launchers.76	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  Wagner	  and	  Sloan	  (1992)	  107	  72	  Ehrhard	  (2010)	  36	  73	  Krebs	  (April	  1979)	  1	  74	  Ehrhard	  (38)	  2010	  75	  Ehrahrd	  (2010)	  15	  Sweetman	  (Sept.	  2015)	  76	  Ehrhard	  (2010)	  13-­‐17;	  Sweetman	  (Sept.	  2015)	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The	  USAF’s	  second	  1980s	  UAV	  project,	  the	  Medium-­‐Range	  UAV	  (MR-­‐UAV)	  began	  in	  1985	  when	  the	  Joint	  Staff	  directed	  the	  USAF	  and	  the	  Navy	  to	  work	  together	  on	  a	  stealthy	  Lightning	  Bug	  variant	  with	  a	  data	  link	  for	  real-­‐time	  data	  transmission.	  The	  USAF	  was	  only	  responsible	  for	  the	  sensor	  package,	  the	  Advanced	  Tactical	  Airborne	  Reconnaissance	  System	  (ATARS),	  which	  could	  also	  be	  used	  on	  its	  manned	  RF-­‐4	  Phantom	  reconnaissance	  aircraft.77	  	  	  	   Both	  AARS	  and	  the	  MR-­‐UAV	  were	  transferred	  to	  new	  congressionally	  mandated	  central	  management	  organizations	  in	  1989.	  AARS	  moved	  into	  the	  Airborne	  Reconnaissance	  Support	  Program	  (ARSP)	  within	  NRO,	  and	  the	  MR-­‐UAV	  moved	  under	  the	  Pentagon’s	  new	  UAV	  Joint	  Program	  Office	  (JPO).78	  But	  both	  programs	  were	  cancelled	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  after	  failing	  to	  survive	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  budget	  pressures.	  AARS	  suffered	  from	  major	  cost	  growth,	  and	  the	  USAF’s	  portion	  of	  the	  MR-­‐UAV,	  the	  sensor	  package	  known	  as	  ATARS,	  also	  suffered	  from	  cost	  increases	  and	  did	  not	  fit	  properly	  on	  the	  MR-­‐UAV.	  79	  Frustrated	  with	  the	  failure	  of	  UAV	  programs	  during	  the	  1980s,	  the	  US	  Congress	  launched	  another	  more	  dramatic	  effort	  to	  centralize	  UAV	  development	  in	  a	  new	  Pentagon	  organization	  called	  the	  Defense	  Airborne	  Reconnaissance	  Office	  (DARO)	  in	  1993.	  That	  agency,	  along	  with	  the	  JPO,	  would	  use	  its	  power	  and	  budget	  authority	  to	  spur	  the	  USAF	  to	  develop	  its	  most	  operationally	  successful	  UAV	  of	  all	  time:	  the	  RQ-­‐1	  Predator.	  	  	  	  	  Reflecting	  on	  the	  USAF’s	  history	  with	  unmanned	  aircraft,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  changes	  in	  the	  threat	  environment,	  cost	  growth,	  the	  loss	  of	  NRO	  funding,	  and	  technological	  challenges	  all	  contributed	  to	  the	  USAF’s	  fitful	  approach	  to	  UAV	  development.	  Indeed,	  the	  USAF	  was	  the	  only	  military	  service	  to	  enter	  the	  Persian	  Gulf	  War	  in	  late	  1990	  without	  its	  own	  operational	  UAV.80	  But	  how	  determined	  was	  the	  USAF	  to	  overcome	  these	  external	  challenges?	  The	  four	  questions	  below	  aim	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  Ehrahrd	  (2010)	  41	  78	  Ehrhard	  (2010)	  15;	  Sweetman	  notes	  (Sept.	  2015);	  Ehrhard	  (2010)	  41	  79	  Ehrhard	  (2010)	  43;	  	  80	  Ehrhard	  (2010)	  42	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answer	  that	  question	  by	  exploring	  how	  USAF	  culture	  shaped	  its	  attitudes	  toward	  UAV	  development	  between	  1917	  and	  1993.	  	  
1. To	  what	  extent	  did	  individuals	  or	  groups	  within	  the	  USAF	  resist	  
UAV	  innovation	  out	  of	  a	  concern	  that	  their	  jobs	  or	  status	  might	  be	  
threatened	  by	  it?	  	  
	  Even	  in	  the	  early	  post-­‐WWII	  period,	  airmen	  displayed	  a	  tendency	  to	  minimize	  technologies	  that	  potentially	  challenged	  the	  central	  role	  of	  manned	  aircraft	  and	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  in	  airpower	  doctrine.	  The	  USAF’s	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  community,	  which	  has	  historically	  dominated	  uniformed	  leadership	  positions,81	  sought	  to	  preserve	  their	  dominance	  by	  promoting	  pilots	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  other	  career	  fields.	  When	  then-­‐retired	  Gen.	  Arnold	  asked	  his	  son	  to	  transfer	  from	  the	  Army	  to	  the	  USAF	  not	  long	  after	  WWII,	  he	  balked	  because	  he	  felt	  his	  promotion	  prospects	  as	  a	  trained	  missileer	  would	  be	  grim.	  “I	  realized	  right	  then	  that	  my	  career	  was	  going	  to	  be	  definitely	  limited,”	  recalled	  Bruce	  Arnold.	  “This	  really	  is,	  I	  think	  the	  pilot/silver	  wings	  syndrome…which	  really	  determines	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  Air	  Force.	  There	  are	  very,	  very	  few	  people	  that	  can	  get	  into	  that	  very	  special	  elite	  society	  of	  pilots	  unless	  they	  wear	  those	  wings.”	  82	  	  	  Further	  indications	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  promotion	  structure	  favored	  manned	  aircraft	  from	  the	  earliest	  days	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  views	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  research	  and	  development	  leadership	  at	  the	  time.	  Before	  he	  retired,	  Gen.	  Arnold	  created	  a	  Scientific	  Advisory	  Group	  (later	  known	  as	  the	  Scientific	  Advisory	  Board)	  to	  make	  recommendations	  for	  improving	  technological	  innovation	  in	  the	  USAF.	  In	  a	  1949	  report,	  the	  group	  called	  for	  “equal	  promotion	  rates	  for	  technical	  personnel	  and	  regular	  flying	  airmen.”	  A	  prophetic	  note	  in	  the	  margin	  of	  the	  report	  written	  by	  General	  Benjamin	  W.	  Childlaw,	  commander	  of	  Air	  Material	  Command,	  reveals	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  USAF’s	  pilot	  leadership	  fended	  off	  efforts	  by	  other	  career	  fields	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  transition	  from	  bomber	  pilot	  dominance	  to	  fighter	  pilot	  dominance,	  see	  Worden	  (March	  1998).	  	  82	  Yenne	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to	  seek	  leadership	  positions.	  “Very	  doubtful	  point,”	  he	  wrote.”	  Perhaps	  I	  am	  a	  pessimist	  but	  I’ll	  never	  live	  to	  see	  equal	  recognition.”	  83	  	  	  	  	  
Post-­‐WWII	  Drones:	  Bias	  in	  the	  Fighter	  and	  Manned	  Reconnaissance	  Communities	  
	  
	  Not	  surprisingly,	  given	  their	  desire	  to	  maintain	  their	  chokehold	  on	  leadership	  positions,	  the	  USAF’s	  pilot	  community	  viewed	  unmanned	  technologies	  with	  strategic	  potential	  as	  a	  significant	  threat.84	  Chapter	  one	  discussed	  how	  the	  bomber	  generals,	  who	  dominated	  the	  USAF	  until	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  saw	  ICBMs	  as	  a	  challenge	  to	  their	  jobs	  and	  status.	  Similarly,	  the	  fighter	  generals	  who	  began	  to	  replace	  the	  USAF’s	  bomber	  leadership	  during	  the	  Vietnam	  era	  saw	  UAVs	  as	  potential	  competition	  to	  manned	  aircraft,	  and,	  consequently,	  their	  preeminent	  status	  in	  the	  USAF.	  	  	  Evidence	  of	  the	  USAF	  pilot	  leadership’s	  cultural	  preference	  for	  manned	  aircraft	  surfaced	  during	  the	  funding	  debate	  over	  “Red	  Wagon”	  and	  “Lucy	  Lee.”	  In	  his	  book	  on	  Lightning	  Bug	  drones,	  William	  Wagner	  argues	  that	  both	  programs	  fell	  victim	  to	  an	  internal	  struggle	  within	  the	  USAF	  between	  supporters	  of	  the	  reconnaissance	  drones	  and	  supporters	  of	  the	  manned	  SR-­‐71.	  Lieutenant	  Colonel	  Lloyd	  Ryan,	  the	  deputy	  in	  the	  USAF	  Headquarters	  Reconnaissance	  Division,	  told	  Wagner	  that	  SR-­‐71	  supporters	  within	  USAF	  leadership	  felt	  threatened	  by	  the	  reconnaissance	  drones.	  “It	  was	  a	  problem	  to	  explain	  that	  a	  low-­‐to-­‐medium	  altitude	  unmanned	  drone	  system	  was	  not	  in	  competition	  with	  the	  big,	  fast,	  high	  altitude	  piloted	  airplane	  —	  that	  it	  really	  constituted	  one	  of	  several	  capabilities	  the	  Air	  Force	  should	  have	  and	  should	  continue	  to	  develop.”85	  	  The	  USAF’s	  rising	  fighter	  pilot	  leadership	  also	  felt	  threatened	  by	  the	  emergence	  of	  drones.	  In	  the	  spring	  of	  1962,	  Lt.	  Col.	  Ryan,	  still	  working	  for	  the	  USAF’s	  Reconnaissance	  Division,	  asked	  Gen.	  Walter	  C.	  Sweeney,	  the	  commander	  of	  TAC,	  if	  he	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  assume	  operational	  control	  of	  the	  Ryan	  Aeronautical	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  Quoted	  in	  Beard	  (1976)	  111	  84	  Perry	  (1967);	  Sheehan	  (2010);	  Beard	  (1976);	  Builder	  (1994);	  Werrell	  1985	  85	  Wagner	  (1981)	  16	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147A	  for	  tactical	  reconnaissance	  missions.	  The	  general	  “wanted	  no	  part	  of	  unmanned	  aircraft,”	  Lt.	  Col	  Ryan	  recalled.86	  One	  participant	  at	  the	  briefing	  recounted	  a	  less	  diplomatic	  response	  from	  Gen.	  Sweeney,	  who	  reportedly	  ended	  the	  meeting	  by	  saying:	  “When	  the	  Air	  Staff	  assigns	  eighteen-­‐inch	  pilots	  to	  this	  command,	  I’ll	  reconsider	  the	  issue!”87	  TAC	  did	  not	  embrace	  the	  reconnaissance	  drones	  until	  1976,	  when	  it	  saw	  them	  as	  a	  means	  to	  overtake	  the	  dominant	  bomber	  community,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Question	  4.	  	  The	  USAF’s	  manned	  reconnaissance	  aircraft	  community	  also	  saw	  drones	  as	  a	  direct	  threat.	  U-­‐2	  pilots	  did	  not	  welcome	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  first	  operational	  reconnaissance	  drone,	  the	  147B,	  which	  was	  rushed	  into	  service	  in	  response	  to	  the	  shoot-­‐down	  of	  Maj.	  Anderson,	  the	  U-­‐2	  pilot,	  over	  Cuba.	  Lt.	  Col.	  Fred	  Yochim,	  deputy	  of	  Big	  Safari’s	  System	  Program	  Office	  for	  drones,	  said	  that	  buried	  beneath	  U-­‐2	  pilots’	  concerns	  about	  the	  military	  potential	  of	  drones	  was	  a	  fear	  that	  the	  drones	  
would	  be	  technologically	  sound	  enough	  to	  replace	  manned	  aircraft.	  That	  might	  mean	  the	  elimination	  of	  their	  jobs	  as	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots,	  leaving	  the	  reconnaissance	  mission	  to	  the	  low-­‐status	  drone	  operator.	  “There	  was	  real	  resistance	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  manned	  recon	  troops,”	  recalled	  Lt.	  Col.	  Yochim.	  “The	  initial,	  first	  reaction	  of	  people	  getting	  flight	  pay	  was	  that	  they	  didn’t	  believe	  the	  technology	  was	  that	  good,	  and	  secondly	  –	  perhaps	  subconsciously	  –	  they	  felt	  they	  were	  being	  threatened.”	  88	  Manned	  reconnaissance	  pilots	  feared	  a	  loss	  of	  prestige	  should	  they	  become	  drone	  operators	  because	  they	  saw	  drones	  as	  inferior	  systems.	  The	  100th	  SRW,	  the	  SAC	  wing	  that	  deployed	  the	  Lightning	  Bug	  during	  its	  first	  operational	  missions	  over	  China	  and	  North	  Vietnam,	  consisted	  of	  both	  a	  drone	  squadron	  and	  a	  U-­‐2	  squadron.	  SAC	  officers	  assigned	  to	  the	  drones	  were	  dismissed	  as	  the	  “Bug”	  section	  of	  the	  wing	  and	  did	  not	  have	  their	  own	  squadron,	  nor	  the	  status	  or	  pay	  associated	  with	  it.89	  Maj.	  Jay	  Merz,	  described	  what	  it	  was	  like	  to	  be	  a	  SAC	  officer	  involved	  in	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  Wagner	  (1981)	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ground-­‐based	  drone	  recovery	  operations.	  The	  job	  was	  not	  glamorous,	  but	  the	  responsibility	  was	  great.	  The	  only	  time	  he	  did	  any	  flying	  was	  via	  the	  Microwave	  Command	  Guidance	  System	  in	  the	  event	  of	  an	  emergency:	  	  
	  
He	  is	  an	  Air	  Force	  pilot	  who	  never	  flies	  a	  flight	  plan.	  He’s	  not	  
allowed	  to	  pre-­‐flight	  his	  airplane.	  He	  never	  gets	  to	  strap	  in.	  They	  
won’t	  allow	  him	  to	  start	  the	  engine.	  He	  never	  sees	  a	  cheerful	  
thumbs	  up	  from	  his	  crew	  chief.	  He	  never	  gets	  to	  taxi.	  Nobody	  will	  
fly	  with	  him.	  He’s	  never	  permitted	  to	  make	  a	  takeoff	  or	  landing.	  He	  
never	  gets	  to	  hear	  the	  reassuring	  roar	  of	  his	  engine.	  He	  can’t	  even	  
raise	  and	  lower	  the	  gear.	  He’s	  not	  allowed	  to	  look	  out	  the	  windows.	  
He	  only	  gets	  to	  fly	  when	  there’s	  a	  problem	  or	  he’s	  running	  out	  of	  
gas.	  But	  you	  let	  one	  little	  thing	  go	  wrong	  and	  we	  confiscate	  his	  
tapes,	  drag	  out	  the	  manuals,	  and	  hang	  the	  guilty	  bastard!”90	  
	  In	  some	  cases,	  drone	  advocacy	  cost	  USAF	  officers	  their	  jobs.	  Bob	  Reichardt,	  Ryan	  Aeronautical’s	  manager	  of	  all	  drone	  programs,	  recalled	  that	  Col.	  Ellsworth	  Powell,	  who	  held	  a	  number	  of	  SAC	  leadership	  positions	  in	  the	  1960s,	  stalled	  his	  career	  due	  to	  his	  support	  of	  Lightning	  Bug	  programs.	  “I	  would	  venture	  his	  total	  commitment	  to	  drones	  may	  have	  cost	  him	  a	  general’s	  star,”	  said	  Reichardt.	  “He	  just	  lived	  and	  breathed	  drones.”	  91	  	  	  	  	  
USAF	  Attitudes	  Toward	  RPVs	  in	  the	  Post-­‐Vietnam	  Era	  	  
	  Once	  responsibility	  for	  drone	  programs	  transferred	  from	  SAC	  to	  TAC	  in	  1976,	  the	  command	  found	  itself	  having	  to	  make	  a	  strong	  case	  for	  continued	  drone	  development	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  post-­‐war	  budget	  crunch	  and	  the	  1974	  loss	  of	  NRO	  funding.	  But	  many	  outsiders	  felt	  that	  TAC	  ‘s	  drone	  advocacy	  was	  halfhearted.	  The	  US	  General	  Accounting	  Office	  (GAO)	  issued	  a	  report	  in	  1981	  noting	  the	  decline	  of	  RPVs	  in	  the	  USAF	  coincided	  with	  the	  transfer	  from	  SAC	  to	  TAC.	  92	  Funding	  and	  manpower	  allocations	  decreased	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  power	  transfer,	  and	  TAC	  did	  little	  to	  keep	  the	  momentum	  going.	  After	  interviewing	  a	  variety	  of	  “RPV	  experts”	  –	  to	  be	  sure,	  many	  of	  them	  with	  their	  own	  bias	  in	  favor	  of	  RPVs	  –	  GAO	  concluded	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	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  81.	  91	  Wagner	  (1981)	  150	  92	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  (July	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that	  the	  principle	  reason	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  TAC	  support	  was	  a	  “pro-­‐pilot	  bias”	  rather	  than	  concerns	  about	  the	  cost	  or	  potential	  of	  RPVs.	  The	  bias	  led	  to	  a	  “general	  reluctance	  to	  replace	  a	  known	  quantity	  [manned	  aircraft]	  with	  an	  unknown	  [RPVs],”	  and	  created	  a	  perception	  that	  RPVs	  were	  “drab	  or	  unexciting	  compared	  to	  manned	  aircraft.”	  93	  Similar	  concerns	  about	  a	  pro-­‐pilot	  bias	  in	  TAC	  leading	  to	  the	  demise	  of	  RPVs	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  were	  expressed	  by	  Republican	  Senator	  John	  J.	  Tower,	  who	  told	  an	  RPV	  symposium	  in	  1978	  that	  he	  believed	  manned	  aircraft	  would	  always	  win	  over	  RPVs	  in	  a	  contest	  for	  limited	  funds,	  due	  to	  cultural	  bias:	  “I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  the	  Air	  Force	  will	  give	  up	  funds	  for	  tactical	  aircraft	  even	  though	  that	  would	  provide	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  strike	  RPVs,”	  he	  told	  the	  symposium	  audience.	  “I	  say	  this	  because	  tactical	  air	  forces	  are	  structured	  around	  man,	  the	  pilot,	  and	  that	  is	  not	  likely	  to	  change	  for	  the	  indefinite	  future.”94	  One	  other	  bias	  that	  contributed	  to	  the	  decline	  of	  RPVs	  in	  the	  USAF	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  relates	  to	  reconnaissance	  assets.	  Even	  Ehrhard,	  who	  argues	  that	  pro-­‐pilot	  bias	  had	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  decline	  of	  RPVs	  in	  the	  USAF,	  concedes	  that	  there	  was	  a	  bias	  within	  TAC	  against	  reconnaissance,	  the	  primary	  RPV	  mission	  during	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  and	  that	  this	  likely	  contributed	  to	  the	  demise	  of	  RPVs	  in	  the	  1970s.95As	  Gen.	  Robert	  T.	  Marsh,	  the	  commander	  of	  AFSC	  in	  the	  early	  1980s,	  explained	  to	  Ehrhard:	  “Tactical	  recce	  is	  like	  electronic	  warfare	  (another	  Firebee	  mission)	  –	  when	  we’re	  at	  war,	  everyone	  wants	  it,	  but	  in	  peacetime,	  nobody	  wants	  it.”96	  	  	   From	  the	  earliest	  days	  of	  airpower,	  USAF	  outsiders	  have	  surmised	  that	  the	  service’s	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  leaders	  have	  viewed	  alternatives	  to	  manned	  aircraft	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  their	  jobs	  and	  status.	  This	  view	  manifested	  itself	  in	  the	  leadership	  community’s	  attempts	  to	  preserve	  promotion	  slots	  for	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots,	  its	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  ibid	  94Krebs,	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  95	  Ehrhard	  (2010)	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reluctance	  to	  adopt	  UAV	  technology	  during	  peacetime,	  and	  its	  perception	  of	  drone	  operators	  as	  having	  lower	  status	  than	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots.	  	  	  
2. To	  what	  extent	  were	  judgments	  about	  the	  potential	  and	  cost	  	  
effectiveness	  of	  UAVs	  based	  on	  the	  USAF’s	  enthusiasm	  for	  
employment	  new	  technology	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  was	  the	  
enthusiasm	  outside	  the	  service?	  	  
	  	  During	  the	  era	  of	  the	  world	  wars,	  airmen	  publicly	  pinned	  their	  hopes	  for	  an	  independent	  air	  service	  on	  a	  doctrine	  built	  around	  the	  use	  of	  the	  manned	  bomber.	  The	  doctrine	  reflected	  a	  deeply	  engrained	  preference	  for	  manned	  aircraft	  discussed	  in	  Question	  1.	  But	  there	  were	  two	  visionary	  airmen,	  Gen.	  Arnold	  and	  Brig.	  Gen.	  Mitchell,	  who	  were	  willing	  to	  look	  beyond	  existing	  doctrine	  and	  cultural	  mores	  to	  recognize	  the	  potential	  for	  unmanned	  systems	  to	  expand	  the	  scope	  and	  legitimacy	  of	  air	  weapons.	  97	  In	  their	  leadership	  positions,	  they	  were	  able	  to	  draw	  attention	  to	  unmanned	  technologies	  even	  as	  the	  rank-­‐and-­‐file	  in	  the	  air	  service	  and	  the	  American	  public	  focused	  on	  manned	  aviation.	  	  Brig.	  Gen.	  Mitchell	  was	  a	  comprehensive	  airpower	  advocate	  willing	  to	  look	  beyond	  manned	  flight	  to	  see	  the	  potential	  benefits	  of	  UAVs.	  His	  unsuccessful	  bid	  to	  employ	  aerial	  torpedoes	  in	  his	  aircraft-­‐versus-­‐battleship	  tests	  in	  1923	  suggested	  that	  he	  cared	  more	  about	  demonstrating	  the	  strategic	  potential	  of	  airpower	  rather	  than	  any	  specific	  commitment	  to	  daylight	  strategic	  bombing	  doctrine	  or	  the	  manned	  bombers	  and	  pilots	  needed	  to	  implement	  it.”98	  	  Later,	  during	  the	  interwar	  period,	  then-­‐Maj.	  Gen.	  Arnold	  even	  more	  directly	  questioned	  whether	  USAF	  doctrine	  required	  a	  focus	  on	  only	  manned	  aircraft.	  His	  1938	  proposal	  for	  an	  improved	  Bug,	  the	  GMA-­‐1	  came	  with	  a	  concept	  of	  operations	  that	  directly	  challenged	  the	  Army	  Air	  Corps’	  strategic	  bombing	  doctrine,	  built	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  Schultz	  (2007)	  194	  98	  Schultz	  (2007)	  199	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around	  the	  manned	  bomber.99	  He	  envisioned	  the	  improved	  Bugs	  flying	  in	  large	  numbers	  over	  enemy	  territory,	  each	  carrying	  about	  800	  pounds	  of	  explosives	  for	  a	  cost	  of	  between	  $800	  and	  $1000	  per	  aircraft.	  In	  contrast,	  he	  estimated	  that	  a	  four-­‐engine	  heavy	  bomber	  would	  cost	  $200,000	  for	  a	  medium	  size	  and	  $400,000	  for	  a	  large	  size.	  Reflecting	  on	  the	  decision	  to	  pursue	  the	  Bug,	  Gen.	  Arnold	  said	  he	  recognized	  he	  was	  suggesting	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  very	  doctrine	  around	  which	  the	  AAF	  was	  building	  its	  case	  for	  independence.	  	  “I	  now	  had	  to	  decide	  whether	  the	  four-­‐engine	  bomber,	  and	  the	  whole	  bombardment	  program	  we	  had	  worked	  toward	  for	  so	  many	  years,	  should	  take	  second	  place	  in	  favor	  of	  something	  else,”	  he	  wrote	  in	  his	  book,	  Global	  Mission.100	  	  Ultimately,	  even	  then-­‐Maj.	  Gen.	  Arnold’s	  enthusiasm	  for	  the	  technology	  could	  not	  overcome	  the	  simple	  fact	  that	  the	  Bug	  lacked	  the	  range	  to	  reach	  Germany.101	  But	  the	  Bug’s	  failure	  did	  not	  stop	  him	  from	  continuing	  to	  advocate	  for	  unmanned	  technologies,	  even	  when	  the	  technology	  was	  not	  quite	  ready.	  The	  War	  Weary	  program	  was	  nicknamed	  “the	  Old	  Man’s	  Baby”	  in	  honor	  of	  then-­‐Maj.	  Gen.	  Arnold’s	  unflagging	  support	  despite	  the	  program’s	  record	  of	  killing	  aircrews,	  its	  ineffectiveness	  against	  heavily	  defended	  targets,	  and	  its	  lack	  of	  navigational	  accuracy.102	  Then-­‐Maj.	  Gen.	  Arnold’s	  willingness	  to	  embrace	  unmanned	  technologies	  was	  particularly	  bold	  given	  that	  UAVs,	  while	  being	  unpopular	  among	  airmen,	  were	  also	  relatively	  unknown	  to	  the	  American	  public.	  Supporting	  unmanned	  technology	  was	  not	  likely	  to	  bolster	  the	  case	  for	  an	  independent	  air	  force,	  given	  that	  Americans	  hardly	  paid	  attention	  to	  drones	  through	  the	  end	  of	  WWII.	  There	  were	  enthusiasts,	  including	  British	  actor	  Reginald	  Denny,	  who	  started	  his	  own	  successful	  target	  drone	  company,	  Radioplanes.103	  By	  and	  large,	  however,	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Americans	  during	  this	  time	  were	  preoccupied	  with	  by	  the	  image	  of	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot,	  willing	  to	  put	  his	  life	  on	  the	  line.	  104	  Despite	  these	  challenges,	  Gen.	  Arnold’s	  advocacy	  ensured	  that	  UAVs	  were	  not	  completely	  forgotten	  after	  he	  retired.	  He	  articulated	  a	  broad	  view	  of	  airpower	  theory	  that	  provided	  a	  rationale	  for	  a	  generation	  of	  airmen	  to	  fight	  for	  control	  of	  pilotless	  aircraft	  during	  the	  struggle	  for	  USAF	  independence	  and,	  later,	  to	  insist	  on	  integration	  of	  the	  ICBM	  into	  the	  USAF.	  “We	  have	  just	  won	  a	  war	  with	  a	  lot	  of	  heroes	  flying	  around	  in	  planes.	  The	  next	  war	  may	  be	  fought	  by	  airplanes	  with	  no	  men	  in	  them	  at	  all,”	  he	  declared	  at	  the	  end	  of	  WWII.	  “Take	  everything	  you’ve	  learned	  about	  aviation	  in	  war,	  and	  throw	  it	  out	  the	  window,	  and	  let’s	  go	  to	  work	  on	  tomorrow’s	  aviation.”105	  	  	  
Post-­‐WWII	  Drone	  Programs:	  Conflicting	  USAF	  Views	  of	  Potential	  	  While	  Gen.	  Arnold’s	  vision	  had	  a	  profound	  impact	  on	  ICBM	  development,	  his	  influence	  on	  UAV	  innovation	  was	  less	  enduring.	  His	  handpicked	  protégé,	  then-­‐	  Col.	  Bernard	  Schriever,	  played	  a	  central	  role	  in	  ICBM	  institutionalization,	  but	  there	  was	  no	  standard	  bearer	  for	  UAV	  technology	  after	  Gen.	  Arnold	  retired.106	  It	  was	  left	  to	  mid-­‐level	  officers	  in	  the	  Air	  Staff’s	  Reconnaissance	  Division	  to	  maintain	  support	  for	  UAV	  innovation.	  	  Notably,	  Col.	  Harold	  Wood	  and	  his	  deputy	  in	  the	  Reconnaissance	  Division	  at	  USAF	  Headquarters,	  Lt.	  Col.	  Ryan,	  were	  enthusiastic	  drone	  supporters	  because	  of	  their	  potential	  to	  reduce	  aircrew	  risk	  (discussed	  in	  Question	  3).	  	  To	  keep	  drone	  programs	  moving	  forward,	  they	  took	  advantage	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  reconnaissance	  division	  had	  	  “carte	  blanche”	  to	  go	  outside	  normal	  USAF	  procedures	  and	  access	  high	  levels	  of	  the	  US	  government.107	  The	  Reconnaissance	  Division	  turned	  to	  Big	  Safari,	  supported	  by	  NRO	  funds,	  to	  develop	  the	  Ryan	  Aeronautical	  147A.	  Operating	  under	  an	  ethos	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  	  See,	  for	  example,	  Franklin	  (	  2003)	  336	  	  105	  Quoted	  in	  Barclay	  (July	  29,	  2015)	  106	  Taubman	  (2003)	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prized	  building	  equipment	  quickly,	  Big	  Safari	  was	  able	  to	  deliver	  an	  operational	  147A	  just	  91	  days	  after	  a	  contract	  was	  awarded.108	  While	  Big	  Safari	  was	  not	  a	  drone	  advocacy	  organization	  per	  se,	  its	  rapid	  acquisition	  processes	  would	  facilitate	  the	  development	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  USAF	  drone	  programs,	  eventually	  to	  include	  the	  Predator.	  	  	  	  The	  Reconnaissance	  Division	  approached	  Big	  Safari	  to	  develop	  the	  147A	  as	  a	  means	  to	  avoid	  the	  Air	  Staff.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  cultural	  preference	  for	  manned	  aircraft	  discussed	  in	  Question	  1,	  the	  Air	  Staff	  also	  suffered	  from	  a	  fear	  of	  the	  unknown.	  	  Their	  regimented	  acquisition	  procedures,	  which	  included	  a	  complex	  approval	  chain,	  provided	  plenty	  of	  opportunities	  for	  risk-­‐averse	  senior	  leaders	  to	  say	  “no”	  to	  drone	  contracts.109	  Even	  after	  Big	  Safari	  developed	  the	  147A,	  the	  Air	  Staff	  demonstrated	  “a	  great	  reluctance	  to	  deploy	  the	  system”	  due	  to	  “the	  unknown	  nature	  of	  just	  how	  good	  it	  would	  be”	  and	  a	  concern	  about	  exposing	  the	  technology	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  before	  it	  was	  really	  needed,	  according	  to	  Lt.	  Col.	  Ryan.110	  	  Outside	  the	  USAF,	  support	  for	  post-­‐WWII	  drone	  programs	  was	  more	  consistent,	  although	  the	  programs	  were	  still	  so	  classified	  that	  widespread	  congressional	  and	  industry	  support	  was	  not	  yet	  forthcoming.	  111	  The	  NRO,	  which	  funded	  these	  programs,	  was	  created	  by	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  with	  no	  input	  from	  the	  US	  Congress.	  Until	  the	  1970’s,	  only	  a	  handful	  of	  lawmakers	  on	  the	  House	  and	  Senate	  defense	  and	  appropriations	  committees	  knew	  about	  the	  NRO’s	  existence	  and	  funding,	  and	  asked	  few	  questions.112	  Even	  so,	  there	  was	  still	  significant	  external	  advocacy	  for	  USAF	  drone	  programs	  among	  a	  small	  group	  of	  drone	  manufacturers	  and	  the	  NRO.	  	  	  At	  the	  center	  of	  industry	  support	  was	  Ryan	  Aeronautical,	  which	  had	  released	  an	  optimistic	  press	  release	  about	  using	  drones	  for	  tactical	  reconnaissance	  as	  far	  back	  as	  1955.113	  After	  the	  USAF’s	  Reconnaissance	  Division	  indicated	  interest	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  Wagner	  (1981)	  23	  109	  ibid	  110	  Quoted	  in	  Wagner	  (1981)	  50.	  	  111	  Krebs	  (April	  1979	  )	  22-­‐24	  	  112	  Laurie	  (June	  2001)	  10-­‐14	  113	  Wagner	  (1981)	  8	  
	   92	  
in	  a	  reconnaissance	  drone	  in	  late	  1959,	  the	  company	  assembled	  a	  group	  to	  start	  pushing	  the	  project,	  despite	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  contract	  guarantee	  from	  the	  USAF.114	  Knowing	  that	  “Red	  Wagon”	  and	  Lucy	  Lee”	  were	  ambitious	  and	  costly	  programs,	  Ryan	  Aeronautical	  was	  ready	  to	  give	  the	  USAF’s	  Reconnaissance	  Division	  a	  more	  modest	  proposal	  to	  modify	  the	  Q-­‐2C	  Firebee,	  which	  ultimately	  resulted	  in	  the	  Big	  Safari	  contract	  for	  the	  147A.115	  	  
	  
The	  Vietnam	  Drone	  Build-­‐Up:	  Conflicting	  USAF	  Views	  Persist	  	  	  By	  the	  time	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  started,	  the	  USAF’s	  Reconnaissance	  Division	  had	  managed	  to	  locate	  another	  drone	  advocate	  within	  the	  USAF’s	  acquisition	  apparatus.	  Col.	  Powell,	  then	  the	  head	  of	  SAC’s	  Reconnaissance	  Division,	  played	  a	  central	  role	  in	  convincing	  SAC	  to	  take	  on	  the	  147A	  after	  both	  SAC	  and	  TAC	  initially	  rejected	  it.116	  He	  was	  also	  instrumental	  in	  the	  development	  of	  low-­‐altitude	  variants	  of	  the	  Lightning	  Bug,	  117	  So	  important	  was	  Col.	  Powell’s	  influence	  on	  expediting	  drone	  operations	  that	  Robert	  Schwanhauser,	  the	  head	  of	  Ryan	  Aeronautical’s	  Lightning	  Bug	  operations,	  cited	  Col.	  Powell’s	  retirement	  as	  one	  of	  the	  major	  reasons	  that	  AFSC	  was	  able	  to	  wrest	  control	  of	  drone	  programs	  from	  Big	  Safari	  in	  1969.118	  Even	  if	  there	  were	  elements	  of	  AFSC	  that	  were	  enthusiastic	  about	  the	  cost	  and	  potential	  of	  drones,	  the	  agency’s	  regimented,	  risk-­‐averse	  acquisition	  procedures	  tended	  to	  stifle	  drone	  innovation.	  The	  transition	  of	  drone	  programs	  to	  AFSC	  was	  positively	  portrayed	  in	  the	  media	  as	  a	  sign	  that	  the	  USAF	  was	  taking	  drones	  seriously	  and	  wanted	  to	  expand	  their	  use	  and	  the	  variety	  of	  contractors	  able	  to	  compete	  for	  drone	  projects.119	  But	  many	  already	  involved	  with	  drone	  programs	  saw	  the	  move	  as	  a	  mistake.	  AFSC’s	  risk	  aversion	  was	  so	  culturally	  engrained	  that	  there	  was	  no	  room	  for	  flexibility,	  even	  in	  response	  to	  combat	  needs.	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  Grimes	  (2014)	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  115	  Wagner	  (1981)	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  Wagner	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  Wagner	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Ryan	  Aeronautical	  contractors	  and	  SAC	  drone	  operators	  felt	  that	  drone	  management	  had	  suffered	  under	  standard	  acquisition	  procedures,	  leading	  to	  delays	  in	  the	  deployment	  of	  drones	  to	  combat.120	  Even	  after	  AFSC	  took	  charge,	  USAF	  drone	  advocates	  continued	  to	  look	  for	  ways	  to	  bypass	  it.	  In	  the	  fall	  of	  1969,	  mid-­‐level	  officers	  went	  directly	  to	  Brig.	  Gen.	  Doug	  Steakley,	  responsible	  for	  reconnaissance	  on	  the	  Joint	  Staff,	  to	  expedite	  the	  deployment	  of	  the	  147T,	  a	  high-­‐altitude	  SIGINT	  Lightning	  Bug	  variant,	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  EC-­‐121	  shoot-­‐down	  off	  the	  North	  Korean	  coast.121	  Even	  the	  USAF’s	  most	  ambitious	  drone	  programs	  of	  the	  1960s,	  developed	  with	  NRO	  funding	  outside	  normal	  acquisition	  channels,	  suffered	  from	  the	  USAF’s	  highly	  regimented	  acquisition	  procedures.	  Lockheed	  Skunkworks	  president	  Kelly	  Johnson	  claimed	  that	  the	  D-­‐21	  Tagboard	  failed	  because	  uniformed	  USAF	  officers,	  following	  USAF	  maintenance	  rules,	  disassembled	  the	  aircraft	  several	  times	  over	  the	  course	  of	  nine	  months	  at	  Beale	  AFB	  in	  California	  prior	  to	  the	  test	  flights.122	  Similarly,	  Ryan	  Aeronautical	  complained	  that	  the	  Compass	  Arrow	  suffered	  from	  over-­‐management	  from	  the	  Pentagon,	  AFSC,	  and	  SAC.123	  	  	  
The	  Vietnam	  War:	  Growing	  USAF	  Support	  for	  RPVs	  	  	  	  	  As	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  progressed,	  RPV	  development	  accelerated	  as	  the	  USAF	  gained	  confidence	  in	  their	  combat	  effectiveness.	  In	  1966,	  Dr.	  Eugene	  Fubini,	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  the	  USAF	  called	  a	  147E	  electronic	  signals	  mission	  that	  successfully	  collected	  fuzing	  data	  on	  the	  SA-­‐2	  “the	  most	  significant	  contribution	  to	  electronic	  intelligence	  in	  the	  last	  20	  years.”124	  	  	   Appreciation	  of	  the	  RPVs’	  military	  potential	  also	  began	  to	  increase	  among	  TAC	  officers	  as	  the	  war	  continued.	  Gen.	  John	  D.	  Lavelle,	  the	  commander	  of	  the	  7th	  Air	  Force,	  which	  controlled	  all	  tactical	  air	  forces	  in	  Vietnam,	  asked	  SAC	  for	  more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120	  Grimes	  (2014)	  243	  121	  Wagner	  (1981)	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drones	  in	  1971	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  they	  are	  the	  “vehicle	  most	  effective	  under	  Northeast	  Monsoonal	  conditions.”125	  Assessing	  the	  147SC	  Buffalo	  Hunter’s	  performance	  in	  Linebacker	  II,	  Gen.	  Lavelle’s	  replacement,	  Gen.	  John	  Vogt,	  said	  it	  did	  a	  much	  better	  job	  at	  bomb	  damage	  assessment	  than	  the	  SR-­‐71.	  “The	  high	  altitude	  airplanes	  such	  as	  the	  SR-­‐71	  and	  our	  own	  tactical	  reconnaissance,	  which	  fly	  at	  altitudes	  considerably	  higher	  [than	  an	  RPV],	  are	  not	  capable	  of	  doing	  this	  particular	  job…Buffalo	  Hunter	  was	  extremely	  valuable	  to	  us	  during	  the	  intense	  combat	  period	  in	  December.”126	  	   Outside	  the	  USAF,	  support	  for	  RPVs	  expanded	  following	  the	  release	  of	  a	  1970	  report	  written	  by	  AFSC	  in	  partnership	  with	  RAND,	  a	  federally	  funded	  research	  center.	  The	  report	  found	  that	  RPVs	  were	  technologically	  feasible	  for	  roles	  ranging	  from	  air-­‐to-­‐air	  combat	  to	  logistics	  and	  resupply.127	  On	  the	  heels	  of	  the	  RAND	  report,	  John	  S.	  Foster,	  the	  Pentagon’s	  chief	  weapons	  officer	  from	  1965	  to	  1973,	  directed	  another	  Pentagon	  organization,	  the	  Defense	  Advanced	  Research	  Projects	  Agency	  (DARPA),	  to	  start	  working	  on	  RPVs.	  In	  an	  era	  of	  post-­‐Vietnam	  budget	  pressure,	  Foster	  made	  the	  case	  that	  RPVs	  were	  truly	  a	  cheaper	  alternative	  to	  manned	  aircraft	  for	  many	  missions.128	  He	  turned	  to	  DARPA,	  whose	  mission	  is	  to	  develop	  risky	  technologies	  that	  the	  military	  services	  cannot	  or	  will	  not	  fund,	  to	  make	  it	  happen.	  Buoyed	  by	  the	  claims	  of	  technological	  feasibility	  and	  reduced	  cost,	  the	  RPV	  industry	  formed	  the	  National	  Association	  of	  Remotely	  Piloted	  Vehicles	  (NARPV)	  in	  1972	  as	  an	  industry	  lobby	  group,	  now	  known	  as	  the	  Association	  of	  Unmanned	  Vehicle	  Systems	  International	  (AUVSI).129	  	   The	  US	  Congress,	  too,	  slowly	  began	  to	  play	  a	  more	  active	  role	  in	  drone	  programs	  starting	  in	  1974,	  when	  the	  USAF’s	  RPV	  funding	  moved	  out	  of	  the	  NRO	  and	  into	  the	  USAF’s	  budget.	  More	  generally,	  congressional	  interest	  in	  intelligence	  matters,	  to	  include	  previously	  classified	  drone	  programs,	  increased	  in	  the	  wake	  of	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the	  Vietnam	  War,	  Watergate,	  and	  revelations	  of	  operational	  wrongdoing	  by	  the	  CIA	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  early	  1970s.130	  	  
	  
Post-­‐Vietnam:	  Declining	  USAF	  Support	  for	  Drone	  Development	  	  	  Inside	  the	  USAF,	  however,	  the	  percolating	  drone	  enthusiasm	  of	  the	  early	  1970s	  began	  to	  wane	  as	  the	  decade	  came	  to	  a	  close.	  Drone	  advocates	  from	  the	  early	  years,	  like.	  Col.	  Wood	  and	  Lt.	  Col.	  Ryan,	  had	  retired,	  as	  had	  later	  advocates	  like	  John	  McLucas,	  the	  USAF	  secretary	  from	  1973	  to	  1975.	  Because	  drone	  programs	  were	  kept	  secret	  within	  the	  USAF	  until	  the	  mid-­‐1970s,	  there	  was	  no	  internal	  constituency	  to	  keep	  the	  programs	  going.131	  Even	  when	  these	  drone	  advocates	  were	  in	  power,	  they	  were	  never	  able	  to	  effectively	  articulate	  a	  strategic	  role	  for	  drones	  in	  the	  USAF	  in	  the	  same	  powerful	  way	  that	  Gen.	  Arnold	  had	  done	  during	  his	  career.	  “	  If	  there	  is	  no	  grand	  architectural	  design	  that’s	  clear	  to	  advocates	  of	  RPVs,	  then	  it’s	  hard	  to	  know	  where	  one	  fits,”	  one	  USAF	  general	  remarked	  at	  a	  1976	  NARPV	  conference.	  “Consequently,	  there	  is	  slow	  acceptance	  of	  the	  technology	  into	  the	  operational	  inventory.”132	  US	  lawmakers	  tried	  to	  remain	  supportive	  of	  drone	  development,	  despite	  a	  feeling	  that	  the	  USAF	  —	  specifically	  TAC,	  which	  took	  control	  of	  RPVs	  after	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  	  —had	  failed	  to	  think	  strategically	  about	  the	  role	  of	  RPVs	  in	  the	  force	  structure	  as	  the	  strategic	  focus	  shifted	  to	  Europe’s	  Central	  Front.	  When	  lawmakers	  de-­‐funded	  all	  USAF	  RPV	  programs	  in	  1977,	  they	  blamed	  the	  USAF	  for	  failing	  to	  manage	  the	  programs	  correctly.	  “The	  committee	  would…	  like	  to	  convey	  support	  for	  the	  requirement	  to	  have	  RPVs	  in	  our	  military	  inventory	  in	  view	  of	  their	  demonstrated	  performance	  in	  actual	  combat,	  “	  members	  of	  the	  House	  Armed	  Services	  Committee	  stated	  in	  a	  report	  accompanying	  the	  fiscal	  year	  1979	  budget.	  “The	  committee	  has	  been	  concerned	  over	  the	  decline	  in	  service	  support	  for	  these	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necessary	  systems	  that	  not	  only	  serve	  as	  force	  multipliers	  but	  in	  many	  instances	  perform	  those	  missions	  that	  greatly	  endanger	  pilots.”133	  	  
Support	  for	  UAVs	  in	  the	  1980s	  	  
	  Although	  lawmakers	  eliminated	  funding,	  they	  did	  not	  give	  up	  on	  UAV	  programs	  in	  the	  1980s.	  After	  holding	  hearings	  to	  discuss	  the	  need	  to	  streamline	  UAV	  development,	  lawmakers	  centralized	  all	  Pentagon	  UAV	  programs	  under	  the	  UAV	  JPO	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  reduce	  cost	  by	  encouraging	  “commonality.”134	  The	  NRO	  also	  remained	  a	  strong	  UAV	  advocate,	  funding	  the	  AARS	  program.	  	  But	  the	  USAF	  remained	  pessimistic	  about	  the	  future	  of	  UAVs.	  Even	  when	  there	  was	  an	  apparent	  strategic	  purpose	  for	  a	  UAV	  program,	  it	  did	  not	  enjoy	  much	  support.	  The	  AARS,	  for	  example,	  might	  have	  functioned	  in	  the	  post-­‐War	  environment	  as	  a	  long-­‐loiter	  strategic	  surveillance	  asset,	  but	  no	  one	  in	  the	  USAF	  was	  very	  optimistic	  about	  its	  cost	  and	  potential.	  Dubious	  of	  its	  capacity	  to	  fly	  autonomously	  without	  a	  pilot	  having	  real-­‐time	  control,	  the	  USAF	  insisted	  that	  the	  prototype	  carry	  a	  pilot	  to	  handle	  in-­‐flight	  problems	  and	  that	  the	  production	  copy	  have	  an	  option	  for	  manned	  flight.	  135	  The	  AARS	  ultimately	  failed	  to	  move	  to	  full-­‐scale	  development	  in	  1991	  because	  one	  of	  the	  AARS	  partners,	  likely	  the	  USAF,	  was	  reluctant	  to	  commit	  funding.136	  Asked	  about	  the	  prospect	  of	  an	  SR-­‐71	  follow-­‐on	  such	  as	  AARS,	  USAF	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  Lawrence	  Welch	  said,	  “There	  are	  a	  couple	  programs…Frankly	  we	  have	  not	  found	  them	  too	  promising.”137	  Ehrhard’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  AARS	  demise	  provides	  the	  most	  telling	  indication	  that	  the	  USAF	  held	  excessively	  pessimistic	  views	  of	  AARS	  technology.	  In	  his	  view,	  a	  “combat	  pilot-­‐led	  Air	  Force”	  simply	  could	  not	  trust	  a	  “risky	  unmanned	  surveillance	  program.”138	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  2015)	  137	  ibid	  	  138	  Ehrhard	  (2010	  17	  
	   97	  
In	  conclusion,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  USAF	  was	  more	  willing	  to	  take	  risks	  on	  unmanned	  technology	  during	  wartime	  than	  during	  eras	  of	  relative	  peace.	  Also,	  leadership	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  determining	  the	  USAF’s	  willingness	  to	  embrace	  unmanned	  technologies.	  Gen.	  Arnold’s	  broad	  conception	  of	  airpower	  and	  powerful	  position	  in	  the	  service	  allowed	  him	  to	  effectively	  start	  several	  UAV	  programs.	  But	  later	  UAV	  advocates	  in	  the	  USAF’s	  Reconnaissance	  Division	  lacked	  the	  authority	  and	  the	  vision	  to	  effectively	  advocate	  for	  UAV	  programs	  over	  the	  hesitance	  of	  TAC	  and	  AFSC,	  which	  tended	  to	  be	  far	  more	  risk-­‐averse	  and	  wary	  of	  the	  cost	  and	  potential	  of	  UAVs.	  	  	  	  
	  
3. To	  what	  extent	  were	  USAF	  judgments	  about	  the	  employment	  of	  
UAVs	  driven	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  reduce	  risk	  to	  friendly	  personnel	  and	  to	  
what	  extent	  was	  that	  push	  from	  outside	  the	  service?	  	  
	  Airmen	  recognized	  the	  potential	  of	  unmanned	  technologies	  to	  reduce	  aircrew	  risk	  during	  WWII.	  But	  on	  the	  whole,	  courage	  in	  the	  face	  of	  physical	  danger	  was	  expected	  from	  American	  and	  British	  bomber	  crews,	  and	  efforts	  to	  improve	  bomber	  aircraft	  were	  primarily	  aimed	  at	  improving	  military	  effectiveness,	  with	  aircrew	  risk	  being	  a	  secondary	  consideration.139	  Gen.	  Arnold’s	  advocacy	  for	  unmanned	  technologies	  to	  reduce	  aircrew	  risk	  was	  a	  notable	  exception.	  As	  he	  weighed	  the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  successors	  to	  the	  Kettering	  Bug,	  he	  remarked:	  “Much	  more	  important	  than	  any	  monetary	  factor	  was	  the	  possible	  saving	  in	  human	  life.	  “140	  This	  view	  was	  reflected	  in	  his	  advocacy	  for	  not	  only	  the	  Bug	  variants,	  but	  also	  the	  War	  Weary	  bomber	  program	  and	  the	  JB-­‐2,	  a	  cruise	  missile.141	  Outside	  the	  USAF,	  there	  is	  little	  evidence	  of	  pressure	  to	  develop	  technologies	  to	  reduce	  aircrew	  risk	  during	  the	  WWII	  period.	  This	  is	  likely	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that,	  as	  noted	  by	  scholars	  including	  Jeffrey	  Record	  and	  Eric	  Larsen,	  the	  American	  public	  has	  historically	  accepted	  a	  large	  number	  of	  casualties	  when	  it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  139	  Wells	  (1995)	  140	  Arnold	  (1949)	  260	  	  141	  Quigg	  (2014)	  55-­‐56	  
	   98	  
perceives	  its	  vital	  interests	  are	  threatened,	  as	  was	  the	  case	  after	  the	  Japanese	  attack	  on	  Pearl	  Harbor.142	  
	  
Dawn	  of	  the	  Cold	  War:	  	  Early	  Recognition	  of	  Drone	  Employment	  to	  Reduce	  Risk	  	  	  	  Even	  before	  Gary	  Powers	  was	  shot	  down	  in	  1960,	  two	  individuals	  in	  the	  USAF’s	  Reconnaissance	  Division,	  Col.	  Wood	  and	  Lt.	  Col.	  Ryan,	  were	  already	  worried	  about	  the	  risks	  of	  using	  the	  U-­‐2	  for	  strategic	  reconnaissance.143	  Col.	  Steakley,	  who	  flew	  a	  B-­‐29	  adapted	  for	  aerial	  reconnaissance	  during	  WWII	  and	  later	  served	  as	  the	  Deputy	  Director	  of	  Reconnaissance	  for	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  (JCS),	  also	  made	  the	  case	  for	  reducing	  aircrew	  risk	  after	  the	  October	  26,	  1962	  shoot-­‐down	  of	  Maj.	  Anderson	  over	  Cuba.	  	   In	  part	  due	  to	  these	  airmen’s	  efforts	  —	  and	  in	  response	  to	  the	  shoot-­‐downs	  —USAF	  outsiders	  increasingly	  came	  to	  realize	  the	  importance	  of	  drones	  as	  a	  means	  to	  reduce	  risk	  to	  aircrew.	  In	  a	  September	  1961	  memo,	  the	  Pentagon’s	  chief	  weapons	  buyer,	  Harold	  Brown,	  cited	  the	  “immediate	  and	  urgent”	  requirement	  for	  drones	  to	  conduct	  reconnaissance	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  China.	  He	  noted	  that	  drones	  were	  preferable	  because	  they	  eliminated	  the	  political	  risks	  associated	  with	  downed	  aircrew.144	  Not	  long	  after,	  Ryan	  Aeronautical	  was	  able	  to	  win	  an	  NRO-­‐funded	  Big	  Safari	  contract	  for	  the	  147A.	  Then,	  in	  late	  1962,	  Army	  General	  Maxwell	  Taylor,	  the	  JCS	  chairman,	  expedited	  the	  NRO’s	  purchase	  of	  nine	  Ryan	  147B	  high-­‐altitude	  drones	  after	  Col.	  Steakley	  pointed	  out	  to	  the	  chairman	  that	  they	  could	  reduce	  aircrew	  risk.145	  The	  US	  government’s	  growing	  concern	  with	  aircrew	  risk	  resurfaced	  again	  in	  late	  1966	  when	  Cyrus	  Vance,	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  told	  Lockheed	  Martin	  to	  pursue	  the	  D-­‐21	  Tagboard	  and	  the	  follow-­‐on	  Senior	  Bowl,	  because	  “our	  government	  will	  never	  again	  allow	  a	  Francis	  Gary	  Powers	  situation	  to	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develop.	  All	  our	  overflights	  over	  denied	  territory	  will	  either	  be	  with	  satellites	  or	  with	  drones.”146	  The	  early	  1960s	  also	  saw	  growing	  enthusiasm	  for	  drones	  as	  a	  means	  to	  reduce	  aircrew	  risk	  in	  private	  industry.	  Lockheed	  Martin	  pitched	  the	  D-­‐21	  Tagboard	  to	  the	  USAF	  after	  Skunkworks	  president	  Ben	  Rich	  convinced	  his	  predecessor,	  Kelly	  Johnson,	  that	  a	  drone	  “was	  the	  pragmatic	  solution	  to	  spying	  over	  extreme	  hostile	  territory	  without	  worrying	  about	  loss	  of	  life	  or	  political	  embarrassments	  of	  the	  Francis	  Gary	  Powers	  variety.”147	  
	  
The	  Vietnam	  War:	  A	  Growing	  Appreciation	  for	  Reduced	  Risk	  Inside	  and	  Outside	  the	  
USAF	  	  	  The	  capacity	  of	  drones	  to	  reduce	  aircrew	  risk,	  and,	  consequentially,	  political	  risk,	  became	  increasingly	  apparent	  to	  the	  American	  public	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1960s	  during	  the	  147B’s	  “Blue	  Springs”	  missions	  over	  North	  Vietnam	  and	  China.	  While	  looking	  for	  signs	  of	  a	  communist	  military	  buildup,	  the	  first	  147B	  was	  shot	  down	  over	  mainland	  China	  on	  November	  16,	  1964,	  followed	  by	  three	  more	  in	  early	  1965.	  The	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  sought	  to	  portray	  the	  shoot-­‐downs	  as	  a	  major	  victory,	  initially	  causing	  an	  uproar	  in	  the	  American	  press.	  	  But	  it	  died	  down	  quickly	  because	  the	  US	  government	  refused	  to	  confirm	  ownership	  of	  the	  drones.	  “The	  Chinese	  could	  claim	  whatever	  they	  wanted,	  but	  they	  didn’t	  have	  a	  captured	  ‘spy	  pilot’	  as	  evidence,”	  said	  Wagner,	  a	  Ryan	  Aeronautical	  spokesman	  who	  wrote	  a	  history	  of	  147	  Lightning	  Bug	  drones.148	  The	  147B	  had	  offered	  a	  means	  to	  conduct	  surveillance	  over	  China	  without	  risking	  the	  political	  embarrassment	  of	  a	  captured	  pilot.	   Inside	  the	  USAF,	  the	  potential	  for	  drones	  to	  reduce	  risk	  to	  aircrew	  also	  gained	  appreciation	  during	  the	  “Blue	  Springs”	  operation.	  Even	  manned	  reconnaissance	  pilots,	  who	  were	  losing	  missions	  to	  Lightning	  Bugs,	  began	  to	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appreciate	  the	  drones’	  risk-­‐reducing	  benefits.	  Robert	  Schwanhauser,	  the	  top	  Ryan	  Aeronautical	  official	  deployed	  with	  SAC’s	  100th	  SRS	  at	  Bien	  Hoa	  AB	  in	  Vietnam,	  recalled	  the	  reaction	  of	  a	  U-­‐2	  pilot	  after	  flying	  alongside	  a	  Lightning	  Bug	  over	  a	  SAM	  site.	  “From	  his	  offset	  position,	  the	  U-­‐2	  pilot	  saw	  the	  Lightning	  Bug	  shot	  down,”	  said	  Schwanhauser.	  “Back	  at	  the	  Officer’s	  Club	  later	  at	  Bien	  Hoa,	  	  he	  told	  me	  how	  he	  watched	  the	  ‘telephone	  pole’	  consume	  the	  drone.	  The	  rivalry	  stopped	  when	  he	  said,	  “from	  now	  on,	  you	  guys	  can	  have	  that	  mission.’”149	  Dale	  Weaver,	  a	  Ryan	  Aeronautical	  technician	  at	  Bien	  Hoa,	  said	  that	  after	  a	  U-­‐2	  was	  shot	  at	  over	  North	  Vietnam,	  he	  frequently	  heard	  pilots	  say	  they	  were	  happy	  to	  let	  drones	  do	  their	  missions.	  “The	  first	  time	  I	  heard	  it,	  it	  really	  made	  the	  whole	  operation	  seem	  worthwhile,”	  he	  said.	  “A	  couple	  of	  captains	  at	  the	  bar	  at	  Tan	  Son	  Nhut	  were	  discussing	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  didn’t	  have	  to	  fly	  the	  next	  day	  because	  the	  Lightning	  Bug	  had	  already	  made	  the	  mission!”150	  	  As	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  wore	  on,	  the	  American	  public	  also	  expressed	  growing	  concern	  about	  physical	  risk	  to	  aircrews,	  which	  in	  turn	  raised	  the	  political	  risks	  of	  using	  manned	  aircraft.	  After	  North	  Koreans	  captured	  a	  Navy	  research	  ship,	  the	  USS	  Pueblo,	  in	  1968,	  a	  Navy	  EC-­‐121	  was	  shot	  down	  off	  the	  North	  Korean	  Coast	  in	  April	  1969,	  prompting	  TIME	  magazine	  to	  admonish:	  “In	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Pueblo	  incident,	  there	  was	  surely	  a	  legitimate	  question	  as	  to	  the	  prudence	  shown	  by	  the	  U.S.	  in	  sending	  slow,	  unprotected	  planes	  to	  spy	  on	  a	  jumpy	  Communist	  nation	  already	  notorious	  for	  pugnacity	  and	  unpredictability.”151	  Within	  the	  USAF,	  the	  mid-­‐level	  staff	  officers	  who	  had	  always	  supported	  drone	  use	  to	  reduce	  aircrew	  risk	  reached	  out	  to	  their	  advocate	  on	  the	  JCS,	  then-­‐Brig.Gen.	  Steakley.	  As	  a	  result,	  efforts	  to	  replace	  the	  EC-­‐121	  mission	  with	  147T	  drones	  for	  Combat	  Dawn	  missions	  were	  swift.	  Test	  flights	  started	  six	  months	  after	  the	  shoot-­‐down.152	  	  	  TAC,	  which	  up	  until	  this	  point	  had	  largely	  ignored	  drones,	  also	  began	  to	  show	  a	  growing	  interest	  as	  the	  SAM	  threat	  mounted.	  Toward	  the	  end	  of	  1970,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  149	  Wagner	  (1981)	  99	  150	  Wagner	  (1981)	  100	  151	  Quoted	  in	  Wagner	  (1981)	  167	  152	  Wagner	  (1981)	  168	  
	   101	  
TAC’s	  7th	  Air	  Force	  complained	  that	  it	  needed	  more	  147SC	  Buffalo	  Hunter	  drones	  to	  reconnoiter	  air	  defenses	  and	  MIG	  locations	  before	  sending	  in	  manned	  B-­‐52	  bombers,	  which	  required	  fighter	  escort	  for	  protection,	  to	  strike	  those	  targets.153	  
	  
Post-­‐Vietnam	  Support	  for	  Drone	  Development:	  Divided	  Views	  Inside	  and	  Outside	  the	  
USAF	  	  	  Aircraft	  survivability	  remained	  a	  pressing	  issue	  after	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  Israel	  lost	  more	  than	  100	  aircraft	  to	  Soviet-­‐built	  anti-­‐aircraft	  defenses	  operated	  by	  Egypt	  and	  Syria	  during	  the	  1973	  Yom	  Kippur	  War.154	  One	  estimate	  predicted	  the	  USAF	  would	  be	  decimated	  in	  about	  two	  and	  a	  half	  weeks	  if	  there	  were	  a	  full-­‐scale	  war	  with	  the	  Warsaw	  Pact	  forces	  in	  Central	  Europe.155	  But	  as	  the	  fighter	  generals	  wrestled	  with	  TAC’s	  lack	  of	  preparedness	  for	  the	  SAM	  threat	  in	  Vietnam,	  the	  command	  turned	  mostly	  to	  manned	  aircraft	  improvements	  rather	  than	  increased	  drone	  development	  as	  a	  means	  to	  reduce	  risk.	  	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  narrative	  above,	  TAC	  initially	  attempted	  to	  develop	  some	  plans	  to	  use	  drones	  in	  a	  war	  with	  Warsaw	  Pact	  nations,	  but	  decided	  there	  were	  too	  many	  challenges	  involved	  with	  European	  weather	  and	  air	  traffic	  control.	  Instead,	  the	  command	  focused	  its	  energy	  on	  mitigating	  the	  SAM	  threat	  by	  improving	  tactical	  aircraft	  development	  and	  training.	  In	  the	  mid-­‐1970s,	  the	  USAF	  developed	  new	  tactics	  for	  fighter	  pilots	  in	  air-­‐to-­‐air	  training	  exercises	  known	  as	  “Red	  Flag.”156	  Nascent	  work	  on	  stealth	  technology	  for	  fighters,	  which	  ultimately	  led	  to	  the	  F-­‐117,	  also	  began	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1970s.157	  	  	   Despite	  the	  USAF’s	  loss	  of	  interest	  in	  RPVs	  as	  a	  means	  to	  reduce	  aircrew	  risk,	  civilian	  government	  officials	  remained	  enthusiastic.	  In	  1975,	  USAF	  Secretary	  McLucas	  wrote	  a	  paper	  extolling	  the	  use	  of	  RPVs	  to	  “reduce	  manned	  aircraft	  attrition	  in	  very	  high	  threat	  environments”	  and	  “to	  provide	  an	  acceptable	  way	  to	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accomplish	  certain	  tasks	  when	  the	  mission	  or	  area	  of	  operation	  is	  politically	  sensitive,	  and	  we	  just	  don't	  want	  an	  aircraft	  flight	  crew	  exposed.”158	  	  	   Lawmakers	  also	  continued	  to	  support	  RPV	  development	  after	  Vietnam,	  partly	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  the	  aircraft	  reduced	  aircrew	  risk.	  After	  the	  Pentagon’s	  1979	  decision	  to	  shut	  down	  drone	  programs,	  Democratic	  Senator	  Strom	  Thurmond	  lamented:	  “By	  this…decision…manned	  aircraft	  must	  now	  be	  used	  to	  fly	  RPV-­‐type	  missions	  into	  the	  most	  hostile	  of	  enemy	  environments.”159	  Lawmakers	  did	  not	  forget	  about	  the	  potential	  for	  RPVs	  to	  reduce	  aircraft	  risk	  in	  the	  1980s,	  creating	  the	  UAV	  JPO	  in	  1988	  in	  part	  to	  stimulate	  UAV	  development	  following	  the	  loss	  of	  an	  F-­‐111	  aircrew	  in	  an	  air	  strike	  over	  Libya	  in	  April	  1986.160	  	   As	  the	  1980s	  came	  to	  a	  close,	  three	  trends	  in	  attitudes	  toward	  aircrew	  risk	  became	  apparent.	  First,	  interest	  in	  reducing	  aircrew	  risk	  was	  highest	  —	  both	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  USAF	  —	  during	  wartime.	  Second,	  consistent	  interest	  in	  reducing	  aircrew	  risk	  inside	  the	  USAF	  was	  limited	  to	  certain	  officers,	  including	  Gen.	  Arnold	  and	  the	  officers	  in	  the	  Reconnaissance	  Division.	  Third,	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  USAF,	  there	  was	  relatively	  consistent	  support	  for	  reducing	  aircrew	  risk,	  even	  in	  peacetime,	  among	  US	  lawmakers	  and	  the	  American	  public.	  	  
	  
4. To	  what	  extent	  were	  judgments	  about	  UAVs	  based	  on	  a	  concern	  
about	  maintaining	  primacy	  over	  air	  assets	  in	  response	  to	  
competition	  from	  other	  civilian	  and	  military	  institutions?	  	  
	  In	  the	  early	  days	  of	  American	  airpower,	  airmen	  showed	  a	  keen	  interest	  in	  protecting	  their	  prerogatives	  over	  unmanned	  weapons	  from	  encroachment	  by	  Army	  infantry.	  Early	  airpower	  advocates,	  including	  Brig.	  Gen.	  Mitchell	  and	  especially	  Gen.	  Arnold,	  realized	  that	  embracing	  a	  holistic	  view	  of	  airpower,	  to	  include	  unmanned	  technologies,	  would	  bolster	  their	  power	  and	  prestige,	  both	  needed	  to	  support	  their	  claim	  for	  an	  independent	  air	  arm.	  The	  “ironic	  reality,”	  as	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  Quoted	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  Wagner	  and	  Sloan	  (1992)	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  160	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Timothy	  Schultz	  describes	  it	  in	  his	  2007	  dissertation	  on	  the	  changing	  relationship	  between	  airman	  and	  aircraft,	  was	  that	  “the	  best	  interests	  of	  an	  institution	  led	  by	  pilots	  were	  served	  by	  the	  development	  of	  unpiloted	  technology.”161	  	  Gen.	  Arnold’s	  UAV	  advocacy,	  described	  in	  Question	  2,	  provided	  the	  strategic	  framework	  for	  airpower	  advocates	  to	  adopt	  a	  broad	  view	  of	  airpower	  theory	  that	  embraced	  UAVs	  in	  response	  to	  challenges	  from	  other	  military	  branches	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  USAF	  independence	  in	  1944.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Kettering	  Bug	  and	  “aerial	  torpedo”-­‐type	  programs	  in	  general,	  the	  USAF	  sought	  to	  carve	  a	  role	  separate	  from	  the	  Navy	  in	  debates	  over	  terminology.	  In	  April	  1941,	  the	  Air	  Corps	  stopped	  using	  the	  term	  “aerial	  torpedo”	  to	  generically	  describe	  Kettering	  Bug	  variants	  after	  a	  joint	  Army-­‐Navy	  conference	  determined	  that	  this	  moniker	  belonged	  only	  to	  devices	  dropped	  from	  aircraft	  into	  the	  water.	  Instead,	  airmen	  started	  to	  use	  the	  phrase,	  “controllable	  bomb,	  power	  driven”	  to	  denote	  a	  powered,	  guided	  unmanned	  aircraft	  directed	  at	  any	  type	  of	  target.	  162	  As	  the	  AAF	  prepared	  to	  separate	  from	  the	  Army	  after	  the	  war,	  the	  AAF	  began	  to	  use	  the	  term	  “pilotless	  aircraft”	  in	  a	  bid	  to	  make	  a	  claim	  on	  missile	  technology.163	  	  	  
Post-­‐WWII:	  Competing	  USAF	  Views	  of	  the	  Importance	  of	  Drones	  	  	  	  While	  airmen	  felt	  compelled	  to	  claim	  UAVs	  and	  cruise	  missiles	  to	  make	  the	  case	  for	  an	  independent	  USAF	  prior	  to	  WWII,	  they	  felt	  no	  similar	  impulse	  in	  the	  post-­‐WWII	  period.	  Initially	  neither	  SAC	  nor	  TAC	  wanted	  to	  take	  responsibility	  for	  the	  first	  operational	  reconnaissance	  drone,	  the	  147A.164	  There	  were	  no	  other	  services	  competing	  for	  the	  drone,	  developed	  in	  Big	  Safari,	  and	  it	  was	  not	  seen	  as	  part	  of	  SAC’s	  or	  TAC’s	  core	  mission	  set.	  As	  suggested	  in	  Question	  1,	  TAC	  also	  harbored	  a	  cultural	  bias	  against	  drones,	  which	  further	  dampened	  its	  interest.	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As	  discussed	  in	  Question	  2,	  SAC	  finally	  agreed	  to	  take	  on	  the	  147A	  after	  previously	  rejecting	  the	  program.	  The	  command’s	  wartime	  success	  with	  the	  Lightning	  Bug	  successors	  to	  the	  147A	  spurred	  an	  intra-­‐service	  rivalry	  over	  management	  of	  the	  drones.	  In	  the	  mid-­‐1960s,	  TAC	  began	  to	  argue	  for	  more	  direct	  control	  over	  Lightning	  Bug	  operations	  in	  Vietnam	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  SAC	  was	  not	  being	  responsive	  enough	  to	  the	  tactical	  needs	  of	  combatant	  commanders	  in	  Vietnam.165	  	  	  The	  fight	  over	  command	  and	  control	  over	  the	  Lightning	  Bug	  was	  a	  microcosm	  of	  a	  much	  bigger	  fight	  between	  SAC	  and	  TAC	  over	  who	  would	  run	  the	  USAF.166	  The	  bomber	  generals	  had	  historically	  dominated	  leadership	  positions	  because	  of	  their	  central	  role	  in	  strategic	  bombing	  in	  WWII.	  During	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  however,	  fighter	  pilots	  made	  their	  case	  for	  their	  own	  ascendancy	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  were	  now	  assuming	  the	  most	  risk	  in	  combat.167	  Given	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  RPVs	  in	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  TAC	  felt	  it	  could	  no	  longer	  ignore	  the	  technology	  as	  it	  sought	  to	  boost	  its	  claim	  as	  the	  standard	  bearer	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  war-­‐winning	  capabilities.168	  	  Almost	  as	  soon	  as	  TAC	  gained	  responsibility	  for	  RPVs	  in	  1976,	  however,	  it	  lost	  interest	  as	  it	  faced	  the	  peacetime	  realities	  of	  a	  budget	  crunch	  and	  a	  loss	  of	  NRO	  funding.	  Instead	  of	  making	  trade-­‐offs	  with	  its	  manned	  fighter	  fleet	  to	  invest	  in	  new	  RPV	  technology,	  TAC	  let	  RPVs	  die	  off	  completely.	  While	  there	  were	  clearly	  a	  host	  of	  externalities	  agitating	  against	  RPV	  development	  at	  this	  time	  —	  including	  a	  shift	  in	  strategic	  focus	  back	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  competition	  from	  manned	  aircraft	  and	  satellites,	  and	  weather	  problems	  on	  the	  European	  Central	  Front	  —there	  was	  still	  robust	  support	  for	  RPV	  development	  from	  the	  US	  Congress,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Question	  2.	  	  The	  main	  reason	  for	  TAC’s	  loss	  of	  interest	  —	  the	  reason	  that	  Congress	  cut	  RPV	  funding	  in	  1977—was	  that	  the	  command	  failed	  to	  think	  about	  RPVs	  as	  part	  of	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a	  broader	  concept	  of	  airpower.	  	  As	  discussed	  in	  Question	  1,	  many	  USAF	  outsiders,	  including	  the	  GAO,	  members	  of	  the	  RPV	  industry,	  and	  lawmakers,	  believed	  that	  TAC	  purposefully	  neglected	  careful	  planning	  for	  the	  future	  of	  RPVs,	  preferring	  to	  focus	  on	  strategic	  planning	  for	  manned	  fighters,	  the	  platform	  on	  which	  the	  command	  hoped	  to	  build	  the	  USAF’s	  future.	  Without	  wartime	  pressures	  or	  external	  competition	  from	  SAC,	  TAC	  returned	  to	  a	  narrow	  conception	  of	  airpower	  built	  around	  the	  promotion	  of	  fighter	  pilots	  and	  fighter	  aircraft.	  	  	  
Lack	  of	  Interest	  in	  the	  1980s	  	  
	  The	  USAF	  abdicated	  responsibility	  for	  UAV	  innovation	  in	  the	  1980s,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  innovation	  efforts	  continued	  in	  the	  other	  military	  services.	  169	  For	  example,	  the	  Army	  continued	  to	  develop	  the	  Aquila,	  an	  ambitious	  UAV	  that	  it	  eventually	  abandoned	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  joint	  effort	  with	  the	  Navy,	  the	  Pioneer,	  which	  saw	  action	  in	  Desert	  Storm.170	  As	  noted	  in	  the	  narrative,	  the	  USAF	  was	  the	  only	  service	  to	  enter	  the	  war	  without	  its	  own	  operational	  UAV.171	  The	  USAF’s	  UAV	  development	  in	  the	  1980s	  had	  been	  limited	  to	  joint	  programs,	  including	  AARS	  and	  the	  MR-­‐UAV,	  which	  failed	  in	  part	  because	  of	  cost	  growth	  as	  each	  of	  the	  participating	  services	  heaped	  on	  additional	  design	  requirements.172	  The	  USAF	  allowed	  these	  programs	  to	  die,	  and	  it	  would	  take	  external	  pressure	  from	  centralized	  UAV	  organizations	  in	  the	  Pentagon	  —	  the	  UAV	  JPO	  and	  DARO	  —	  to	  launch	  the	  Predator	  program	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  Ultimately,	  the	  findings	  here	  indicate	  that	  the	  USAF	  tended	  to	  ignore	  external	  challenges	  to	  control	  of	  UAVs	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  visionary	  leadership	  or	  wartime	  expediency.	  This	  behavior	  shows	  that	  the	  USAF	  generally	  did	  not	  closely	  associate	  UAVs	  with	  its	  core	  functions,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  visionary	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leadership	  of	  Gen.	  Arnold,	  who	  pushed	  for	  the	  USAF	  to	  embrace	  a	  broad	  conception	  of	  airpower	  theory	  that	  included	  UAV	  innovation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	  In	  his	  research	  on	  UAVs,	  Ehrhard	  concludes	  that	  the	  USAF	  has	  historically	  failed	  to	  incorporate	  UAVs	  on	  a	  permanent	  basis	  due	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  externalities	  unrelated	  to	  USAF	  culture.	  The	  “UAV	  hiatus”	  of	  the	  1980s	  was	  a	  result	  of	  competition	  from	  satellites,	  arms	  control	  treaty	  limitations	  on	  UAVs,	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  technological	  challenges	  including	  the	  failure	  of	  UAVs	  to	  accommodate	  the	  change	  in	  threat	  environment	  from	  Vietnam	  to	  a	  Soviet	  challenge	  in	  the	  European	  theatre,	  and	  the	  high	  costs	  of	  UAV	  development.	  	  	  	  But	  this	  review	  of	  more	  than	  70	  years	  of	  American	  airpower	  history	  suggests	  that	  a	  consistently	  present	  and	  powerful	  influence	  on	  the	  USAF’s	  capacity	  for	  UAV	  innovation	  has	  been	  the	  service’s	  cultural	  preference	  for	  manned	  aircraft.	  The	  pro-­‐manned	  aircraft	  bias	  has	  led	  the	  service	  to	  shun	  unmanned	  technologies	  and	  make	  pessimistic	  assessments	  about	  the	  cost	  and	  potential	  of	  UAVs,	  minimize	  the	  importance	  of	  aircrew	  risk,	  and	  compete	  for	  UAV	  programs	  only	  reluctantly.	  	  The	  intensity	  of	  UAV	  skepticism	  has	  tended	  to	  vary	  according	  to	  whether	  the	  nation	  was	  at	  war.	  During	  WWII	  and	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  airmen	  were	  willing	  to	  take	  a	  risk	  on	  UAV	  technology	  to	  meet	  combat	  needs.	  Visionary	  leaders	  nurtured	  UAV	  development	  in	  periods	  of	  conflict.	  Gen.	  Arnold	  played	  the	  role	  of	  a	  visionary	  leader	  during	  WWII,	  making	  a	  connection	  between	  expanding	  the	  variety	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  airborne	  arsenal	  and	  advancing	  the	  cause	  of	  airpower.	  During	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  middle-­‐level	  reconnaissance	  officers,	  with	  the	  help	  of	  Big	  Safari,	  took	  positive	  views	  of	  the	  cost	  and	  potential	  of	  UAVs,	  their	  capacity	  to	  reduce	  risk,	  and	  their	  potential	  to	  increase	  the	  USAF’s	  war-­‐winning	  edge.	  But	  during	  periods	  of	  relative	  peace	  and	  constrained	  budgets,	  the	  USAF	  was	  far	  less	  willing	  to	  take	  a	  risk	  on	  UAV	  technology.	  Arguments	  about	  technological	  immaturity	  and	  high	  costs	  became	  far	  more	  prominent	  during	  the	  1980s.	  But	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when	  one	  considers	  that	  airmen	  employed	  UAVs	  far	  more	  frequently	  during	  WWII	  than	  they	  did	  during	  the	  “UAV	  Hiatus”	  of	  the	  1980s,	  the	  argument	  about	  technological	  maturity	  rings	  hollow.	  	  While	  UAVs	  of	  course	  had	  development	  problems	  —	  consider	  the	  lethal	  results	  of	  the	  War	  Weary	  Bomber	  program	  —	  the	  USAF	  nevertheless	  judged	  their	  potential	  military	  potential	  to	  be	  worth	  the	  risk.	  The	  USAF’s	  widespread	  use	  of	  UAVs	  during	  wartime	  considerably	  weakens	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  USAF	  saw	  UAVs	  as	  too	  technologically	  immature	  to	  take	  on	  UAV	  development	  risks.	  In	  contrast	  to	  Ehrhard’s	  research,	  my	  findings	  indicate	  an	  early	  and	  influential	  set	  of	  biases	  that	  held	  back	  UAV	  development.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  external	  forces	  did	  not	  help	  to	  slow	  down	  the	  USAF’s	  UAV	  programs,	  but	  it	  does	  suggest	  that	  USAF	  culture	  played	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  mediating	  the	  USAF’s	  assessments	  of	  UAV	  technology	  during	  wartime	  versus	  peacetime.	  From	  the	  earliest	  days	  of	  American	  airpower,	  airmen	  clung	  to	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  as	  their	  central	  justification	  for	  a	  new	  military	  service.	  The	  cultural	  preference	  for	  manned	  aircraft	  often	  led	  the	  USAF	  to	  ignore	  UAV	  innovations,	  unless	  wartime	  imperatives	  or	  visionary	  leaders	  demanded	  it,	  because	  they	  were	  seen	  as	  a	  fundamental	  threat	  to	  the	  service’s	  identity.	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CHAPTER	  THREE,	  The	  Peace	  Dividend	  Era:	  
The	  USAF	  Rejects	  the	  Predator	  
	  The	  USAF	  rejected	  the	  Predator	  when	  it	  first	  became	  a	  US	  military	  program	  in	  1993.	  In	  fact,	  none	  of	  the	  military	  services	  were	  willing	  to	  operate	  the	  UAV,	  which	  started	  in	  the	  Pentagon’s	  UAV	  JPO	  and	  was	  managed	  by	  DARO.	  	  It	  was	  not	  until	  1995	  that	  the	  Army,	  seeking	  a	  mission	  for	  a	  newly	  available	  UAV	  unit,	  agreed	  to	  fly	  the	  Predator	  in	  the	  Balkans	  with	  support	  from	  the	  Navy.	  But	  the	  USAF	  continued	  to	  minimize	  its	  involvement,	  sending	  just	  one	  airman	  to	  support	  Predator	  operations.1	  	  	  The	  first	  half	  of	  this	  chapter	  examines	  the	  technical,	  political,	  and	  bureaucratic	  dynamics	  that	  led	  to	  the	  Pentagon’s	  decision	  to	  establish	  the	  Predator	  program	  and	  the	  USAF’s	  decision	  to	  reject	  the	  UAV.	  Because	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  limited	  participation,	  the	  narrative	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  chapter	  focuses	  mainly	  on	  the	  other	  players	  in	  Predator	  development,	  including	  civilian	  leadership	  in	  the	  Pentagon	  and	  UAV	  industry	  leaders.	  The	  second	  half	  shifts	  the	  focus	  to	  the	  USAF,	  exploring	  how	  USAF	  culture	  shaped	  the	  decision	  to	  forgo	  participation	  in	  the	  Predator	  program	  in	  1993	  and	  1994.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
UAVs	  in	  the	  Post-­‐Cold	  War	  Era	  	  	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  there	  was	  a	  broad	  push	  across	  the	  DoD	  to	  reduce	  the	  military’s	  budget	  by	  developing	  cost-­‐effective,	  low-­‐risk	  weapon	  systems.	  The	  drive	  to	  reduce	  military	  spending	  —	  while	  maintaining	  capability	  —	  stemmed	  from	  the	  Clinton	  administration’s	  desire	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  to	  capitalize	  on	  “the	  peace	  dividend.”2	  In	  1993,	  the	  Pentagon	  released	  the	  Bottom-­‐Up	  Review	  (BUR),	  which	  called	  for	  increasing	  US	  military	  capability	  by	  relying	  heavily	  on	  engagement	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Ehrhard	  (2000)	  540	  2	  Senior	  Pentagon	  civilian	  interview	  (Mar.	  27,	  2013)	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prevention,	  thereby	  saving	  money	  after	  more	  than	  four	  decades	  of	  heavy	  spending	  on	  conventional	  forces	  to	  meet	  the	  Soviet	  threat.3	  	  	  That	  same	  year,	  William	  Perry,	  the	  Deputy	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  and	  John	  Deutch,	  the	  Pentagon’s	  chief	  weapons	  buyer	  from	  1993	  to	  1994	  (and	  later,	  CIA	  director)	  asked	  Larry	  Lynn,	  the	  deputy	  undersecretary	  of	  defense	  for	  Advanced	  Programs,	  to	  lead	  a	  Defense	  Science	  Board	  (DSB)	  summer	  study	  on	  Global	  Surveillance.4	  The	  study	  found	  that	  the	  Pentagon’s	  long-­‐endurance	  surveillance	  capability	  was	  seriously	  lacking.	  	  At	  the	  time,	  the	  USAF	  was	  committed	  to	  a	  strategic	  reconnaissance	  strategy	  built	  around	  satellites.5	  Gen.	  Merrill	  McPeak,	  the	  USAF	  chief	  from	  October	  1990	  to	  October	  1994,	  believed	  that	  satellite	  imagery	  and	  communications	  held	  the	  key	  to	  achieving	  	  “information	  dominance,”	  which	  he	  described	  as	  “the	  ability	  to	  observe	  the	  whole	  theater,	  to	  rapidly	  asses	  threats	  and	  opportunities,	  to	  identify	  targets,	  and	  to	  navigate	  precisely	  to	  those	  targets.”6	  	  	  But	  the	  DSB	  study	  cited	  two	  factors	  that	  led	  Pentagon	  officials	  to	  favor	  UAVs	  over	  satellites.	  First,	  the	  DSB	  found	  that	  satellites	  lacked	  the	  tactical	  flexibility	  to	  meet	  the	  long-­‐dwell	  coverage	  requirements	  of	  the	  emerging	  strategic	  environment.7	  While	  the	  Cold	  War	  was	  over	  and	  the	  free	  flow	  of	  spending	  with	  it,	  “military	  operations	  other	  than	  war”	  (MOOTW)	  —	  as	  they	  were	  known	  in	  the	  1990s	  —	  were	  on	  the	  rise.	  Conflict	  was	  escalating	  among	  ethnic	  and	  national	  groups	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia.	  The	  American,	  French,	  and	  British	  governments	  faced	  increasing	  media	  and	  public	  pressure	  to	  stop	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs’	  ethnic	  cleansing	  campaign,	  which	  eventually	  led	  to	  the	  deaths	  of	  thousands,	  including	  many	  civilians.8	  	  	  Satellites,	  which	  could	  only	  provide	  sporadic	  coverage,	  were	  ill-­‐suited	  for	  this	  rapidly	  changing	  battlespace.	  In	  order	  for	  the	  US	  government	  to	  conduct	  air	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Larsen,	  Orletsky,	  Leuschner	  (2001)	  41-­‐79.	  	  4	  Entzminger	  interview	  (Dec.	  15,	  2012);	  Lynn	  interview	  (Apr.	  23,	  2013)	  5	  McPeak	  (August	  1995)	  207-­‐213	  and	  214-­‐220	  6	  McPeak	  (Aug.	  1995)	  207	  7	  Entzminger	  interview	  (Dec.	  15,	  2012);	  Barzelay	  and	  Campbell	  (2003)	  157;	  Blackwelder	  interview	  (Aug.	  13,	  2013)	  	  8	  Bucknam	  (March	  2003)	  65	  
	   110	  
strikes	  on	  Serbian	  military	  targets	  —	  the	  policy	  that	  it	  finally	  settled	  on	  in	  May	  1993	  and	  continued	  until	  December	  1995	  —	  it	  would	  first	  need	  continuous	  and	  accurate	  information	  on	  Serbian	  air	  bases,	  entrenchments,	  supply	  caches,	  and	  troop	  movements,	  as	  well	  as	  UN-­‐mandated	  safe	  enclaves	  for	  civilians.9	  In	  contrast	  to	  satellites,	  which	  provided	  only	  intermittent	  coverage	  depending	  on	  their	  orbit,	  long-­‐dwell	  UAVs	  could	  persistently	  monitor	  these	  moving	  targets,	  which	  were	  scattered	  across	  Bosnia’s	  expansive,	  mountainous	  terrain,	  often	  under	  heavy	  cloud	  cover.10	  The	  second	  factor	  weighing	  in	  favor	  of	  UAVs	  concerned	  technological	  maturity.	  Claims	  that	  UAVs	  lacked	  the	  technical	  capability	  required	  to	  be	  useful	  to	  the	  military	  had	  been	  losing	  credibility	  since	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  The	  DSB	  study	  concluded	  that	  UAVs	  had	  come	  of	  age.11	  UAV	  component	  technologies	  were	  becoming	  increasingly	  available,	  including	  software	  for	  command	  and	  control,	  computer	  processing	  power	  for	  autonomous	  flight	  control	  systems,	  and	  sensors	  to	  provide	  color,	  video	  imagery	  and	  other	  information.12	  	  Most	  significantly,	  a	  major	  leap	  in	  the	  maturity	  of	  navigation	  systems	  and	  satellite	  communications	  occurred	  during	  the	  1980s.13	  In	  Vietnam,	  Ehrhard	  notes,	  navigation	  errors	  prevented	  147	  Lightning	  Bug	  variants	  from	  finding	  more	  than	  50	  percent	  of	  their	  reconnaissance	  targets.14	  But	  Global	  Positioning	  System	  (GPS)	  technology,	  which	  had	  grown	  increasingly	  reliable	  and	  smaller	  in	  size	  since	  its	  introduction	  in	  1978,	  began	  to	  show	  potential	  for	  dramatically	  improving	  the	  capacity	  to	  direct	  UAV	  flights	  and	  to	  provide	  usable	  targeting	  information.15	  By	  the	  late	  1980s,	  a	  full	  constellation	  of	  GPS	  satellites	  was	  on	  orbit.	  Satellite	  data	  links	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Newcome	  (2004)107;	  Strickland	  (March	  2013)	  	  2	  	  10	  Strickland	  (2013)	  2.	  	  	  11	  Barzelay	  and	  Campbell	  (2003)	  157	  12	  Rosenwasser	  (2004)	  21-­‐22	  	  	  13	  Blue	  interview	  (June	  11,	  2012)	  ;	  Karem	  interview	  (June	  12,	  2012);	  Bowie	  (September	  2010)	  	  14	  Ehrhard	  (2001)	  409-­‐411.	  15	  Rosenwasser	  (2004)	  22;	  Blue	  interview	  (June	  11,	  2012);	  Karem	  interview	  (June	  12,	  2012)	  
	   111	  
also	  emerged	  around	  1990	  to	  enable	  communication	  between	  UAVs	  and	  remotely-­‐positioned	  ground	  stations,	  thereby	  enabling	  UAVs	  to	  fly	  beyond	  the	  line	  of	  sight.	  16	  	  	  
The	  Creation	  of	  a	  UAV	  Bureaucracy	  	  
	  Around	  the	  same	  time	  as	  the	  1993	  DSB	  study,	  Lynn	  —	  with	  the	  support	  of	  Perry	  and	  Deutch	  —	  launched	  a	  new	  acquisition	  concept	  known	  as	  the	  	  “Advanced	  Concept	  Technology	  Demonstration”(ACTD).17	  Lynn	  ultimately	  initiated	  over	  50	  ACTD	  programs,	  designed	  to	  provide	  a	  fast,	  low-­‐risk	  way	  for	  the	  military	  services	  to	  test	  new	  technologies	  in	  combat	  and	  then	  accept	  or	  reject	  them	  depending	  on	  their	  performance.18	  Lynn,	  Perry,	  and	  Deutch	  were	  especially	  interested	  in	  using	  the	  ACTD	  process	  to	  force	  the	  UAV	  JPO	  to	  accelerate	  the	  delivery	  of	  UAVs	  to	  combat	  commanders	  for	  testing,	  all	  the	  while	  keeping	  requirements	  minimal	  and	  costs	  low.19	  	  To	  briefly	  review,	  the	  US	  Congress	  had	  established	  the	  UAV	  JPO	  in	  1988	  to	  increase	  “commonality”	  among	  UAV	  programs	  and	  reduce	  costs.	  But	  as	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  two,	  the	  centralized	  organization	  had	  failed	  to	  produce	  combat-­‐ready	  UAVs	  because	  it	  could	  not	  protect	  joint	  UAV	  programs	  such	  as	  the	  USAF-­‐Navy	  MR-­‐UAV	  from	  the	  military	  services’	  mounting	  requirements	  and	  the	  associated	  development	  delays	  and	  growing	  costs.	  The	  UAV	  JPO	  was	  ultimately	  a	  slave	  to	  the	  services’	  demands	  because	  it	  did	  not	  have	  leverage	  in	  the	  form	  of	  its	  own	  budget.	  	  	  The	  ACTD	  process	  was	  the	  Pentagon	  civilians’	  attempt	  to	  overcome	  the	  UAV	  JPO’s	  weaknesses.	  The	  UAV	  JPO	  would	  still	  bear	  responsibility	  for	  managing	  UAV-­‐related	  projects,	  but	  Pentagon	  civilians	  would	  pick	  the	  projects	  and	  set	  the	  requirements.	  Lynn	  chaired	  a	  committee	  that	  settled	  on	  three	  “tiers”	  of	  UAV	  efforts.20	  Tier	  I	  was	  a	  requirement	  for	  a	  relatively	  small	  UAV	  that	  could	  easily	  be	  filled	  by	  an	  existing	  airframe,	  the	  CIA’s	  Gnat-­‐750.	  Tier	  II	  was	  a	  requirement	  for	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Rosenwasser	  (2004)	  21	  	  17	  Thirtle,	  Johnson,	  Birkler	  (1997)	  xiii	  and	  Perdue	  interview	  (Apr.	  11,	  2013).	  18	  ibid	  19	  Perdue	  interview	  (Apr.	  11,	  2013);	  Williams	  interview	  (Apr.	  14,	  2013);	  Thirtle,	  Johnston	  and	  Birkler	  (1997)	  13	  20	  Lynn	  interview	  (Apr.	  23,	  2013)	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medium-­‐altitude	  UAV,	  which	  would	  eventually	  be	  filled	  by	  the	  Predator.	  Tier	  III	  involved	  a	  high-­‐altitude	  design	  that	  would	  become	  the	  USAF’s	  RQ-­‐4	  Global	  Hawk	  and	  the	  later-­‐cancelled	  Darkstar	  program.	  21	  Pentagon	  civilians	  took	  one	  further	  step	  to	  diminish	  the	  role	  of	  the	  UAV	  JPO	  and	  the	  military	  services	  in	  UAV	  development.	  They	  hatched	  a	  plan	  to	  develop	  a	  new	  Pentagon	  organization,	  DARO,	  which	  would	  control	  all	  funding	  for	  UAVs	  and	  other	  reconnaissance	  aircraft.	  DARO	  funding	  was	  usurped	  from	  the	  airborne	  reconnaissance	  budgets	  of	  each	  of	  the	  military	  services.22	  DARO	  would	  redistribute	  these	  funds	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  highest	  priority	  airborne	  reconnaissance	  programs	  while	  cutting	  lower-­‐priority	  efforts.23	  	  DARO	  would	  pay	  for	  the	  first	  two	  years	  of	  airborne	  reconnaissance	  ACTD	  programs.	  Once	  a	  military	  service	  took	  responsibility	  for	  an	  ACTD,	  DARO	  would	  release	  the	  funding	  to	  the	  military	  service,	  but	  also	  would	  require	  the	  service	  to	  commit	  a	  dedicated	  funding	  stream	  to	  the	  program.24	  The	  US	  Congress	  adopted	  language	  approving	  the	  Pentagon	  civilians’	  construct	  for	  DARO,	  which	  officially	  stood	  up	  in	  November	  1993.25	  The	  same	  month	  that	  DARO	  was	  created,	  Deutch	  issued	  the	  requirements	  for	  the	  new	  Tier	  II	  UAV,	  which	  would	  eventually	  become	  known	  as	  the	  Predator.	  Drawing	  on	  Deutch’s	  requirements,	  the	  UAV	  JPO	  released	  a	  request	  for	  a	  Tier	  II	  “tactical	  endurance”	  UAV,	  calling	  for	  a	  first	  flight	  within	  six	  months	  and	  the	  delivery	  of	  10	  air	  vehicles	  within	  10	  months.26	  The	  UAV	  was	  expected	  to	  fly	  beyond	  the	  line-­‐of-­‐sight	  and	  have	  an	  endurance	  of	  up	  to	  44	  hours.27	  Additionally,	  it	  was	  expected	  to	  have	  satellite	  capability	  for	  navigational	  control	  and	  imagery	  transmission,	  and	  also	  to	  fly	  500	  nautical	  miles,	  remain	  on	  station	  for	  24	  hours,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Thirtle,	  Johnston	  and	  Birkler	  (1997)	  10	  22	  Blackwelder	  interview	  (Aug.	  13,	  2013);	  Ehrhard	  (2010)	  48;	  Fogleman	  interview	  (Oct.	  22,	  2013),	  	  23	  Blackwelder	  interview	  (Aug.	  13,	  2013)	  24	  ACC	  History	  Office	  (Aug,	  2006)	  5;	  Fogleman	  interview	  (Oct.	  22,	  2013)	  25	  Ehrhard	  (2010)	  48	  26	  Thirtle,	  Johnston,	  Birkler	  (1997)	  20	  27	  Thirtle,	  Johnston,	  Birkler	  (1997)	  9	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carry	  a	  4,000	  to	  5,000	  lb.	  payload,	  and	  fly	  at	  15,000	  to	  20,000	  feet.28	  The	  Tier	  II	  UAV	  was	  required	  only	  to	  relay	  still	  images,	  not	  full	  motion	  video	  (FMV),	  according	  to	  the	  original	  request	  for	  proposals.29	  	  	  	  As	  soon	  as	  the	  Tier	  II	  bid	  was	  released	  in	  1993,	  UAV	  development	  accelerated	  at	  General	  Atomics	  Aeronautical	  Systems	  (GA-­‐ASI),	  where	  the	  aircraft	  that	  became	  the	  Predator	  was	  born.	  The	  small,	  San	  Diego,	  California-­‐based	  company	  was	  run	  by	  two	  adventurous	  brothers,	  Neal	  and	  Linden	  Blue,	  who	  had	  been	  hatching	  a	  plan	  to	  get	  into	  the	  aviation	  business.	  Just	  three	  years	  earlier,	  General	  Atomics	  had	  added	  “Aeronautical	  Systems”	  to	  its	  company	  name	  after	  buying	  Leading	  Systems,	  the	  manufacturer	  of	  the	  CIA’s	  combat-­‐tested	  Gnat-­‐750.30	  GA-­‐ASI’s	  Tier	  II	  design	  was	  a	  “stretch”	  version	  of	  the	  Gnat	  -­‐750,	  with	  longer	  wings	  and	  a	  larger	  four-­‐stroke	  engine	  to	  accommodate	  satellite	  data	  links	  in	  the	  nose	  of	  the	  aircraft,	  allowing	  for	  beyond	  line-­‐of-­‐sight	  operation	  and	  real-­‐time	  data	  transmission.31	  	  The	  Tier	  II	  design	  also	  augmented	  its	  inertial	  navigation	  system	  with	  GPS	  to	  dramatically	  improve	  navigation.32	  These	  innovations	  had	  already	  been	  developed	  and	  tested	  onboard	  various	  versions	  of	  the	  Gnat-­‐750,	  as	  discussed	  below.	  GA-­‐ASI	  initially	  called	  its	  Tier	  II	  design	  “Birdie”	  because	  it	  was	  supposed	  to	  be	  “cheap	  cheap	  cheap”33	  before	  Thomas	  Cassidy,	  a	  retired	  Navy	  admiral	  and	  the	  president	  of	  the	  company’s	  aeronautics	  division	  until	  2010,	  proposed	  the	  name	  “Predator.”34	  In	  May	  1994,	  reported	  cost	  data	  put	  the	  price	  of	  one	  Predator	  vehicle	  at	  $4.2	  million;	  later	  that	  year	  another	  estimate	  put	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  air	  vehicle	  at	  $1.6	  million,	  plus	  $2	  million	  for	  the	  ground	  station.35	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Thirtle,	  Johnston,	  Birkler	  (1997)	  11	  29	  Big	  Safari	  scientist	  interview	  (Aug.	  21,	  2013)	  .	  	  30	  Newcome	  (2004)	  107.	  	  31	  Hirschberg	  (2010)	  15	  32	  Ehrhard	  (2001)	  535.	  
33	  Blue	  interview	  (June	  11,	  2012)	  	  	  34	  Blue	  interview	  (June	  11,	  2012)	  	  	  35	  Fulghum	  (May	  16,	  1994)	  20;	  Fulghum	  (Nov.	  28,	  1994)	  62.	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On	  January	  7,	  1994,	  the	  UAV	  JPO	  awarded	  GA-­‐ASI	  a	  $31.7	  million	  contract	  to	  deliver	  up	  to	  10	  Predator	  aircraft	  for	  Tier	  II.36	  By	  that	  time,	  GA-­‐ASI	  had	  already	  starting	  building	  two	  Predator	  air	  vehicles.37	  There	  was	  an	  open	  bidding	  competition	  for	  the	  Tier	  II	  design,	  but	  US	  defense	  officials	  decided	  the	  GA-­‐ASI	  bid	  was	  the	  obvious	  choice	  because	  it	  was	  based	  on	  the	  CIA’s	  combat-­‐proven	  Gnat-­‐750.38	  While	  this	  was	  technically	  true,	  the	  reasons	  that	  the	  UAV	  JPO	  picked	  a	  Gnat-­‐750-­‐based	  design	  —	  under	  heavy	  influence	  from	  Pentagon	  civilians	  and	  DARO	  —ran	  far	  deeper	  than	  that.	  	  	  
Strategic	  Potential:	  Predecessor	  UAVs	  Set	  the	  Conditions	  for	  Predator	  
Development	  	  	  	  
	  The	  lineage	  of	  the	  Predator	  program	  reveals	  how	  it	  became	  possible	  to	  build	  a	  UAV	  with	  truly	  strategic	  potential	  during	  the	  1980s,	  which	  had	  been	  a	  particularly	  barren	  time	  for	  military	  UAV	  development,	  especially	  in	  the	  USAF.	  UAV	  design	  was	  consigned	  to	  small	  UAV	  companies	  widely	  thought	  of	  in	  the	  defense	  community	  as	  “garage	  tinkerers.”39	  But	  underestimating	  this	  small	  inventor	  community	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  a	  mistake.	  Abraham	  Karem,	  an	  Israeli	  inventor	  and	  founder	  of	  Leading	  Systems,	  literally	  built	  the	  Predator’s	  prototype,	  known	  as	  the	  Albatross,	  in	  his	  garage	  in	  California.40	  The	  Albatross’	  humble	  beginnings	  belied	  major	  design	  innovations	  and	  Karem’s	  connections	  with	  powerful	  figures	  in	  the	  US	  government	  that	  would	  make	  it	  possible	  to	  build	  a	  UAV	  that	  could	  succeed	  where	  so	  many	  others	  had	  failed.	  The	  Albatross	  was	  a	  modest-­‐looking	  aircraft,	  but	  it	  represented	  the	  first	  UAV	  that	  could	  potentially	  provide	  reliable,	  long-­‐range	  aerial	  reconnaissance.	  Initially	  funded	  with	  private	  money,	  Karem	  built	  the	  “Albatross”	  using	  plywood,	  homemade	  fiberglass,	  and	  a	  two-­‐stroke	  engine	  similar	  to	  those	  in	  used	  in	  go-­‐karts.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Thirtle,	  Johnston	  and	  Birkler	  (1997)	  20.	  37	  Lynn	  interview	  (April	  23,	  2013);	  Thirtle,	  Johnston,	  and	  Birkler	  (1997)	  	  38	  Evers	  (Feb.	  7,	  1994)	  54.	  39	  Zaloga	  (January	  1999)	  97	  	  	  40	  Karem	  interview	  (June	  12,	  2012);	  The	  Economist	  (Dec.	  	  2012);	  Finn,	  Peter	  (23	  Dec.	  2011)	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41	  The	  design	  was	  simple,	  and	  the	  UAV	  could	  take	  off	  and	  land	  like	  a	  manned	  aircraft.	  After	  the	  Albatross	  demonstrated	  the	  capacity	  to	  stay	  aloft	  for	  up	  to	  56	  hours	  during	  a	  series	  of	  DARPA-­‐funded	  flight	  tests	  between	  1980	  and	  1982,	  DARPA	  officials	  contracted	  Karem’s	  company	  to	  build	  a	  bigger,	  more	  capable	  version	  known	  as	  Amber.42	  The	  main	  purpose	  of	  DARPA’s	  Amber	  program	  was	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  build	  a	  long-­‐range	  UAV	  less	  prone	  to	  crashes.43	  At	  the	  time,	  there	  was	  no	  systematic	  data	  collection	  to	  support	  the	  defense	  community’s	  perception	  of	  UAVs	  as	  unreliable	  toys,	  nor	  was	  there	  data	  to	  support	  their	  reliability.	  The	  Pentagon	  would	  not	  conduct	  its	  first–ever	  study	  on	  UAV	  reliability	  until	  2003.44	  Yet	  even	  UAV	  supporters	  conceded	  that	  the	  paltry	  data	  available	  suggested	  that	  UAV	  reliability	  rates	  had	  become	  a	  major	  obstacle	  to	  UAV	  innovation.	  Bob	  Williams,	  a	  project	  manager	  for	  UAV	  programs	  at	  DARPA	  in	  the	  1980’s,	  pieced	  together	  available	  data	  in	  1981	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  US	  had	  spent	  about	  $50	  billion	  on	  UAVs	  since	  the	  1960s,	  but	  it	  had	  been	  unusual	  to	  conduct	  more	  than	  30	  to	  40	  relatively	  short	  flights	  before	  a	  loss.45	  Losses	  occurred	  for	  many	  reasons,	  but	  in	  the	  1980s	  landing	  difficulties	  anecdotally	  accounted	  for	  the	  largest	  category.46	  Even	  today,	  landing	  a	  UAV	  on	  a	  runway	  is	  the	  most	  challenging	  part	  of	  the	  flight	  envelope	  because	  it	  requires	  the	  physically-­‐separated	  pilot	  to	  judge	  his	  UAV’s	  approach	  and	  landing	  conditions	  from	  a	  distance.	  Karem’s	  view	  was	  that	  more	  operator	  experience	  —	  rather	  than	  technology	  fixes	  —	  would	  improve	  UAV	  reliability.	  He	  did	  develop	  a	  version	  of	  Amber	  that	  could	  be	  launched	  from	  a	  torpedo	  tube	  for	  the	  Navy,	  but	  he	  felt	  that	  reliability	  would	  be	  best	  improved	  by	  taking	  “a	  serious	  manned	  aircraft	  approach.”47	  To	  this	  end,	  he	  developed	  a	  version	  of	  Amber	  that	  included	  a	  cockpit-­‐like	  ground	  control	  station	  and	  required	  manual	  takeoff	  and	  landing	  on	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Karem	  interview	  (June	  12,	  2012);	  The	  Economist	  	  (Dec	  2012)	  42	  Hirschberg	  (2010)	  11;	  The	  Economist	  	  (	  Dec.	  2012);	  Williams	  interview	  (Apr.	  14,	  2013).	  	  	  43	  Williams	  interview	  (Apr.	  14,	  2013)	  	  44	  DoD	  (Feb.	  2003)	  45	  Williams	  email,	  interview	  (April	  27,	  2013)	  	  	  46	  Williams	  email,	  interview	  (April	  27,	  2013)	  	  	  47	  Karem	  interview	  (June	  12,	  2012)	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runway.48	  Instead	  of	  relying	  solely	  on	  flight	  controls	  as	  many	  previous	  UAV	  designs	  had	  done,	  Karem	  put	  a	  nose	  in	  the	  camera	  of	  the	  aircraft,	  giving	  pilots	  a	  bird’s	  eye	  view	  of	  the	  landing	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  landing	  accidents.49	  He	  also	  established	  a	  flight	  training	  program	  for	  test	  pilots	  within	  Leading	  Systems	  to	  reduce	  flight	  test	  crash	  rates.50	  	  	  	  	  By	  1988,	  Amber	  represented	  a	  highly	  successful	  attempt	  to	  improve	  UAV	  reliability,	  achieving	  650	  flight	  hours	  with	  only	  one	  incident,	  an	  engine	  failure.51	  The	  loss	  rate	  stood	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  earlier	  UAVs,	  such	  as	  the	  RQ-­‐2	  Pioneer,	  the	  longest-­‐serving	  UAV	  in	  the	  US	  military,	  which	  has	  a	  lifetime	  loss	  rate	  of	  1	  loss	  per	  50	  flights.52	  But	  Karem	  suffered	  a	  major	  disappointment	  that	  year	  when	  the	  Navy	  and	  the	  Army	  backed	  out	  of	  their	  plans	  to	  take	  over	  the	  Amber	  from	  DARPA.	  The	  Navy	  had	  just	  accepted	  responsibility	  for	  management	  of	  the	  UAV	  JPO,	  giving	  them	  more	  power	  to	  control	  the	  fate	  of	  Pentagon	  UAV	  projects.	  Navy	  officials	  decided	  to	  kill	  Amber,	  citing	  the	  growing	  costs	  of	  the	  Pioneer,	  which	  had	  already	  been	  combat-­‐tested	  in	  the	  first	  Gulf	  War.53	  Karem’s	  last-­‐ditch	  attempt	  to	  pitch	  the	  Amber	  to	  the	  Army	  also	  failed.	  54	  Karem	  was	  undeterred.	  Even	  if	  the	  US	  military	  did	  not	  realize	  it	  yet,	  he	  had	  successfully	  overcome	  a	  major	  barrier	  to	  UAV	  innovation	  by	  improving	  reliability.	  Now	  he	  turned	  his	  attention	  to	  another	  historic	  showstopper:	  navigation	  accuracy.	  He	  developed	  a	  scaled-­‐down	  version	  of	  the	  Amber,	  the	  Gnat-­‐750	  that	  would	  employ	  GPS	  technology,	  which	  was	  just	  starting	  to	  come	  on	  the	  market	  in	  the	  late	  1980’s.	  But	  money	  was	  tight.	  Karem	  borrowed	  funding	  from	  Hughes	  Aircraft	  to	  build	  10	  pre-­‐production	  models	  of	  the	  Gnat-­‐750,	  and,	  after	  going	  bankrupt	  because	  the	  UAV	  JPO	  refused	  to	  let	  him	  export	  the	  aircraft,	  he	  turned	  over	  control	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Karem	  interview	  (June	  12,	  2012)	  
49	  Williams	  interview	  (April	  14,	  2013)	  	  50	  Karem	  interview	  (June	  12,	  2013);	  Hirschberg	  (2010)	  12.	  51	  Hirschberg	  (12010)	  13.	  52	  DoD	  (Feb	  2003)	  53	  Hirschberg	  (2010)	  14.	  54	  Karem	  interview	  (June	  12,	  2013);	  Williams	  interview	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  2013);	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Leading	  Systems	  to	  Hughes.	  When	  Karem’s	  close	  colleague	  at	  Hughes	  passed	  away,	  he	  again	  was	  in	  need	  of	  a	  buyer	  to	  could	  keep	  his	  company	  in	  the	  UAV	  business.55	  	  By	  1990,	  Neal	  and	  Linden	  Blue	  at	  General	  Atomics	  were	  also	  thinking	  about	  how	  to	  build	  a	  UAV	  that	  solved	  the	  navigation	  accuracy	  problem.	  Neal	  Blue	  began	  looking	  into	  the	  Trimble	  GPS	  system,	  an	  inexpensive	  handheld	  device,	  and	  he	  also	  bought	  a	  cheap	  UAV	  kit	  from	  an	  Australian	  designer	  to	  conduct	  some	  flight	  tests.56	  What	  Blue	  still	  needed,	  however,	  was	  a	  reliable	  UAV	  designed	  for	  military	  missions.	  With	  the	  DoD	  still	  focused	  on	  a	  major	  conventional	  conflict	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  he	  began	  to	  imagine	  using	  a	  swarm	  of	  GPS-­‐guided	  UAVs	  to	  strike	  Soviet	  tanks	  in	  the	  Fulda	  Gap.57	  The	  question	  then	  became	  what	  the	  actual	  UAV	  would	  look	  like.	  He	  recalls	  thinking	  at	  the	  time:	  “We	  knew	  we	  can	  demonstrate	  high-­‐level	  accuracy	  with	  a	  cheap	  GPS	  transmitter,	  and	  then	  the	  question	  is:	  what	  do	  we	  put	  this	  on?	  We	  wanted	  something	  that	  could	  handle	  the	  Fulda	  Gap,	  and	  we	  wanted	  something	  that	  was	  cheap.”	  58	  	  The	  opportunity	  to	  build	  a	  reliable,	  GPS-­‐guided	  UAV	  emerged	  in	  1990	  when	  a	  friend	  called	  Linden	  Blue	  and	  asked	  him	  if	  he	  was	  interested	  in	  buying	  Karem’s	  Leading	  Systems.59	  General	  Atomics	  purchased	  the	  company,	  salvaging	  Karem’s	  GPS-­‐guided	  Gnat-­‐750,	  which	  with	  minor	  modifications	  would	  later	  become	  the	  Predator.	  General	  Atomics	  sold	  six	  copies	  of	  the	  Gnat-­‐750	  to	  Turkey	  in	  1993,60	  the	  same	  year	  it	  established	  GA-­‐ASI	  to	  run	  its	  UAV	  business.61	  The	  foreign	  military	  sale	  was	  the	  first	  signal	  that	  the	  strategic	  and	  political	  tide	  in	  the	  US	  was	  about	  to	  shift	  dramatically	  in	  favor	  of	  UAV	  technology.	  	  The	  CIA	  was	  first	  to	  pick	  up	  on	  the	  growing	  strategic	  potential	  of	  UAVs	  relative	  to	  other	  surveillance	  systems	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  As	  conflict	  heated	  up	  in	  the	  Balkans,	  US	  European	  Command	  (EUCOM)	  became	  increasingly	  desperate	  for	  a	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Karem	  interview	  (June	  12,	  2012);	  The	  Economist	  (December	  2012).	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  Blue	  (June	  11,	  2012)	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  ibid	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  59	  Karem	  interview	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  June	  12,	  2012)	  ;Newcome	  (2004)	  106-­‐107	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  The	  Economist	  	  (Dec.	  2012);	  Newcome	  (2004)	  107.	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  Trimble	  (Mar.	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  2011).	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“loitering	  surveillance	  capability.”62	  While	  the	  USAF	  advocated	  satellites,	  the	  CIA	  was	  turning	  its	  attention	  to	  UAVs.	  After	  assuming	  the	  position	  of	  CIA	  director	  in	  February	  1993,	  James	  Woolsey	  immediately	  began	  to	  investigate	  how	  to	  overcome	  the	  intelligence	  gaps	  in	  the	  region.63	  He	  came	  down	  firmly	  on	  the	  side	  of	  those	  who	  saw	  a	  need	  for	  new	  long-­‐endurance	  surveillance	  assets,	  expressing	  a	  view	  completely	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  USAF’s	  notion	  that	  satellites	  were	  the	  optimum	  solution.	  Based	  on	  decades	  of	  experience	  in	  government	  service	  —	  including	  leading	  a	  panel	  on	  reconnaissance	  for	  Robert	  Gates,	  the	  previous	  CIA	  director	  —Woolsey	  was	  concerned	  about	  the	  limitations	  of	  satellites,	  including	  their	  main	  drawback:	  they	  only	  provide	  coverage	  for	  a	  few	  minutes	  a	  day,	  when	  they	  are	  correctly	  positioned	  on	  orbit.64	  	  As	  he	  searched	  for	  alternatives,	  Woolsey	  was	  alerted	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  using	  an	  operational	  UAV,	  the	  Gnat-­‐750,	  to	  tackle	  the	  Bosnia	  surveillance	  problem	  by	  Gen.	  George	  Joulwan,	  the	  four-­‐star	  Army	  general	  running	  US	  Southern	  Command	  (SOUTHCOM).	  The	  general	  learned	  about	  the	  Gnat-­‐750	  from	  Williams,	  one	  of	  his	  staffers	  who	  had	  worked	  on	  the	  Gnat-­‐750	  predecessor,	  Amber,	  at	  DARPA.	  Eager	  to	  fill	  a	  major	  surveillance	  shortfall	  in	  the	  SOUTHCOM	  theatre,	  Gen.	  Joulwan	  asked	  the	  Joint	  Staff	  for	  a	  UAV	  with	  design	  specifications	  mirroring	  the	  Gnat-­‐750:	  a	  500	  nm	  radius,	  24	  hour	  loiter	  time	  and	  a	  300	  lb.	  payload	  for	  surveillance	  and	  satellite	  devices.65	  	  The	  Joint	  Staff	  asked	  the	  USAF’s	  Big	  Safari	  office	  to	  review	  Gen.	  Joulwan’s	  request.	  The	  secretive	  acquisition	  unit	  based	  at	  Wright	  Patterson	  Air	  Force	  Base	  (AFB)	  in	  Ohio	  normally	  jumped	  at	  the	  chance	  to	  deliver	  tailor-­‐made,	  combat-­‐ready	  solutions.66	  But	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  organization	  ignored	  the	  combatant	  commander’s	  requirement	  for	  a	  UAV	  and	  instead	  suggested	  the	  use	  of	  a	  manned	  Schweitzer	  glider.67	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Barzelay	  and	  Campbell	  (2003)156-­‐157;	  Strickland	  (2013)	  2.	  63	  Strickland	  (2013)	  3.	  	  64	  ibid	  65	  Williams	  interview	  (Sept	  .13	  2014)	  66Grimes	  (2014)	  1-­‐3.	  	  67	  Williams	  interview	  (Sept	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  2014)	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Frustrated	  with	  the	  USAF’s	  response,	  Gen.	  Joulwan	  presented	  the	  Gnat-­‐750	  concept	  to	  Woolsey,	  who	  was	  familiar	  with	  UAVs	  from	  his	  time	  working	  on	  US-­‐Soviet	  arms	  treaties.	  Woolsey	  also	  knew	  the	  Gnat-­‐750’s	  inventor,	  Karem,	  from	  working	  with	  him	  a	  decade	  earlier	  on	  MX	  missile	  basing.68	  Woolsey	  immediately	  agreed	  with	  Gen.	  Joulwan	  that	  the	  Gnat-­‐750	  provided	  a	  potential	  solution	  to	  their	  shared	  concern	  about	  the	  gap	  in	  theater-­‐level	  surveillance	  assets	  and	  began	  to	  lobby	  the	  Pentagon	  for	  the	  acquisition	  of	  the	  Gnat-­‐750.69	  	  The	  CIA	  director	  first	  paid	  a	  courtesy	  call	  to	  the	  UAV	  JPO,	  now	  notorious	  for	  its	  bureaucratic	  delays.	  But	  after	  being	  told	  it	  would	  take	  $20	  million	  per	  year	  over	  five	  years	  to	  procure	  the	  Gnat-­‐750,70	  Woolsey	  turned	  to	  civilian	  leadership	  in	  the	  Pentagon	  —	  Perry,	  Deutch,	  and	  Lynn	  —	  to	  secure	  funding.	  Already	  in	  the	  throes	  of	  streamlining	  UAV	  acquisition	  processes,	  the	  Pentagon	  civilians	  were	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  need	  to	  act	  quickly	  and	  readily	  provided	  funding.	  	  Woolsey	  flew	  to	  GA-­‐ASI	  in	  California	  to	  tell	  Karem	  he	  wanted	  to	  purchase	  four	  Gnat-­‐750	  aircraft	  for	  CIA	  operations	  in	  the	  Balkans.71	  	  In	  early	  1994,	  the	  CIA	  flew	  the	  Gnat-­‐750	  from	  an	  air	  base	  in	  Albania	  to	  conduct	  surveillance	  in	  Serbia	  and	  Bosnia.	  One	  major	  success	  of	  the	  deployment	  was	  that	  it	  demonstrated	  that	  a	  UAV	  could	  transmit	  electro-­‐optical	  and	  infrared	  FMV	  to	  Washington,	  DC.	  72	  Flying	  at	  low	  altitude,	  the	  Gnat-­‐750	  followed	  UN	  convoys,	  collecting	  imagery	  that	  was	  clear	  enough	  to	  distinguish	  decoy	  artillery	  and	  SAMs.73	  In	  a	  further	  indication	  that	  the	  Gnat-­‐750	  had	  become	  a	  useful	  surveillance	  asset,	  the	  CIA	  returned	  the	  Gnat-­‐750	  to	  combat	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1994	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  EUCOM,	  which	  by	  this	  point	  was	  run	  by	  Gen.	  Joulwan.74	  Operating	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  Strickland	  (March	  2013)	  3	  69	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  (Sept.	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  2014	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closer	  to	  Bosnia	  on	  the	  Croatian	  coast,75	  the	  Gnat-­‐750	  returned	  with	  a	  new	  high-­‐resolution	  Mitsubishi	  thermal	  imager	  and	  a	  SIGINT	  payload.76	  	  But	  the	  Gnat-­‐750	  still	  suffered	  from	  serious	  limitations.	  Its	  C-­‐band	  data	  link	  was	  line-­‐of-­‐sight.77	  This	  meant	  that	  FMV	  feeds	  had	  to	  be	  relayed	  through	  a	  manned	  aircraft	  to	  a	  ground	  station	  in	  Albania,	  and	  then	  transmitted	  via	  satellite	  to	  the	  Pentagon.78	  The	  line-­‐of-­‐sight	  limitations	  also	  capped	  the	  Gnat-­‐750’s	  range	  to	  a	  maximum	  radius	  of	  500	  miles.79	  Although	  the	  CIA	  brought	  the	  Gnat-­‐750	  back	  for	  a	  second	  deployment,	  the	  results	  of	  the	  first	  had	  been	  marginal:	  12	  of	  the	  30	  missions	  attempted	  were	  successful.80	  The	  data	  relay	  process	  was	  cumbersome,	  and	  bad	  weather	  threatened	  the	  Gnat-­‐750’s	  delicate	  internal	  electronics	  and	  created	  poor	  flying	  conditions.	  81	  The	  introduction	  of	  satellite	  data	  links	  around	  1990	  presented	  an	  opportunity	  to	  streamline	  FMV	  transmission	  processes.	  Before	  leaving	  SOUTHCOM,	  Gen.	  Joulwan	  secured	  funds	  to	  develop	  a	  wideband	  satellite	  data	  link	  on	  the	  Gnat-­‐	  750.82	  Karem	  used	  the	  money	  to	  equip	  the	  UAV	  with	  a	  bulbous	  satellite	  pod	  carried	  on	  top	  of	  the	  aircraft83	  The	  resulting	  design,	  known	  as	  the	  Gnat	  750	  “whale	  configuration,”	  allowed	  for	  near-­‐real	  time	  FMV	  transmission	  to	  CIA	  headquarters,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  old,	  unwieldy	  relay	  process.84	  	  	  	  	  In	  1994,	  SOUTHCOM	  successfully	  tested	  the	  whale	  configuration,	  leading	  the	  Vice	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff,	  Admiral	  William	  Owens	  to	  declare	  it	  a	  “Revolution	  in	  Military	  Affairs”85	  Over	  the	  previous	  decade,	  the	  Blue	  Brothers	  and	  Karem	  had	  been	  able	  to	  develop	  a	  series	  of	  UAV	  prototypes	  with	  increasing	  strategic	  potential	  –	  first,	  there	  were	  improvements	  in	  reliability,	  followed	  by	  leaps	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  Hasik	  (2008)	  35;	  Newcome	  (2004)	  107.	  76	  Jane’s	  Unmanned	  Aerial	  Vehicles	  and	  Targets	  (Oct.	  28,	  2010)	  	  77	  DoD	  UAV	  JPO	  (1993)	  Slide	  1.	  	  78	  Newcome	  (2004)	  107.	  	  79	  DoD	  UAV	  JPO	  (1993)	  Slide	  1;	  	  80	  Fulghum	  (May	  16,	  1994)	  20.	  	  81	  Fulghum	  (May	  16,	  1994)	  20;	  Howard	  (June	  1995)	  	  82	  Williams	  interview	  (April	  14,	  2013)	  	  83	  Hirschberg	  (2010)15;	  Williams	  interview	  (April	  14,	  2013)	  84	  Trimble	  (17	  March	  2011).	  	  85	  Hirschberg	  (2010)	  15.	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forward	  in	  navigation	  accuracy	  due	  to	  GPS,	  and	  now,	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  satellite	  communications,	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  achieve	  near-­‐real-­‐time	  data	  transmission.	  The	  addition	  of	  a	  wideband	  satellite	  data	  link	  also	  opened	  the	  possibility	  of	  flying	  a	  UAV	  beyond-­‐line-­‐of	  sight,	  thereby	  dramatically	  expanding	  its	  range,	  although	  that	  capability	  was	  not	  exercised	  until	  the	  late	  1990s,	  as	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  five.	  While	  the	  Gnat-­‐750	  experience	  indicates	  that	  UAV	  technology	  was	  evolving	  quickly	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  assessments	  of	  technological	  maturity,	  reliability,	  combat	  capability,	  and	  cost	  were	  not	  yet	  backed	  by	  the	  evidence	  that	  can	  only	  become	  available	  after	  a	  lengthy	  combat	  record.	  As	  a	  result,	  UAV	  performance	  was	  still	  open	  to	  the	  interpretation	  of	  stakeholders	  with	  varying	  agendas.	  The	  intelligence	  community,	  Gen.	  Joulwan	  and	  Adm.	  Owens	  were	  enthusiastic,	  but	  it	  would	  be	  up	  to	  a	  new	  set	  of	  stakeholders	  —	  Pentagon	  civilians	  and	  the	  military	  services	  —	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  Gnat-­‐750	  design	  could	  make	  the	  transition	  from	  the	  CIA	  to	  the	  US	  military.	  	  	  
	  The	  Army	  Deploys	  with	  the	  Predator	  	  	  	  
	  	  Ehrhard	  argues	  that	  UAV	  innovation	  is	  most	  successful	  when	  military	  services	  start	  their	  own	  programs.	  In	  his	  view,	  civilian	  intervention	  often	  leads	  to	  bungled	  UAV	  programs	  because	  civilians	  do	  not	  understand	  the	  services’	  requirements.86	  Yet	  he	  concedes	  that	  the	  Predator	  was	  an	  exception	  to	  this	  rule.87	  The	  Predator	  only	  made	  its	  way	  into	  the	  Pentagon	  acquisition	  system	  by	  the	  intervention	  of	  high-­‐ranking	  Pentagon	  civilians	  working	  through	  the	  UAV	  JPO	  and	  DARO.	  	  Because	  it	  enjoyed	  no	  backing	  from	  a	  military	  service,	  the	  Predator	  had	  to	  prove	  itself	  before	  it	  could	  find	  a	  home.	  Its	  first	  flight	  occurred	  on	  July	  3,	  1994,	  five	  days	  before	  the	  six-­‐month	  deadline	  specified	  in	  the	  ACTD	  requirements.88	  Additional	  tests	  at	  Fort	  Huachuca	  in	  Arizona	  culminated	  in	  a	  40-­‐hour,	  17	  minute	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flight	  in	  January	  1995,	  shattering	  the	  previous	  UAV	  endurance	  record	  of	  29	  hours	  set	  by	  another	  Predator	  progenitor,	  Amber,	  in	  1989.89	  	  	  	  Although	  the	  USAF’s	  Big	  Safari	  office	  was	  not	  yet	  involved	  in	  Predator	  development,	  a	  Big	  Safari	  scientist	  tracking	  UAV	  developments	  stepped	  in	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  extent	  of	  its	  untapped	  potential.	  While	  the	  ACTD	  requirements	  only	  called	  for	  still	  imagery,	  the	  Big	  Safari	  scientist	  convinced	  the	  Pentagon	  to	  allow	  him	  to	  demonstrate	  a	  real-­‐time	  FMV	  capability	  in	  January	  11,	  1995.	  While	  the	  Gnat-­‐750	  “whale	  configuration”	  had	  already	  shown	  the	  feat	  was	  possible,	  piping	  the	  Predator’s	  FMV	  directly	  into	  high-­‐security	  Pentagon	  communications	  networks	  presented	  logistical	  challenges.	  But	  the	  Big	  Safari	  scientist	  was	  able	  to	  overcome	  them.	  ”That	  was	  the	  breakthrough	  moment,”	  said	  the	  Big	  Safari	  scientist,	  who	  would	  later	  become	  a	  central	  character	  in	  the	  development	  of	  Predator	  satellite	  communications.	  “I	  had	  accomplished	  my	  mission	  of	  exposing	  full	  motion	  video	  and	  its	  value.”90	  After	  additional	  FMV	  demonstrations	  in	  1995	  during	  an	  Army	  exercise	  known	  as	  Roving	  Sands,	  the	  Predator	  entered	  the	  final	  stage	  of	  ACTD	  development:	  an	  operational	  deployment.	  By	  now,	  EUCOM	  was	  eager	  to	  deploy	  the	  Predator	  to	  Gjader	  Airfield	  in	  Albania	  to	  conduct	  surveillance,	  just	  as	  its	  predecessor,	  the	  Gnat-­‐750	  had	  done.91	  But	  Pentagon	  officials	  were	  still	  having	  trouble	  finding	  a	  military	  service	  willing	  to	  take	  operational	  responsibility	  for	  the	  deployment.	  	  Army,	  Navy,	  and	  USAF	  generals	  were	  kept	  apprised	  of	  Predator	  developments	  at	  weekly	  “Breakfast	  Club”	  meetings	  with	  Lynn,	  the	  Deputy	  Undersecretary	  of	  Defense	  for	  Advanced	  Programs.92	  But	  none	  of	  the	  services	  expressed	  significant	  interest	  in	  the	  Predator.	  Lt.	  Col.	  Donald	  Blackwelder,	  a	  USAF	  representative	  at	  the	  meetings,	  said	  he	  asked	  Air	  Combat	  Command	  (ACC),	  the	  headquarters	  for	  the	  USAF’s	  combat	  aircraft,	  to	  provide	  specifications	  for	  Predator	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  Defense	  Daily	  (Jan.	  24,	  1995).	  90	  Big	  Safari	  scientist	  interview	  (Aug.	  21,	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  Fulghum	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design	  improvements,	  but	  the	  command	  declined	  to	  do	  so	  because	  it	  had	  no	  formal	  “requirement”	  for	  a	  long-­‐loiter	  UAV.	  93	  	  	  The	  USAF	  did	  not	  change	  its	  position	  when	  it	  came	  time	  to	  find	  a	  service	  home	  for	  the	  Predator	  program.	  Both	  the	  USAF	  and	  the	  Navy	  initially	  rejected	  the	  program	  outright.94	  Eventually,	  the	  Army	  expressed	  interest	  when	  one	  of	  its	  UAV	  units	  became	  available	  to	  take	  on	  the	  Predator.95	  Army	  officials	  volunteered	  to	  take	  the	  Predator	  to	  Bosnia,	  and	  the	  Navy	  agreed	  to	  provide	  maintainers	  to	  support	  the	  deployment.96	  The	  USAF,	  however,	  provided	  just	  one	  airman	  for	  the	  deployment.	  97	  The	  lack	  of	  USAF	  influence	  on	  early	  Predator	  development	  would	  become	  a	  major	  problem	  later	  on,	  as	  described	  in	  chapter	  four.	  In	  the	  summer	  of	  1995,	  the	  Army	  took	  the	  Predator	  to	  Bosnia	  on	  its	  first	  deployment,	  known	  as	  Operation	  Nomad	  Vigil.98	  The	  UAV	  was	  initially	  expected	  to	  stay	  in	  theater	  60	  days,	  but	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  theater	  commanders	  stayed	  for	  120.99	  Before	  leaving	  in	  November	  because	  of	  poor	  winter	  flight	  conditions,	  the	  Predator	  flew	  750	  flight	  hours	  and	  80	  surveillance	  missions,	  which	  provided	  evidence	  of	  weapons	  movements	  in	  violation	  of	  NATO	  agreements.100	  NATO	  commanders	  drew	  on	  that	  intelligence	  to	  inform	  major	  strike	  decisions,101	  including	  the	  decision	  to	  launch	  the	  August	  1995	  air	  campaign	  known	  as	  “Deliberate	  Force,”	  which	  in	  turn	  led	  to	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  Dayton	  Peace	  Accords	  in	  December	  1995.102	  	  Of	  the	  10	  Predators	  initially	  built	  under	  the	  ACTD,	  two	  were	  destroyed	  in	  Bosnia.	  The	  first	  was	  possibly	  destroyed	  by	  enemy	  fire	  and	  the	  second	  was	  intentionally	  crashed	  into	  a	  mountain	  after	  engine	  trouble.103	  The	  putative	  shoot-­‐down	  was	  hardly	  covered	  in	  the	  media	  because	  there	  was	  no	  pilot	  capture	  or	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death.	  A	  RAND	  report	  written	  in	  1997	  concluded	  that	  the	  Predator	  deployment	  “was	  considered	  an	  overwhelming	  success	  by	  the	  warfighters	  in	  Bosnia.”104	  	  	  	  But	  there	  were	  tactical	  and	  technical	  problems	  with	  imagery	  collection.	  Initially	  the	  concept	  of	  operations	  called	  for	  flying	  above	  clouds,	  at	  a	  significant	  altitude	  of	  15,000	  feet	  where	  the	  Predator	  could	  not	  provide	  useful	  surveillance.	  (Today	  the	  Predator	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  found	  below	  10,000	  ft.,	  and	  also	  has	  synthetic	  aperture	  radar	  to	  see	  through	  clouds).	  In	  terms	  of	  technological	  barriers,	  the	  KU-­‐band	  data	  link	  that	  had	  allowed	  FMV	  during	  the	  Roving	  Sands	  exercise	  was	  not	  immediately	  available.105	  Instead,	  a	  UHF	  satellite	  data	  link	  transmitted	  still	  images	  with	  a	  20	  to	  30-­‐second	  delay	  to	  a	  satellite	  earth	  station,	  which	  in	  turn	  relayed	  the	  images	  through	  a	  Pentagon	  teleconferencing	  system,	  the	  Joint	  WorldWide	  Intelligence	  Communication	  System	  (JWICS).106	  Access	  to	  the	  KU	  band	  was	  added	  later	  in	  the	  deployment	  to	  enable	  FMV,	  but	  the	  still-­‐immature	  technology	  delivered	  relatively	  low-­‐resolution	  images.107	  	  As	  the	  Predator’s	  first	  Bosnia	  deployment	  ended,	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  the	  arguments	  historically	  cited	  for	  the	  USAF’s	  waxing	  and	  waning	  interest	  in	  UAVs	  were	  now	  being	  called	  into	  question.	  UAV	  component	  technology	  and	  reliability	  had	  improved.	  EUCOM’s	  request	  for	  a	  long-­‐dwell	  surveillance	  capability	  also	  revealed	  a	  pressing	  demand	  for	  better	  theater	  reconnaissance	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Yet	  the	  Predator’s	  deployment	  experience	  was	  still	  limited,	  so	  there	  was	  a	  lack	  of	  reliable	  data	  on	  its	  combat	  capability	  and	  its	  total	  costs	  relative	  to	  other	  weapon	  systems.	  	  	  Pentagon	  civilians,	  who	  were	  not	  constrained	  by	  the	  USAF’s	  budgetary	  concerns,	  believed	  the	  emerging	  evidence	  regarding	  UAV	  technological	  maturity,	  reliability,	  combat	  capability,	  and	  cost	  was	  sufficient	  to	  field	  the	  Predator	  in	  combat.	  But	  the	  USAF	  and	  the	  other	  military	  services,	  which	  had	  lost	  their	  reconnaissance	  budgets	  to	  DARO	  and	  were	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  major	  post-­‐Cold	  War	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drawdown,	  had	  far	  more	  incentive	  to	  question	  the	  evidence	  regarding	  material	  improvements	  in	  UAV	  technology.	  Clearly	  there	  were	  rational	  reasons	  to	  reject	  the	  Predator	  program,	  but	  how	  far	  did	  culture	  impact	  the	  USAF’s	  initial	  reluctance	  to	  embrace	  the	  UAV?	  	  The	  second	  half	  of	  this	  chapter	  will	  discuss	  how	  USAF	  culture	  colored	  the	  service’s	  assessments	  of	  the	  Predator	  program	  and	  the	  service’s	  decision	  not	  to	  participate.	  	  
	  
1. To	  what	  extent	  did	  individuals	  or	  groups	  within	  the	  USAF	  resist	  	  
the	  Predator	  out	  of	  a	  concern	  that	  their	  jobs	  or	  status	  might	  be	  
threatened	  by	  it?	  	  	  	  Gen.	  McPeak,	  the	  USAF	  chief	  from	  1990	  to	  1994,	  told	  me	  that	  he	  rejected	  the	  Predator	  program	  based	  on	  his	  concerns	  about	  its	  cost	  and	  combat	  effectiveness	  relative	  to	  manned	  aircraft,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Question	  2.	  But	  he	  also	  revealed	  that	  he	  saw	  the	  Predator	  and	  other	  UAVs	  as	  a	  potential	  threat	  to	  the	  dominance	  of	  manned	  aircraft	  and	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  “I	  worry	  a	  lot”	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  Predator	  and	  other	  UAVs	  affecting	  the	  jobs	  and	  status	  of	  USAF	  pilots,	  he	  told	  me.	  In	  his	  view,	  USAF	  pilots	  represented	  the	  human	  dimension	  of	  warfare,	  which	  UAVs	  such	  as	  the	  Predator	  threatened	  to	  eviscerate.	  “This	  is	  about	  human	  values.	  I’ve	  never	  heard	  of	  any	  robots	  having	  a	  reunion	  or	  an	  ‘I	  love	  me’	  wall,”	  he	  said.108	  Asked	  in	  2012	  whether	  UAVs	  make	  combatants	  “less	  noble”	  in	  warfare	  by	  increasing	  the	  distance	  between	  adversaries,	  Gen.	  McPeak	  said	  “Yes,	  and	  I	  lament	  it,	  and	  I	  spent	  a	  lot	  of	  time	  as	  a	  warrior	  myself	  and	  as	  a	  leader	  of	  various	  units	  —	  small,	  medium,	  and	  large	  —	  trying	  to	  inculcate	  this	  warrior	  ethos	  which	  really	  requires	  some	  kind	  of	  intimacy	  with	  the	  enemy.”	  109	  Gen.	  McPeak	  took	  a	  dismissive	  view	  of	  USAF	  members	  who	  were	  not	  “operators,”	  a	  reference	  to	  manned	  combat	  aircraft	  pilots.	  Shortly	  after	  he	  retired,	  he	  gave	  an	  end-­‐of-­‐tour	  interview	  in	  which	  he	  clarified	  that	  the	  main	  goal	  of	  his	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  McPeak	  interview	  (Apr.	  7,	  2013)	  	  109	  McPeak	  interview	  (Nov.	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tenure	  was	  to	  make	  operations	  more	  central	  to	  the	  USAF	  and	  to	  enhance	  the	  warrior	  image	  of	  the	  service.	  “Operators	  should	  be	  placed	  in	  charge…and	  the	  whole	  thing	  should	  be	  wired	  together	  or	  wrapped	  up	  in	  a	  way	  that	  makes	  clear	  the	  warrior	  ethos	  of	  the	  whole	  enterprise.”110	  	  	  While	  Gen.	  McPeak	  sought	  to	  preserve	  the	  superior	  status	  of	  all	  manned	  combat	  aircraft	  pilots,	  he	  was	  most	  worried	  about	  maintaining	  fighter	  pilot	  dominance.	  The	  central	  role	  of	  the	  fighter	  pilot	  in	  USAF	  culture	  had	  fueled	  his	  own	  rise	  to	  the	  top	  of	  the	  service.	  In	  the	  1970s,	  during	  the	  USAF’s	  leadership	  transition	  from	  bomber	  generals	  to	  fighter	  generals,	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  fighter	  pilots	  received	  promotions	  “below	  the	  zone”	  (ahead	  of	  schedule)	  than	  peers	  in	  other	  career	  fields	  because	  they	  had	  more	  combat	  and	  leadership	  experience	  because	  of	  their	  frequent	  deployments	  to	  Vietnam.111	  As	  these	  fighter	  pilots	  advanced	  through	  the	  system,	  there	  was	  simply	  a	  better	  chance	  —	  better	  than	  half	  by	  1990	  —	  that	  the	  USAF	  chief	  would	  be	  a	  fighter	  pilot.112	  Since	  1982,	  every	  chief	  had	  been	  a	  fighter	  pilot,	  and	  Gen.	  McPeak	  intended	  to	  preserve	  fighter	  pilot	  dominance.	  In	  1991,	  he	  bluntly	  announced	  his	  intention	  to	  promote	  fighter	  pilots	  to	  leadership	  positions	  over	  officers	  in	  other	  career	  fields.	  “The	  service‘s	  purpose	  is	  to	  generate	  combat	  capability	  that	  protects	  the	  country,	  and	  not	  necessarily	  to	  provide	  equal	  career	  opportunities	  for	  those	  who	  fly	  heavies	  [transport	  aircraft]	  or,	  heaven	  forbid,	  don‘t	  wear	  wings	  at	  all,”	  he	  said.113	  	  To	  further	  consolidate	  fighter	  pilot	  dominance,	  Gen.	  McPeak	  combined	  Strategic	  Air	  Command	  (SAC)	  and	  Tactical	  Air	  Command	  (TAC),	  into	  a	  new	  ACC.	  The	  move	  was	  part	  of	  his	  broader	  view,	  expressed	  in	  a	  1991	  speech,	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  legacy	  culture	  built	  around	  strategic	  bombing,	  embodied	  in	  SAC,	  needed	  to	  shift	  toward	  a	  “strategic	  attack”	  construct	  built	  around	  fighters	  and	  fighter	  pilots.	  The	  lines	  between	  strategic	  and	  tactical	  were	  blurring,	  he	  argued,	  as	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  1991	  Persian	  Gulf	  War	  when	  stealth	  fighters	  dropped	  precision	  guided	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  Watson	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  (1994)	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  111	  Worden	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  224;	  Michel	  (Dec.	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  Smith	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munitions	  on	  strategic	  targets.	  As	  a	  result,	  combat	  pilots	  should	  all	  reside	  under	  one	  command:	  ACC.	  114	  	  	  In	  reality,	  however,	  the	  merger	  of	  SAC	  and	  TAC	  within	  ACC	  was	  widely	  perceived	  as	  a	  “hostile	  takeover”	  by	  TAC,	  the	  nerve	  center	  of	  fighter	  culture,	  as	  one	  USAF	  lieutenant	  colonel	  described	  the	  transition	  at	  the	  time.115	  This	  was	  probably	  an	  accurate	  perception,	  inasmuch	  as	  Gen.	  McPeak	  himself	  argued	  that	  fighter	  pilots	  were	  most	  qualified	  to	  lead	  the	  USAF	  because	  they	  assumed	  the	  most	  risk	  and	  took	  on	  the	  most	  strategically	  significant	  missions.116	  The	  organizational	  construct	  at	  ACC	  further	  confirmed	  the	  perception.	  The	  new	  ACC	  was	  based	  at	  Langley	  AFB,	  the	  old	  headquarters	  of	  TAC.117	  New	  ACC	  offices	  were	  headed	  by	  TAC	  officers	  with	  SAC	  officers	  acting	  as	  deputies,	  and	  the	  new	  ACC	  patch	  was	  actually	  a	  TAC	  patch	  with	  “Air	  Combat	  Command”	  written	  on	  it.	  118	  A	  1991	  document	  circulated	  around	  the	  air	  staff	  in	  the	  Pentagon,	  titled	  “TAC-­‐umcizing	  the	  Air	  Force:	  The	  Emerging	  Vision	  of	  the	  Future,”	  confirmed	  the	  cultural	  implications	  of	  Gen.	  McPeak’s	  organizational	  changes.	  Highlighting	  the	  problems	  with	  the	  dominant	  fighter	  pilot	  culture	  of	  the	  McPeak	  era,	  it	  noted	  that	  under	  Gen.	  McPeak’s	  leadership,	  	  “manly	  men”	  (i.e.	  fighter	  pilots)	  ranked	  first	  in	  the	  service,	  followed	  by	  cargo	  crews,	  acquisition	  officials,	  administrators,	  enlisted	  airmen,	  and	  others.	  “First,	  manly	  men	  must	  dominate	  Headquarters	  USAF,”	  the	  brown	  paper	  said.	  “Second,	  they	  must	  command	  all	  Air	  Force	  major	  commands.	  Last,	  USAF	  must	  have	  a	  wing	  structure	  [favoring	  fighter	  units]	  which	  will	  grow	  and	  nurture	  the	  future	  leaders	  of	  the	  Air	  Force.”119	  	  	  	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  backlash	  generated	  by	  Gen.	  McPeak’s	  focus	  on	  fighter	  pilots,	  then-­‐USAF	  Secretary	  Donald	  Rice	  asked	  him	  to	  tone	  down	  his	  remarks.	  “One	  of	  the	  few	  issues	  I	  had	  a	  little	  concern	  over	  myself	  was	  this	  favoritism-­‐to-­‐pilots	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  McPeak	  (August	  1995)	  7-­‐14	  	  115	  McGuirk	  (April.	  15,	  1996)	  15	  116	  Danskine	  (June	  2001)	  105	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  McGuirk	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  Quoted	  in	  Worden,	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issue,”	  Rice	  said	  at	  the	  time,	  adding	  that	  he	  asked	  Gen.	  McPeak	  to	  tone	  down	  his	  comments.120	  	  Gen.	  McPeak’s	  preferences	  for	  preserving	  the	  dominance	  of	  manned	  combat	  aircraft	  pilots,	  and	  especially	  fighter	  pilots,	  led	  him	  to	  see	  UAVs	  as	  a	  potential	  threat.	  While	  UAVs	  were	  not	  yet	  doing	  the	  same	  missions	  as	  fighters,	  the	  very	  possibility	  was	  enough	  for	  Gen.	  McPeak	  to	  proactively	  resist	  their	  introduction	  into	  the	  USAF.	  “I	  was	  pretty	  successful	  in	  resisting	  buying	  a	  lot	  of	  drone	  aircraft,”	  he	  told	  me.121	  When	  Robert	  Gates,	  the	  CIA	  director	  from	  1991	  to	  1993,	  approached	  Gen.	  McPeak	  about	  collaborating	  on	  UAV	  development,	  Gen.	  McPeak	  said	  he	  declined	  to	  spend	  his	  shrinking	  budget	  on	  a	  reconnaissance	  UAV.	  Gates	  interpreted	  the	  rejection	  as	  evidence	  of	  pilot	  bias:	  “The	  Air	  Force	  wasn’t	  interested	  because,	  as	  I	  was	  told,	  people	  join	  the	  Air	  Force	  to	  fly	  planes	  and	  drones	  had	  no	  pilot.”122	  	  Gen.	  Michael	  Moseley,	  USAF	  chief	  from	  2005	  to	  2008,	  was	  more	  sympathetic	  to	  Gen.	  McPeak’s	  point	  of	  view,	  arguing	  that	  his	  response	  did	  not	  reflect	  a	  pro-­‐pilot	  bias	  but	  rather	  the	  cultural	  tension	  between	  military	  commanders	  preparing	  for	  war	  and	  intelligence	  personnel	  collecting	  information.	  That	  tension	  was	  acute	  at	  this	  time,	  Gen.	  Moseley	  said,	  because	  Gen.	  McPeak	  was	  already	  being	  asked	  to	  cut	  one	  third	  of	  his	  budget.	  “Gates	  was	  not	  an	  operator,	  so	  Gen.	  McPeak	  would	  not	  have	  been	  humored	  by	  this	  analyst	  showing	  up	  and	  saying	  ‘this	  is	  what	  you	  need	  to	  do’	  while	  he	  is	  having	  to	  kill	  one	  out	  of	  three	  of	  his	  babies,”	  said	  Gen.	  Moseley.	  123	  	  Nevertheless,	  many	  outsiders	  interpreted	  Gen.	  McPeak’s	  rejection	  of	  UAVs	  as	  evidence	  of	  his	  pro-­‐pilot	  bias	  rather	  than	  his	  concern	  for	  preserving	  the	  USAF’s	  combat	  capability	  in	  an	  austere	  budget	  environment.	  The	  senior	  civilian	  official	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  Predator	  ACTD	  said	  he	  got	  the	  impression	  that	  the	  service	  simply	  disliked	  UAVs.	  “I	  think	  they	  worried	  about	  the	  threat	  to	  manned	  airplanes,”	  he	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said.124	  Lynn,	  the	  Pentagon’s	  Deputy	  Undersecretary	  for	  Advanced	  Programs,	  agreed	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  resistance	  to	  the	  Predator	  was	  rooted	  in	  the	  threat	  it	  posed	  to	  USAF	  pilots:	  “The	  operators	  resisted	  UAVs	  for	  50	  years,	  the	  Air	  Force	  being	  the	  worst	  of	  the	  lot.	  My	  view	  was	  that	  the	  Air	  Force	  was	  afraid	  of	  UAVs	  somehow	  damaging	  manned	  flight	  and	  so	  they	  were	  less	  interested	  in	  UAVs.”125	  	  	  Bob	  Williams,	  the	  DARPA	  official	  who	  had	  worked	  on	  the	  Amber	  program	  and	  for	  Gen.	  Joulwan,	  said	  he	  knew	  there	  was	  a	  hardcore	  manned	  aircraft	  bias	  in	  the	  USAF	  when	  Big	  Safari	  responded	  to	  Gen.	  Joulwan’s	  request	  for	  a	  UAV	  with	  a	  manned	  glider.	  “This	  illustrates	  how	  the	  USAF	  actually	  operates	  at	  lower	  levels.	  	  Pilots	  did	  not	  believe	  in	  ‘drones’	  based	  on	  their	  experience	  and	  knowledge,	  so	  the	  AF	  working	  level	  opposed	  the	  idea,”	  said	  Williams.	  “Many	  innovative	  ideas	  are	  filtered	  at	  that	  level.”126	  	  The	  USAF	  also	  signaled	  to	  the	  US	  Congress	  that	  it	  did	  not	  want	  to	  get	  involved	  with	  the	  Predator	  program.	  Michael	  Meermans,	  a	  professional	  staff	  member	  for	  US	  Congressman	  Jerry	  Lewis,	  a	  Predator	  advocate,	  said	  that	  he	  did	  not	  get	  a	  positive	  reaction	  from	  any	  military	  service	  when	  he	  surveyed	  them	  about	  taking	  over	  Predator	  management.	  The	  USAF’s	  rejection	  was	  rooted	  in	  bias	  rather	  than	  rational	  concerns.	  “Let’s	  face	  it,	  there	  was,	  and	  to	  some	  extent	  continues	  to	  be,	  the	  white	  scarf	  syndrome,	  where	  pilots	  like	  to	  be	  in	  the	  seats	  and	  push	  pointy	  nose	  airplanes	  all	  around	  the	  sky	  really	  fast,”	  said	  Meermans.127	  	  	  	  But	  it	  was	  not	  just	  the	  USAF’s	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  community	  that	  felt	  threatened.	  While	  the	  unmanned	  configuration	  troubled	  the	  USAF’s	  pilot	  leadership,	  the	  UAV’s	  capacity	  to	  deliver	  FMV	  worried	  the	  USAF’s	  intelligence	  analyst	  community.	  USAF	  intelligence	  analysts	  favored	  the	  longstanding	  practice	  of	  analyzing	  post	  hoc	  analysis	  of	  still	  satellite	  imagery.	  But	  the	  Predator	  design	  adopted	  a	  real-­‐time	  FMV	  streaming	  capability,	  which	  required	  a	  change	  in	  mindset	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  Pentagon	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  interview	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  Lynn	  interview	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and	  also	  generated	  more	  work	  for	  the	  analysts.128	  To	  circumvent	  the	  change,	  Army	  intelligence	  analysts	  in	  Bosnia	  initially	  froze	  images	  from	  the	  FMV	  for	  analysis	  rather	  than	  watching	  the	  FMV	  in	  real	  time	  to	  pick	  up	  on	  patterns.	  Cassidy,	  the	  GA-­‐ASI	  CEO	  said	  that	  after	  Predator	  FMV	  became	  available	  in	  Bosnia	  in	  1995,	  Army	  intelligence	  analysts	  would	  freeze-­‐frame	  images	  in	  the	  FMV	  for	  analysis.	  	  Similar	  to	  the	  USAF’s	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  leadership,	  USAF	  and	  Army	  intelligence	  analysts	  saw	  the	  Predator	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  their	  existing	  jobs,	  although	  status	  was	  less	  of	  a	  concern	  because	  they	  did	  not	  dominate	  USAF	  leadership	  positions.	  “I	  would	  like	  to	  think	  that	  the	  intel	  guys	  picked	  up	  on”	  the	  Predator	  contribution	  to	  reconnaissance,	  recalled	  Adm.	  Owens,	  the	  Vice	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  during	  this	  time	  period,	  “but	  just	  like	  we	  have	  aviators	  and	  submariners	  and	  ground-­‐pounders,	  we	  have	  in	  the	  intelligence	  services	  people	  who	  love	  satellites	  and	  ELINT	  [electronic	  intelligence]	  and	  love	  what	  they	  have	  known	  from	  their	  own	  experience	  to	  be	  important.”129	  In	  conclusion,	  these	  findings	  suggest	  that	  cultural	  biases	  within	  the	  USAF	  provided	  a	  reinforcing	  context	  for	  the	  service’s	  initial	  rejection	  of	  the	  Predator	  program.	  Gen.	  McPeak	  promoted	  a	  “white	  scarf”	  mentality	  that	  focused	  on	  the	  preservation	  of	  the	  jobs	  and	  status	  of	  manned	  aircraft	  and	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots.	  The	  acceptance	  of	  the	  Predator’s	  unmanned	  configuration	  would	  have	  required	  the	  USAF	  to	  adopt	  a	  broad	  conception	  of	  airpower	  theory	  that	  allowed	  for	  competition	  between	  manned	  and	  unmanned	  assets.	  During	  Gen.	  McPeak’s	  tenure,	  such	  a	  competition	  was	  unacceptable	  because	  it	  opened	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  Predator	  doing	  some	  of	  the	  same	  jobs	  as	  manned	  aircraft,	  thereby	  diminishing	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots’	  status	  and	  even	  harming	  their	  career	  prospects.	  	  The	  USAF’s	  intelligence	  analyst	  community	  similarly	  felt	  threatened,	  although	  the	  introduction	  of	  Predator	  FMV	  did	  not	  diminish	  their	  status	  as	  much	  as	  it	  threatened	  their	  job	  description,	  built	  around	  years	  of	  well-­‐entrenched	  SOPs	  for	  viewing	  still	  imagery.	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  interview	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2. To	  what	  extent	  were	  judgments	  about	  the	  potential	  and	  cost	  
effectiveness	  of	  the	  Predator	  based	  on	  the	  USAF’s	  enthusiasm	  for	  
employing	  new	  technology	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  was	  the	  enthusiasm	  
outside	  the	  service?	  	  In	  his	  book	  on	  the	  history	  of	  UAVs,	  Richard	  Armitage	  addresses	  the	  difficulty	  of	  comparing	  the	  potential	  and	  cost	  effectiveness	  of	  manned	  and	  unmanned	  aircraft.	  “Because	  of	  the	  entirely	  different	  concepts	  involved	  in	  unmanned	  as	  compared	  to	  manned	  aircraft,	  no	  sensible	  balance	  of	  cost	  effectiveness	  can	  be	  drawn,”	  he	  wrote.130	  Yet	  the	  inherent	  difficulties	  have	  not	  stopped	  generations	  of	  uniformed	  and	  civilian	  military	  officials	  from	  trying	  to	  make	  such	  comparisons,	  highlighting	  and	  obscuring	  data	  to	  suit	  their	  respective	  interests	  and	  biases.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Predator	  program,	  the	  USAF	  took	  a	  far	  more	  pessimistic	  view	  of	  the	  potential	  and	  cost	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  Predator	  program	  while	  Pentagon	  civilians	  were	  enthusiastic.	  
Diverging	  Views	  on	  Predator	  Cost	  Effectiveness	  	  
In	  terms	  of	  cost	  effectiveness,	  Pentagon	  civilians	  admitted	  in	  interviews	  that	  they	  lacked	  data	  to	  prove	  that	  the	  Predator	  would	  be	  cheaper	  than	  manned	  aircraft	  alternatives	  for	  medium-­‐altitude	  reconnaissance	  missions.131	  Rather,	  their	  optimism	  about	  UAV	  costs	  was	  extrapolated	  from	  cost	  comparisons	  for	  high	  altitude	  surveillance	  aircraft.	  Major	  General	  Kenneth	  Israel,	  the	  director	  of	  DARO,	  compared	  the	  unmanned	  Global	  Hawk	  to	  the	  manned	  SR-­‐71	  Blackbird	  in	  a	  classified	  briefing	  known	  as	  “Senior	  Ulm.”132	  He	  obtained	  the	  cost	  data	  directly	  from	  the	  military	  services,	  and	  the	  cost	  comparison	  was	  reviewed	  by	  the	  Pentagon’s	  Cost	  Analysis	  Improvement	  Group	  (CAIG,	  now	  known	  as	  the	  Cost	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  Lynn	  interview	  (Apr.	  27,	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Assessment	  and	  Program	  Evaluation	  [CAPE]).	  According	  to	  Lynn,	  who	  saw	  the	  study,	  the	  unmanned	  option	  came	  out	  cheaper.133	  	  	   This	  comparison,	  while	  not	  directly	  applicable	  to	  the	  Predator	  program,	  was	  considered	  by	  Lynn	  and	  other	  senior	  Pentagon	  officials	  to	  be	  indicative	  of	  the	  relative	  cost	  effectiveness	  of	  UAVs	  compared	  to	  manned	  counterparts.134	  More	  important	  to	  Pentagon	  civilians	  than	  Senior	  Ulm,	  however,	  was	  their	  view	  that	  it	  was	  only	  common	  sense	  to	  believe	  that	  UAVs	  would	  be	  cheaper.135	  “Arguing	  that	  UAVs	  are	  more	  expensive	  than	  manned	  aircraft	  is	  nonsense,”	  said	  Lynn.136	  A	  senior	  Pentagon	  civilian	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  Predator	  program	  ACTD	  confirmed:	  “It	  was	  very	  much	  a	  cost	  argument	  for	  certain	  missions.”137	  Echoed	  Williams,	  the	  DARPA	  official	  who	  worked	  on	  the	  Amber	  program:	  “I	  really	  don’t	  think	  that	  Larry	  [Lynn]	  and	  others	  gave	  cost	  much	  thought	  —	  they	  were	  looking	  for	  an	  ISR	  system	  to	  conduct	  the	  ‘dull,	  dangerous,	  and	  dirty’	  missions,	  and	  intuitively	  knew	  that	  a	  reliable	  UAV	  would	  have	  a	  high	  cost-­‐benefit	  ratio.”	  But	  the	  USAF	  did	  not	  agree	  that	  the	  cost	  data	  was	  sufficient	  to	  show	  that	  the	  Predator	  would	  be	  less	  expensive	  than	  manned	  aircraft.	  “Nobody	  could	  prove	  to	  me	  that	  it	  was	  cheaper,”	  said	  Gen.	  McPeak.	  “For	  me,	  cost	  was	  the	  overriding	  issue.”138	  Faced	  with	  a	  shrinking	  budget,	  Gen.	  McPeak	  was	  unwilling	  to	  cut	  into	  his	  bottom	  line	  for	  manned	  aircraft	  to	  take	  a	  risk	  on	  funding	  a	  UAV.	  “I	  didn’t	  have	  enough	  money	  to	  buy	  manned	  aircraft,	  let	  alone	  unmanned,”	  said	  Gen.	  McPeak.139	  “I	  didn’t	  think	  it	  made	  economic	  sense.”	  Yet	  Gen	  McPeak’s	  argument	  about	  cost	  rings	  somewhat	  hollow.	  	  As	  discussed	  above,	  the	  USAF	  would	  be	  required	  to	  pay	  only	  support	  costs	  for	  the	  Predator	  for	  the	  first	  two	  years	  while	  DARO	  footed	  the	  remainder	  of	  program	  costs.	  After	  two	  years,	  DARO	  would	  release	  Predator	  funding	  to	  the	  USAF,	  allowing	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the	  service	  to	  regain	  some	  control	  of	  its	  airborne	  reconnaissance	  budget.	  From	  a	  rational	  perspective,	  then,	  Gen.	  McPeak’s	  argument	  is	  weakened	  because	  the	  USAF	  would	  only	  have	  to	  pay	  for	  support	  costs.	  Furthermore,	  the	  service	  stood	  to	  recoup	  the	  airborne	  reconnaissance	  funding	  that	  DARO	  had	  previously	  taken	  away	  if	  it	  kept	  the	  Predator	  beyond	  two	  years.	  	  	  In	  the	  view	  of	  USAF	  outsiders,	  a	  more	  powerful	  explanation	  for	  the	  USAF’s	  negative	  views	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  Predator	  program	  was	  rooted	  in	  USAF	  culture.	  Maj.	  Gen.	  Israel,	  the	  USAF	  official	  running	  the	  civilian	  agency	  DARO,	  told	  the	  
Washington	  Post	  in	  1999	  that	  USAF	  officials	  questioned	  his	  cost	  data,	  and	  they	  also	  frequently	  manipulated	  his	  calculations	  to	  argue	  for	  more	  funds	  for	  manned	  aircraft	  during	  his	  tenure	  at	  DARO	  from	  1993	  to	  1998.	  “Critics	  determined	  that	  the	  best	  way	  to	  slow	  down	  a	  bold	  and	  innovative	  idea	  was	  to	  load	  it	  down	  with	  cultural	  innuendoes	  and	  inaccurate	  comparisons	  between	  manned	  and	  unmanned	  aircraft,"	  he	  told	  the	  paper.	  140	  	  	  
Assessing	  the	  Potential	  of	  the	  Predator	  Program	  	  
	  Gen.	  McPeak	  also	  expressed	  reservations	  about	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  Predator	  UAV,	  although	  he	  mentioned	  it	  as	  a	  secondary	  issue.	  “I	  didn’t	  know	  what	  the	  accident	  rate	  was,”	  he	  said.141	  To	  be	  sure,	  pockets	  of	  the	  USAF	  that	  believed	  UAVs	  had	  potential.	  One	  USAF	  intelligence	  officer	  wrote	  an	  article	  in	  1990	  for	  the	  USAF’s	  professional	  journal	  highlighting	  the	  combat	  capability	  of	  UAVs	  as	  demonstrated	  by	  Israel	  in	  the	  1973	  Yom	  Kippur	  War	  and	  the	  1982	  Peace	  for	  Galilee	  Campaign.142	  But	  the	  USAF’s	  leadership	  was	  more	  skeptical	  about	  the	  relative	  benefits	  of	  UAVs	  compared	  to	  manned	  aircraft.	  Gen.	  McPeak	  said	  that	  even	  today,	  he	  believes	  the	  capability	  of	  unmanned	  aircraft	  remains	  	  “unproven,”	  adding	  “UAVs	  cannot	  beat	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  140	  Ricks	  and	  Squeo	  (1999)	  A1.	  141	  McPeak	  interview	  (Apr.	  7,	  2013)	  142	  Tice	  (Spring	  1991).	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manned	  aircraft	  except	  in	  highly	  specialized	  missions	  like	  going	  to	  Mars	  and	  [surveillance]	  photography.”	  143	  	  	  	  	   Gen.	  McPeak	  also	  was	  skeptical	  of	  the	  Predator’s	  relevance	  in	  the	  emerging	  strategic	  context.	  In	  his	  view,	  the	  future	  of	  airpower	  resided	  with	  fighters	  performing	  strategic	  attack	  roles	  in	  a	  conventional	  air	  campaign.	  Reconnaissance	  was	  largely	  ignored	  during	  this	  time	  period.	  The	  USAF	  retired	  its	  workhorse	  tactical	  reconnaissance	  aircraft,	  the	  RF-­‐4C,	  cancelled	  its	  new	  sensor,	  ATARS,	  and	  resisted	  lawmakers’	  calls	  to	  bring	  back	  the	  SR-­‐71	  Blackbird	  strategic	  reconnaissance	  plane	  for	  surveillance	  over	  Bosnia.144	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  Gen.	  McPeak	  considered	  reconnaissance	  in	  the	  USAF’s	  strategic	  planning,	  he	  focused	  on	  satellites,	  which	  had	  provided	  valuable	  theater-­‐wide	  intelligence	  during	  Desert	  Storm.	  145	  In	  this	  cultural	  context,	  there	  was	  little	  room	  for	  a	  reconnaissance	  UAV	  with	  a	  collection	  capability	  that	  seemed	  to	  fall	  somewhere	  between	  strategic	  and	  tactical	  reconnaissance.	  	  Outside	  the	  USAF,	  however,	  the	  Predator	  was	  seen	  as	  having	  significant	  potential.	  Pentagon	  civilians	  and	  the	  aircraft	  industry	  expressed	  growing	  confidence	  in	  the	  reliability	  of	  UAV	  technology.	  “I	  had	  visited	  General	  Atomics	  many	  times,	  and	  I	  think	  somewhere	  along	  the	  line	  I	  got	  the	  feeling	  they	  were	  really	  going	  to	  work,”	  said	  one	  top	  civilian	  official	  managing	  the	  Predator	  ACTD	  process.146	  Others,	  like	  Lynn,	  the	  Deputy	  Undersecretary	  for	  Advanced	  Technology,	  argued	  that	  UAV	  technology	  had	  been	  mature	  enough	  for	  combat	  as	  far	  back	  as	  the	  1970s.147	  By	  the	  early	  1990s,	  pockets	  of	  the	  aircraft	  industry	  also	  showed	  their	  optimism	  by	  investing	  in	  long-­‐dwell	  UAV	  development.	  Convinced	  the	  technological	  components	  were	  now	  available,	  Karem	  and	  the	  Blue	  brothers	  turned	  to	  Tom	  Cassidy,	  the	  president	  of	  GA-­‐ASI,	  to	  lobby	  for	  UAV	  investment	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  143	  McPeak	  Interview	  (Apr.	  7,	  2013)	  	  144	  ACC	  	  (2006)	  3;	  LA	  Times	  (29	  November	  1995)	  1;	  Burnett	  (5	  July	  1993)	  17.	  145	  McPeak	  (1995)	  207	  146	  Senior	  Pentagon	  civilian	  	  (March	  27,	  2013)	  147	  Lynn	  interview	  (Apr.	  23,	  2013)	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Pentagon	  and	  on	  Capitol	  Hill.	  US	  lawmakers	  were	  also	  optimistic	  about	  the	  potential	  of	  UAV	  technology,	  in	  part	  because	  of	  Cassidy’s	  aggressive	  lobbying.	  There	  was	  not	  one	  year	  that	  I	  did	  not	  get	  more	  money	  than	  I	  requested,”148	  recalled	  retired	  Maj.	  Gen.	  Israel,	  who	  ran	  DARO	  from	  1993	  until	  it	  was	  disbanded	  in	  1998.”149	  Outsiders	  were	  also	  more	  optimistic	  than	  Gen.	  McPeak	  about	  the	  potential	  relevance	  of	  the	  Predator	  in	  future	  conflicts.	  While	  Gen.	  McPeak	  focused	  on	  the	  role	  of	  satellites	  collecting	  still	  imagery	  in	  a	  conventional	  conflict	  similar	  to	  Desert	  Storm,	  Pentagon	  civilians	  saw	  a	  need	  for	  theater–level	  reconnaissance	  capabilities,	  such	  as	  UAVs,	  for	  persistent	  monitoring	  in	  places	  like	  Bosnia,	  where	  the	  sporadic	  coverage	  provided	  by	  satellites	  was	  insufficient	  to	  track	  rapidly	  changing	  events	  and	  combatants	  moving	  among	  civilian	  populations.	  150	  Woolsey,	  the	  CIA	  director,	  also	  had	  developed	  a	  preference	  for	  long-­‐dwell	  surveillance	  UAVs	  —	  “pseudolites”	  —	  over	  satellites,	  which	  dated	  back	  to	  the	  1980s	  when	  he	  was	  looking	  for	  ways	  to	  monitor	  arms	  movements	  during	  his	  time	  as	  US	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  Negotiation	  on	  Conventional	  Armed	  Forces	  in	  Europe.	  Around	  Woolsey’s	  office,	  it	  was	  common	  to	  hear	  colleagues	  say:	  “Whatever	  the	  problem,	  Woolsey	  thinks	  UAVs	  are	  the	  solution.”151	  	  
Reconciling	  Conflicting	  Views	  	  
	  Gen.	  McPeak	  defended	  his	  pessimistic	  view	  of	  Predator	  cost	  and	  reliability	  as	  being	  based	  on	  rational	  decision-­‐making,	  not	  in	  a	  cultural	  preference	  for	  manned	  aircraft.	  	  But	  he	  also	  conceded	  that	  a	  conservative	  streak	  tinged	  his	  view,	  comparing	  himself	  to	  Gen.	  Curtis	  LeMay,	  who	  resisted	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  ICBM	  until	  its	  technological	  feasibility	  has	  been	  significantly	  demonstrated.	  “LeMay	  and	  I	  are	  the	  same,”	  he	  said,	  “but	  LeMay	  was	  wrong	  and	  I	  was	  right.	  LeMay	  resisted	  the	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  Wood	  (2015)	  32	  149	  Wood	  (2015)	  32	  150	  Entzminger	  interview	  (Dec.	  15,	  2012)	  151	  Strickland	  (March	  2013)	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ICBM	  for	  no	  good	  reason;	  I	  resisted	  the	  UAV	  based	  on	  logic.”	  Gen.	  McPeak	  argued	  that	  Gen.	  LeMay	  benefitted	  from	  ample	  Cold	  War-­‐era	  funding	  to	  buy	  both	  manned	  aircraft	  and	  ICBMs,	  while	  Gen.	  McPeak	  was	  fiscally	  constrained	  and	  forced	  to	  make	  choices	  between	  manned	  and	  unmanned	  technologies.	  “Our	  policy	  was	  Mutually	  Assured	  Destruction,	  so	  why	  the	  hell	  wouldn’t	  he	  buy	  ICBMs?	  The	  problem	  was	  I	  was	  dealing	  with	  retrenchment.”	  152	  	  But	  there	  may	  be	  less	  of	  a	  difference	  between	  Gen.	  LeMay	  and	  Gen.	  McPeak	  than	  the	  latter	  was	  willing	  to	  admit.	  Regardless	  of	  the	  budget	  environment,	  the	  decision	  to	  invest	  in	  a	  military	  innovation	  always	  requires	  trade-­‐offs	  because	  funds	  are	  never	  unlimited	  and	  there	  are	  always	  competing	  priorities.	  Cultural	  perceptions	  shape	  the	  views	  of	  the	  relative	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  one	  military	  innovation	  versus	  another.	  There	  is	  reason	  to	  suspect	  that	  such	  cultural	  influences	  impacted	  Gen.	  McPeak’s	  judgments	  about	  the	  Predator	  program	  because	  outsiders	  took	  a	  very	  different	  view	  of	  the	  UAV	  than	  he	  did.	  As	  Adm.	  Owens,	  the	  Vice	  Chairman	  of	  the	  JCS	  at	  the	  time,	  explains,	  the	  USAF	  had	  rational	  concerns	  about	  UAV	  technology,	  which	  were	  further	  reinforced	  by	  its	  cultural	  preferences.	  On	  one	  hand,	  “There	  was…a	  feeling,	  and	  I	  think	  Gen.	  McPeak	  felt	  this	  way,	  that	  the	  Predator	  was	  not	  reliable.	  We	  were	  having	  difficulty,	  we	  had	  crashed	  a	  bunch	  of	  them,	  and	  they	  were	  cheap	  but	  still	  not	  free,”	  he	  said.	  But	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  “I	  think	  deep	  down	  there	  was	  a	  feeling	  that	  manned	  combat	  aircraft	  were	  the	  only	  answer	  to	  capability	  in	  the	  air…the	  straight	  aviation	  perspective	  on	  this	  was	  ‘if	  we	  do	  Predator,	  than,	  by	  God,	  there	  goes	  many	  of	  my	  missions.’”153	  As	  Allison	  and	  Halperin’s	  bureaucratic	  politics	  model	  predicts,	  assessments	  differed	  based	  on	  the	  position	  of	  the	  person	  making	  the	  assessment,	  a	  concept	  captured	  in	  the	  phrase	  “where	  you	  stand	  is	  where	  you	  sit.”	  As	  the	  USAF	  chief,	  Gen.	  McPeak’s	  instinct	  to	  protect	  the	  existing	  organizational	  structure	  of	  the	  USAF	  —	  built	  around	  the	  preeminent	  warrior	  status	  of	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  —	  led	  him	  to	  question	  the	  potential	  and	  cost	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  Predator.	  However,	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  2013).	  	  153	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  interview	  (Oct.	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Pentagon	  civilians	  with	  no	  stake	  in	  the	  USAF’s	  existing	  organizational	  structure	  or	  the	  costs	  associated	  with	  fielding	  the	  Predator	  thought	  that	  UAVs	  offered	  great	  capability	  at	  low	  cost.	  The	  difference	  in	  views	  between	  the	  USAF	  and	  outsiders	  suggests	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  cultural	  preference	  for	  manned	  aircraft	  may	  have	  influenced	  its	  assessment	  of	  the	  Predator’s	  cost	  and	  potential.	  	  
	  
3. To	  what	  extent	  were	  USAF	  judgments	  about	  the	  employment	  of	  the	  
Predator	  driven	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	  to	  friendly	  personnel,	  
and	  to	  what	  extent	  was	  that	  push	  from	  outside	  the	  service?	  	  
	  As	  discussed	  in	  Question	  1,	  Gen.	  McPeak	  expressed	  a	  strong	  preference	  for	  a	  narrow	  conception	  of	  airpower	  that	  favored	  manned	  strike	  aircraft,	  thereby	  affirming	  the	  special	  role	  and	  status	  of	  the	  pilot	  as	  a	  warrior.	  He	  saw	  pilots	  of	  combat	  aircraft	  —	  especially	  fighters,	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  the	  bombers,	  reconnaissance	  aircraft,	  tankers	  and	  other	  aircraft	  under	  the	  newly	  created	  ACC	  —	  as	  possessing	  the	  unusual	  courage	  and	  skill	  required	  to	  fly	  into	  harm’s	  way.	  Gen.	  McPeak	  promoted	  a	  cultural	  view	  of	  fighter	  pilots	  as	  the	  most	  elite	  warriors	  in	  the	  USAF	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  they	  possessed	  the	  unique	  skills	  to	  perform	  the	  most	  high-­‐risk	  missions.	  These	  missions,	  such	  as	  air-­‐to-­‐air	  combat,	  required	  courage,	  flexibility,	  quick	  decision-­‐making,	  and	  heightened	  awareness	  of	  one’s	  surroundings.	  	  	  Given	  the	  premium	  that	  the	  USAF	  placed	  on	  risk	  acceptance	  among	  its	  pilot	  leadership	  during	  Gen.	  McPeak’s	  tenure,	  it	  follows	  that	  reducing	  aircrew	  risk	  was	  not	  a	  major	  concern.	  In	  Gen.	  McPeak’s	  view,	  the	  raison	  d’etre	  of	  the	  USAF	  was	  the	  unique	  capacity	  of	  the	  USAF	  combat	  aircraft	  pilot	  —	  as	  opposed	  to	  aviators	  in	  other	  services	  —	  to	  employ	  the	  skills	  and	  courage	  necessary	  to	  accept	  the	  risks	  of	  entering	  highly	  contested	  airspace.	  “We’ve	  discovered	  we	  know	  more	  about	  penetrating	  air	  defenses	  with	  manned	  aircraft	  than	  you	  can	  imagine	  because	  we	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have	  been	  operated	  for	  60	  years	  independently,”	  he	  told	  me.	  “How	  many	  of	  our	  pilots	  have	  been	  shot	  down	  lately?	  Not	  many.”154	  	  The	  priority	  of	  maintaining	  the	  risk-­‐taking	  image	  of	  the	  combat	  pilot	  led	  to	  a	  reluctance	  to	  invest	  in	  UAV	  technology.	  Gen.	  McPeak	  argued	  that	  USAF	  combat	  pilots	  and	  manned	  combat	  aircraft	  had	  a	  proven	  track	  record	  of	  being	  able	  to	  manage	  risk	  and	  therefore	  UAVs	  were	  unnecessary.	  In	  fact,	  Gen.	  McPeak	  argued	  that	  UAVs	  might	  be	  more	  risky	  than	  manned	  combat	  aircraft	  because	  they	  lacked	  the	  situational	  awareness	  and	  flexibility	  provided	  by	  a	  human	  operator.	  “The	  argument	  was	  [the	  Predator]	  was	  cheaper	  and	  there	  was	  no	  risk,”	  recalled	  Gen.	  McPeak.	  “You	  don’t	  have	  to	  worry	  about	  some	  pilot	  on	  the	  ground	  waving	  his	  hands	  in	  the	  air.	  I	  have	  to	  admit,	  fighter	  pilots	  are	  obnoxious,	  but	  I	  didn’t	  agree	  necessarily	  that	  these	  things	  were	  cheaper	  or	  any	  less	  risky.”155	  Gen.	  McPeak	  pointed	  to	  his	  personal	  experience	  in	  Vietnam	  as	  an	  example	  of	  the	  USAF	  pilot’s	  unique	  ability	  to	  employ	  his	  weapon	  system	  in	  hostile	  airspace.	  “I	  flew	  285	  missions	  in	  the	  F-­‐100	  in	  Vietnam	  and	  I	  only	  got	  one	  little	  hole	  in	  the	  airplane	  floor,”	  he	  said.156	  He	  also	  cited	  the	  track	  record	  of	  USAF	  combat	  pilots	  in	  the	  1991	  Persian	  Gulf	  War.	  	  “I	  had	  just	  fought	  Desert	  Storm	  and	  lost	  something	  like	  seven	  airplanes.	  People	  are	  going	  to	  tell	  me	  it’s	  dangerous	  and	  risky	  to	  expose	  men	  in	  airplanes?	  You’ve	  got	  to	  be	  kidding	  me.	  And	  no	  robot	  is	  cheaper	  than	  a	  human	  brain.”157	  But	  the	  historical	  evidence	  of	  casualties	  in	  combat	  during	  Gen.	  McPeak’s	  career	  suggests	  a	  clash	  between	  his	  beliefs	  and	  reality.	  The	  USAF’s	  losses	  in	  Vietnam,	  which	  occurred	  largely	  as	  a	  result	  of	  flak	  and	  small	  arms,	  were	  significant.	  To	  be	  sure,	  the	  air	  war	  involved	  far	  fewer	  losses	  per	  sortie	  than	  in	  WWII,	  but	  Gen.	  McPeak’s	  claim	  that	  pilot	  skill	  negated	  risk	  discounted	  other	  factors	  —	  not	  the	  least	  of	  which	  was	  luck.	  Gen.	  McPeak’s	  experience	  in	  Southeast	  Asia	  (one	  little	  hole	  in	  the	  floor	  of	  his	  airplane)	  was	  quite	  different	  from	  that	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  154	  McPeak	  interview	  (Apr.	  7,	  2013)	  155	  McPeak	  interview	  (Apr.	  7,	  2013)	  	  156	  ibid	  157	  ibid	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pilots	  in	  the	  2,562	  fixed	  wing	  aircraft	  and	  3,587	  helicopters	  lost	  to	  enemy	  fire	  during	  that	  conflict.	  Taking	  into	  account	  noncombat	  accidents	  and	  other	  operational	  losses	  the	  totals	  climbed	  to	  3,720	  fixed	  wing	  aircraft	  and	  4,869	  helicopters.158	  Gen.	  McPeak’s	  own"Misty"	  forward	  air	  controller	  unit	  lost	  14	  aircraft	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  1969	  alone.159	  During	  Desert	  Storm,	  the	  actual	  number	  of	  USAF	  aircraft	  lost	  was	  14,	  not	  7	  as	  he	  suggested	  —	  still	  a	  small	  number,	  given	  the	  US	  flew	  against	  an	  enemy	  with	  16,000	  SAMs,	  7,000	  antiaircraft	  guns	  and	  750	  combat	  aircraft,	  but	  bigger	  than	  he	  remembered.160	  	  	  Despite	  the	  very	  real	  risk	  encountered	  by	  USAF	  pilots	  during	  Vietnam	  and	  Desert	  Storm,	  Gen.	  McPeak’s	  views	  of	  the	  invincibility	  of	  the	  fighter	  pilots	  were	  shared	  by	  others	  in	  the	  service.	  A	  1990	  USAF	  Fighter	  Weapons	  Review	  article	  titled,	  “The	  Late	  Great	  Fighter	  Pilot”	  sought	  to	  remind	  fighter	  pilots	  of	  the	  irreplaceable	  attributes	  that	  humans	  bring	  to	  aerial	  combat,	  which	  cannot	  be	  substituted	  with	  technology	  even	  when	  lives	  are	  at	  stake:	  	  	  	  	  
“Never	  forget	  it’s	  you	  and	  not	  the	  airplane	  you	  are	  flying	  that	  breeds	  
success.	  Your	  personal	   traits	  are	  key:	  aggressiveness	  —	  wanting	   to	  
kill;	   preparation	  —	  being	   ready	   to	   kill;	   persistence	  —	  not	   quitting	  
until	   you	   kill;	   knowledge	  —	   knowing	   how	   to	   kill	   and	   discipline	  —	  
doing	   what’s	   briefed	   so	   we	   can	   kill.	   Aerial	   victory	   is	   achieved	  
partially	  through	  technology,	  but	  it	  lives	  or	  dies	  in	  the	  heart	  and	  soul	  
of	  the	  fighter	  pilot.”161	  	  
	  	   Even	  as	  these	  views	  about	  aircrew	  risk	  pervaded	  the	  USAF,	  however,	  concerns	  about	  the	  political	  risks	  of	  wartime	  casualties	  were	  climbing	  to	  an	  all-­‐time	  high	  outside	  the	  service.	  Pentagon	  civilians	  had	  grown	  particularly	  concerned	  about	  the	  risk	  to	  aircrews	  flying	  un-­‐armed	  reconnaissance	  aircraft,	  which	  the	  USAF	  had	  ironically	  ignored	  in	  favor	  of	  fighters	  that	  were	  seen	  as	  being	  truly	  representative	  of	  combat	  risk	  and	  capability.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  158	  Lambeth	  (2000)	  13	  159	  Grant	  (Feb	  2013)	  	  160	  Haulman	  (Dec.	  9,	  2002)	  1	  161	  Smiley	  (Fall	  1990)	  31	  
	   140	  
Throughout	  the	  Cold	  War,	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  un-­‐armed	  reconnaissance	  aircraft	  flying	  in	  hostile	  airspace	  became	  increasingly	  apparent.	  A	  total	  of	  23	  aircraft	  and	  179	  airmen	  were	  lost	  flying	  peacetime	  reconnaissance	  missions	  between	  1946	  and	  1990;	  that	  does	  not	  include	  another	  12	  aircraft	  and	  50	  airmen	  who	  were	  lost	  flying	  peacetime	  reconnaissance	  missions	  over	  Vietnam.162	  The	  shoot-­‐down	  of	  Capt.	  Powers’	  U-­‐2	  in	  1960	  brought	  public	  attention	  to	  the	  issue,	  causing	  political	  embarrassment	  and	  influencing	  US-­‐Soviet	  treaty	  negotiations.163	  The	  incident	  had	  prompted	  the	  USAF	  to	  begin	  the	  series	  of	  drone	  surveillance	  programs	  based	  on	  the	  147	  Lightning	  Bug	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  two.	  	  Even	  after	  the	  USAF’s	  involvement	  in	  surveillance	  UAV	  programs	  ended	  in	  the	  1980s,	  a	  concern	  for	  casualty	  aversion	  continued	  to	  grow	  among	  Pentagon	  civilians.	  	  Navy	  Secretary	  John	  Lehman	  said	  he	  started	  buying	  the	  Pioneer	  UAVs	  in	  the	  1980s	  to	  conduct	  surveillance	  after	  the	  loss	  of	  two	  pilots	  and	  two	  surveillance	  jets	  in	  Lebanon.	  “They	  are	  cheaper.	  They	  are	  expendable.	  They	  fly	  behind	  enemy	  lines	  and	  you	  don't	  have	  to	  worry	  about	  creating	  a	  widow,	  or	  having	  a	  POW	  on	  the	  ground	  to	  tie	  the	  president's	  hands,''	  Ray	  Coleman,	  an	  official	  in	  the	  Pentagon’s	  Office	  of	  Unmanned	  Aerial	  Vehicles,	  told	  a	  reporter	  in	  1991.164	  	  By	  the	  time	  the	  1991	  Persian	  Gulf	  War	  ended,	  civilian	  defense	  officials	  assumed	  support	  for	  action	  in	  Bosnia	  depended	  on	  near-­‐zero	  losses	  of	  military	  personnel.165	  In	  light	  of	  these	  political	  circumstances,	  Perry,	  Deutch,	  and	  Lynn	  were	  eager	  to	  pursue	  unmanned	  options.166	  According	  to	  one	  senior	  Pentagon	  civilian	  managing	  Predator	  development,	  UAVs	  were	  in	  a	  stronger	  position	  than	  the	  U-­‐2	  to	  undertake	  certain	  types	  of	  missions,	  particularly	  those	  that	  presented	  the	  political	  risks	  of	  a	  downed	  pilot	  being	  captured	  or	  killed:167	  	  “We	  were	  very	  worried	  about	  using	  U-­‐2’s	  for	  manned,	  high-­‐altitude	  surveillance”	  in	  politically	  sensitive	  areas	  such	  as	  the	  38th	  parallel	  in	  North	  Korea	  and	  areas	  of	  the	  Middle	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  162	  Newcome	  (2004)	  71	  163	  Newcome	  (2004)	  71	  164	  Nalder	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East.”168	  One	  defense	  official	  was	  quoted	  in	  a	  1994	  news	  report	  saying	  that	  the	  U-­‐2	  had	  been	  relegated	  to	  “strictly	  stand-­‐off	  missions”	  because	  of	  the	  growing	  proliferation	  of	  long-­‐range,	  high	  altitude	  Soviet-­‐designed	  SA-­‐5,	  SA-­‐10,	  and	  SA-­‐12	  SAMs.169	  The	  CIA	  shared	  the	  Pentagon	  civilians’	  concerns.	  The	  agency’s	  Gnat-­‐750	  UAVs	  were	  bought	  to	  replace	  the	  two-­‐man	  RG-­‐8	  Schweitzer	  powered	  gliders	  that	  the	  agency	  had	  been	  using	  for	  reconnaissance	  missions.	  “The	  agency	  is	  moving	  to	  UAVs	  to	  avoid	  the	  risk	  of	  its	  pilots	  being	  captured	  or	  killed	  in	  clandestine	  fights,”	  
Aviation	  Week	  &	  Space	  Technology	  reported.170	  	  	  	  On	  September	  10,1995,	  the	  US	  government	  decided	  to	  use	  the	  Navy’s	  Tomahawk	  cruise	  missiles,	  rather	  than	  aircraft,	  to	  target	  Serbian	  air	  defenses	  in	  Bosnia	  for	  the	  first	  time	  out	  of	  a	  concern	  for	  reducing	  risk	  to	  aircrews	  after	  an	  SA-­‐6	  shot	  down	  Captain	  O’Grady	  in	  June.171	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  claimed	  the	  missiles	  killed	  civilians,	  and	  NATO	  leaders	  said	  the	  US	  decision	  to	  use	  Tomahawks	  was	  unauthorized	  and	  escalated	  the	  conflict.172	  	  Looking	  back	  on	  the	  decision,	  however,	  former	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Warren	  Christopher	  said	  that	  NATO’s	  objections	  “were	  quite	  unconvincing	  when	  weighed	  against	  the	  pilot	  risk	  in	  those	  areas	  where	  we	  didn’t	  have	  good	  anti-­‐aircraft	  suppression.”	  173	  	  While	  the	  USAF	  tended	  to	  see	  its	  aircrews	  as	  uniquely	  qualified	  to	  handle	  high-­‐risk	  environments,	  USAF	  outsiders	  were	  more	  interested	  in	  substituting	  UAV	  technology	  for	  pilot	  skill.	  The	  difference	  in	  opinion	  was	  based	  on	  diverging	  views	  of	  the	  relative	  importance	  of	  employing	  the	  unique	  skills	  of	  USAF	  pilots	  versus	  the	  significance	  of	  aircraft	  loss	  rates.	  USAF	  government	  civilians	  were	  increasingly	  driven	  to	  employ	  UAVs	  because	  of	  their	  concerns	  for	  rising	  expectations	  of	  zero	  casualties	  in	  the	  American	  public	  after	  the	  relatively	  minimal	  losses	  of	  the	  Persian	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Gulf	  War.	  	  The	  USAF	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Gen.	  McPeak,	  however,	  tended	  to	  view	  threats	  to	  manned	  aircraft	  during	  this	  time	  period	  as	  real	  but	  tolerable,	  greatly	  mitigated	  by	  the	  capacity	  of	  highly	  trained	  aircrews	  —	  and	  pilots	  in	  particular	  —	  to	  operate	  in	  high	  threat	  environments.	  	  The	  USAF’s	  view	  of	  aircrew	  risk	  reflected	  a	  cultural	  preference	  for	  preserving	  the	  status	  of	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot,	  which	  was	  derived	  in	  part	  from	  his	  willingness	  to	  face	  risk	  in	  aerial	  combat.	  If	  UAVs	  eliminated	  the	  need	  to	  put	  pilots	  at	  risk,	  then	  the	  special	  skills	  and	  courage	  that	  provided	  the	  justification	  for	  their	  occupation	  of	  leadership	  positions	  would	  be	  diminished.	  USAF	  culture	  also	  promoted	  the	  impression	  that	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  reasons	  for	  the	  service’s	  existence	  was	  that	  its	  aircrews	  could	  perform	  better	  than	  any	  other	  services’	  aircrews	  in	  the	  most	  high-­‐risk	  environments.	  	  In	  this	  cultural	  context,	  the	  idea	  of	  using	  UAVs	  for	  high-­‐risk	  reconnaissance	  missions	  threatened	  not	  only	  the	  jobs	  and	  status	  of	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots,	  but	  the	  entire	  rationale	  for	  an	  independent	  USAF	  based	  on	  the	  unique	  war–fighting	  capabilities	  of	  its	  aircrew.	  	  
4. To	  what	  extent	  were	  judgments	  about	  the	  Predator	  based	  on	  a	  
concern	  about	  maintaining	  the	  USAF’s	  primary	  control	  over	  air	  
assets	  in	  response	  to	  competition	  from	  other	  civilian	  and	  military	  
institutions?	  	  
	  The	  USAF’s	  leaders	  were	  not	  protective	  of	  the	  Predator	  program	  —	  nor	  were	  the	  other	  military	  services	  —	  despite	  outside	  interest	  from	  the	  CIA	  in	  both	  the	  Gnat-­‐750	  and	  Predator.	  In	  his	  dissertation,	  Ehrhard	  found	  that	  the	  tendency	  of	  military	  services	  to	  ignore	  UAVs	  that	  are	  developed	  outside	  their	  purview	  is	  a	  completely	  rational	  phenomenon.174	  In	  Ehrhard’s	  view,	  the	  decision	  to	  pass	  on	  the	  Predator	  program	  did	  not	  reflect	  a	  general	  judgment	  about	  the	  relevance	  of	  UAVs	  to	  the	  USAF.	  Instead,	  the	  USAF	  and	  the	  other	  military	  services	  initially	  rejected	  the	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Predator	  simply	  because	  it	  was	  developed	  in	  the	  Pentagon	  without	  regard	  to	  any	  of	  the	  services’	  particular	  material	  interests	  regarding	  cost	  or	  combat	  capability.175	  	  In	  terms	  of	  cost,	  the	  USAF	  viewed	  funding	  for	  manned	  versus	  unmanned	  aircraft	  as	  a	  “zero	  sum	  game”	  because	  it	  was	  combined	  in	  DARO,	  putting	  the	  two	  aircraft	  configurations	  in	  direct	  competition.	  In	  terms	  of	  capability,	  the	  Predator’s	  mixed	  operational	  performance	  in	  Bosnia	  also	  provided	  rational	  justification	  to	  balk	  at	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Predator	  program.	  	  	  	   While	  surely	  rational	  factors	  influenced	  the	  USAF’s	  decision-­‐making,	  the	  USAF’s	  culture	  influenced	  how	  these	  factors	  were	  perceived.	  First,	  organizations	  tend	  to	  compete	  for	  technologies	  that	  perform	  the	  missions	  they	  most	  care	  about	  —	  the	  missions	  that	  are	  closest	  to	  their	  “essence,”	  as	  Halperin	  describes	  it.	  The	  USAF	  did	  not	  see	  the	  reconnaissance	  mission	  —	  the	  only	  mission	  performed	  by	  the	  Predator	  at	  this	  time	  —	  as	  being	  nearly	  as	  important	  to	  its	  essence	  as	  the	  missions	  performed	  by	  manned	  aircraft,	  especially	  fighters.	  In	  the	  view	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  leadership,	  the	  USAF	  did	  not	  need	  to	  compete	  for	  the	  Predator	  program	  because	  its	  reconnaissance	  mission	  was	  seen	  as	  peripheral,	  rather	  than	  something	  so	  central	  to	  the	  USAF’s	  doctrine	  that	  it	  could	  not	  be	  ignored.	  The	  second	  way	  that	  culture	  may	  influence	  an	  organization’s	  decision	  to	  claim	  or	  ignore	  a	  technology	  is	  when	  the	  technology	  performs	  a	  peripheral	  mission	  that	  is	  threatening	  to	  become	  so	  important	  to	  outsiders	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  lack	  of	  involvement	  may	  detract	  from	  its	  war-­‐wining	  reputation.	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  USAF	  may	  see	  to	  control	  the	  technology,	  if	  only	  to	  manage	  its	  rate	  of	  growth	  and	  prevent	  it	  from	  interfering	  with	  what	  the	  service	  perceives	  as	  its	  central	  tasks.	  During	  the	  McPeak	  era,	  the	  Predator’s	  unmanned	  configuration	  was	  indeed	  viewed	  as	  a	  potential	  threat	  to	  manned	  aircraft.	  	  However,	  the	  Predator’s	  operations	  in	  Bosnia	  were	  still	  small-­‐scale,	  confined	  to	  reconnaissance,	  and	  not	  yet	  widely	  appreciated	  across	  the	  defense	  community.	  Therefore	  the	  service	  saw	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little	  risk	  in	  actively	  ignoring	  the	  technology;	  it	  was	  not	  necessary	  —	  yet	  —	  to	  stake	  a	  claim	  on	  the	  Predator	  to	  control	  its	  rate	  of	  growth.	  While	  the	  USAF’s	  leadership	  felt	  no	  pressure	  to	  compete	  for	  the	  Predator	  program,	  one	  might	  still	  expect	  certain	  sub-­‐communities	  in	  the	  service	  to	  lobby	  for	  the	  Predator	  because	  they	  viewed	  it	  as	  part	  of	  their	  own	  core	  mission.	  Given	  the	  CIA’s	  early	  interest	  in	  the	  Predator	  program,	  it	  would	  be	  logical	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  intelligence	  analyst	  community,	  which	  put	  a	  higher	  premium	  on	  reconnaissance	  than	  the	  USAF’s	  fighter	  pilot	  leadership,	  would	  take	  a	  protective	  interest	  in	  an	  airborne	  asset	  designed	  for	  exploitation	  of	  valuable	  intelligence.	  Yet	  as	  discussed	  in	  Question	  1,	  even	  that	  sub-­‐community’s	  cultural	  preferences	  agitated	  against	  Predator	  program	  adoption.	  Like	  the	  USAF’s	  manned	  aircraft	  community,	  intelligence	  analysts	  did	  not	  see	  the	  Predator	  as	  essential	  to	  fulfilling	  their	  intelligence	  collection	  mission,	  nor	  did	  they	  see	  it	  as	  a	  big	  enough	  threat	  to	  their	  existing	  ways	  of	  doing	  business	  to	  ignite	  their	  protective	  instincts	  to	  control	  its	  rate	  of	  growth.	  	  	  The	  USAF’s	  lack	  of	  interest	  in	  asserting	  jurisdiction	  over	  the	  Predator	  during	  the	  McPeak	  era	  highlights	  both	  the	  USAF’s	  low	  regard	  for	  the	  strategic	  relevance	  of	  the	  technology	  and	  the	  relative	  obscurity	  of	  Predator	  operations.	  	  The	  Predator’s	  reconnaissance	  missions	  in	  Bosnia	  were	  not	  central	  enough	  to	  USAF	  doctrine,	  built	  around	  strategic	  attack,	  to	  require	  a	  campaign	  to	  control	  the	  technology.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  potential	  advantages	  of	  the	  Predator’s	  unmanned	  configuration	  and	  FMV	  capabilities	  were	  not	  widely	  understood	  enough	  at	  the	  time	  to	  force	  the	  USAF	  to	  seek	  control	  of	  the	  Predator	  as	  a	  means	  to	  prevent	  it	  from	  raising	  questions	  about	  	  	  	  the	  service’s	  reliance	  on	  a	  strategic	  airpower	  doctrine	  built	  strictly	  around	  manned	  aircraft.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  
	  Pentagon	  civilians,	  eager	  to	  adopt	  the	  Predator	  as	  an	  ISR	  asset,	  played	  the	  central	  role	  in	  developing	  the	  Predator	  program	  and	  ultimately	  finding	  a	  military	  user	  for	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the	  system	  in	  the	  Army.	  Throughout	  1993	  and	  1994,	  the	  USAF	  actively	  avoided	  the	  Predator	  program	  based	  on	  their	  cultural	  perceptions	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  factors	  that	  impinged	  on	  Predator	  development.	  	  	   In	  Gen.	  McPeak’s	  view,	  all	  indications	  were	  that	  the	  Predator	  program	  was	  a	  bad	  investment.	  He	  believed	  that	  UAV	  technology	  was	  still	  relatively	  unproven;	  he	  felt	  that	  there	  were	  no	  compelling	  evidence	  that	  UAVs	  were	  cheaper	  than	  manned	  aircraft,	  a	  major	  drawback	  in	  an	  austere	  post-­‐Cold	  war	  budget	  environment;	  and	  he	  felt	  that	  the	  future	  of	  strategic	  reconnaissance,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  this	  peripheral	  mission	  mattered,	  lay	  with	  satellites	  rather	  than	  UAVs.	  	  In	  contrast,	  Pentagon	  civilians,	  who	  had	  no	  stake	  in	  preserving	  the	  USAF’s	  existing	  cultural	  norms	  nor	  financial	  responsibility	  for	  the	  Predator	  program,	  totally	  disagreed	  with	  Gen.	  McPeak’s	  assessment.	  In	  their	  view,	  UAV	  technology	  was	  sophisticated	  enough	  to	  have	  military	  potential,	  cheaper	  than	  manned	  aircraft,	  and	  better-­‐suited	  to	  the	  emerging	  strategic	  context	  as	  threats	  shifted	  from	  the	  Fulda	  Gap	  to	  MOOTW	  —	  more	  dynamic	  regional	  conflicts	  taking	  place	  amidst	  civilian	  populations.	  	  The	  USAF’s	  cultural	  attitudes	  toward	  UAV	  innovation	  help	  to	  explain	  these	  sharply	  differing	  assessments	  of	  the	  Predator	  program’s	  potential.	  	  Under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Gen.	  McPeak,	  the	  USAF	  embraced	  a	  	  narrow	  conception	  of	  airpower	  built	  around	  the	  central	  role	  of	  manned	  aircraft	  in	  a	  conventional	  air	  campaign.	  Seeking	  to	  preserve	  the	  preeminence	  of	  aircraft	  and	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  in	  airpower	  theory,	  Gen.	  McPeak	  viewed	  any	  technological	  alternatives	  to	  manned	  aircraft,	  such	  as	  UAVs,	  as	  a	  potential	  threat.	  His	  cultural	  preference	  for	  manned	  aircraft	  over	  UAVs	  fed	  into	  pessimistic	  assessments	  about	  the	  cost,	  potential,	  and	  relevance	  of	  UAVs	  in	  the	  emerging	  strategic	  context.	  His	  preoccupation	  with	  preserving	  the	  leadership	  status	  of	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots,	  built	  partly	  on	  their	  courage	  in	  aerial	  battle,	  also	  led	  him	  to	  devalue	  the	  advantage	  that	  UAVs	  provided	  in	  terms	  of	  reducing	  risk	  to	  aircrew.	  Taken	  together,	  Gen.	  McPeak’s	  views	  promoted	  a	  prevailing	  culture	  in	  the	  USAF	  that	  saw	  little	  to	  no	  use	  for	  UAVs	  in	  the	  service’s	  inventory.	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In	  closing,	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  chapter	  do	  not	  support	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  USAF	  has	  been	  open	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  technologies	  to	  advance	  the	  service’s	  war-­‐winning	  edge.	  Chapter	  two	  identified	  a	  historical	  cultural	  tendency	  of	  the	  USAF	  to	  favor	  manned	  aircraft	  over	  other	  types	  of	  technology,	  particularly	  during	  periods	  of	  relative	  peace.	  This	  pattern	  continued	  during	  the	  McPeak	  era.	  The	  development	  and	  expert	  employment	  of	  manned	  aircraft	  remained	  central	  to	  the	  USAF’s	  justification	  for	  its	  existence	  during	  this	  time	  period.	  Reconnaissance	  UAVs	  were	  not	  yet	  considered	  even	  a	  peripheral	  consideration	  worthy	  of	  the	  service’s	  attention	  and	  resources.	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CHAPTER	  FOUR,	  Air	  War	  Over	  Bosnia:	  
The	  Predator	  Transitions	  to	  the	  USAF	  
	  After	  initially	  rejecting	  responsibility	  for	  the	  Predator	  program,	  the	  USAF	  completely	  reversed	  its	  position	  in	  1995,	  making	  a	  series	  of	  decisions	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  Predator	  that	  led	  to	  its	  formal	  transition	  to	  USAF	  control	  in	  August	  1997.	  Ehrhard	  cites	  the	  leadership	  of	  Gen.	  Ronald	  Fogleman,	  the	  USAF	  chief	  from	  October	  1994	  to	  August	  1999,	  as	  a	  central	  force	  behind	  the	  USAF’s	  abrupt	  reversal.	  According	  to	  Ehrhard,	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  “mobilized	  the	  support	  of	  the	  senior	  generals	  and	  applied	  the	  full	  weight	  of	  his	  service	  to	  get	  Predator.”1	  	  	  	  In	  Ehrhard’s	  view,	  Gen.	  Fogleman’s	  advocacy	  was	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  historical	  cultural	  affinity	  within	  the	  USAF	  for	  aerospace	  innovations	  of	  all	  types.	  The	  USAF’s	  pilot	  leadership	  has	  been	  especially	  enthusiastic,	  stepping	  up	  to	  make	  “rickety	  UAV	  programs	  fly	  efficiently”	  2	  because	  “their	  love	  of	  technology	  perhaps	  allowed	  more	  flexibility	  concerning	  non-­‐standard	  forms	  of	  aerospace	  power.”3	  Ehrhard	  cites	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  as	  one	  of	  several	  “visionary	  service	  chiefs”	  that	  supported	  UAV	  innovation.4	  This	  chapter	  explores	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  technological	  enthusiasm	  among	  the	  USAF’s	  pilot	  leadership,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  cultural	  attitudes	  within	  the	  service,	  led	  the	  USAF	  to	  adopt	  the	  Predator	  program.	  If	  the	  findings	  suggest	  that	  technological	  enthusiasm	  was	  pervasive	  across	  the	  USAF’s	  pilot	  leadership,	  as	  Ehrhard	  suggests,	  this	  evidence	  would	  mark	  a	  significant	  cultural	  shift	  within	  the	  USAF	  from	  the	  years	  of	  Gen.	  McPeak.	  If,	  however,	  the	  findings	  suggest	  that	  technological	  enthusiasm	  was	  not	  widespread	  within	  the	  USAF’s	  leadership,	  then	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Ehrhard	  (2000)	  541	  2	  Ehrhard	  (2000)	  592	  3	  Ehrhard	  (2000)	  593	  4	  Ehrhard	  (2000)	  541	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other	  cultural	  influences	  and	  material	  factors	  may	  have	  more	  power	  to	  explain	  why	  the	  USAF	  suddenly	  pursued	  management	  of	  the	  Predator	  program.	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  first	  half	  of	  the	  chapter	  reviews	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Predator’s	  transition	  to	  the	  USAF,	  examining	  the	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  that	  led	  the	  USAF	  to	  pursue	  Predator	  management	  after	  1995.	  The	  second	  half	  uses	  the	  four	  sub-­‐questions	  identified	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  thesis	  to	  explore	  how	  USAF	  culture	  influenced	  the	  service’s	  decisions	  during	  the	  Predator	  program’s	  transition	  from	  DARO	  to	  the	  USAF	  between	  1995	  and	  1997.	  	  	  
Transition:	  The	  USAF	  Claims	  the	  Predator	  Program	  	  
	  
	  The	  end	  of	  the	  Predator’s	  first	  deployment	  to	  Bosnia	  in	  late	  1995	  marked	  the	  last	  major	  milestone	  in	  the	  Pentagon’s	  ACTD	  process.	  In	  anticipation	  of	  the	  ACTD”s	  conclusion	  in	  June	  1996,	  DARO	  prepared	  to	  transfer	  responsibility	  for	  the	  Predator	  to	  one	  of	  the	  military	  services.	  The	  Army	  had	  agreed	  to	  deploy	  the	  Predator	  to	  test	  it,	  but	  that	  is	  where	  their	  commitment	  ended.	  The	  looming	  question	  was	  whether	  any	  of	  the	  military	  services	  would	  agree	  to	  manage	  the	  Predator	  as	  a	  “program	  of	  record,”	  making	  a	  commitment	  to	  fly	  and	  maintain	  the	  aircraft	  as	  part	  of	  its	  force	  structure.	  Finding	  a	  military	  service	  to	  sponsor	  the	  Predator	  program	  was	  essential	  if	  it	  were	  to	  survive	  beyond	  the	  ACTD.	  	  As	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  three,	  in	  1993	  and	  1994	  none	  of	  the	  military	  services	  wanted	  to	  adopt	  the	  Predator	  program.	  The	  USAF	  was	  most	  reluctant,	  limiting	  its	  participation	  in	  the	  Predator’s	  first	  Bosnia	  deployment.	  Yet	  in	  early	  1995,	  a	  sea	  change	  in	  thinking	  about	  the	  Predator	  washed	  over	  the	  Pentagon	  brass.	  The	  USAF	  suddenly	  joined	  the	  Army	  and	  Navy	  in	  a	  three-­‐way	  race	  to	  control	  the	  Predator	  program.5	  Each	  military	  service	  began	  writing	  an	  	  “Operational	  Requirements	  Document”	  to	  make	  their	  case	  for	  ownership	  once	  the	  Predator	  ACTD	  ended	  in	  June	  1996.6	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  ACC	  History	  Office	  (Aug.	  2006)	  7;	  Blackwelder	  interview	  (Aug.	  13,	  2013)	  6	  ibid	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The	  emerging	  competition	  for	  the	  Predator	  in	  late	  1995	  surprised	  Pentagon	  acquisition	  officials.	  The	  Predator	  ACTD	  was	  the	  first	  to	  transition	  to	  a	  formal	  acquisition	  program.	  At	  the	  time,	  there	  were	  no	  precedents	  and	  no	  formal	  policy	  for	  selecting	  a	  “lead	  service”	  to	  manage	  a	  weapon	  system	  at	  the	  end	  of	  an	  ACTD.7	  Existing	  ACTD	  policy	  stated	  only	  that	  Lynn’s	  Advanced	  Technology	  office,	  as	  the	  managing	  ACTD	  authority,	  should	  make	  a	  recommendation	  on	  the	  fate	  of	  ACTD	  programs	  to	  a	  panel	  of	  senior	  Pentagon	  officials	  responsible	  for	  major	  acquisition	  decisions,	  known	  as	  the	  Joint	  Requirements	  Oversight	  Council	  (JROC).	  The	  mission	  of	  the	  JROC,	  established	  in	  1986,	  is	  to	  ensure	  that	  new	  weapons	  systems	  meet	  the	  “joint”	  needs	  of	  compatibility	  and	  do	  not	  overlap	  with	  other	  efforts.	  The	  JROC	  could	  make	  three	  types	  of	  recommendations:	  one	  service	  could	  be	  selected	  to	  manage	  the	  weapon	  system;	  management	  could	  be	  split	  among	  the	  services;	  or,	  the	  weapon	  system	  could	  be	  cancelled	  all	  together.8	  The	  ambiguity	  about	  how	  to	  select	  a	  service	  to	  manage	  the	  Predator	  program	  created	  an	  opportunity	  for	  the	  USAF	  to	  take	  decisive	  action.	  	  Under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Gen.	  Fogleman,	  the	  USAF	  activated	  a	  new	  unit	  to	  fly	  the	  Predator	  —	  the	  11th	  Reconnaissance	  Squadron	  (RS)	  at	  Indian	  Springs	  Auxiliary	  Airfield	  in	  Nevada	  —in	  August	  1995.9	  The	  decision	  was	  so	  sudden	  that	  the	  service	  failed	  to	  inform	  Lynn’s	  Advanced	  Technology	  office,	  the	  managing	  authority	  for	  the	  Predator	  ACTD.	  	  Retired	  Lt.	  Col.	  Donald	  Blackwelder,	  an	  F-­‐111	  pilot	  and	  the	  USAF’s	  representative	  for	  the	  Predator	  ACTD	  in	  that	  office,	  first	  learned	  about	  the	  decision	  when	  he	  read	  the	  morning	  news.	  “There	  was	  no	  communication	  between	  the	  Air	  Force	  and	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,”	  he	  recalled.10	  	  On	  October	  17,	  1995,	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  made	  another	  bold	  push	  for	  control	  of	  the	  Predator	  program,	  asking	  his	  generals	  at	  ACC,	  the	  command	  that	  would	  be	  responsible	  for	  Predator	  management,	  about	  the	  feasibility	  of	  accepting	  the	  UAV	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Thirtle,	  Johnston	  and	  Birkler	  (1997)	  34;	  Blackwelder	  interview;	  Poilcy	  guidance	  was	  issued	  in	  Dec.	  1996,	  see	  Kaminski	  (Dec.	  19,	  1996)	  8	  Blackwelder	  interview	  (Aug.	  13,	  2013)	  	  9	  Ehrhard	  (2000)541;Fogleman	  interview	  (July	  22,	  2013)	  	  10	  Blackwelder	  interview	  (Aug.	  13,	  2013)	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for	  operations	  within	  30	  days.	  ACC	  said	  it	  would	  be	  possible,	  but	  operational	  use	  in	  that	  timeframe	  would	  require	  Army	  assistance.	  ACC	  also	  said	  that	  an	  all-­‐USAF	  operation	  would	  not	  be	  possible	  until	  1996.11	  Meanwhile,	  Lt	  Col	  Blackwelder,	  still	  a	  USAF	  officer	  detailed	  to	  work	  for	  Lynn,	  drafted	  a	  memo	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Advanced	  Technology	  office	  to	  request	  the	  transfer	  of	  the	  Predator	  program	  to	  his	  service.	  He	  did	  so	  based	  on	  his	  understanding	  from	  reading	  the	  newspaper	  that	  Gen	  Fogleman	  wanted	  control	  of	  the	  Predator	  program.12	  	  
Deployment	  Two,	  Operation	  Nomad	  Endeavor:	  The	  USAF	  Joins	  the	  Predator	  in	  
Bosnia	  	  
	  Although	  the	  USAF	  still	  needed	  assistance	  from	  the	  Army	  for	  Predator	  operations,	  it	  rapidly	  assumed	  bureaucratic	  responsibility	  for	  the	  Predator	  program.	  In	  November	  1995,	  Gen	  Fogleman	  told	  ACC	  that	  the	  USAF	  had	  been	  appointed	  “executive	  agent”	  of	  the	  Predator	  program.13	  In	  December	  1995,	  the	  JROC,	  the	  panel	  responsible	  for	  reviewing	  the	  Advanced	  Technology	  Office’s	  recommendation	  on	  the	  Predator	  program,	  confirmed	  that	  the	  UAV	  would	  be	  transitioned	  to	  the	  USAF.	  The	  head	  of	  the	  JROC,	  Admiral	  William	  Owens	  —	  the	  Pentagon’s	  Vice	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  at	  the	  time	  —	  sent	  a	  version	  of	  Lt.	  Col.	  Blackwelder’s	  memo	  to	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  William	  Perry,	  with	  the	  JROC’s	  recommendation.14	  Then,	  on	  February	  12,	  1996,	  the	  JROC	  confirmed	  that	  the	  Predator	  had	  demonstrated	  sufficient	  military	  utility	  to	  warrant	  production	  and	  requested	  the	  fielding	  of	  16	  systems.15	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  said	  he	  worked	  hard	  to	  shape	  a	  JROC	  decision	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  USAF,	  making	  it	  clear	  that	  “we	  were	  willing	  to	  take	  this	  on,	  and	  make	  it	  a	  success.”16	  However,	  the	  USAF’s	  victory	  was	  not	  complete.	  USAF	  officials	  expected	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  Army	  for	  operational	  assistance	  during	  the	  Predator’s	  transition,	  but	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  ACC	  History	  Office	  (Aug.	  2006)	  9	  12	  Blackwelder	  interview	  (Aug.	  13,	  2013)	  13	  ACC	  History	  Office	  (2006)	  9	  14	  Blackwelder	  Interview	  (Aug	  13,	  2013)	  15	  	  Israel	  (Mar.	  7,	  1997)	  16	  Fogleman	  interview	  (July	  22,	  2013)	  
	   151	  
bureaucratic	  requirements	  solidified	  a	  longer-­‐term	  management	  role	  for	  the	  other	  services.	  In	  an	  April	  1996	  memo,	  Perry,	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  concurred	  with	  the	  JROC’s	  recommendation	  to	  designate	  the	  USAF	  as	  the	  lead	  service,	  but	  he	  also	  cemented	  the	  Navy’s	  role	  development	  and	  procurement.17	  Meanwhile,	  the	  Army	  was	  still	  running	  Predator	  training.	  Pentagon	  officials	  stopped	  short	  of	  consolidating	  Predator	  management	  solely	  in	  the	  USAF	  because	  of	  pressure	  from	  the	  US	  Congress,	  which	  had	  intentionally	  consolidated	  responsibility	  for	  UAVs	  in	  the	  US-­‐Navy-­‐run	  JPO	  and	  DARO	  out	  of	  frustration	  with	  the	  military	  services’	  failure	  to	  build	  UAVs	  on	  their	  own.18	  In	  light	  of	  these	  concerns,	  Pentagon	  officials	  ensured	  the	  Predator	  program	  retained	  	  “a	  joint	  flavor.”19	  	  The	  Pentagon’s	  call	  for	  “jointness”	  initially	  left	  the	  USAF	  on	  the	  sidelines	  during	  the	  Predator’s	  second	  Bosnia	  deployment,	  known	  as	  Operation	  Nomad	  Endeavor.	  During	  this	  tasking,	  Predator	  operations	  were	  based	  in	  Taszar,	  Hungary.	  US	  Atlantic	  Command,	  which	  was	  staffed	  by	  USAF	  officials,	  as	  well	  as	  Army	  and	  Navy	  officials	  eager	  to	  preserve	  “jointness,”	  was	  slow	  to	  provide	  training	  slots	  for	  USAF	  personnel	  at	  the	  Army’s	  Predator	  training	  location	  in	  Fort	  Huachuca,	  Arizona.20	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  USAF	  was	  not	  ready	  in	  time	  to	  run	  operations	  in	  Bosnia	  when	  Nomad	  Endeavor	  began	  in	  March	  1996.	  	  The	  same	  Army	  intelligence	  team	  that	  flew	  the	  Predator	  during	  its	  first	  deployment	  (Operation	  Nomad	  Vigil)	  returned	  with	  it	  to	  Taszar	  to	  support	  Predator	  operations.21	  The	  USAF’s	  11th	  RS	  did	  not	  assume	  management	  of	  the	  Predator	  during	  Nomad	  Endeavor	  until	  September	  1996,	  three	  months	  after	  the	  ACTD	  phase	  had	  officially	  ended.22	  Even	  then,	  the	  11th	  RS	  did	  not	  work	  strictly	  for	  the	  USAF;	  it	  also	  flew	  missions	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  CIA.23	  Throughout	  the	  Nomad	  Endeavor	  deployment,	  which	  lasted	  until	  February	  1998,	  the	  Predator	  program	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  ACC	  History	  Office	  (Aug.	  2006)	  13	  18	  Fulghum	  (Nov.	  13,	  1995)	  	  19	  ACC	  History	  Office	  (2006)	  9	  
20	  ibid	  21	  Big	  Safari	  scientist	  	  (Aug.	  21,	  2013)	  22	  ibid	  	  23	  Coll	  (2004)	  529	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was	  still	  very	  much	  a	  “joint”	  effort	  despite	  the	  USAF’s	  designation	  as	  the	  lead	  service.	  	  	  The	  main	  mission	  of	  the	  Predator	  while	  based	  in	  Taszar	  was	  to	  provide	  support	  to	  Operation	  Joint	  Endeavor,	  a	  NATO	  effort	  to	  enforce	  the	  ceasefire	  codified	  by	  the	  1995	  Dayton	  Accords.	  During	  the	  deployment,	  the	  Predator	  monitored	  belligerents	  that	  might	  interfere	  with	  NATO	  peacekeeping	  operations	  and	  searched	  for	  mass	  graves	  that	  would	  provide	  evidence	  of	  1995	  massacres.24	  The	  UAV’s	  performance	  in	  Bosnia	  during	  this	  second	  deployment	  was	  similar	  to	  its	  first	  in	  terms	  of	  reliability.	  Weather	  remained	  a	  problem,	  forcing	  the	  Predator	  to	  briefly	  abandon	  operations	  during	  the	  winter	  months.	  Light	  enough	  to	  be	  picked	  up	  by	  the	  nose	  with	  one	  hand,	  the	  UAV	  was	  buffeted	  about	  by	  high	  winds,	  heavy	  rain	  and	  cloud	  formations.	  Cold	  weather	  and	  clouds	  contributed	  to	  icing,	  which	  upset	  the	  airflow	  on	  the	  Predator’s	  wings,	  leading	  to	  crashes.	  One	  analysis	  of	  the	  second	  deployment,	  conducted	  in	  2003,	  found	  that	  of	  315	  missions	  scheduled	  between	  March	  1996	  and	  April	  1997,	  weather	  and	  maintenance	  problems	  kept	  60	  percent	  of	  the	  Predator’s	  scheduled	  missions	  on	  the	  ground.25	  Of	  the	  missions	  that	  were	  launched,	  slightly	  less	  than	  half	  were	  aborted,	  mostly	  due	  to	  weather.26	  Another	  analysis	  conducted	  in	  early	  1997,	  while	  the	  deployment	  was	  still	  ongoing,	  also	  blamed	  weather	  for	  reliability	  shortfalls,	  noting	  that	  out	  of	  the	  210	  missions	  that	  had	  been	  conducted	  at	  the	  time,	  62	  were	  aborted	  mostly	  because	  of	  weather.27	  Things	  got	  so	  bad	  between	  December	  1996	  and	  January	  1997	  that	  the	  Predator	  flew	  just	  one	  mission	  in	  27	  days	  before	  suspending	  winter	  combat	  operations	  in	  January,	  according	  to	  Col.	  James	  “Snake”	  Clark,	  who	  visited	  Predator	  operations	  in	  Taszar	  in	  1996	  on	  behalf	  of	  USAF	  leaders.28	  	  While	  weather	  posed	  problems	  during	  the	  second	  deployment,	  the	  Predator	  demonstrated	  significant	  improvements	  in	  imagery	  collection.	  The	  UAV’s	  KU-­‐band	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  DARO	  (1996)	  9	  25	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  (February	  2003)7-­‐8	  	  26	  ibid	  	  27	  Big	  Safari	  Scientist	  (May	  9,	  1997)	  12.	  28	  	  	  Clark	  (1996B)	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satellite	  data	  link	  was	  employed	  from	  the	  start,	  providing	  the	  bandwidth	  capacity	  needed	  to	  deliver	  real-­‐time	  FMV	  rather	  than	  the	  delayed	  still	  imagery	  provided	  over	  a	  UHF	  satellite	  data	  link	  during	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  first	  deployment.	  When	  Pope	  John	  Paul	  II	  visited	  Bosnia	  in	  April	  1996,	  the	  Predator	  flew	  two	  missions,	  transmitting	  imagery	  that	  was	  used	  to	  identify	  threats.29	  CIA	  Director	  Jim	  Woolsey	  also	  praised	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  agency’s	  Predator	  imagery.	  Using	  the	  FMV	  technology	  developed	  by	  a	  Big	  Safari	  scientist	  in	  1995,	  Woolsey	  was	  able	  to	  watch	  video	  of	  Bosnia	  from	  CIA	  headquarters	  at	  Langley,	  Virginia	  and	  communicate	  via	  email	  with	  Predator	  pilots	  in	  Taszar	  in	  real-­‐time.30	  SAR	  sensors,	  which	  can	  see	  through	  clouds,	  provided	  a	  last-­‐resort	  method	  to	  collect	  imagery	  on	  cloudy	  days	  when	  the	  weather	  was	  not	  so	  poor	  to	  keep	  the	  Predator	  grounded.31	  	  	  
The	  USAF’s	  Assessment	  of	  the	  Second	  Deployment:	  Problems	  Persist	  
	  The	  USAF	  attributed	  the	  Predator’s	  spotty	  flight	  record	  during	  the	  second	  deployment	  to	  the	  very	  same	  material	  factors	  that	  had	  led	  the	  service	  to	  reject	  the	  Predator	  program	  initially.	  Reliability	  and	  technological	  maturity	  were	  still	  in	  question.	  Col.	  Clark	  noted	  in	  a	  report	  to	  his	  bosses	  following	  his	  visit	  to	  Taszar	  that	  the	  UAV’s	  reliability	  problems	  stemmed	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  de-­‐icing	  technology	  and	  a	  spare	  parts	  shortage.32	  	  	  The	  Predator	  program	  also	  suffered	  from	  other	  reliability	  problems	  in	  Bosnia,	  stemming	  from	  shortfalls	  in	  maintenance,	  training	  and	  personnel,	  according	  to	  Lt.	  Gen.	  Brett	  Dula,	  ACC’s	  vice	  commander.	  He	  argued	  that	  these	  problems	  all	  could	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  Pentagon	  civilians’	  decision	  to	  pursue	  a	  rapid	  ACTD,	  bypassing	  a	  traditional	  acquisition	  phase	  known	  as	  “Engineering,	  Manufacturing	  and	  Development”	  (EMD).33	  During	  this	  phase,	  the	  Pentagon	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  	  Richardson	  (Sept.1997)	  	  30	  Coll	  (2004)	  528;	  Strickland	  (March	  2013)	  6	  31	  Big	  Safari	  Scientist	  	  (May	  9,	  1997)	  13.	  	  32	  Clark	  (1996B)	  	  	  33	  Dula	  (Apr.	  9,	  1997)	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produces	  small	  quantities	  of	  weapon	  systems	  to	  hone	  a	  smooth	  manufacturing	  process	  and	  refine	  the	  design.	  “It	  is	  ACC's	  opinion	  that	  the	  ACTD	  process	  should	  include	  a	  limited	  EMD	  phase	  to	  ensure	  a	  smooth	  transition	  from	  acquisition	  to	  operations,”	  Lt	  Gen.	  Dula	  said	  during	  congressional	  testimony	  in	  1997.34	  In	  his	  trip	  report,	  Col.	  Clark	  called	  the	  lack	  of	  an	  EMD	  phase	  “the	  fundamental	  root	  of	  the	  Predator	  problem.”	  35	  USAF	  officials	  also	  argued	  that	  the	  Army’s	  and	  Navy’s	  continued	  involvement	  in	  Predator	  operations	  was	  a	  hindrance.	  “Clearly	  the	  Predator’s	  biggest	  problem	  is	  political,”	  Col.	  Clark	  wrote	  in	  the	  trip	  report.	  The	  Navy-­‐led	  UAV	  Joint	  Program	  Office,	  still	  in	  charge	  of	  funding	  and	  development,	  failed	  to	  provide	  spares	  and	  infrastructure	  to	  the	  USAF’s	  11th	  RS	  once	  it	  arrived	  in	  Taszar	  to	  manage	  the	  second	  deployment.	  36	  “Operational	  support	  is	  terrible!”	  Col.	  Clark	  elaborated	  in	  another	  set	  of	  talking	  points	  on	  his	  trip.	  The	  UAV	  JPO	  also	  failed	  to	  hold	  GA-­‐ASI	  accountable	  for	  replacement	  parts,	  technical	  orders	  for	  maintenance	  and	  system	  modification	  requests.	  The	  Army’s	  management	  of	  infrastructure	  in	  Taszar	  was	  also	  poor,	  noted	  Col.	  Clark.	  The	  11th	  RS	  was	  living	  in	  “a	  harsh	  tent	  city	  environment”	  with	  2000	  army	  personnel,	  which	  had	  an	  “impact	  on	  morale.”	  Summing	  it	  up,	  he	  said	  the	  shared	  power	  structure	  among	  the	  services	  had	  confused	  the	  chain	  of	  command.37	  	  	  	  	  GA-­‐ASI	  also	  fell	  under	  USAF	  scrutiny	  for	  overselling	  Predator	  capabilities,	  thereby	  raising	  the	  expectations	  of	  US	  lawmakers	  at	  the	  same	  time	  that	  performance	  problems	  mounted	  in	  Bosnia.	  GA-­‐ASI	  was	  still	  a	  relatively	  small	  company	  using	  tailor-­‐made	  production	  processes,	  which	  meant	  that	  modifying	  components	  like	  radios	  and	  engines	  required	  a	  12-­‐month	  lead	  time.38	  But	  Cassidy,	  the	  GA-­‐ASI	  president,	  continued	  to	  lobby	  for	  increased	  production	  on	  Capitol	  Hill	  and	  in	  the	  Pentagon.	  The	  USAF’s	  perception	  was	  that	  the	  company’s	  size	  and	  the	  technological	  maturity	  of	  the	  Predator	  program	  were	  mismatched	  with	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  ibid	  35	  Clark	  (1996A)	  	  36	  Clark	  (1996A)	  37	  Clark	  (1996B:	  Undated)	  	  	  38	  	  ibid	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Cassidy’s	  claim	  the	  company	  was	  ready	  to	  build	  more.	  “We	  couldn’t	  buy	  the	  thing	  the	  way	  it	  was,”	  recalled	  Gen.	  John	  Jumper,	  the	  deputy	  chief	  of	  staff	  of	  Air	  Operations	  June	  1996	  to	  November	  1997.	  “It	  was	  a	  piece	  of	  crap	  reliability-­‐wise.”39	  Echoed	  Gen.	  Fogleman,	  	  “General	  Atomics	  had	  a	  lot	  of	  support	  on	  the	  Hill	  and	  they	  were	  really	  pumping	  this	  thing	  up	  big	  time.	  Once	  we	  took	  this	  thing	  over	  people	  expected	  it	  to	  perform,	  and	  what	  we	  discovered	  was	  ‘gee,	  there	  was	  no	  logistics	  behind	  it.’”40	  
	  
The	  Predator	  Program’s	  Formal	  Transition	  into	  the	  USAF	  	  	  Despite	  persistent	  problems	  with	  the	  Predator’s	  operational	  efficiency	  during	  the	  second	  deployment,	  at	  home	  the	  USAF	  moved	  ahead	  with	  plans	  to	  manage	  the	  Predator	  program.	  “The	  bottom	  line	  is	  that,	  on	  my	  watch,	  the	  Air	  Force	  will	  embrace	  UAVs	  and	  work	  to	  fully	  exploit	  their	  potential,”	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  wrote	  in	  a	  mid-­‐1996	  policy	  letter.41	  As	  the	  official	  lead	  service	  for	  the	  Predator,	  the	  USAF	  took	  several	  steps	  to	  shore	  up	  its	  control	  of	  the	  UAV	  in	  1996	  and	  1997.	  Among	  the	  considerations	  addressed	  were:	  how	  to	  stimulate	  UAV	  innovation	  with	  the	  USAF;	  who	  should	  fly	  Predator	  UAVs,	  what	  to	  call	  those	  people	  and	  how	  to	  recruit	  them;	  how	  to	  capture	  the	  remaining	  Predator	  program	  elements	  still	  in	  the	  Army;	  and	  how	  to	  institutionalize	  the	  Predator	  in	  the	  USAF’s	  organizational	  structure.	  	  
	  
Stimulating	  UAV	  Innovation	  in	  the	  USAF	  	  In	  early	  1996,	  Gen	  Fogleman	  took	  two	  steps	  to	  stimulate	  UAV	  innovation	  in	  the	  service.	  He	  first	  established	  a	  “UAV	  Battlelab”	  at	  Eglin	  AFB	  in	  Florida.	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  battlelab	  was	  to	  create	  a	  formal	  process	  for	  spurring	  UAV	  innovation	  in	  the	  USAF.	  While	  research	  labs	  focus	  on	  basic	  science,	  the	  battlelab	  was	  to	  focus	  on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  	  Jumper	  interview	  (July	  30,	  2013)	  40	  Fogleman	  interview	  (July	  22,	  2013)	  41	  Grier	  (July	  1996)	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using	  mature	  technologies	  in	  innovative	  ways.42	  This	  approach	  had	  been	  one	  of	  the	  main	  tenets	  of	  the	  Predator	  ACTD	  program.	  Gen	  Fogleman	  also	  commissioned	  a	  study,	  conducted	  by	  field	  grade	  USAF	  officers	  at	  the	  USAF’s	  Air	  University	  at	  Maxwell	  AFB	  in	  Alabama,	  known	  as	  “Strikestar	  2025.”	  Its	  purpose	  was	  to	  determine	  what	  the	  USAF	  would	  need	  to	  do	  “to	  remain	  dominant	  in	  air	  and	  space	  in	  the	  future”	  and	  it	  focused	  mostly	  on	  new	  UAV	  technologies,	  including	  a	  notional	  “Strikestar”	  stealth	  aircraft	  that	  would	  conduct	  strike,	  reconnaissance,	  and	  electronic	  warfare	  missions.43	  	  	  
Establishing	  the	  Criteria	  for	  Predator	  Assignments	  	  Also	  in	  early	  1996,	  the	  USAF	  officially	  decided	  that	  only	  rated	  officers,	  who	  met	  standards	  for	  regular	  and	  frequent	  flight,	  would	  be	  able	  to	  fly	  the	  Predator.	  Airmen	  who	  flew	  the	  UAV	  would	  be	  called	  “Air	  Vehicle	  Operators”	  (AVOs),	  although	  they	  were	  informally	  known	  as	  “pilots”	  from	  the	  beginning.44	  At	  the	  request	  of	  Gen	  Fogleman,	  ACC	  defined	  the	  skills	  necessary	  to	  operate	  a	  UAV,	  including:	  knowledge	  of	  aerodynamics,	  theory	  of	  flight,	  meteorology,	  air	  navigation,	  flying	  directives,	  airmanship,	  aircraft	  operating	  procedures	  and	  mission	  tactics.45	  The	  USAF	  began	  to	  recruit	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  and	  navigators	  with	  Federal	  Aviation	  Administration	  (FAA)	  commercial/instrument	  aircraft	  ratings	  for	  three-­‐year	  Predator	  assignments.46	  To	  rapidly	  recruit	  new	  personnel	  for	  the	  11th	  RS,	  the	  USAF	  relied	  on	  “non-­‐volunteers.”	  Air	  Force	  Personnel	  Command	  (AFPC)	  asked	  unit	  commanders	  to	  select	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  to	  fly	  the	  Predator.	  Knowing	  little	  about	  the	  system,	  commanders	  recruited	  airmen	  who	  were	  underperforming	  in	  the	  cockpit	  or	  who	  were	  passed	  over	  for	  promotion.47	  These	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  were	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Neese	  (Nov.21	  1997)	  78	  43	  Carmichael,	  Devine,	  Kaufman,	  Pence,	  and.	  Wilcox	  (Aug.	  1996).	  	  44	  ACC	  History	  Office	  (2006)14	  and	  	  29;	  Soto	  interview	  (April	  18,	  2013)	  45	  ACC	  History	  Office	  (2006)14	  46	  Tobin	  (June	  1999)	  49.	  47	  Anonymous	  source;	  Moseley	  interview	  (Apr.	  1,	  2014)	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interested	  in	  the	  job.	  As	  of	  June	  1997,	  the	  USAF	  had	  issued	  19	  non-­‐volunteer	  assignments	  to	  the	  11th	  RS,	  resulting	  in	  fifteen	  assignments	  and	  four	  separations,	  and	  only	  one	  volunteer	  on	  the	  11th	  RS.48	  Even	  the	  position	  of	  squadron	  commander	  —	  normally	  a	  coveted	  spot	  for	  “fast	  burners”	  in	  the	  USAF	  —	  was	  shunned	  in	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  community.	  When	  the	  Air	  Staff	  called	  pilots	  selected	  for	  command	  slots	  to	  determine	  their	  willingness	  to	  manage	  the	  11th	  RS,	  many	  said	  they	  would	  prefer	  to	  “7-­‐day	  opt,”	  ending	  their	  USAF	  careers	  within	  one	  week,	  rather	  than	  be	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  UAV	  unit.49	  One	  reason	  for	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots’	  misgivings	  about	  a	  Predator	  assignment	  was	  the	  lack	  of	  flight	  pay.	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  had	  decided	  that	  Predator	  AVOs	  needed	  to	  have	  pilot	  skills,	  but	  the	  Air	  Force	  Judge	  Advocate	  General	  ruled	  that	  AVOs	  were	  not	  eligible	  for	  the	  monthly	  stipend	  awarded	  to	  USAF	  pilots.	  50	  	  The	  dearth	  of	  volunteers	  meant	  the	  USAF	  had	  to	  force	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  to	  fly	  the	  Predator,	  serving	  to	  only	  increase	  their	  misgivings	  about	  the	  UAV,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Question	  1.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Assuming	  Full	  Control	  from	  the	  Army	  
	  In	  late	  1996,	  the	  USAF	  also	  staked	  out	  its	  position	  in	  regard	  to	  several	  army	  initiatives	  involving	  Predator	  training	  and	  doctrine.	  The	  USAF’s	  goal	  in	  these	  bureaucratic	  battles	  was	  to	  turn	  the	  Predator	  into	  an	  exclusive	  USAF	  asset,	  rather	  than	  one	  that	  was	  “jointly”	  owned.	  	  The	  USAF	  had	  initially	  declined	  to	  take	  over	  Predator	  training	  from	  the	  Army	  	  in	  mid	  to	  late	  1995.	  But	  after	  assuming	  control	  of	  the	  Predator	  program	  in	  April	  1996,	  it	  was	  eager	  to	  assume	  the	  responsibility.51	  In	  November	  1996	  the	  USAF	  moved	  the	  training	  from	  the	  Army’s	  Fort	  Huachuca	  to	  its	  own	  turf	  at	  Indian	  Springs,	  Nevada,	  home	  of	  its	  Predator	  squadron,	  the	  11th	  RS.	  At	  this	  point,	  all	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Predator	  assets	  that	  were	  not	  deployed	  in	  Bosnia	  were	  shipped	  to	  Indian	  Springs.52	  ACC	  also	  overruled	  the	  Army’s	  and	  Navy’s	  bids	  to	  pursue	  the	  Tactical	  Control	  System	  (TCS),	  which	  would	  have	  allowed	  the	  other	  services	  to	  exert	  varying	  degrees	  of	  control	  over	  the	  USAF’s	  Predator	  UAV,	  ranging	  from	  receiving	  data	  to	  actively	  operating	  the	  UAV	  from	  takeoff	  to	  landing.53	  The	  Army,	  Navy,	  and	  US	  Marine	  Corps,	  along	  with	  the	  JROC	  and	  US	  Congress	  criticized	  the	  USAF	  for	  inhibiting	  “interoperability”,	  but	  the	  USAF	  held	  its	  ground.	  	  Secretary	  Perry	  deferred	  to	  the	  USAF’s	  wishes,	  and	  the	  JROC	  —	  now	  headed	  by	  USAF	  General	  Joseph	  Ralston,	  previously	  the	  head	  of	  ACC	  —watered	  down	  TCS	  requirements,	  contributing	  to	  a	  loss	  of	  momentum	  that	  ultimately	  killed	  the	  program.	  54	  	  On	  a	  related	  note,	  the	  USAF	  also	  successfully	  killed	  the	  Army’s	  proposed	  Predator	  concept	  of	  operations,	  which	  would	  have	  allowed	  an	  Army	  “forward	  control	  element”	  to	  physically	  take	  control	  of	  Predator	  aircraft	  from	  USAF	  operators.	  The	  Army	  commanders	  would	  then	  be	  able	  to	  direct	  the	  Predator’s	  flight	  path	  and	  camera	  angle,	  and	  transmit	  intelligence	  directly	  to	  ground	  commanders.	  But	  USAF	  officials	  drafted	  their	  own	  concept	  of	  operations	  that	  cut	  out	  the	  Army.	  Predator	  information	  would	  be	  relayed	  through	  a	  satellite	  to	  a	  joint	  theater	  commander	  who	  would	  then	  relay	  the	  information	  as	  he	  saw	  fit	  to	  the	  Army.55	  	  
Predator	  911:	  The	  USAF	  Establishes	  Predator	  Requirements	  
	  After	  staking	  out	  positions	  vis	  a	  vis	  the	  Army	  and	  Navy,	  the	  USAF	  looked	  inward	  to	  finish	  the	  Predator	  programs	  integration	  into	  the	  service.	  In	  May	  1997,	  Gen.	  Jumper,	  still	  Deputy	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  for	  Air	  Operations,	  formed	  a	  “Predator	  911	  Task	  Force”	  to	  finish	  work	  on	  the	  operational	  requirements	  document	  that	  ACC	  started	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  Rosenwasser	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in	  1995,	  which	  detailed	  spares	  provisioning,	  technical	  orders	  for	  maintenance,	  and	  further	  development	  funding.56	  The	  document	  also	  declared	  that	  the	  USAF	  would	  reduce	  the	  number	  of	  aircraft	  to	  be	  purchased	  from	  the	  JROC’s	  16	  to	  just	  12,	  due	  to	  fiscal	  constraints.	  57	  The	  USAF	  completed	  the	  requirements	  document	  in	  July	  1997,	  clearing	  the	  way	  for	  the	  Predator’s	  formal	  transition	  into	  the	  service.58	  	  In	  documentation	  shared	  with	  congressional	  committees,	  the	  USAF	  said	  that	  it	  would	  take	  two	  years	  to	  “normalize”	  the	  Predator	  program,	  a	  process	  that	  involved	  stabilizing	  the	  acquisition	  so	  that	  earlier	  problems	  —	  such	  as	  the	  lack	  of	  pilots,	  training,	  spare	  parts,	  and	  logistic	  issues	  —	  could	  be	  corrected.	  59	  	  	  
The	  Formal	  Transition	  	  
	  In	  August	  1997,	  the	  Pentagon’s	  Defense	  Acquisition	  Board	  (DAB)	  declared	  that	  the	  Predator	  program	  was	  ready	  to	  move	  into	  the	  USAF’s	  formal	  acquisition	  process.	  60	  The	  DAB	  authorized	  full-­‐rate	  production	  and	  operational	  use	  of	  the	  Predator,	  and	  also	  designated	  the	  Predator	  program	  as	  an	  “ACAT	  II”	  effort	  —	  acquisition-­‐	  speak	  for	  lower	  documentation	  requirements	  and	  less	  Pentagon	  oversight	  than	  the	  Pentagon’s	  biggest	  and	  most	  expensive	  weapon	  system	  acquisitions.61	  That	  same	  month,	  the	  USAF	  activated	  a	  second	  Predator	  squadron	  at	  Indian	  Springs	  in	  Nevada,	  the	  15th	  RS,	  to	  handle	  infrastructure	  set-­‐up,	  freeing	  the	  11th	  RS	  to	  focus	  on	  training	  and	  deployments.	  	  	  Between	  October	  1995	  and	  August	  1997,	  the	  USAF’s	  position	  on	  the	  Predator	  program	  had	  changed	  dramatically.	  As	  discussed	  chapter	  three,	  the	  USAF	  rejected	  the	  Predator	  program	  based	  on	  ostensibly	  rational	  arguments	  regarding	  its	  lack	  of	  technological	  maturity	  and	  reliability,	  problems	  that	  persisted	  between	  1996	  and	  1997.	  The	  UAV’s	  combat	  record	  had	  lengthened,	  but	  little	  had	  changed	  in	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terms	  of	  providing	  proof	  of	  operational	  efficiency	  and	  cost	  effectiveness.	  The	  material	  factors	  that	  led	  the	  USAF	  to	  reject	  the	  Predator	  program	  in	  1994	  were	  still	  largely	  in	  play	  in	  1995,	  raising	  the	  possibility	  that	  some	  possible	  shifts	  in	  USAF	  culture	  led	  the	  service	  to	  embrace	  the	  Predator	  program.	  This	  prospect	  is	  explored	  in	  the	  four	  sub-­‐questions	  below.	  	  
	  
1. To	  what	  extent	  did	  individuals	  or	  groups	  within	  the	  USAF	  resist	  the	  
Predator	  out	  of	  a	  concern	  that	  their	  jobs	  or	  status	  might	  be	  
threatened	  by	  it?	  	  	  
	  The	  cultural	  biases	  that	  fueled	  the	  USAF’s	  decision	  under	  Gen.	  McPeak	  to	  ignore	  the	  Predator	  ACTD	  lingered	  beneath	  the	  surface	  even	  as	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  began	  to	  campaign	  for	  Predator	  control	  in	  early	  1995.	  While	  the	  chain	  of	  command	  complied	  with	  Gen.	  Fogleman’s	  direction,	  the	  cultural	  preference	  for	  manned	  aircraft	  —	  and	  concerns	  that	  UAVs	  may	  pose	  a	  threat	  to	  them	  —	  sometimes	  bubbled	  to	  the	  surface	  on	  both	  the	  operational	  and	  staff	  sides	  of	  the	  USAF.	   	  	   On	  the	  operational	  side,	  Gen.	  Fogleman’s	  decision	  to	  recruit	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  to	  fly	  the	  Predator,	  a	  move	  meant	  to	  signal	  his	  commitment	  to	  UAVs,	  sparked	  tremendous	  anxiety	  within	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  community.	  The	  tension	  was	  evident	  at	  the	  christening	  of	  the	  11th	  RS	  in	  July	  1995.	  A	  reporter	  who	  attended	  the	  ceremony	  quoted	  Lt.	  Col	  Steve	  Hampton,	  the	  first	  commander	  of	  the	  11th	  RS,	  saying	  that	  UAVs	  would	  complement	  manned	  aircraft,	  not	  replace	  them.	  But	  that	  view	  was	  not	  universally	  shared.	  “Yep,	  this	  will	  be	  the	  death	  of	  us,”	  one	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  assigned	  to	  the	  11th	  RS	  told	  the	  reporter	  as	  he	  examined	  a	  Predator	  on	  static	  display.	  “We’re	  getting	  replaced	  by	  R2D2.”62	  	  	  Manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  saw	  an	  assignment	  in	  the	  Predator	  as	  a	  major	  threat	  to	  their	  careers.	  “It’s	  a	  little	  bit	  hard	  to	  convince	  rated	  pilots	  that	  flying	  a	  UAV	  is	  a	  good	  career	  path,”	  a	  Predator	  program	  official	  told	  Inside	  the	  Air	  Force	  in	  1996.63	  Aside	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  flight	  pay	  for	  UAV	  pilots	  discussed	  in	  the	  narrative	  above,	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there	  were	  three	  cultural	  perceptions	  that	  fueled	  the	  view	  of	  the	  Predator	  as	  a	  threat.	  	  First,	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  forced	  to	  fly	  the	  Predator	  were	  uniformed	  about	  the	  system,	  contributing	  to	  fear	  of	  the	  unknown.	  When	  Capt.	  Bayne	  Meeks	  was	  non-­‐volunteered	  to	  a	  Predator	  assignment	  in	  early	  1998,	  his	  response	  was:	  “What’s	  a	  Predator?...no	  seriously,	  I	  don’t	  know	  what	  it	  is.”64	  	  	  Second,	  the	  Predator	  program	  had	  developed	  a	  stigma	  as	  a	  second-­‐rate	  shop.	  Manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  forced	  into	  the	  Predator	  program	  saw	  themselves	  as	  trapped	  in	  a	  “leper	  colony”	  and	  were	  eager	  to	  leave	  Indian	  Springs	  as	  soon	  as	  they	  arrived.	  As	  a	  result,	  they	  failed	  to	  invest	  time	  and	  energy	  in	  the	  assignment,	  learning	  just	  enough	  to	  get	  by	  through	  hands-­‐on	  experience	  augmented	  by	  word	  of	  mouth	  and	  confusing	  GA-­‐ASI	  manuals.65	  The	  prevailing	  disdain	  that	  Predator	  pilots	  had	  for	  their	  own	  assignment	  fed	  into	  low	  morale.	  	  Third,	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  community	  viewed	  comrades	  assigned	  to	  the	  Predator	  as	  low-­‐status.	  After	  completing	  a	  year	  of	  training	  and	  physical	  examinations	  to	  earn	  their	  wings,	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  assigned	  to	  the	  Predator	  had	  to	  “relinquish	  their	  membership	  in	  the	  fraternity	  of	  pilots,”	  as	  then-­‐Lt.	  Col.	  Houston	  Cantwell,	  a	  USAF	  officer	  qualified	  on	  the	  Predator	  and	  the	  F-­‐16,	  explained	  in	  a	  2009	  journal	  article.66	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  community	  referred	  to	  the	  11th	  RS	  and	  15th	  RS	  as	  a	  “leper	  colony”	  and	  the	  “land	  of	  misfit	  toys,”	  according	  to	  several	  sources,	  including	  retired	  USAF	  Col.	  Bill	  Grimes,	  a	  former	  director	  of	  Big	  Safari,	  and	  retired	  Lt.	  Col.	  Brian	  Raduenz,	  who	  also	  worked	  for	  Big	  Safari.”67	  The	  perception	  of	  lost	  status	  resulted	  partly	  from	  the	  Predator’s	  primary	  focus	  on	  reconnaissance.	  As	  had	  been	  the	  case	  in	  the	  era	  of	  Gen.	  McPeak,	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  tended	  to	  look	  down	  on	  reconnaissance	  because	  it	  did	  not	  directly	  contribute	  to	  the	  service’s	  war-­‐winning	  edge.	  	  “Given	  the	  stigma	  of	  surveillance	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  Cantwell	  (Summer	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and	  reconnaissance	  missions…it	  is	  understandable	  why	  some	  early	  Predator	  pilots	  felt	  as	  if	  the	  USAF	  treated	  them	  like	  lepers,”	  wrote	  then-­‐Lt.	  Col.	  Timothy	  Cullen,	  who	  interviewed	  over	  50	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  pilots	  at	  Creech	  AFB	  for	  his	  2009	  doctoral	  dissertation	  on	  the	  Predator’s	  successor,	  the	  MQ-­‐9	  Reaper.68	  The	  perception	  of	  Predator	  pilots	  as	  low-­‐status	  also	  was	  a	  result	  of	  the	  Predator	  pilot	  assignment	  process.	  In	  these	  early	  days,	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  forced	  into	  the	  Predator	  program	  were	  considered	  	  “sick,	  lame,	  and	  lazy”	  in	  comparison	  to	  their	  counterparts.69	  Lacking	  objective	  criteria	  to	  select	  Predator	  pilots,	  USAF	  commanders	  employed	  an	  informal	  tier	  system.	  Because	  Tier	  one	  individuals	  outperformed	  their	  peers,	  their	  commanders	  wanted	  to	  keep	  them	  in	  their	  existing	  weapon	  system.	  Tier	  twos	  did	  a	  solid	  job,	  so	  they	  were	  recommended	  to	  serve	  in	  training	  command	  as	  flight	  instructors.	  Tier	  three	  individuals	  were	  outperformed	  by	  their	  peers,	  so	  they	  were	  pushed	  into	  UAV	  assignments.70	  	  The	  geographical	  location	  of	  Indian	  Springs	  also	  detracted	  from	  the	  status	  of	  Predator	  assignments.	  According	  to	  an	  urban	  legend,	  the	  bus	  that	  drove	  those	  early	  recruits	  from	  Nellis	  AFB	  more	  than	  50	  miles	  to	  Indian	  Springs	  was	  not	  air-­‐conditioned,	  while	  convicts	  were	  bussed	  to	  a	  prison	  along	  the	  same	  route	  in	  climate-­‐controlled	  comfort.	  71	  On	  the	  staff	  side,	  the	  USAF’s	  leadership	  at	  ACC	  did	  nothing	  to	  mitigate	  the	  perception	  that	  the	  Predator	  posed	  a	  threat.	  During	  the	  transition	  of	  Predator	  management	  from	  the	  UAV	  JPO	  to	  the	  USAF,	  Gen.	  Richard	  Hawley,	  the	  commanding	  fighter	  general	  at	  ACC,	  bluntly	  told	  UAV	  JPO	  officials	  in	  April	  1996	  that	  he	  dreaded	  convincing	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  to	  fly	  the	  Predator.	  “Hawley	  made	  it	  plain	  that,	  in	  his	  opinion,	  any	  pilot	  involuntarily	  assigned	  to	  fly	  this	  stupid	  thing	  would	  hate	  to	  trade	  soaring	  through	  the	  sky	  for	  sitting	  in	  a	  hot	  van	  for	  hours,”	  according	  to	  an	  account	  in	  Whittle’s	  2014	  book.	  When	  the	  UAV	  JPO	  officials	  briefed	  ACC	  staff	  later	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that	  day,	  they	  were	  greeted	  with	  contempt	  and	  “scoffing	  laughs”	  when	  they	  showed	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  UAV.72	  	  	  	  Many	  officers	  at	  ACC,	  the	  USAF’s	  combat	  aviation	  headquarters,	  were	  promising	  pilots	  building	  their	  resumes	  in	  a	  staff	  job	  before	  returning	  to	  the	  cockpit.	  They	  were	  frequently	  reluctant	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  dealings	  involved	  in	  Predator	  development,	  according	  to	  Lt.	  Col.	  Blackwelder.	  This	  was	  particularly	  true	  from	  the	  ranks	  of	  major	  to	  one	  or	  two-­‐star	  generals,	  he	  found.	  “I	  think	  it	  wasn’t	  the	  senior	  leaders,	  but	  rather	  the	  ‘iron	  majors’	  that	  do	  all	  the	  staff	  work	  who	  were	  resistant	  to	  this	  thing,”	  recalled	  Lt.	  Col.	  Blackwelder.	  	  Tom	  Perdue,	  who	  worked	  as	  Lynn’s	  civilian	  deputy	  in	  the	  Pentagon’s	  Advanced	  Technology	  office,	  shared	  Lt.	  Col.	  Blackwelder’s	  concern	  that	  bias	  at	  the	  field-­‐grade	  level	  and	  above	  might	  limit	  the	  success	  of	  the	  Predator	  program’s	  transition.	  “On	  the	  issue	  of	  Air	  Force	  reluctance	  to	  embrace	  UAVs	  early	  in	  the	  program,	  there	  was	  a	  general	  awareness	  of	  their	  bias	  against	  aircraft	  that	  did	  not	  have	  pilots,”	  noted	  Perdue.	  	  “Pilots	  were	  the	  movers	  and	  shakers	  in	  the	  Air	  Force	  and	  they	  were	  protective	  of	  that	  role.”73	  	  In	  November	  1997,	  Col.	  Mike	  Francis,	  who	  worked	  for	  DARO,	  said	  that	  he	  felt	  that	  a	  bias	  within	  the	  USAF	  was	  holding	  back	  UAV	  innovation,	  particularly	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  development	  of	  armed	  UAVs,	  known	  as	  unmanned	  combat	  aerial	  vehicles	  (UCAVs).	  “Not	  offending	  the	  culture	  is	  a	  big	  concern,”	  he	  told	  Popular	  
Science.	  “Most	  of	  us	  realize	  that	  [UCAVs]	  will	  ultimately	  happen,	  but	  no	  pilot	  wants	  them	  to	  happen	  on	  his	  watch.”74	  USAF	  Maj.	  Gen.	  Kenneth	  Israel,	  the	  head	  of	  DARO,	  saw	  his	  promotions	  stall	  at	  two	  stars	  because	  of	  his	  UAV	  advocacy	  during	  a	  time	  when	  USAF	  cultural	  biases	  against	  UAVs	  were	  prevalent.	  75	  He	  told	  Wired	  magazine	  in	  1996	  that	  he	  and	  other	  UAV	  advocates	  were	  “like	  Billy	  Mitchell,”	  who	  was	  court-­‐martialed	  for	  insubordination	  in	  the	  1920’s	  for	  his	  airplane	  versus	  battleships	  tests	  but	  later	  became	  revered	  in	  the	  USAF	  as	  a	  maverick	  airpower	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advocate.76	  	  	  To	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  another	  bias	  against	  the	  Predator	  program	  continued	  to	  reside	  in	  the	  intelligence	  community	  at	  ACC,	  according	  to	  Lt	  Col	  Blackwelder.	  FMV	  was	  a	  revolutionary	  capability	  that	  challenged	  the	  existing	  ways	  of	  doing	  business	  for	  USAF	  intelligence	  officers.	  Their	  analytical	  expertise	  centered	  on	  still	  imagery.	  
“We	  periodically	  briefed	  ACC	  on	  the	  progress	  trying	  to	  get	  their	  interest,	  and	  we	  were	  trying	  to	  sell	  them	  on	  the	  idea,”	  said	  Lt	  Col	  Blackwelder.	  “Their	  biggest	  concern	  was	  that	  Predator,	  along	  with	  the	  Global	  Hawk	  and	  Dark	  Star	  [the	  Tier	  III	  ACTD	  designs]	  were	  going	  to	  collect	  so	  much	  imagery	  that	  we	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  handle	  it.”77	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  agreed	  about	  the	  hesitance	  of	  the	  intelligence	  community,	  citing	  its	  preference	  for	  Cold	  War-­‐era	  strategic	  collection	  assets,	  the	  U-­‐2	  and	  the	  RC-­‐135	  Rivet	  Joint	  SIGINT	  aircraft,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  distraction	  caused	  by	  a	  major	  reorganization	  ongoing	  at	  the	  time	  that	  was	  designed	  to	  more	  closely	  align	  intelligence	  analysis	  with	  pilots	  flying	  combat	  missions.78	  	  	  As	  these	  findings	  indicate,	  the	  bias	  against	  UAVs	  within	  the	  USAF	  persisted	  after	  the	  service	  took	  over	  the	  Predator	  program.	  Bias	  seemed	  to	  be	  strongest	  among	  rank-­‐and-­‐file	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots,	  and,	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  intelligence	  officers.	  The	  centers	  of	  gravity	  for	  Predator	  support	  were	  at	  the	  Air	  Staff	  level,	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  and	  Gen.	  Jumper,	  and	  at	  the	  squadron	  level,	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Lt.	  Col.	  Hampton,	  the	  11th	  RS	  squadron	  commander.	  As	  one	  former	  11th	  RS	  commander	  put	  it,	  “There	  was	  a	  squadron	  commander	  and	  a	  four-­‐star	  general	  committed	  to	  UAVs,	  although	  no	  institutional	  buy-­‐in	  or	  support	  in	  between	  those	  two	  levels	  of	  authority.”79	  	  Perdue,	  the	  Pentagon	  civilian	  who	  worked	  in	  the	  Advanced	  Technology	  office,	  elaborated	  on	  why	  support	  existed	  only	  at	  the	  top.	  Manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  vying	  for	  cockpit	  time	  were	  “directly	  affected”	  and	  therefore	  had	  “stronger	  opposition	  to	  unmanned	  aircraft	  than	  senior	  officers,”	  he	  explained.	  In	  contrast,	  he	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noted	  senior	  officers	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  vie	  for	  “ownership”	  of	  airspace	  assets	  and	  to	  be	  the	  “first	  to	  recognize	  the	  value	  that	  a	  new	  capability	  has	  brought	  to	  the	  battlefield	  because	  they	  are	  better	  connected	  with	  senior	  officers	  in	  the	  conflict.”80	  
	  
2. To	  what	  extent	  were	  judgments	  about	  the	  potential	  and	  cost	  
effectiveness	  of	  the	  Predator	  based	  on	  the	  USAF’s	  enthusiasm	  for	  UAV	  
technology	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  was	  the	  enthusiasm	  outside	  the	  
service?	  	  
	  As	  Chief	  of	  Staff,	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  benefited	  from	  the	  same	  Vietnam-­‐era	  rise	  of	  the	  fighter	  pilots	  that	  had	  propelled	  Gen.	  McPeak	  to	  the	  position.	  In	  fact,	  the	  two	  served	  together	  in	  the	  Misty	  Forward	  Air	  Control	  (FAC)	  unit	  in	  Vietnam.81	  But	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  thought	  somewhat	  differently	  about	  UAVs	  than	  Gen.	  McPeak	  did.	  On	  one	  hand,	  he	  shared	  Gen.	  McPeak’s	  skepticism	  of	  the	  cost	  and	  potential	  of	  UAVs,	  explaining	  he	  had	  not	  seen	  any	  data	  proving	  UAVs	  were	  cheaper	  than	  manned	  aircraft,	  and	  that,	  in	  fact,	  	  “people	  were	  surprised”	  by	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  Predator	  program.	  82	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  also	  initially	  expressed	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  Predator’s	  military	  potential.	  Gen.	  Moseley	  recalled	  that,	  at	  first,	  no	  one	  really	  knew	  what	  to	  do	  with	  the	  Predator.	  In	  1996	  he	  was	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  57th	  Wing,	  which	  owned	  Indian	  Springs,	  home	  of	  the	  Predator	  when	  he	  got	  a	  phone	  call	  from	  Gen.	  Fogleman.	  “I	  said	  ‘chief,	  what	  are	  they	  and	  what	  the	  hell	  do	  I	  do	  with	  them?”	  recalled	  Gen.	  Moseley.	  “He	  said	  ‘I	  don’t	  have	  a	  clue,	  go	  figure	  it	  out.’	  But	  I	  think	  he	  knew	  this	  was	  leading	  edge,	  it	  could	  be	  very	  interesting.”83	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  differed	  from	  Gen.	  McPeak	  in	  that	  he	  showed	  a	  willingness	  to	  look	  beyond	  the	  Predator	  program’s	  perceived	  shortcomings.	  In	  Gen.	  Fogleman’s	  view,	  the	  Predator	  presented	  an	  opportunity	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  symbol	  of	  significant	  cultural	  change	  in	  the	  USAF.	  He	  saw	  the	  Predator	  as	  a	  vehicle	  to	  promote	  the	  ISR	  mission	  in	  the	  USAF	  and	  also	  to	  get	  the	  service	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thinking	  about	  the	  central	  role	  of	  information	  collection	  in	  the	  emerging	  Revolution	  in	  Military	  Affairs	  (RMA).	  	  
	  
The	  Shifting	  Strategic	  Context:	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  Sees	  a	  Growing	  Role	  for	  ISR	  	  
	  In	  his	  dissertation,	  Ehrhard	  asserts	  that	  Gen.	  Fogelman	  spearheaded	  the	  USAF’s	  efforts	  to	  appropriate	  the	  Predator	  program	  in	  part	  because	  he	  saw	  himself	  as	  a	  “change	  agent.”84	  But	  he	  tried	  to	  do	  more	  than	  convince	  the	  USAF	  to	  control	  the	  Predator	  program.	  He	  used	  the	  USAF’s	  adoption	  of	  the	  Predator	  program	  as	  a	  symbol	  of	  a	  broader	  effort	  to	  put	  reconnaissance	  on	  more	  equal	  footing	  with	  strike	  missions	  within	  USAF	  culture.	  His	  belief	  in	  the	  need	  to	  put	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  the	  reconnaissance	  mission	  was	  partly	  based	  on	  his	  personal	  experience	  as	  a	  “Misty”	  Fast	  FAC,	  flying	  the	  F-­‐100F	  Super	  Sabre	  in	  Vietnam.	  The	  fast	  FAC	  concept	  was	  a	  response	  to	  the	  challenge	  of	  identifying	  targets	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  mounting	  SA-­‐2	  SAM	  threat	  in	  North	  Vietnam.	  The	  fast-­‐moving	  F-­‐100F	  quickly	  identified	  targets	  with	  smoke	  rockets	  before	  making	  its	  escape,	  whereas	  the	  slow-­‐moving	  Predator	  loitered	  in	  relatively	  uncontested	  airspace.	  	  But	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  did	  see	  a	  parallel	  in	  terms	  of	  surveillance	  capabilities.	  “We	  were	  the	  Vietnam	  surrogate	  for	  Predator,	  if	  you	  will,”	  he	  told	  me.85	  	  In	  viewing	  his	  Vietnam	  experience	  as	  a	  partial	  justification	  for	  a	  greater	  focus	  on	  tactical	  reconnaissance,	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  took	  a	  different	  stance	  than	  Gen.	  McPeak,	  who	  cancelled	  the	  USAF’s	  tactical	  reconnaissance	  programs	  and	  ignored	  the	  Predator	  while	  he	  was	  chief,	  as	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  three.	  “Two	  people	  can	  go	  through	  the	  same	  experience	  and	  come	  away	  with	  very	  different	  views,”	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  explained.86	  	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  embraced	  a	  broader	  conception	  of	  airpower	  than	  Gen.	  McPeak	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  he	  viewed	  reconnaissance	  as	  a	  core	  mission	  and	  Gen.	  McPeak	  did	  not.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  Ehrhard	  (2000)	  541	  85	  Fogleman	  interview	  (Oct.	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But	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  also	  noted	  the	  defense	  community	  was	  still	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  trying	  to	  understand	  the	  strategic	  context	  emerging	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  But	  by	  the	  time	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  was	  chief,	  there	  was	  a	  lively	  discussion	  in	  the	  defense	  community	  and	  academia	  regarding	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  1991	  Gulf	  War	  including	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  emerging	  RMA.	  Under	  this	  concept,	  “information	  age”	  technology,	  such	  as	  the	  Predator,	  combined	  with	  new	  doctrine	  and	  training,	  would	  allow	  a	  smaller	  US	  military	  to	  protect	  America’s	  national	  security	  prerogatives.87	  	  The	  defense	  community	  was	  still	  debating	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  RMA	  for	  conflicts	  short	  of	  a	  full-­‐scale	  war,	  known	  as	  “MOOTW”	  or	  	  “gray	  area	  phenomena.”88	  However,	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  saw	  RMA	  technologies	  built	  around	  the	  concept	  of	  “information	  dominance,”	  as	  having	  major	  strategic	  potential	  in	  “gray	  wars”	  like	  the	  air	  campaign	  in	  Bosnia	  that	  required	  tracking	  fleeting	  targets	  in	  civilian	  population	  areas.	  He	  based	  this	  view	  on	  the	  writings	  of	  Adm.	  William	  Owens,	  the	  Vice	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  from	  1994	  to	  1996.	  	  “I	  was	  a	  big	  believer”	  in	  Adm.	  Owens’	  views	  said	  Gen.	  Fogleman,	  “particularly	  as	  he	  talked	  about	  information	  warfare.”89	  In	  Adm.	  Owens	  believed	  information	  was	  at	  the	  center	  of	  the	  RMA,	  which	  would	  involve	  an	  emerging	  network	  of	  sensors	  that	  would	  provide	  the	  US	  military	  with	  the	  information	  needed	  to	  strike	  increasingly	  fleeting	  targets	  on	  the	  battlefield	  quickly	  and	  precisely.	  This	  level	  of	  situational	  awareness,	  combined	  with	  the	  use	  of	  precision-­‐guided	  weapons,	  would	  allow	  the	  US	  military	  to	  take	  the	  initiative	  on	  the	  battlefronts	  of	  the	  future.	  “If	  you	  could	  see	  the	  battlefield	  in	  great	  detail,	  and	  the	  enemy	  could	  not,	  you	  would	  win,”	  Adm.	  Owens	  told	  me.	  “That	  was	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  RMA.”90	  	  Heavily	  influenced	  by	  Adm.	  Owens’	  writing,	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  sought	  to	  make	  “information	  dominance”	  a	  central	  USAF	  mission,	  declaring	  it	  a	  “core	  competency”	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of	  the	  USAF	  at	  the	  fall	  1996	  Corona	  conference,	  a	  regular	  gathering	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  three-­‐and	  four-­‐star	  generals	  to	  discuss	  USAF	  policy.	  Although	  he	  knew	  that	  UAVs	  were	  already	  causing	  cultural	  upheaval	  in	  the	  USAF,	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  issued	  a	  directive	  statement	  at	  Corona	  calling	  on	  airmen	  to	  aggressively	  pursue	  UAV	  development.	  Principals	  attending	  Corona	  that	  year	  recalled	  that	  “UAVs	  stood	  as	  an	  object	  lesson	  in	  allowing	  the	  Air	  Force’s	  culture	  —	  centered	  on	  manned	  aviation	  —to	  dictate	  technological	  choices.”	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  used	  UAV	  technology	  to	  make	  the	  point	  that	  the	  USAF	  needed	  to	  embrace	  innovation	  in	  order	  to	  perform	  core	  missions,	  including	  ISR,	  even	  if	  that	  meant	  breaking	  with	  historical	  cultural	  preferences.91	  	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  continued	  to	  press	  the	  case	  for	  UAV	  development	  as	  a	  means	  to	  achieve	  strategic	  effects	  at	  an	  October	  1996	  Air	  Force	  Association	  conference.	  He	  argued	  that	  the	  link	  between	  intelligence	  and	  operations	  was	  becoming	  tight	  enough	  that	  “it	  will	  become	  possible	  to	  find,	  fix,	  or	  track,	  and	  target	  anything	  that	  moves	  on	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  earth.”	  He	  argued	  that	  what	  made	  the	  USAF	  unique	  was	  its	  ability	  to	  “hit	  centers	  of	  gravity	  directly,”	  thereby	  delivering	  strategic	  effects,	  while	  also	  operating	  at	  the	  operational	  and	  tactical	  levels	  of	  war.	  92	  “I	  actually	  got	  ridiculed	  by	  some	  so-­‐called	  forward	  thinkers	  in	  the	  other	  services	  for	  making	  that	  comment,	  but	  the	  fact	  of	  the	  matter	  is	  that	  it	  came	  through,”	  said	  Gen.	  Fogleman.	  	  Although	  he	  did	  not	  discuss	  the	  idea	  of	  putting	  a	  weapon	  on	  the	  Predator,	  his	  remarks	  on	  closing	  the	  loop	  between	  intelligence	  collection	  and	  target	  prosecution	  foreshadowed	  what	  was	  to	  come.	  “The	  tools	  were	  starting	  to	  be	  developed	  [for	  the	  RMA],	  and	  the	  Predator	  became	  one	  of	  those	  tools.”93	  	  
	  
Outsider	  Views	  of	  the	  Predator’s	  Relevance	  in	  the	  Emerging	  Strategic	  Context	  	  	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  was	  “absolutely	  critical”	  in	  spurring	  the	  USAF	  to	  adopt	  the	  Predator	  program,	  according	  to	  Adm.	  Owens.	  But	  he	  also	  had	  help	  from	  USAF	  outsiders	  who	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believed	  the	  Predator	  had	  growing	  relevance	  in	  the	  emerging	  strategic	  context.	  94	  	  Two	  long-­‐time	  Predator	  program	  advocates	  supported	  his	  appointment	  to	  USAF	  chief:	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  William	  Perry	  and	  Deputy	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  John	  Deutch.95	  As	  the	  first	  USAF	  general	  to	  command	  both	  US	  Air	  Mobility	  Command	  and	  US	  Transportation	  Command,	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  showed	  a	  willingness	  to	  develop	  airpower	  assets	  outside	  his	  own	  fighter	  background.	  His	  candidacy	  for	  chief	  therefore	  had	  strong	  appeal	  to	  Perry	  and	  Deutch,	  who	  wanted	  to	  pursue	  new,	  low-­‐cost	  technologies,	  such	  as	  UAVs,	  to	  improve	  the	  USAF’s	  effectiveness.	  Together,	  Adm.	  Owens,	  Gen.	  Fogleman,	  Lynn	  and	  Deutch	  worked	  with	  the	  JCS	  to	  dramatically	  cut	  the	  US	  military’s	  peacetime	  force	  structure	  while	  boosting	  expenditures	  on	  ISR	  and	  precision-­‐guided	  munitions.	  “I	  think	  that	  was	  a	  critical	  time	  in	  DoD,”	  recalled	  Adm.	  Owens.	  “It	  was	  a	  time	  when	  we	  did,	  in	  some	  ways,	  shift	  the	  theory	  of	  war	  from	  ‘mass’	  to	  mass	  knowledge	  and	  mass	  precision.”96	  Other	  Pentagon	  officials	  also	  showed	  support	  for	  the	  Predator	  program	  based	  on	  a	  perceived	  shift	  in	  the	  strategic	  context	  in	  which	  ISR	  may	  become	  more	  critical.	  	  “We	  received	  an	  inkling	  of	  what	  combat	  will	  look	  like	  in	  the	  21st	  century	  during	  Desert	  Storm	  and	  more	  recently	  in	  our	  support	  of	  NATO	  action	  in	  Bosnia.	  In	  both	  cases,	  unmanned	  aerial	  vehicles	  have	  demonstrated	  the	  ability	  to	  provide	  continuous	  real-­‐time	  battlefield	  surveillance,”	  Paul	  Kaminski,	  the	  Pentagon’s	  top	  acquisition	  official,	  told	  a	  House	  subcommittee	  in	  October	  1995.97	  In	  November	  1996,	  DARO	  provided	  an	  annual	  UAV	  report	  to	  lawmakers	  calling	  UAV	  deployments	  to	  Bosnia	  the	  “UAV	  success	  story”	  of	  the	  year.98	  	  Pentagon	  support	  was	  further	  buoyed	  by	  growing	  congressional	  interest,	  in	  part	  due	  to	  the	  effective	  lobbying	  of	  GA-­‐ASI	  president	  Tom	  Cassidy.	  He	  was	  lobbying	  lawmakers	  for	  the	  rapid	  procurement	  of	  more	  airplanes	  –	  often	  to	  the	  point	  of	  annoying	  people	  with	  his	  aggressive	  stance.	  “His	  force	  of	  will,	  his	  force	  of	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presence,	  was	  clearly	  a	  component	  to	  the	  success	  of	  the	  Predator,”	  recalled	  Meermans,	  the	  congressional	  staffer	  for	  Rep.	  Lewis.99	  All	  of	  this	  outsider	  enthusiasm	  for	  the	  Predator,	  which	  had	  been	  viewed	  by	  Gen.	  McPeak	  as	  a	  burden	  in	  a	  constrained	  budget	  environment,	  became	  an	  opportunity	  for	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  to	  win	  even	  more	  funding.	  Responding	  to	  the	  enthusiasm	  of	  Pentagon	  civilians	  and	  industry,	  US	  lawmakers	  added	  	  “plus	  up”	  funding	  above	  the	  president’s	  budget	  request	  for	  the	  Predator	  program	  every	  year.100	  With	  Congress	  so	  eager	  to	  fund	  the	  Predator,	  the	  USAF	  did	  not	  have	  to	  seek	  funding	  for	  the	  aircraft	  in	  its	  annual	  budget	  request	  or	  plan	  for	  it	  in	  its	  five-­‐year	  budget	  plan,	  known	  as	  the	  Program	  Objective	  Memorandum.101	  This	  meant	  that	  the	  Predator	  program	  actually	  presented	  an	  opportunity	  for	  the	  USAF	  to	  grow	  its	  budget	  share,	  rather	  than	  forcing	  trade-­‐offs	  between	  manned	  and	  unmanned	  aircraft	  programs	  as	  Gen.	  McPeak	  had	  feared.	  	  	  
Acquisition	  Culture:	  	  A	  Divide	  Between	  the	  USAF	  and	  Outsiders	   	  
	  While	  the	  USAF’s	  leaders	  shared	  a	  similar	  outlook	  with	  Perry	  and	  Deutch	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  developing	  ISR	  capabilities,	  they	  were	  far	  more	  cautious	  about	  the	  cost	  and	  potential	  of	  the	  Predator	  program.	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  and	  Gen.	  Jumper	  believed	  that	  the	  UAV	  needed	  to	  be	  incorporated	  into	  standard	  USAF	  acquisition	  processes,	  which	  emphasized	  a	  gradual,	  regimented	  approach.	  But	  outsiders,	  including	  the	  US	  Congress,	  Perry,	  and	  Deutch,	  wanted	  to	  speed	  UAV	  development.	  From	  the	  USAF’s	  perspective,	  “normalization”	  of	  the	  Predator	  program,	  through	  vehicles	  like	  the	  Predator	  911	  Task	  Force,	  was	  the	  best	  way	  to	  integrate	  the	  UAV	  in	  USAF	  culture.102	  As	  Gen.	  Jumper	  explained	  it,	  normalization	  was	  “so	  important”	  to	  make	  the	  Predator	  a	  “reliable”	  part	  of	  the	  USAF	  force	  structure.103	  ACC	  needed	  to	  systematically	  test	  the	  UAV	  to	  develop	  training	  and	  safety	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procedures	  and	  to	  prepare	  for	  gradual	  modifications	  over	  a	  considerable	  period	  of	  time.	  None	  of	  these	  goals	  had	  been	  accomplished	  thus	  far	  because	  the	  Predator	  was	  developed	  by	  the	  Pentagon	  civilians	  as	  an	  ACTD.	  	  Some	  outsiders	  saw	  the	  USAF’s	  insistence	  on	  process	  as	  a	  cultural	  bias	  against	  UAVs,	  but	  Gen.	  Jumper	  said	  the	  USAF	  simply	  believed	  that	  the	  Predator	  program	  needed	  to	  take	  on	  the	  USAF’s	  acquisition	  philosophy.	  “All	  these	  normal	  logistical	  and	  operational	  considerations	  were	  coming	  into	  play,	  but	  they	  were	  being	  interpreted	  in	  many	  funny	  ways,	  like	  ‘we	  hated	  the	  Predator,”	  said	  Gen	  Jumper.	  To	  the	  USAF,	  the	  reality	  was	  that	  the	  Predator	  UAV	  was	  poorly	  prepared	  for	  operational	  use.	  “It	  had	  warts,	  it	  was	  put	  together	  sloppily,”	  he	  said.104	  	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  concurred	  that	  any	  slow-­‐down	  of	  the	  process	  of	  integrating	  the	  Predator	  into	  the	  USAF	  resulted	  from	  acquisition	  problems	  that	  cropped	  up	  during	  the	  ACTD	  rather	  than	  a	  bias	  against	  unmanned	  technology.	  Initially,	  he	  said,	  the	  USAF	  did	  not	  fully	  appreciate	  the	  logistics	  challenge	  involved	  in	  integrating	  the	  Predator	  into	  its	  standard	  operating	  procedures.	  “We	  inherited	  one	  hell	  of	  a	  problem	  when	  we	  took	  this	  thing,”	  he	  said.	  “It	  was	  maybe	  bigger	  than	  we	  realized	  at	  the	  time	  because	  it	  had	  been	  a	  real	  success	  in	  Roving	  Sands,	  and	  that	  is	  because	  people	  were	  making	  it	  a	  success,	  but	  if	  you’re	  going	  to	  operate	  a	  lot	  of	  these	  systems	  over	  a	  long	  period	  of	  time	  you’ve	  got	  to	  build	  a	  foundation	  to	  support	  it.”	  	  105	   But	  others	  saw	  the	  USAF’s	  acquisition	  approach	  as	  being	  so	  unreasonably	  slow	  that	  it	  defied	  logic.	  Lt.	  Col.	  Blackwelder,	  the	  USAF	  representative	  in	  the	  Pentagon’s	  Advanced	  Technology	  Office,	  recalled	  that	  ACC	  had	  concerns	  about	  the	  Predator	  because	  it	  was	  “not	  a	  full	  program,”	  to	  which	  he	  responded:	  “duh,	  it’s	  an	  ACTD.	  We	  had	  it	  flying	  in	  the	  Balkans	  in	  18	  months	  and	  it’s	  not	  perfect	  because	  it’s	  not	  meant	  to	  be.”106	  He	  also	  recalled	  attending	  meetings	  with	  an	  11th	  RS	  commander,	  whom	  he	  said	  complained	  that	  he	  could	  not	  effectively	  set	  up	  the	  squadron	  because	  the	  UAVs	  were	  still	  deployed	  to	  Bosnia.	  “This	  guy	  was	  whining	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about	  how	  he	  doesn’t	  have	  all	  the	  ACTD	  assets	  but	  he	  has	  all	  these	  people	  [in	  the	  squadron].	  Well	  whose	  fault	  is	  that?	  You	  stood	  up	  a	  squadron	  and	  manned	  it	  and	  you	  didn’t	  have	  an	  airplane	  yet?	  If	  we	  hadn’t	  given	  them	  the	  ACTD	  assets,	  they	  would	  have	  had	  nothing.”	  107	  The	  Pentagon’s	  senior	  leadership	  agreed	  with	  Lt.	  Col.	  Blackwelder	  that	  the	  military	  services	  should	  not	  try	  to	  completely	  “normalize”	  ACTD	  programs.	  Indeed,	  the	  whole	  point	  of	  the	  ACTD	  was	  to	  accelerate	  acquisition	  and	  to	  produce	  less	  than	  a	  100	  percent	  solution.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Predator	  ACTD,	  Pentagon	  civilians	  went	  out	  of	  their	  way	  to	  avoid	  long	  requirements	  lists	  that	  would	  sidetrack	  development.108	  In	  1996,	  Kaminski,	  who	  had	  replaced	  John	  Deutch	  as	  the	  Pentagon’s	  top	  acquisition	  official,	  confirmed	  in	  a	  guidance	  memo	  on	  ACTD	  programs	  that	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  military	  services	  should	  not	  be	  to	  completely	  “normalize”	  the	  ACTD,	  but	  to	  take	  some	  “non-­‐traditional”	  approaches,	  such	  as	  using	  contractors	  for	  logistics	  instead	  of	  military	  members.109	  In	  closing,	  the	  USAF’s	  senior	  leadership	  saw	  the	  Predator	  program	  as	  a	  symbol	  of	  a	  cultural	  shift	  toward	  ISR,	  which	  they	  believed	  represented	  a	  core	  USAF	  mission	  in	  the	  emerging	  strategic	  context.	  USAF	  outsiders	  shared	  senior	  USAF	  leaders’	  views	  of	  the	  potential	  importance	  of	  the	  Predator	  as	  an	  ISR	  platform,	  but	  sharply	  disagreed	  with	  the	  USAF’s	  acquisition	  culture,	  which	  slowed	  things	  down	  to	  the	  point	  that	  it	  created	  the	  impression	  that	  the	  USAF	  did	  not	  support	  the	  Predator	  program.	  	  	  
3. To	  what	  extent	  were	  USAF	  judgments	  about	  the	  employment	  of	  	  
the	  Predator	  	  driven	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	  to	  friendly	  
personnel,	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  was	  that	  push	  from	  outside	  the	  service?	  	  	  In	  keeping	  with	  the	  era	  of	  Gen.	  McPeak,	  reducing	  aircrew	  risk	  was	  not	  a	  major	  concern	  in	  the	  USAF	  during	  Gen.	  Fogleman’s	  tenure	  as	  chief.	  The	  USAF’s	  manned	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combat	  aircraft	  pilots	  were	  still	  seen	  as	  possessing	  unusual	  courage	  and	  skill	  that	  generally	  kept	  them	  safe	  when	  flying	  in	  harm’s	  way.	  Asked	  whether	  reducing	  risk	  to	  aircrew	  was	  a	  consideration	  in	  the	  decision	  to	  pursue	  the	  Predator	  program,	  Gen	  Fogleman	  said:	  “It	  certainly	  wasn’t	  in	  the	  Air	  Force.”110	  	  	  The	  USAF’s	  Misty	  FAC	  unit	  in	  Vietnam,	  in	  which	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  and	  Gen.	  McPeak	  both	  served,	  saw	  seven	  pilots	  killed,	  four	  captured	  and	  34	  shot	  down	  over	  the	  three-­‐year	  life	  of	  the	  organization.111	  Misty	  pilots	  eagerly	  embraced	  the	  risk	  involved	  in	  flying	  F-­‐100F	  aircraft	  over	  the	  Ho	  Chi	  Minh	  Trail	  in	  North	  Vietnam	  and	  Laos	  to	  interdict	  men	  and	  materiel	  moving	  south	  toward	  the	  fighting.	  Flying	  over	  hostile	  territory	  armed	  with	  20	  mm	  cannons,	  they	  would	  quickly	  mark	  targets	  with	  smoke	  to	  guide	  strike	  aircraft	  before	  exiting	  the	  hostile	  area.	  The	  job	  involved	  constant	  low-­‐level	  flying	  and	  “jinking,”	  the	  practice	  of	  abruptly	  changing	  flight	  direction	  to	  dodge	  anti-­‐aircraft	  fire.	  “Pilots	  wanted	  to	  come	  to	  Misty	  so	  they	  could	  fly	  north	  of	  the	  border,”	  the	  first	  Misty	  commander,	  retired	  Col.	  George	  E.	  “Bud”	  Day,	  told	  Air	  &	  Space	  Smithsonian	  Magazine.	  “We	  attracted	  every	  studly	  young	  guy	  in	  Southeast	  Asia.”	  112	  	   While	  Gen.	  Fogleman’s	  Vietnam	  experience	  led	  him	  to	  value	  reconnaissance	  more	  highly	  than	  Gen.	  McPeak,	  he	  shared	  Gen.	  McPeak’s	  view	  that	  aircrew	  risk	  was	  part	  of	  the	  job	  of	  being	  a	  USAF	  pilot	  and	  did	  not	  see	  UAVs	  as	  being	  particularly	  advantageous	  in	  terms	  of	  driving	  down	  that	  risk.	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  said	  the	  Predator	  was	  not	  practical	  for	  reducing	  aircrew	  risk	  in	  hostile	  air	  environments	  because	  it	  simply	  lacked	  the	  defensive	  measures	  and	  situational	  awareness	  of	  a	  pilot	  in	  the	  cockpit,	  both	  preconditions	  he	  regarded	  as	  a	  necessary	  for	  successfully	  completing	  reconnaissance	  or	  strike	  missions	  under	  enemy	  fire.113	  	  	  	  	  As	  the	  US	  shifted	  its	  focus	  from	  the	  Cold	  War	  to	  regional	  conflicts	  in	  which	  US	  vital	  interests	  were	  not	  clearly	  at	  stake,	  however,	  a	  new	  cultural	  preference	  for	  using	  UAVs	  to	  reduce	  casualties	  began	  to	  emerge.	  	  The	  USAF’s	  top	  commander	  in	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Bosnia,	  Gen.	  Michael	  Ryan,	  said	  that	  both	  politics	  and	  a	  feeling	  of	  personal	  responsibility	  shaded	  his	  decisions	  about	  putting	  aircrews	  in	  harm’s	  way.	  In	  terms	  of	  personal	  risks	  to	  aircrew,	  Gen.	  Ryan	  noted	  that	  while	  the	  average	  fighter	  pilot	  in	  the	  USAF	  certainly	  is	  not	  worried	  about	  flying	  into	  danger	  zones,	  an	  air	  campaign	  commander	  is	  extremely	  concerned.	  “Aircrews	  don’t	  worry	  about	  it	  much,	  but	  commanders	  worry	  about	  it	  a	  lot,”	  reflected	  Gen.	  Ryan,	  who	  flew	  the	  F-­‐4	  in	  escort	  and	  strike	  roles	  in	  Vietnam.	  “You	  are	  responsible	  for	  those	  crews	  and	  their	  safety	  as	  well	  as	  the	  mission	  and	  you	  have	  to	  balance	  that	  a	  bit.	  If	  you	  have	  never	  been	  a	  commander	  or	  a	  shooter,	  I	  don’t	  think	  you	  think	  about	  that	  a	  whole	  lot.”	  Given	  these	  concerns,	  Gen.	  Ryan	  said	  he	  made	  every	  effort	  to	  substitute	  Tomahawk	  cruise	  missiles	  or	  UAVS	  for	  manned	  aircraft	  in	  Bosnia.114	  	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  political	  reasons	  to	  reduce	  risk	  to	  aircrew,	  Gen.	  Ryan	  cited	  the	  June	  1995	  shoot-­‐down	  of	  Capt.	  O’Grady’s	  F-­‐16	  by	  a	  Bosnian	  Serbian	  SA-­‐6.	  “It	  was	  my	  fault	  that	  O’Grady	  got	  shot	  down,”	  he	  said,	  noting	  that	  the	  fighter	  orbits	  had	  grown	  too	  predictable.	  “Having	  him	  on	  the	  ground	  changes	  a	  lot	  of	  what	  you	  are	  doing,”	  he	  said,	  referring	  to	  the	  necessity	  to	  shift	  from	  operations	  against	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  to	  a	  rescue	  mission.115	  	  Another	  USAF	  leader	  impacted	  by	  Capt.	  O’Grady’s	  shoot-­‐down	  was	  Maj.	  Gen.	  Michael	  Kostelnik,	  a	  USAF	  test	  pilot	  serving	  as	  director	  of	  plans	  at	  Air	  Force	  Materiel	  Command	  (AFMC)	  between	  1995	  and	  1997	  and	  an	  important	  player	  in	  Predator	  weaponization,	  as	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  five.	  “In	  Vietnam,	  we	  lost	  one	  hundred	  a	  week,	  and	  that	  was	  the	  price	  of	  doing	  business,”	  he	  said.	  “But	  then	  you	  watch	  the	  O’Grady	  affair,	  and	  the	  whole	  war	  stops	  because	  one	  guy	  gets	  shot	  down	  and	  we	  don’t	  know	  where	  he	  is.	  That	  should	  have	  been	  a	  lesson.”116	  Maj.	  Gen.	  Kostelnik	  acknowledged	  his	  view	  of	  aircrew	  risk	  was	  unusual	  for	  a	  USAF	  pilot,	  and	  he	  attributed	  it	  to	  working	  outside	  the	  career	  field	  as	  a	  test	  pilot	  and	  acquisition	  official.	  “You	  have	  this	  technology	  emerging	  and	  growing,	  and	  sometimes	  the	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warfighters	  can’t	  see	  the	  forest	  through	  the	  trees,”	  he	  said.	  “But	  developers	  like	  myself	  are	  sitting	  on	  the	  sidelines,	  looking	  in.”117	  	  	  Outside	  the	  USAF,	  Predator	  advocates	  continued	  to	  see	  UAVs	  as	  a	  valuable	  tool	  for	  reducing	  risk.	  Maj.	  Gen.	  Israel,	  the	  USAF	  official	  running	  the	  civilian	  agency	  DARO,	  told	  Air	  Force	  Magazine	  that	  “the	  nation	  held	  its	  breath”	  when	  Capt.	  O’Grady	  was	  shot	  down,	  but	  when	  two	  Predators	  were	  lost	  on	  the	  first	  Bosnia	  deployment,	  “the	  president	  didn’t	  call.”118	  He	  told	  Wired	  Magazine	  in	  1996:	  “In	  the	  next	  century,	  we	  will	  definitely	  rely	  more	  on	  pilotless	  aircraft	  to	  place	  people	  out	  of	  harm’s	  way.”119	  Col.	  Francis,	  the	  DARO	  official,	  told	  Popular	  Science	  in	  1997	  that	  UAVs	  should	  be	  built	  to	  be	  “attritable,”	  able	  to	  survive	  for	  several	  missions	  but	  also	  cheap	  enough	  to	  be	  expendable	  in	  airspace	  that	  is	  too	  dangerous	  for	  manned	  aircraft.	  120	  	  	  	  	  Media	  sentiment	  also	  was	  increasingly	  in	  favor	  of	  reducing	  aircrew	  risk.	  	  Capt.	  O’Grady’s	  shoot-­‐down	  prompted	  Aviation	  Week	  &	  Space	  Technology	  to	  write	  an	  opinion	  article	  lamenting	  the	  failure	  to	  deploy	  the	  Predator	  UAV	  sooner.	  “Three	  Predator	  Tier	  2	  medium-­‐altitude	  unmanned	  aerial	  vehicles	  with	  sensors	  for	  day	  and	  night	  reconnaissance	  and	  U.N.	  monitoring	  have	  been	  ready	  since	  Christmas	  for	  deployment	  with	  a	  ground	  station,”	  the	  editorial	  stated.	  “But	  the	  Predator	  has	  been	  kept	  in	  the	  U.S.	  because	  of	  over-­‐cautiousness	  for	  fear	  of	  a	  technological	  misstep,	  competition	  among	  various	  programs	  for	  limited	  UAV	  funding	  and	  fixed-­‐wing	  operators'	  resistance	  to	  unmanned	  aircraft.	  With	  the	  F-­‐16	  downing	  emphatically	  driving	  home	  again	  that	  allied	  pilots	  are	  flying	  in	  a	  war	  zone,	  the	  Pentagon	  should	  give	  free	  rein	  to	  its	  technology.”121	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Aircrew	  Risk:	  The	  Predator	  as	  a	  Challenge	  to	  Pilot	  Identity	  
	  As	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Predator	  spurred	  a	  growing	  divergence	  of	  opinion	  over	  the	  wisdom	  of	  substituting	  technology	  for	  manpower,	  it	  also	  launched	  a	  growing	  debate	  about	  pilot	  identity.	  Historically,	  what	  had	  made	  the	  USAF’s	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  unique	  was	  their	  piloting	  skills	  and	  their	  capacity	  to	  operate	  effectively	  in	  the	  dangerous	  medium	  of	  the	  air.	  But	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  assigned	  to	  the	  Predator	  would	  not	  meet	  the	  second	  criterion.	  Because	  airmen	  assigned	  to	  the	  Predator	  did	  not	  share	  this	  aspect	  of	  a	  pilot’s	  duty,	  there	  was	  a	  considerable	  debate	  over	  what	  to	  call	  them.	  Had	  they	  earned	  the	  right	  to	  be	  called	  pilots?	  	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  made	  a	  point	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  airmen	  flying	  the	  Predator	  needed	  to	  have	  special	  piloting	  skills	  to	  ensure	  the	  Predator	  program’s	  success.	  “If	  Predator	  fails,	  it	  won’t	  be	  because	  of	  our	  pilots,”	  he	  said.122	  But	  the	  airmen	  flying	  the	  Predator	  were	  not	  exposed	  to	  the	  risks	  of	  the	  air	  environment.	  Recognizing	  this,	  Gen.	  Fogelman	  stopped	  short	  of	  waging	  a	  campaign	  to	  force	  the	  pilot	  community	  to	  accept	  Predator	  operators	  as	  one	  of	  their	  own.	  Although	  airmen	  informally	  referred	  to	  Predator	  operators	  as	  “pilots,”	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  left	  the	  decision	  to	  choose	  a	  formal	  duty	  title	  up	  to	  the	  11th	  RS	  commander.	  The	  commander	  chose	  “AVO”	  rather	  than	  “pilot”	  because	  Predator	  UAV	  flyers	  were	  “more	  a	  monitor	  than	  a	  pilot.”123	  His	  views	  were	  widely	  shared:	  “Many	  within	  ACC	  felt	  the	  term	  ‘pilot’	  was	  inappropriate”	  because	  it	  did	  not	  accurately	  describe	  the	  job	  of	  the	  person	  flying	  a	  Predator	  UAV,	  according	  to	  the	  ACC	  history	  of	  the	  Predator	  program.124	  	  	  The	  debate	  over	  what	  to	  call	  Predator	  operators	  hinted	  at	  a	  larger	  cultural	  concern	  regarding	  pilot	  identity.	  Predator	  pilots	  did	  not	  accept	  the	  same	  level	  of	  personal	  risk	  as	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots.	  By	  asking	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  to	  fly	  the	  Predator,	  the	  USAF	  was	  expanding	  pilot	  identity	  to	  include	  missions	  that	  did	  not	  demand	  courage	  in	  the	  air	  medium.	  This	  role	  presented	  a	  potential	  identity	  crisis	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for	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  community,	  which	  had	  built	  its	  case	  for	  dominance	  of	  the	  USAF	  on	  the	  courage	  and	  skill	  of	  its	  members	  in	  aerial	  combat.	  	  In	  conclusion,	  the	  USAF’s	  views	  of	  the	  value	  of	  the	  Predator	  to	  reduce	  aircrew	  risk	  were	  in	  a	  state	  of	  flux	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  believed	  that	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  were	  still	  willing,	  able,	  and	  uniquely	  qualified	  to	  handle	  high	  threat	  environments.	  However,	  he	  took	  a	  comprehensive	  and	  pragmatic	  view	  of	  airpower	  theory	  that	  saw	  the	  value	  of	  reconnaissance	  and	  the	  employment	  of	  the	  Predator	  as	  a	  practical	  means	  to	  perform	  the	  mission.	  Others	  in	  the	  USAF,	  however,	  including	  Gen.	  Ryan	  and	  Gen.	  Kostelnik,	  saw	  the	  potential	  of	  the	  Predator	  to	  reduce	  aircrew	  risk	  as	  having	  significant	  value	  in	  and	  of	  itself	  as	  the	  strategic	  environment	  shifted	  to	  one	  in	  which	  US	  interests	  were	  not	  at	  stake	  and	  therefore	  interest	  in	  minimizing	  casualties	  was	  high.	  	  	  	  
4. To	  what	  extent	  were	  judgments	  about	  the	  Predator	  based	  on	  a	  
concern	  about	  maintaining	  the	  USAF’s	  primary	  control	  over	  air	  
assets	  in	  response	  to	  competition	  from	  civilian	  and	  military	  
institutions?	  
	   Inter-­‐service	  competition	  between	  the	  USAF	  and	  the	  Army	  was	  an	  important	  force	  behind	  the	  USAF’s	  sudden	  decision	  to	  pursue	  the	  Predator	  program.	  The	  competition	  was	  intense.	  Col.	  Clark	  noted	  in	  his	  memo	  that	  the	  Army	  had	  established	  a	  paper	  trail	  to	  stake	  its	  claim,	  keeping	  a	  tally	  of	  “Predator	  support/non-­‐support”	  in	  Bosnia	  to	  establish	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  Predator	  operations	  had	  not	  provided	  adequate	  support	  to	  ground	  forces.125	  	  The	  USAF	  had	  DARO	  to	  thank	  for	  spurring	  the	  inter-­‐service	  competition	  that	  led	  it	  to	  adopt	  the	  Predator.	  In	  his	  dissertation,	  Ehrhard	  claims	  that	  DARO	  was	  a	  “rousing	  failure”	  because	  it	  built	  UAVs	  without	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  services’	  unique	  functional	  requirements.126	  The	  Predator	  program	  was	  such	  a	  poor	  fit	  for	  the	  USAF’s	  mission	  set,	  Ehrhard	  argues,	  that	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  only	  sought	  to	  control	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it	  as	  an	  inroads	  to	  asserting	  jurisdiction	  over	  Global	  Hawk	  and	  Dark	  Star,	  higher-­‐flying	  UAVs	  for	  strategic	  reconnaissance127	  But	  Ehrhard’s	  appraisal	  is	  far	  too	  harsh.	  Although	  the	  Predator	  was	  not	  developed	  with	  the	  USAF	  in	  mind,	  the	  service	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  saw	  the	  Predator	  as	  an	  having	  potential	  strategic	  value	  in	  its	  own	  right,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Question	  2.	  It	  was	  Pentagon	  civilians	  and	  DARO	  who	  ensured	  the	  Predator	  developed	  to	  the	  point	  that	  the	  USAF	  could	  find	  it	  useful.	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  USAF’s	  Rationale	  for	  Embracing	  the	  Predator	  Program	  	  
	  There	  was	  a	  rational	  element	  to	  interservice	  competition	  for	  the	  Predator	  program,	  since	  all	  the	  services	  stood	  to	  gain	  financially	  due	  to	  growing	  congressional	  interest	  in	  supporting	  the	  program.128	  But	  two	  competing	  cultural	  trends	  also	  led	  the	  service	  to	  push	  for	  control	  over	  the	  Predator.	  First,	  there	  was	  a	  genuine	  belief	  that	  the	  Predator	  program	  would	  advance	  the	  USAF’s	  war-­‐winning	  capacit,	  fitting	  with	  its	  newfound	  commitment	  to	  the	  ISR	  mission	  and	  its	  focus	  on	  centralized	  command	  and	  control.	  In	  stark	  contrast,	  the	  second	  cultural	  element	  was	  a	  cynical	  perception	  that	  the	  USAF	  needed	  to	  control	  the	  Predator’s	  UAV	  to	  ensure	  it	  did	  not	  encroach	  on	  manned	  aircraft	  programs.	  	  	  	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  first	  cultural	  trend,	  there	  was	  a	  genuine	  desire	  within	  the	  service	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  Predator	  as	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  effort	  to	  capitalize	  on	  what	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  saw	  as	  the	  USAF’s	  unique	  capacity	  to	  conduct	  strategic	  reconnaissance.	  As	  discussed	  in	  Question	  2,	  he	  believed	  that	  ISR	  was	  a	  core	  mission	  of	  the	  USAF	  and	  he	  saw	  his	  bid	  to	  adopt	  the	  Predator	  as	  a	  symbol	  of	  that.	  But	  he	  also	  believed	  that	  the	  USAF	  was	  uniquely	  qualified	  to	  fly	  the	  UAV,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  other	  military	  services.	  In	  his	  view,	  the	  Predator	  was	  best	  suited	  to	  the	  USAF’s	  operating	  environment.	  The	  army’s	  high	  crash	  rates	  with	  the	  Hunter	  UAV	  bothered	  him,	  and	  he	  though	  the	  USAF	  could	  do	  better.	  “When	  I	  got	  into	  looking	  at	  why	  they	  had	  such	  a	  lousy	  record,	  to	  me	  it	  came	  down	  to	  the	  fact	  that	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they	  saw	  these	  things	  not	  as	  aerospace	  vehicles,	  but	  as	  just	  another	  piece	  of	  equipment,	  like	  trucks	  in	  a	  motorpool,”	  he	  said.129	  In	  another	  indication	  of	  Gen.	  Fogleman’s	  commitment	  to	  making	  the	  Predator	  program	  a	  success,	  he	  recruited	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  —	  officers	  with	  the	  command	  authority,	  airmanship	  skills	  and	  status	  to	  maximize	  the	  Predator’s	  potential.	  “If	  this	  program	  fails,	  it	  won’t	  be	  because	  of	  our	  pilots,”	  he	  later	  told	  Col.	  Ehrhard	  in	  1999.”130	  	  On	  a	  related	  note,	  the	  USAF	  also	  believed	  that	  its	  approach	  to	  command	  culture,	  based	  on	  centralized	  control	  and	  de-­‐centralized	  execution,	  was	  most	  appropriate	  for	  the	  Predator	  as	  an	  air	  asset	  with	  potentially	  strategic	  value.	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  service	  fought	  the	  Army’s	  plans	  for	  the	  TCS,	  which	  would	  have	  given	  the	  Army	  the	  ability	  to	  control	  the	  Predator	  at	  the	  tactical	  level.	  Aside	  from	  rational	  opposition	  to	  the	  Army’s	  control	  of	  a	  system	  that	  it	  was	  not	  paying	  to	  develop,	  the	  USAF	  also	  opposed	  the	  TCS	  on	  the	  doctrinal	  ground	  that	  it	  violated	  the	  USAF	  tenet	  of	  centralized	  control.	  131	  The	  USAF	  used	  the	  same	  doctrinal	  argument	  to	  kill	  the	  Army’s	  proposed	  Predator	  concept	  of	  operations,	  which	  would	  have	  allowed	  forward	  air	  controllers	  to	  operate	  the	  Predator.	  A	  second	  cultural	  influence	  that	  led	  the	  USAF	  to	  compete	  for	  control	  of	  the	  Predator	  UAV	  was	  more	  cynical.	  To	  some	  in	  the	  USAF,	  the	  real	  prize	  was	  gaining	  control	  over	  an	  air	  asset	  that	  potentially	  threatened	  manned	  aircraft.	  	  Cultural	  biases	  against	  UAVs,	  described	  in	  chapter	  three,	  continued	  to	  linger	  beneath	  the	  surface	  in	  1994	  and	  1995,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Questions	  1	  and	  3	  above.	  Several	  interviewees	  said	  that	  although	  there	  was	  no	  evidence	  of	  widespread	  support	  for	  the	  Predator	  in	  the	  USAF,	  there	  was	  nevertheless	  a	  sense	  that	  the	  USAF	  needed	  to	  control	  it,	  if	  only	  to	  crush	  it	  so	  it	  couldn’t	  threaten	  other	  missions.	  The	  view	  was	  particularly	  prevalent	  in	  the	  USAF’s	  leadership	  ranks,	  led	  by	  the	  pilot	  community.	  	  “I	  don’t	  think	  there	  was	  any	  enthusiasm	  for	  the	  mission,”	  recalled	  Tim	  Owings,	  the	  deputy	  project	  manager	  for	  the	  Army’s	  Unmanned	  Aircraft	  Systems	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  129	  Fogleman	  (July	  22,	  2013)	  	  130	  Ehrhard	  (2000)	  593	  131	  Rosenwasser	  (2003)	  300	  
	   180	  
office,	  who	  attended	  regular	  meetings	  on	  UAVs	  with	  his	  Air	  Staff	  equivalents	  during	  this	  time	  period.	  “[USAF]	  People	  wanted	  to	  own	  it,	  and	  I	  will	  tell	  you,	  they	  were	  loath	  to	  add	  anything	  new.	  They	  wanted	  these	  things	  to	  stay	  dumb.”	  132	  	  Other	  USAF	  outsiders	  said	  that	  ACC	  was	  a	  specific	  source	  of	  resistance.	  Navy	  Capt.	  Alan	  Rutherford,	  who	  worked	  in	  the	  UAV	  JPO,	  recalled	  coming	  away	  from	  his	  briefing	  at	  ACC	  with	  a	  sense	  that	  the	  USAF	  might	  just	  want	  the	  Predator	  UAV	  to	  keep	  another	  service	  from	  making	  something	  of	  it.133	  Colonel	  William	  Grimes,	  the	  Big	  Safari	  director	  at	  the	  time,	  said	  he	  got	  a	  similar	  reaction	  from	  ACC.	  “They	  really	  didn’t	  want	  it.	  They	  treated	  it	  like	  a	  stepchild,”	  he	  recalled.	  “They	  imposed	  a	  lot	  of	  things	  on	  it	  that	  really	  weren’t	  necessary	  that	  sucked	  up	  money	  and	  time	  but	  avoided	  them	  having	  to	  make	  overt	  use	  of	  it.”	  134	  	  	  A	  Big	  Safari	  scientist	  closely	  involved	  with	  Predator	  development	  agreed.	  “I	  heard	  that	  the	  Air	  Force	  was	  basically	  ‘volunteered’	  into	  taking	  on	  the	  Predator.	  There	  was	  even	  a	  rumor	  that	  the	  only	  reason	  the	  Air	  Force	  took	  on	  Predator	  was	  to	  quash	  it,”	  he	  recalled.	  “At	  the	  time,	  there	  seemed	  to	  be	  far	  more	  adversaries	  than	  advocates	  for	  Predator,	  mostly	  in	  the	  pilot	  community	  who	  apparently	  felt	  threatened	  by	  a	  high	  capability	  aircraft	  that	  did	  not	  require	  a	  human	  pilot.”135	  Oddly	  enough,	  these	  competing	  cultural	  trends	  within	  the	  USAF	  —	  one,	  a	  genuine	  concern	  for	  improving	  the	  USAF’s	  strategic	  edge,	  and	  the	  other,	  a	  cynical	  ploy	  to	  protect	  manned	  aircraft—	  both	  served	  to	  bolster	  support	  for	  the	  USAF’s	  control	  of	  the	  Predator	  program.	  One	  example	  of	  how	  these	  competing	  cultural	  tensions	  co-­‐existed	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  UAV	  Battlelab.	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  established	  it	  to	  aggressively	  pursue	  UAV	  concepts,	  but	  in	  practice	  it	  was	  constantly	  marginalized	  by	  ACC.	  Rather	  than	  making	  substantive	  progress	  toward	  UAV	  innovation,	  the	  battlelab	  was	  no	  more	  than	  a	  sop	  to	  the	  US	  Congress	  and	  other	  external	  actors	  who	  wanted	  to	  see	  UAV	  innovation	  move	  forward	  in	  the	  USAF.	  As	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one	  USAF	  officer	  involved	  in	  Predator	  development	  put	  it,	  the	  battlelab	  was	  “a	  toothless	  appeasement	  to	  the	  dark	  forces	  of	  the	  unmanned	  imposter.”136	  The	  contrast	  between	  these	  competing	  cultural	  elements	  also	  came	  to	  light	  when	  I	  asked	  Gen.	  McPeak	  about	  the	  later	  success	  of	  the	  Predator	  program.	  Would	  he	  have	  pursued	  the	  UAV	  in	  hindsight,	  knowing	  it	  would	  eventually	  boast	  healthy	  congressional	  support	  and	  garner	  operational	  success?	  “If	  I	  thought	  the	  Army	  was	  going	  to	  go	  make	  something	  out	  of	  it,	  I	  would	  have	  told	  them	  it	  was	  ours,”	  said	  Gen.	  McPeak.	  “This	  is	  airpower!	  You’re	  poaching	  on	  my	  territory!”	  Gen.	  McPeak’s	  view	  was	  in	  line	  with	  the	  cynical	  cultural	  undercurrents	  that	  still	  pervaded	  the	  USAF’s	  pilot	  leadership	  under	  Gen.	  Fogleman.	  Gen	  McPeak	  saw	  the	  Predator	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  manned	  flight,	  and	  chose	  to	  ignore	  it	  as	  long	  as	  it	  doing	  so	  did	  not	  pose	  an	  even	  bigger	  threat	  to	  the	  USAF’s	  core	  missions.	  If	  it	  had	  posed	  such	  a	  threat,	  he	  would	  have	  advocated	  for	  it.	  In	  contrast,	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  took	  on	  the	  risk	  of	  the	  Predator	  program	  because	  he	  genuinely	  believed	  that	  it	  meshed	  well	  with	  his	  doctrinal	  vision	  for	  the	  service	  –	  not	  because	  he	  wanted	  to	  keep	  it	  from	  succeeding	  in	  another	  service.	  	  Regardless	  of	  the	  cultural	  influences	  that	  led	  the	  USAF	  to	  adopt	  the	  Predator,	  it	  was	  clear	  by	  now	  that	  the	  UAV	  would	  raise	  difficult	  questions	  about	  pilot	  identity,	  and,	  ultimately,	  service	  identity.	  	  As	  mentioned	  in	  Question	  3,	  Predator	  operators	  did	  not	  face	  the	  same	  level	  of	  risk	  as	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  and	  there	  were	  questions	  about	  whether	  flying	  a	  Predator	  required	  unique	  piloting	  skills,	  given	  that	  the	  other	  services	  used	  enlisted	  crews	  to	  fly	  UAVs.	  	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  and	  other	  Predator	  advocates	  argued	  that	  pilot	  skills	  were	  needed	  to	  make	  UAVs	  a	  success,	  but	  others	  inside	  the	  USAF’s	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  community	  were	  wary.	  	  Percolating	  internal	  debates	  about	  pilot	  identity	  grew	  sharper	  due	  to	  external	  pressure.	  Lawmakers	  periodically	  questioned	  the	  USAF	  about	  whether	  enlisted	  personnel	  could	  fly	  the	  Predator,137	  putting	  the	  service	  in	  the	  awkward	  position	  of	  defending	  the	  use	  of	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  while	  internally	  confronting	  its	  own	  misgivings	  about	  the	  prospect.	  If	  the	  USAF	  agreed	  to	  use	  enlisted	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personnel,	  then	  it	  would	  basically	  be	  admitting	  that	  its	  officers	  brought	  no	  special	  war-­‐winning	  edge	  to	  UAV	  employment.	  Given	  Gen.	  Fogleman’s	  position	  that	  the	  USAF	  was	  uniquely	  qualified	  to	  take	  on	  the	  Predator,	  as	  discussed	  above,	  this	  was	  not	  an	  option.	  But	  by	  choosing	  to	  use	  rated	  officers	  for	  a	  job	  that	  did	  not	  fully	  utilize	  the	  skills	  and	  bravery	  of	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots,	  the	  USAF	  —perhaps	  inadvertently	  —	  raised	  difficult	  questions	  about	  pilot	  identity	  and	  whether	  it	  was	  changing	  with	  the	  arrival	  of	  the	  Predator	  program.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	  	  The	  USAF	  embraced	  the	  Predator	  program	  between	  1995	  and	  1997	  to	  increase	  its	  budget	  share,	  but	  cultural	  factors	  also	  played	  a	  powerful	  role.	  The	  service	  remained	  skeptical	  of	  the	  Predator’s	  cost	  and	  potential,	  but	  perceptions	  of	  the	  Predator’s	  relevance	  in	  the	  emerging	  strategic	  environment	  were	  changing.	  There	  was	  a	  growing	  sentiment	  in	  the	  USAF	  that	  reconnaissance	  was	  becoming	  a	  more	  central	  part	  of	  warfighting	  and	  that	  reducing	  aircrew	  risk	  was	  becoming	  more	  important	  as	  the	  US	  entered	  a	  period	  of	  “gray”	  conflict	  that	  included	  fleeting	  targets	  and	  the	  mixing	  of	  combatants	  and	  civilians	  in	  the	  battlespace.	  Acting	  as	  what	  Farrell	  describes	  as	  a	  “norm	  entrepreneur,	  “	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  attempted	  to	  enact	  a	  cultural	  shift	  in	  the	  USAF	  through	  a	  top-­‐down	  process	  of	  “planned	  change.”138	  He	  saw	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  Predator	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  reinforce	  a	  broad	  conception	  of	  USAF	  doctrine	  that	  included	  reconnaissance	  as	  a	  core	  competency.	  	  The	  impact	  of	  Gen.	  Fogleman’s	  attempt	  at	  cultural	  change	  was	  limited.	  By	  insisting	  that	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  fly	  the	  Predator	  to	  give	  the	  UAV	  the	  best	  chance	  of	  success,	  he	  ironically	  fueled	  a	  cultural	  undercurrent	  in	  the	  USAF’s	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  community	  that	  saw	  the	  UAV	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  their	  jobs	  and	  status.	  As	  a	  result,	  a	  second	  motive	  for	  adopting	  the	  Predator	  emerged	  within	  the	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USAF	  as	  members	  of	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  community	  sought	  to	  control	  the	  UAV	  only	  to	  manage	  its	  rate	  of	  growth.	  	  In	  his	  dissertation,	  Ehrhard	  argues	  that	  Gen.	  Fogleman’s	  support	  for	  the	  Predator	  program	  was	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  enthusiasm	  for	  UAVs	  across	  the	  pilot	  community.	  This	  chapter	  supports	  Ehrhard’s	  view	  that	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  played	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  decision	  to	  adopt	  the	  Predator	  program.	  Contrary	  to	  Ehrhard,	  however,	  I	  found	  that	  support	  for	  UAV	  innovation	  was	  far	  from	  universal.	  The	  USAF’s	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  community	  still	  expressed	  a	  cultural	  preference	  for	  manned	  aircraft,	  and	  the	  intelligence	  community	  also	  struggled	  with	  the	  changes	  to	  imagery	  that	  the	  Predator	  introduced.	  	  In	  closing,	  Gen.	  Fogleman’s	  decision	  to	  adopt	  the	  Predator	  program	  between	  1995	  and	  1997	  launched	  a	  cultural	  upheaval	  in	  the	  USAF.	  The	  air	  campaign	  in	  Bosnia	  provided	  an	  early	  indication	  of	  the	  blurring	  of	  the	  lines	  between	  war	  and	  peace	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  war	  era.	  The	  phenomenon	  created	  more	  ambiguity	  about	  what	  kinds	  of	  weapon	  systems	  and	  missions	  were	  central	  to	  the	  USAF’s	  capacity	  to	  organize,	  train,	  and	  equip	  for	  future	  conflicts.	  Predator	  advocates	  perceived	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  strategic	  context	  toward	  “gray”	  conflicts,	  threat	  environments	  in	  which	  they	  believed	  long-­‐dwell	  reconnaissance	  and	  reduced	  risk	  to	  aircrew	  were	  increasingly	  important	  priorities	  that	  could	  be	  met	  through	  greater	  employment	  of	  UAVs.	  	  But	  this	  leadership	  emphasis	  on	  unmanned	  platforms	  and	  reconnaissance	  created	  tension	  within	  the	  USAF’s	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  community,	  which	  had	  long	  built	  its	  preeminence	  around	  its	  central	  importance	  in	  winning	  wars.	  The	  introduction	  of	  a	  new	  UAV,	  which	  the	  USAF	  leadership	  believed	  had	  potentially	  strategic	  relevance,	  launched	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  complicated	  Predator	  innovation	  process	  that	  would	  force	  the	  USAF	  to	  reexamine	  its	  cultural	  norms,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  striving	  to	  develop	  the	  Predator	  in	  such	  as	  way	  that	  it	  meshed	  with	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  existing	  cultural	  preferences.	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CHAPTER	  FIVE,	  The	  Hunt	  for	  bin	  Laden:	  
Innovation	  in	  the	  Predator	  Program	  
	  After	  taking	  responsibility	  for	  the	  Predator	  program	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  the	  USAF	  pursued	  three	  major	  changes	  to	  mold	  the	  UAV	  to	  the	  service’s	  combat	  requirements.	  The	  changes	  included	  the	  installation	  of	  a	  laser	  designator,	  the	  weaponization	  of	  the	  Predator	  with	  the	  Hellfire	  missile,	  and	  the	  development	  of	  a	  new	  ways	  to	  employ	  the	  Predator,	  known	  as	  split	  operations,	  along	  with	  a	  follow-­‐on	  concept,	  remote	  split	  operations	  (RSO).	  This	  chapter	  explores	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  USAF	  was	  responsible	  for	  these	  innovations.	  It	  also	  examines	  how	  USAF	  culture	  influenced	  the	  service’s	  capacity	  to	  bring	  these	  innovations	  to	  fruition,	  and,	  in	  turn,	  how	  these	  innovations	  impacted	  USAF	  culture.	  Chapter	  four	  discussed	  how	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  attempted	  to	  shift	  USAF	  culture	  in	  favor	  of	  UAV	  innovation,	  but	  faced	  significant	  undercurrents	  of	  cultural	  resistance	  from	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  community.	  This	  chapter	  will	  explore	  whether	  and	  how	  these	  cultural	  dynamics	  changed	  between	  1998	  and	  September	  11,	  2001.	  The	  first	  half	  describes	  the	  Predator	  innovations	  themselves,	  and	  the	  second	  half	  explores	  their	  cultural	  implications.	  	  	  
Transforming	  the	  Predator	  into	  a	  USAF	  Weapon	  System	  	  	  	  	  Once	  the	  USAF	  established	  control	  over	  the	  Predator	  program,	  USAF	  officials	  continued	  to	  institutionalize	  the	  UAV,	  dealing	  with	  matters	  related	  to	  funding,	  acquisition,	  and	  Predator	  pilot	  assignments.	  	  	  Strong	  congressional	  support	  ameliorated	  USAF	  concerns	  about	  Predator	  funding.	  Any	  lingering	  financial	  concerns	  dissipated	  by	  the	  fall	  of	  1997	  when	  the	  US	  Congress	  passed	  the	  fiscal	  year	  1998	  defense	  authorization	  law,	  which	  dissolved	  DARO	  and	  returned	  its	  funding	  to	  the	  military	  services.1	  The	  USAF	  was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Inside	  the	  Air	  Force	  (April	  24,	  1998)	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able	  to	  reclaim	  $33.9	  million	  previously	  lost	  to	  DARO.	  This	  figure	  had	  constituted	  nearly	  80	  percent	  of	  DARO’s	  budget.2	  As	  of	  August	  1998,	  ACC	  assumed	  full	  control	  over	  the	  UAV	  budget,	  but	  the	  command	  was	  not	  a	  generous	  benefactor.3	  ACC’s	  answer	  was,	  apparently,	  not	  too	  much.	  There	  were	  only	  sixteen	  Predator	  air	  vehicles	  in	  the	  USAF’s	  inventory	  by	  the	  beginning	  of	  2001.	  The	  service	  was	  buying	  so	  few,	  in	  fact,	  that	  GA-­‐ASI	  discussed	  laying	  off	  ten	  employees.4	  Although	  funding	  was	  tightly	  controlled	  by	  ACC,	  the	  USAF	  did	  move	  acquisition	  responsibility	  away	  from	  ACC	  management	  to	  Big	  Safari	  located	  at	  Wright	  Patterson	  AFB	  in	  Ohio.	  The	  unit	  worked	  closely	  with	  GA-­‐ASI,	  setting	  up	  a	  unit	  at	  the	  company’s	  headquarters	  in	  San	  Diego	  known	  as	  Operating	  Location-­‐Detachment	  4.	  Retired	  USAF	  Colonel	  William	  Grimes,	  the	  commander	  of	  Big	  Safari	  from	  1986	  to	  2002,	  put	  then-­‐Captain	  Brian	  Raduenz	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  detachment.5	  The	  USAF	  also	  started	  to	  change	  its	  recruiting	  strategy	  for	  Predator	  pilots	  in	  the	  11th	  and	  15th	  RS	  at	  Indian	  Springs	  AFB,	  still	  controlled	  by	  the	  57th	  Operations	  Group	  at	  Nellis	  AFB.	  To	  make	  a	  UAV	  assignment	  more	  appealing,	  the	  57th	  Wing	  commander,	  then-­‐Brig.	  Gen.	  Moseley,	  successfully	  pushed	  to	  make	  the	  Predator	  duty	  into	  a	  temporary	  assignment	  known	  as	  an	  ALFA	  (air	  liaison	  -­‐	  forward	  air	  control	  -­‐Air	  Education	  and	  Training	  Command)	  tour,	  an	  option	  the	  USAF	  approved	  in	  December	  1996.6	  ALFA	  tours	  are	  typical	  in	  a	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot’s	  career,	  providing	  a	  chance	  to	  gain	  experience	  outside	  the	  cockpit,	  but	  with	  a	  promise	  of	  returning	  to	  it.7	  Then-­‐Brig.	  Gen.	  Moseley	  also	  ensured	  that	  UAV	  pilot’s	  exploits	  would	  receive	  official	  recognition,	  awarding	  the	  first	  Air	  Force	  Aerial	  Achievement	  Medal	  to	  a	  UAV	  pilot,	  Capt.	  Greg	  Harbin,	  who	  managed	  to	  safely	  land	  a	  UAV	  after	  its	  engine	  seized	  in	  a	  populated	  area	  in	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina.8	  	  Despite	  some	  USAF	  efforts	  to	  improve	  Predator	  operations,	  however,	  Predator	  pilots	  continued	  to	  train	  on	  outdated	  equipment.	  There	  were	  three	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Rosenwasser	  (2004)	  314	  3	  Thirtle,	  Johnston	  and	  Birkler	  (1997)	  34-­‐35	  4	  Whittle	  (2014)	  218	  5	  	  Grimes	  interview	  (Nov.	  14,	  2013);	  Raduenz	  interview	  (Sept.	  3,	  2013)	  6	  Tobin	  (1999)	  49	  7	  Moseley	  interview	  (April	  1,	  2014)	  8	  Munro	  (Dec.	  1,	  1997);	  Moseley	  interview	  (April	  1,	  2014)	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configurations	  of	  the	  Predator	  system	  in	  the	  first	  five	  years	  of	  the	  program.	  The	  11th	  RS	  trained	  on	  the	  first	  configuration,	  known	  as	  the	  RQ-­‐1A,	  which	  included	  a	  single	  ground	  control	  station	  and	  two	  unmodified	  aircraft	  left	  over	  from	  the	  ACTD.9	  	  	  
Innovation	  One:	  the	  Laser	  Designator	  	  
	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  all	  this	  activity	  at	  home,	  Predator	  deployments	  abroad	  continued.	  The	  aircraft	  was	  deployed,	  along	  with	  50	  to	  60	  personnel,	  to	  Ali	  Al	  Salem	  AB	  in	  Kuwait	  in	  1998	  for	  Operation	  Southern	  Watch.	  The	  aircrews	  flew	  missions	  over	  Iraq,	  observing	  Iraqi	  forces	  and	  facilities	  to	  ensure	  compliance	  with	  UN	  resolutions	  enacted	  after	  the	  1991	  Gulf	  War.10	  	  But	  it	  was	  the	  Predator’s	  third	  deployment	  to	  the	  Balkans	  that	  highlighted	  a	  pressing	  need	  for	  further	  innovation.	  On	  March	  24,	  1999,	  the	  USAF	  and	  CIA	  started	  to	  operate	  Predator	  ground	  control	  stations	  and	  air	  vehicles	  from	  Tuzla	  AB	  in	  Bosnia	  in	  support	  of	  NATO’s	  78-­‐day	  air	  campaign	  in	  Kosovo,	  known	  as	  Operation	  Allied	  Force.11	  To	  be	  sure,	  the	  Predator	  continued	  to	  earn	  praise	  from	  commanders.	  “We’re	  getting	  fabulous	  imagery	  of	  Serb	  forces,	  refugee	  movements,	  and	  battle	  damage	  assessments,”	  said	  one	  NATO	  commander.12	  USAF	  commanders,	  who	  were	  running	  the	  Kosovo	  air	  war	  out	  of	  the	  service’s	  Combined	  Air	  Operations	  Center	  (CAOC)	  in	  Vicenza,	  Italy,	  were	  also	  impressed.	  13	  But	  the	  Predator	  program	  also	  continued	  to	  face	  serious	  limitations.	  	  First,	  the	  distance	  between	  the	  ground	  control	  station	  and	  the	  Predator	  air	  vehicle	  continued	  to	  be	  limited	  not	  only	  by	  aircraft	  range	  but	  also	  by	  satellite	  coverage.	  Predators	  took	  off	  from	  runways	  next	  to	  their	  ground	  control	  stations,	  co-­‐located	  under	  the	  same	  satellite	  footprint	  to	  allow	  for	  real-­‐time	  imagery	  transmission	  and	  limited	  beyond	  line-­‐of-­‐sight	  navigation.	  NATO	  forces	  would	  have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Cullen	  (2011)	  213	  10	  Gibbs	  (2005)1	  11	  Frisbee	  (June	  2004)	  9	  	  12	  Becker	  (June	  3,	  1999)	  13	  Newman	  (March	  2002)	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preferred	  to	  operate	  the	  Predator	  from	  a	  less	  politically	  sensitive	  location	  than	  Bosnia,	  but	  could	  not	  do	  so	  because	  of	  these	  range	  limitations.14	  	  	  Second,	  weather	  problems	  and	  the	  threat	  environment	  limited	  the	  capabilities	  of	  all	  deployed	  aircraft.	  NATO	  mandated	  that	  air	  assets,	  including	  the	  Predator,	  remain	  above	  15,000	  ft.	  to	  avoid	  Yugoslav	  man-­‐portable	  air	  defense	  systems	  and	  anti-­‐aircraft	  artillery.15	  The	  order	  was	  prompted	  after	  an	  SA-­‐3	  SAM	  shot	  down	  an	  F-­‐117	  Nighthawk	  on	  the	  fourth	  night	  of	  combat	  operations.16	  The	  altitude	  floor	  meant	  that	  aircrews	  often	  could	  not	  see	  below	  the	  cloud	  deck,	  and	  the	  Predator’s	  SAR,	  which	  could	  theoretically	  see	  through	  clouds,	  provided	  only	  fuzzy	  imagery.17	  	  Third,	  relaying	  the	  Predator’s	  targeting	  information	  to	  strike	  aircraft	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  complex	  process.	  Strike	  aircraft	  pilots	  did	  not	  have	  access	  to	  the	  Predator’s	  FMV	  feed,	  so	  they	  relied	  principally	  on	  voice	  communications	  with	  the	  CAOC	  to	  locate	  targets	  based	  on	  its	  analysis	  of	  Predator	  imagery.	  CAOC	  planners	  used	  their	  access	  to	  the	  FMV	  feed,	  combined	  with	  the	  GPS	  position	  of	  the	  Predator	  and	  digital	  terrain	  mapping	  programs,	  to	  get	  a	  rough	  idea	  of	  the	  location	  of	  the	  Predator	  relative	  to	  the	  target.18	  They	  then	  verbally	  relayed	  this	  targeting	  information	  to	  the	  strike	  aircraft	  or	  an	  airborne	  forward	  air	  control	  aircraft	  —	  usually	  the	  A-­‐10	  Thunderbolt	  II	  —	  to	  provide	  a	  general	  longitude	  and	  latitude	  and	  a	  description	  of	  the	  geographical	  location	  of	  the	  target	  using	  landmarks	  and	  terrain.19	  	  But	  this	  method,	  known	  as	  “talking	  on,”	  was	  far	  from	  precise	  and	  proved	  frustrating	  for	  the	  strike	  pilots.20	  Gen.	  Jumper,	  then	  the	  USAFE	  commander,	  told	  Gen.	  Ryan,	  the	  USAF	  chief	  from	  October	  1997	  to	  September	  2001,	  about	  the	  targeting	  dilemma.21	  Gen.	  Ryan	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Becker	  (3	  June	  1999)	  15	  15	  Lambeth	  (2000)	  183;	  Jumper	  interview	  (July	  30,	  2013);	  Smaller	  UAVs	  could	  fly	  below	  15,000	  feet,	  see	  Lambeth	  (2000)	  195	  16	  Lambeth	  (	  2000)	  200	  17	  Porter	  (26-­‐28	  April,	  1999)	  B24-­‐3	  18	  Raduenz	  interview	  (March	  12,	  2014)	  	  	  19	  Newman	  (March	  2002);	  Jumper	  interview	  (July	  30,	  2013);	  Shiner	  (May	  2000)	  	  20	  Boyne	  (July	  2009)	  Jumper	  interview	  (July	  30,	  2013);	  Haave	  and	  Haun	  (2003)	  211	  21	  Jumper	  interview	  (July	  30,	  2013)	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acted	  immediately,	  asking	  Big	  Safari	  to	  devise	  a	  solution.	  The	  group	  responded	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  mounting	  a	  laser	  designator	  on	  the	  Predator.22	  Gen.	  Ryan	  tasked	  one	  of	  his	  special	  projects	  personnel,	  Col.	  Clark,	  who	  had	  written	  the	  report	  on	  the	  Predator’s	  second	  Bosnia	  deployment,	  to	  ensure	  the	  laser	  designator	  concept	  came	  to	  fruition.23	  The	  USAF’s	  acquisition	  office	  directed	  Big	  Safari	  to	  modify	  the	  Predator	  and	  install	  the	  laser	  designator	  within	  three	  weeks.24	  	  	  After	  evaluating	  several	  designs,	  Big	  Safari	  settled	  on	  Raytheon’s	  An/AAS	  44	  (V)	  forward	  looking	  infrared	  (FLIR)	  sensor	  turret,	  which	  was	  already	  flying	  on	  Navy	  helicopters.	  	  After	  meeting	  the	  three-­‐week	  deadline	  to	  install	  the	  laser	  designator,	  Big	  Safari	  started	  flight	  tests.	  25	  The	  laser	  showed	  promise,	  but	  availability	  was	  limited.	  Col.	  Clark	  sprung	  into	  action,	  persuading	  the	  Navy	  to	  give	  the	  USAF	  four	  of	  its	  Raytheon	  laser	  designator	  turrets.26	  	  	  	  Always	  eager	  to	  test	  weapons	  in	  a	  combat	  setting,	  Big	  Safari	  rushed	  to	  deploy	  the	  laser-­‐equipped	  Predator	  to	  Bosnia	  for	  operations	  over	  Kosovo.	  Normally	  this	  process	  involved	  transferring	  responsibility	  to	  the	  warfighting	  command,	  in	  this	  case,	  ACC.	  But	  ACC	  refused	  to	  accept	  the	  laser-­‐equipped	  UAV,	  which	  came	  to	  be	  known	  in	  Big	  Safari	  as	  the	  WILD	  Predator,	  short	  for	  Wartime	  Integrated	  Laser	  Designator	  Predator.27	  The	  command	  was	  concerned	  about	  the	  safety	  of	  sending	  an	  unproven	  Predator	  variant	  directly	  into	  combat,	  and	  it	  also	  worried	  about	  the	  cost	  of	  doing	  so.28	  To	  circumvent	  ACC,	  Big	  Safari	  took	  the	  WILD	  Predator	  to	  Bosnia	  on	  a	  provisional	  basis,	  referred	  to	  as	  “depot	  status,”	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  AFMC,	  using	  its	  own	  handpicked	  pilots	  and	  sensor	  operators.29	  Three	  WILD	  Predator	  vehicles,	  officially	  designated	  RQ-­‐1L,	  were	  delivered	  to	  Tuzla	  AB	  in	  Bosnia	  in	  late	  May.30	  Big	  Safari	  seconded	  personnel	  from	  the	  USAF’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Grimes	  (2014)	  330;	  C4ISR	  Journal	  (Nov.	  1,	  2004)	  14	  23	  Grimes	  interview	  (Nov.	  14,	  2013);	  Raduenz	  interview	  (Sept.	  3,	  2013)	  24	  Grimes	  (2014)	  330	  25	  ibid	  	  26	  Frisbee	  (2004)	  61	  27	  Grimes	  interview	  (Nov.	  14,	  2013)	  	  28	  Grimes	  (2014);	  Jumper	  interview	  (July	  30,	  2013)	  29	  Grimes	  interview	  (Nov.	  14,	  2013)	  30	  Frisbee	  (2004)	  62-­‐63	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11th	  RS	  and	  15th	  RS	  to	  fly	  more	  than	  a	  dozen	  sorties	  of	  the	  WILD	  Predator	  as	  Operation	  Allied	  Force	  started	  winding	  down.31	  But	  it	  was	  not	  until	  June	  2,	  just	  as	  Operation	  Allied	  Force	  was	  ending,	  that	  ACC	  allowed	  the	  WILD	  Predator	  to	  test	  the	  laser	  designator	  against	  a	  simulated	  target.32	  There	  would	  be	  no	  operational	  missions	  for	  the	  WILD	  Predator	  in	  Kosovo	  because	  ACC	  was	  unwilling	  to	  fly	  the	  unproven	  system	  in	  combat.33	  Nevertheless,	  the	  demonstration	  proved	  worthwhile.	  The	  Predator	  was	  able	  to	  effectively	  “buddy	  lase,”	  shining	  its	  laser	  on	  an	  old	  shed	  or	  an	  old	  tank	  (there	  were	  conflicting	  reports	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  target)	  so	  that	  an	  A-­‐10	  equipped	  with	  a	  laser	  spot	  tracker,	  the	  Pave	  Penny,	  could	  detect	  it.34	   	  The	  Predator’s	  performance	  in	  Kosovo	  was	  ultimately	  considered	  a	  success,	  despite	  four	  losses	  over	  enemy	  territory,	  three	  to	  hostile	  fire	  and	  one	  to	  an	  unknown	  cause.35	  The	  UAV	  had	  once	  again	  provided	  real-­‐time	  FMV	  for	  bomb	  damage	  assessment	  and	  surveillance	  of	  Serbian	  activity.	  These	  successes	  notwithstanding,	  ACC	  ordered	  the	  immediate	  removal	  of	  the	  laser	  designators	  from	  the	  WILD	  Predators	  after	  they	  returned	  to	  the	  continental	  United	  States.36	  At	  the	  time,	  Gen.	  Jumper,	  still	  at	  USAFE,	  was	  not	  informed	  of	  ACC’s	  decision.	  He	  later	  came	  to	  find	  out	  that	  ACC	  justified	  the	  order	  to	  remove	  the	  laser	  designators	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  reduce	  “unprogrammed”	  costs.37	  Big	  Safari	  fought	  ACC’s	  order	  for	  several	  weeks,	  but	  ultimately	  acquiesced.38	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Raduenz	  interview	  (Sept.	  3,	  2013)	  	  32	  C4ISR	  Journal	  (1	  Nov.	  2014)	  14;	  Raduenz	  interview	  (Sept.	  3,	  2013);	  Whittle	  (2014)	  141;	  	  33	  Swanson	  interview	  (Nov.	  17,	  2014);	  Grimes	  interview	  (Nov.	  14,	  2013)	  34	  Whittle	  (2014)	  141;	  Haave	  and	  Haun	  (2003)	  211	  35	  DoD	  (Nov.	  1,	  2001);	  Dixon	  (Feb.8,	  2000)	  	  	  36	  Raduenz	  interview	  (Sept.	  3,	  2013);	  Grimes	  interview	  (Nov.	  14,	  2013);	  Jumper	  interview	  (July	  30,	  2013)	  	  37	  Jumper	  interview	  (July	  30,	  2013)	  	  38	  Raduenz	  interview	  (Sept.	  3,	  2013)	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Innovation	  Two:	  The	  Hellfire	  Missile	  	  	  From	  a	  technological	  perspective,	  weaponization	  of	  the	  Predator	  was	  an	  obvious	  next	  step.	  The	  laser	  designator	  provided	  a	  means	  for	  the	  Predator	  to	  track	  targets	  with	  precision.	  Armed	  with	  precision-­‐guided	  munitions,	  the	  Predator	  would	  be	  able	  to	  act	  on	  that	  targeting	  information	  quickly,	  presenting	  a	  potential	  solution	  to	  the	  challenge	  presented	  by	  moving	  targets	  in	  Bosnia,	  and	  now,	  Kosovo.	  	  From	  a	  strategic	  perspective,	  however,	  the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  Predator	  weaponization	  were	  far	  less	  clear.	  	  Armed	  with	  precision-­‐guided	  munitions,	  the	  Predator	  would	  be	  able	  to	  act	  on	  that	  targeting	  information	  quickly,	  thereby	  closing	  the	  sensor-­‐to-­‐shooter	  loop	  —	  a	  USAF	  leadership	  priority	  in	  the	  type	  of	  “gray”	  conflict	  the	  USAF	  faced	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  Kosovo.	  Yet	  the	  long-­‐term	  strategic	  benefits	  of	  weaponization	  were	  still	  unclear	  because	  there	  was	  a	  sense,	  particularly	  at	  ACC,	  that	  even	  a	  weaponized	  Predator	  would	  be	  ill-­‐suited	  for	  the	  future	  threat	  environment,	  given	  the	  perceived	  likelihood	  of	  a	  high	  intensity	  conflict	  in	  which	  the	  Predator	  would	  easily	  be	  shot	  down.	  In	  light	  of	  these	  uncertainties,	  the	  events	  that	  initially	  led	  to	  Predator	  weaponization	  were	  more	  serendipitous	  than	  part	  of	  a	  deliberate	  plan	  to	  develop	  a	  strategic	  capability.	  	  	   For	  its	  part,	  GA-­‐ASI	  started	  thinking	  seriously	  about	  weaponization	  in	  late	  1999	  when	  it	  built	  the	  Predator’s	  successor,	  the	  Predator	  B	  —	  later	  designated	  the	  MQ-­‐9	  Reaper	  —	  funded	  by	  its	  own	  internal	  research	  and	  development	  money.39	  The	  Predator	  B	  was	  designed	  from	  the	  start	  as	  a	  “hunter-­‐killer,”	  able	  to	  strike	  time-­‐sensitive	  targets	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  onboard	  munitions.	  It	  housed	  a	  750-­‐horsepower	  engine	  that	  was	  much	  larger	  than	  the	  Predator’s	  101-­‐horsepower	  four-­‐cylinder	  design,	  enabling	  it	  to	  fly	  faster,	  higher,	  farther,	  or	  carry	  more	  munitions,	  depending	  on	  mission	  requirements.40	  	  	  	  The	  USAF	  was	  not	  involved	  in	  Predator	  B	  development.	  The	  USAF’s	  own	  weaponization	  activity	  began	  in	  late	  1999,	  when	  Maj.	  Gen.	  Michael	  Kostelnik,	  commander	  of	  the	  new	  Air	  Armaments	  Center	  at	  Eglin	  AFB	  in	  Florida,	  started	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Cullen	  (2011)	  263	  40	  Cullen	  (2011)	  41	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looking	  for	  a	  test	  aircraft	  to	  demonstrate	  a	  new,	  small,	  precision-­‐guided	  munition,	  the	  Small	  Smart	  Bomb	  (SSB).41	  Given	  the	  favorable	  publicity,	  operational	  success,	  and	  limited	  payload	  capacity	  of	  the	  Predator,	  Gen.	  Kostelnik	  decided	  it	  would	  make	  an	  ideal	  demonstrator	  for	  the	  lightweight	  SSB.42	  He	  asked	  his	  deputy,	  then-­‐Brig.	  Gen.	  Kevin	  Sullivan,	  to	  brief	  the	  idea	  at	  a	  March	  2000	  Air	  Armaments	  Summit,	  an	  invitation-­‐only	  event	  to	  discuss	  the	  latest	  weapons	  developments.	  	  The	  generals	  were	  particularly	  keen	  to	  find	  an	  audience	  with	  Gen.	  Jumper.	  Not	  only	  was	  he	  responsible	  for	  equipping	  the	  Predator	  with	  the	  laser	  designator	  before	  he	  left	  USAFE	  in	  February	  2000,	  he	  was	  now	  in	  charge	  of	  ACC,	  the	  command	  responsible	  for	  Predator	  management.	  After	  a	  briefing	  from	  then-­‐Brig.	  Gen.	  Sullivan	  at	  the	  summit,	  Gen.	  Jumper	  soon	  agreed	  to	  support	  Predator	  weaponization	  as	  long	  as	  it	  could	  be	  done	  without	  additional	  funding.43	  Gen.	  Jumper	  worried	  about	  costs	  because	  ACC’s	  Aerospace	  Command	  and	  Control,	  Intelligence,	  Surveillance,	  and	  Reconnaissance	  Center	  (AC2ISRC),	  responsible	  for	  Predator	  program	  requirements,	  had	  balked	  at	  weaponization	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  there	  was	  no	  funding	  to	  support	  it.44	  	  	  	  	   	  The	  Air	  Armaments	  Center	  formulated	  a	  plan	  involving	  other	  government	  agencies	  and	  industry	  to	  drop	  a	  live	  weapon	  from	  the	  Predator	  in	  May	  2001.45	  But	  Big	  Safari’s	  parent	  organization,	  Aeronautical	  Systems	  Command,	  insisted	  that	  Big	  Safari	  should	  handle	  weaponization	  because	  of	  its	  experience	  developing	  the	  laser	  designator.46	  Driven	  by	  Big	  Safari’s	  focus	  on	  the	  rapid	  delivery	  of	  combat	  capability,	  the	  emphasis	  of	  the	  weaponization	  effort	  quickly	  shifted	  from	  an	  SSB	  demonstration	  to	  an	  all-­‐out	  attempt	  to	  weaponize	  the	  Predator	  for	  operational	  use.	  In	  light	  of	  these	  developments,	  Gen.	  Jumper	  sent	  a	  message	  to	  senior	  USAF	  leaders	  on	  May	  1,	  2000,	  announcing	  that	  ACC	  was	  “moving	  on	  to	  the	  next	  logical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Kostelnik	  	  interview	  (Feb.	  26,	  2014);	  Frisbee	  (2004)	  70	  42	  Kostelnik	  interview	  (Feb.	  26,	  2014)	  	  	  43	  Sullivan	  interview	  (March	  4,	  2014)	  	  44	  Jumper	  interview	  (July	  30,	  2013);	  Frisbee	  (2004)	  73.	  	  45	  Frisbee	  (2004)	  72	  46	  Kostelnik	  interview	  (Feb.	  26,	  2014)	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step…weaponizing	  UAVs.”47	  Shortly	  thereafter,	  Maj.	  Gen.	  Kostelnik	  relinquished	  control	  to	  Big	  Safari,	  which	  began	  its	  weaponization	  efforts	  in	  June	  2000.48	  	  	  Planning	  was	  now	  moving	  forward,	  but	  the	  USAF’s	  original	  timeline	  was	  not	  aggressive.	  White	  House	  and	  CIA	  officials	  were	  under	  the	  impression	  that	  the	  USAF	  did	  not	  plan	  to	  field	  a	  combat-­‐ready	  armed	  Predator	  until	  2004.49	  This	  was	  in	  part	  because	  none	  of	  the	  weapons	  options	  were	  quick	  fixes.	  Big	  Safari	  provided	  Gen.	  Jumper	  with	  three	  possibilities:	  two	  	  still	  in	  development	  —	  the	  SSB	  and	  the	  Low	  Cost	  Autonomous	  Attack	  System	  (LOCAAS)	  —	  and	  a	  third,	  the	  Army’s	  Hellfire	  missile.50	  The	  Hellfire	  was	  the	  only	  one	  that	  could	  be	  integrated	  in	  less	  than	  five	  to	  ten	  years,	  still	  a	  lengthy	  time	  horizon.51	  Yet	  while	  the	  USAF	  was	  pursuing	  Predator	  innovation	  cautiously,	  CIA	  and	  Pentagon	  officials	  were	  growing	  desperate	  for	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  real-­‐world	  problem	  of	  tracking	  Osama	  bin	  Laden.	  Fear	  of	  US	  casualties	  and	  collateral	  damage	  had	  thwarted	  several	  attempts	  during	  the	  1990s	  to	  target	  the	  al	  Qaeda	  leader.52	  The	  CIA,	  the	  lead	  agency	  for	  the	  bin	  Laden	  manhunt,	  needed	  time-­‐sensitive	  intelligence	  collection	  to	  target	  bin	  Laden	  with	  confidence.53	  The	  White	  House	  came	  to	  the	  same	  conclusion	  and	  began	  to	  search	  for	  ways	  to	  improve	  intelligence	  collection.54	  In	  the	  spring	  of	  2000,	  Richard	  Clarke,	  the	  top	  counterterrorism	  official	  on	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  (NSC),	  proposed	  “Afghan	  Eyes,”	  a	  CIA-­‐led	  Predator	  deployment	  to	  track	  bin	  Laden.	  He	  had	  learned	  about	  the	  Predator	  from	  officers	  on	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff.	  By	  August	  11,	  2000,	  NSC	  principals	  authorized	  the	  CIA	  to	  conduct	  an	  unarmed	  Predator	  mission	  in	  Afghanistan.55	  	  Around	  June	  2000,	  Gen.	  Jumper	  became	  aware	  of	  the	  CIA’s	  interest	  in	  using	  the	  Predator	  to	  track	  bin	  Laden.	  The	  CIA	  asked	  the	  Pentagon	  if	  it	  could	  provide	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Whittle	  (2014)	  169	  48	  Kostelnik	  interview	  (Feb.	  26,	  2014);	  Frisbee	  (2004)	  73	  49	  Clarke	  (2004)	  221;	  Crumpton	  (2012)	  155-­‐156;	  Rosenwasser	  2004)363	  50	  Sullivan	  interview	  (March	  4,	  2014)	  51	  Big	  Safari	  Predator	  program	  manager	  interview	  (July	  24,	  2013)	  52	  National	  Commission	  on	  Terrorist	  Attacks	  Upon	  the	  United	  States,	  known	  as	  “9/11	  Commission”	  from	  this	  point	  forward	  (2004)	  117,	  131,	  137,	  140-­‐141	  	  53	  9/11	  Commission(2004)142	  54	  9/11	  Commission	  (2004)189;	  Coll	  (2004)	  526-­‐527	  55	  9/11	  Commission	  (2004)	  189	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operations	  support	  for	  the	  first	  Predator	  deployment	  to	  Afghanistan.	  	  The	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  took	  the	  request	  to	  Gen.	  Ryan,	  the	  USAF	  chief.56	  Gen.	  Ryan	  asked	  both	  ACC	  and	  the	  Air	  Staff’s	  Air	  and	  Space	  Operations	  Directorate	  if	  they	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  Predator’s	  first	  deployment	  to	  Afghanistan.57	  Both	  organizations	  declined	  the	  request,	  citing	  the	  technological	  immaturity	  of	  the	  Predator	  system.58	  	  Although	  ACC	  distanced	  itself	  from	  the	  un-­‐armed	  Predator	  deployment,	  Gen.	  Jumper	  took	  actions	  to	  speed	  up	  Predator	  weaponization	  after	  learning	  of	  the	  CIA’s	  interest.	  First,	  he	  chose	  to	  weaponize	  the	  Predator	  with	  Hellfire,	  the	  most	  readily	  available	  weapon.59	  Second,	  he	  ordered	  the	  re-­‐installation	  of	  the	  laser	  designator	  that	  ACC	  had	  removed	  after	  Operation	  Allied	  Force.60	  Third,	  in	  July	  of	  that	  year,	  Gen.	  Jumper	  ordered	  Big	  Safari	  to	  accelerate	  the	  timeline	  for	  Predator	  weaponization,	  telling	  GA-­‐ASI	  that	  ACC	  would	  pay	  the	  company	  $3	  million	  to	  arm	  the	  Predator	  in	  three	  months.	  61	  	  	  	   While	  Gen.	  Jumper	  was	  accelerating	  the	  Predator	  weaponization	  effort,	  the	  CIA	  moved	  ahead	  with	  Afghan	  Eyes.	  After	  meeting	  resistance	  when	  he	  asked	  ACC	  and	  the	  Air	  and	  Space	  Directorate	  for	  Predator	  support,	  Gen.	  Ryan	  —	  with	  the	  support	  of	  Gen.	  Jumper	  —	  next	  turned	  to	  Col.	  Ed	  Boyle,	  the	  Director	  of	  Intelligence	  for	  USAFE.	  On	  June	  24,	  2000,	  Gen.	  Ryan	  asked	  Col.	  Boyle	  if	  he	  would	  be	  willing	  and	  able	  to	  deploy	  the	  unarmed	  Predator	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  CIA.	  Col.	  Boyle	  came	  back	  24	  hours	  later	  with	  a	  team	  that	  was	  ready	  to	  take	  on	  the	  Predator’s	  first	  Afghanistan	  deployment.	  The	  team	  would	  later	  become	  known	  notionally	  as	  the	  32nd	  Expeditionary	  Air	  Intelligence	  Squadron	  (EAIS),	  but	  at	  the	  time	  the	  title	  did	  not	  exist	  on	  paper.	  62	  In	  that	  first	  year,	  it	  reported	  to	  USAFE,	  but	  it	  continued	  to	  use	  Big	  Safari’s	  handpicked	  pilots	  and	  test	  aircraft	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  AFMC.	  63	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Boyle	  interview	  (Feb.	  11,	  2015)	  57	  ibid	  	  58	  ibid	  59	  Big	  Safari	  Predator	  program	  manager	  interview	  (July	  24,	  2013)	  60	  Raduenz	  interview	  (Sept.	  3,	  2013)	  	  61	  Jumper	  interview	  (July	  30,	  2013)	  62	  Boyle	  interview	  (Nov.	  20,	  2015)	  	  63	  Boyle	  interview	  (Nov.	  20,	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   During	  the	  32nd	  EAIS’	  first	  deployment	  to	  Afghanistan	  from	  September	  to	  mid-­‐November,	  the	  unarmed	  Predator	  flew	  approximately	  15	  missions.64	  Clarke,	  the	  counterterrorism	  advisor,	  and	  CIA	  officials	  would	  watch	  the	  Predator’s	  FMV	  feeds	  from	  CIA	  headquarters	  in	  Langley	  Virginia	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  night,	  as	  the	  UAV	  flew	  missions	  in	  Afghan	  daylight	  to	  provide	  the	  clearest	  imagery.65	  On	  September	  7,	  2000,	  CIA	  officials	  observed	  a	  tall	  man	  in	  flowing	  white	  robes	  surrounded	  by	  a	  security	  detail	  at	  his	  compound,	  Tarnak	  Farm,	  outside	  Kandahar.66	  CIA	  officials	  spotted	  the	  figure,	  believed	  to	  be	  bin	  Laden,	  again	  on	  28	  September.67	  Clarke	  said	  he	  spotted	  bin	  Laden	  at	  least	  three	  times	  during	  the	  CIA’s	  first	  Predator	  deployment.	  68	  	  To	  the	  great	  frustration	  of	  the	  32nd	  EAIS,	  the	  CIA	  had	  no	  way	  to	  conduct	  a	  timely	  strike	  on	  bin	  Laden.	  Though	  CIA	  officials	  were	  confident	  that	  the	  Predator	  was	  obtaining	  images	  of	  the	  al	  Qaeda	  leader,	  they	  had	  few	  targeting	  options	  except	  to	  pre-­‐position	  the	  Navy’s	  submarine-­‐	  launched	  cruise	  missiles,	  an	  unreliable	  option	  given	  bin	  Laden’s	  constant	  movements.69	  As	  the	  brisk	  fall	  weather	  moved	  in,	  the	  Predator	  again	  struggled	  to	  fly	  in	  high	  winds	  and	  icing	  conditions,	  and	  the	  deployment	  ended.	  By	  the	  fall	  of	  2000,	  the	  stakes	  involved	  in	  Predator	  weaponization	  were	  clear.	  Senior	  USAF	  officials,	  including	  Gen.	  Jumper,	  were	  shown	  a	  video	  of	  bin	  Laden	  taken	  during	  the	  Afghan	  Eyes	  deployment.70	  Predator	  weaponization	  presented	  the	  clearest	  opportunity	  to	  find,	  fix,	  and	  finish	  bin	  Laden	  in	  a	  single	  mission.	  	  	  
	   By	  now,	  the	  USAF	  had	  begun	  initial	  work	  on	  Predator	  weaponization,	  including	  the	  development	  of	  a	  new	  sensor,	  the	  Multi-­‐Spectral	  Targeting	  System	  (MTS)	  and	  structural	  changes	  to	  the	  Predator	  so	  it	  could	  withstand	  the	  force	  of	  a	  Hellfire	  launch.71	  But	  several	  external	  factors	  were	  slowing	  progress.	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  Coll	  (2004)	  532;	  Benjamin	  and	  Simon	  (2003)	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  9/11	  Commission	  (2004)190	  	  65	  Clarke	  (2004)	  220;	  King	  and	  Cloud	  (November	  2001)	  A1;	  Coll	  (2004)	  532	  66	  9/11	  Commission	  (2004)	  190	  	  67	  Tenet	  (2007)	  127	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  Clarke	  (2004)	  221	  69	  Tenet	  (2007)	  127	  	  70	  Wood	  (2015)	  38;	  Whittle	  (2014)	  179	  71	  Grimes	  (2014)	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First,	  no	  onboard	  modifications	  of	  the	  Predator	  could	  begin	  until	  the	  USAF	  received	  congressional	  approval	  for	  a	  “New	  Start	  Notification.”	  USAF	  lawyers	  issued	  a	  legal	  opinion	  prohibiting	  “touch	  labor”	  until	  the	  USAF	  received	  permission	  to	  weaponize	  the	  Predator	  from	  the	  U.S.	  Congress.72	  The	  USAF	  resolved	  the	  issue	  by	  September	  21,	  2000,	  but	  only	  after	  a	  10-­‐day	  shutdown	  of	  weaponization	  work.73	  	   Second,	  there	  was	  a	  debate	  about	  whether	  Predator	  weaponization	  violated	  the	  1987	  Intermediate	  Range	  Nuclear	  Forces	  Treaty	  banning	  the	  development	  of	  new	  ground-­‐launched	  cruise	  missiles.	  Big	  Safari	  was	  ordered	  to	  stop	  Predator	  weaponization	  on	  October	  17,	  2000	  and	  could	  not	  resume	  until	  receiving	  word	  in	  December	  2000	  that	  General	  Jumper	  and	  the	  CIA	  had	  convinced	  a	  panel	  of	  interagency	  experts	  that	  an	  armed	  Predator	  did	  not	  constitute	  a	  treaty	  violation.74	  Once	  Predator	  manufacturer	  GA-­‐ASI	  re-­‐opened	  in	  January	  2001,	  Big	  Safari	  resumed	  work	  and	  conducted	  the	  first	  successful	  Hellfire	  was	  shot	  from	  a	  laser-­‐designator–equipped	  Predator	  in	  February	  2001.75	  Third,	  the	  Predator	  program	  was	  slowed	  down	  by	  the	  kind	  of	  technological	  hurdles	  that	  typically	  affect	  weapons	  development	  programs.	  There	  was	  the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  mount	  two	  Hellfire	  missiles	  on	  the	  flimsy	  Predator	  airframe	  without	  blowing	  it	  apart.76	  Once	  that	  problem	  was	  resolved,	  Big	  Safari	  had	  to	  deal	  with	  CIA	  requests	  for	  major	  technical	  changes.	  The	  original	  Hellfire	  was	  designed	  to	  destroy	  tanks,	  but	  the	  CIA	  needed	  a	  warhead	  optimized	  to	  eliminate	  human	  targets.77	  It	  also	  needed	  a	  new	  concept	  of	  operations	  that	  would	  allow	  weaponized	  Predators	  to	  be	  flown	  from	  the	  US,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  section.	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Innovation	  Three:	  The	  CIA	  Adopts	  Split	  Operations	  and	  RSO	  	  The	  concept	  of	  RSO	  emerged	  in	  the	  late	  1990s.	  The	  same	  Big	  Safari	  scientist	  who	  enabled	  FMV	  operations	  introduced	  the	  idea	  at	  an	  annual	  communications	  conference	  at	  Indian	  Springs,	  the	  Predator’s	  home	  base.	  He	  suggested	  that	  ground	  control	  stations	  could	  be	  based	  at	  one	  safe	  central	  location	  in	  the	  US,	  while	  only	  the	  aircraft	  and	  ground-­‐based	  satellite	  earth	  station	  operated	  in	  foreign	  countries.	  “I	  hadn’t	  called	  it	  RSO	  yet,	  but	  I	  pitched	  the	  concept,	  saying	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  why	  we	  have	  to	  have	  individual	  ground	  control	  stations	  all	  over	  the	  place,	  sending	  all	  these	  people	  out	  there	  —	  crews,	  pilots	  sensor	  operators.	  We	  have	  the	  technical	  capability	  to	  do	  all	  that	  remotely,”	  he	  recalled.78	  	  
	   The	  USAF	  initially	  rejected	  the	  concept.	  “We’ll	  never	  operate	  that	  way,”	  a	  USAF	  colonel	  told	  the	  Big	  Safari	  scientist	  at	  the	  time.79	  As	  a	  result,	  during	  the	  Predator’s	  1990’s	  deployments,	  the	  three	  main	  elements	  of	  the	  Predator	  system	  —	  the	  ground	  control	  station,	  the	  satellite	  earth	  station	  and	  the	  air	  vehicles	  	  —	  all	  operated	  from	  the	  same	  location.	  This	  conspicuous	  arrangement	  required	  Predator	  systems	  to	  take	  off	  and	  land	  in	  friendly	  countries	  within	  the	  satellite	  footprint	  of	  the	  Predator	  mission.	  	   The	  political	  concerns	  of	  host	  nations	  made	  this	  arrangement	  increasingly	  difficult	  during	  the	  1990s.	  Soon	  after	  Afghan	  Eyes,	  the	  first	  CIA-­‐led	  Predator	  deployment,	  began	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  2000,	  it	  became	  apparent	  that	  a	  new	  concept	  of	  operations	  would	  be	  needed.	  At	  first,	  all	  of	  the	  Predator	  equipment	  was	  based	  in	  Uzbekistan,	  a	  government	  facing	  its	  own	  Muslim	  insurgency	  supported	  from	  Afghanistan.80	  But	  after	  the	  deployment	  started,	  Uzbekistan’s	  president,	  Islam	  Karimov,	  began	  to	  worry	  that	  the	  Predator’s	  presence	  would	  further	  inflame	  political	  resistance	  to	  his	  own	  leadership.81	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   Big	  Safari	  quickly	  developed	  a	  solution	  that	  would	  minimize	  the	  CIA’s	  footprint	  in	  Uzbekistan.	  The	  Big	  Safari	  scientist	  again	  suggested	  RSO,	  and	  the	  CIA	  agreed	  to	  it.	  While	  the	  idea	  had	  potential	  in	  theory,	  however,	  in	  practice	  it	  was	  not	  a	  ready-­‐made	  solution.	  It	  required	  some	  technological	  problem-­‐solving	  to	  move	  the	  Predator’s	  ground	  control	  stations	  all	  the	  way	  back	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  To	  deal	  with	  the	  immediate	  political	  problem	  in	  Uzbekistan,	  the	  Big	  Safari	  scientist	  recommended	  “split	  operations.”	  The	  Predator	  aircraft	  and	  a	  small	  crew	  for	  launch	  and	  recovery	  operations	  stayed	  in	  Uzbekistan,	  while	  the	  satellite	  earth	  station,	  ground	  control	  stations,	  and	  majority	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  aircrews	  moved	  to	  Germany.82	  Big	  Safari	  referred	  to	  their	  support	  to	  the	  CIA’s	  Afghan	  Eyes	  deployment	  as	  the	  Summer	  Project.”83	   	  Split	  operations	  provided	  a	  quick	  solution	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  political	  problems	  in	  Uzbekistan,	  but	  would	  not	  work	  for	  a	  second	  weaponized	  Predator	  deployment	  in	  2001.	  Flying	  a	  weaponized	  Predator	  from	  outside	  the	  United	  States	  was	  a	  diplomatic	  non-­‐starter.	  White	  House	  and	  CIA	  officials	  worried	  that	  even	  a	  close	  ally	  like	  Germany	  would	  balk	  at	  the	  prospect	  of	  a	  Predator	  pilot	  or	  CIA	  operative	  hitting	  the	  “monkey	  switch”	  —	  the	  nickname	  for	  the	  Predator’s	  weapons	  release	  function—	  from	  a	  ground	  control	  station	  in	  their	  country.84	  An	  NSC	  lawyer	  first	  raised	  the	  problem	  at	  a	  summer	  2001	  NSC	  meeting	  at	  the	  White	  House.85	  Bush	  administration	  officials	  convened	  another	  meeting	  to	  discuss	  the	  problem,	  warning	  that	  it	  would	  jeopardize	  the	  entire	  effort	  to	  use	  armed	  Predators	  against	  bin	  Laden.	  The	  Big	  Safari	  scientist	  again	  suggested	  RSO,	  promising	  to	  set	  up	  an	  operation	  that	  would	  allow	  the	  US	  to	  fly	  the	  Predator	  over	  Afghanistan	  from	  ground	  control	  stations	  in	  the	  United	  States	  within	  six	  weeks.86	  By	  mid-­‐August	  2001,	  the	  Big	  Safari	  scientist	  had	  a	  workable	  concept.	  It	  involved	  splitting	  up	  the	  Predator’s	  network	  once	  again.	  The	  satellite	  earth	  station	  remained	  in	  Germany,	  under	  the	  same	  satellite	  footprint	  as	  Afghanistan.	  Predator	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launch	  and	  recovery	  operations	  remained	  in	  Uzbekistan.	  But	  the	  ground	  control	  stations	  were	  moved	  back	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  housed	  in	  double-­‐wide	  trailers	  on	  the	  CIA’s	  headquarters	  campus	  at	  Langley,	  Virginia.87	  The	  move	  back	  to	  the	  United	  States	  was	  made	  possible	  because	  the	  Big	  Safari	  scientist	  had	  been	  able	  to	  connect	  the	  ground	  control	  stations	  to	  the	  satellite	  earth	  station	  in	  Germany	  via	  a	  long	  fiber	  optic	  cable	  owned	  by	  the	  Pentagon’s	  Defense	  ATM	  Network	  Services	  (DATUMS).	  88	  	  	  
The	  USAF	  Delivers	  a	  Weaponized	  Predator	  	  
	  The	  ongoing	  plan	  to	  fly	  a	  weaponized	  Predator	  over	  Afghanistan	  had	  been	  formalized	  on	  July	  11,	  2001,	  when	  Deputy	  National	  Security	  Advisor	  Stephen	  Hadley	  directed	  the	  deployment	  to	  begin	  by	  September	  1,	  2001.	  The	  USAF	  was	  feverishly	  working	  to	  overcome	  the	  obstacles	  to	  Predator	  weaponization	  in	  time	  for	  this	  deadline.	  	  GA-­‐ASI	  received	  a	  new	  contract	  to	  modify	  two	  more	  existing	  Predators	  to	  carry	  MTS	  sensors	  and	  Hellfires.89	  But	  ongoing	  bureaucratic	  disputes,	  largely	  outside	  the	  USAF’s	  control,	  prevented	  the	  weaponized	  Predator	  from	  meeting	  Hadley’s	  deadline.	  Had	  the	  deadline	  been	  met,	  armed	  Predators	  would	  have	  been	  operational	  in	  Afghanistan	  before	  the	  September	  11	  attacks.	  	  Though	  Gen.	  Jumper	  wanted	  the	  USAF	  to	  play	  a	  prominent	  role	  in	  future	  weaponized	  Predator	  operations,	  the	  DoD	  was	  more	  reserved.	  Neither	  Pentagon	  officials	  nor	  the	  CIA	  were	  eager	  to	  take	  legal	  responsibility	  for	  authorizing	  Predator	  strikes	  or	  for	  launching	  a	  Hellfires	  from	  a	  UAVs	  because	  to	  do	  so	  would	  raise	  questions	  about	  command	  and	  control	  and	  financial	  responsibility.90	  The	  issues	  were	  hotly	  debated	  at	  a	  September	  4,	  2001	  meeting	  of	  the	  NSC	  Principals	  Committee,	  but	  they	  were	  not	  resolved.	  Instead,	  the	  principals	  decided	  to	  forgo	  an	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attempt	  to	  strike	  bin	  Laden	  with	  an	  armed	  Predator	  until	  their	  issues	  could	  be	  worked	  out.91	  	  	   By	  then	  it	  was	  too	  late.	  The	  Big	  Safari	  scientist	  was	  on	  the	  second	  day	  of	  a	  successful	  testing	  schedule	  for	  RSO	  in	  California	  when	  he	  saw	  the	  World	  Trade	  Center	  towers	  fall	  on	  television.	  Hours	  later,	  he	  got	  a	  call	  from	  Grimes,	  the	  director	  of	  Big	  Safari,	  who	  told	  him	  “the	  customer	  has	  just	  declared	  your	  system	  operational.”92	  Predator	  3034,	  along	  with	  a	  laser	  designator,	  Hellfire	  missile,	  and	  new	  concept	  of	  operations,	  RSO,	  was	  finally	  on	  its	  way	  to	  Afghanistan.	  In	  closing,	  it	  is	  clear	  there	  were	  changes	  in	  the	  material	  factors	  surrounding	  the	  Predator	  program	  between	  1998	  and	  September	  2001.	  The	  Predator’s	  growing	  combat	  record,	  bolstered	  by	  its	  relative	  success	  in	  Kosovo,	  made	  it	  more	  difficult	  to	  dispute	  its	  technological	  maturity	  and	  combat	  capability.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  CIA’s	  desperate	  hunt	  for	  bin	  Laden	  constituted	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  threat	  environment	  that	  ultimately	  compelled	  the	  USAF	  to	  act.	  Initially,	  however,	  the	  USAF	  seemed	  to	  maintain	  its	  peacetime	  footing	  despite	  these	  changes,	  pursuing	  Predator	  innovation	  at	  a	  measured	  pace.	  The	  four	  sub-­‐questions	  below	  explore	  how	  USAF	  perceptions	  of	  the	  Predator	  program	  influenced	  the	  pace	  of	  Predator	  innovation,	  and	  how	  these	  Predator	  innovations,	  in	  turn,	  influenced	  the	  USAF.	  	  	  
1. To	  what	  extent	  did	  individuals	  or	  groups	  within	  the	  USAF	  resist	  
the	  Predator	  out	  of	  a	  concern	  that	  their	  jobs	  or	  status	  might	  be	  
threatened	  by	  it?	  	  
	  As	  was	  the	  case	  during	  Gen.	  Fogleman’s	  tenure,	  support	  for	  Predator	  innovation	  existed	  at	  the	  highest	  echelons	  of	  the	  USAF	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  chief,	  Gen.	  Ryan,	  and	  Gen.	  Jumper,	  the	  ACC	  commander.	  	  But	  concerns	  about	  the	  Predator’s	  impact	  on	  the	  pilot	  community	  remained	  pervasive	  at	  lower	  ranks.	  “I	  got	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  chief	  understood	  it,	  but	  the	  lower	  down	  you	  got,	  there	  was	  more	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resistance,”	  explained	  Mark	  Cooter,	  a	  retired	  colonel	  who	  was	  a	  USAF	  major	  when	  he	  left	  his	  Air	  Staff	  job	  to	  deploy	  with	  the	  32nd	  EAIS	  during	  Afghan	  Eyes.	  93	  	  	  	   Many	  saw	  ACC	  staff	  as	  the	  center	  of	  gravity	  for	  culturally-­‐based	  obstruction	  of	  innovation	  in	  the	  Predator	  program.	  “All	  of	  the	  initiatives	  that	  really	  occurred	  in	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  Predator	  were	  in	  spite	  of	  ACC,	  not	  because	  of	  it,”	  said	  retired	  Col.	  Grimes,	  the	  former	  Big	  Safari	  director.	  ACC	  cited	  the	  Predator’s	  technological	  immaturity	  and	  cost	  considerations	  as	  the	  driving	  factors	  behind	  their	  decisions	  to	  remove	  the	  laser	  designator	  and	  to	  decline	  responsibility	  for	  the	  CIA’s	  Afghan	  Eyes	  deployment.	  But	  a	  preference	  for	  manned	  aircraft	  was	  a	  central	  force	  driving	  the	  resistance,	  said	  one	  Predator	  program	  manager	  who	  worked	  for	  Big	  Safari.	  	  “They	  were	  very	  much	  against	  it	  until	  the	  boss	  said	  ‘you	  will	  do	  it’,	  and	  then	  they	  didn’t	  go	  cooperatively	  but	  at	  least	  they	  got	  to	  the	  end	  state,”	  he	  recalled.	  “There	  was	  a	  big	  pushback	  across	  the	  board	  —	  that’s	  the	  last	  thing	  we	  need	  is	  that	  aircraft	  flying	  around	  without	  any	  pilots	  in	  it.	  Not	  that	  they	  did	  anything	  derogatory,	  but	  they	  just	  used	  derogatory	  language	  on	  a	  regular	  basis.	  That	  you	  expect,	  and	  some	  of	  it	  is	  fun.	  But	  it	  does	  permeate	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  attitude	  in	  the	  organization	  we	  were	  dealing	  with.”94	  	  	  Another	  cultural	  bias	  against	  Predator	  innovation	  prevalent	  amongst	  ACC	  staff	  was	  skepticism	  of	  the	  Predator’s	  capabilities	  and	  concept	  of	  operations,	  which	  in	  turn	  led	  to	  slow	  and	  highly	  regimented	  procedures	  for	  pursuing	  Predator	  innovations,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Question	  2.	  The	  two	  biases	  tended	  to	  “feed	  upon	  each	  other,”	  according	  to	  Scott	  Swanson,	  who	  flew	  the	  Predator	  as	  a	  USAF	  captain	  with	  the	  32th	  EAIS.	  “You	  can	  combine	  the	  two	  and	  it	  makes	  four	  times	  the	  stink	  instead	  of	  two.	  It	  builds	  momentum	  for	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘no,	  not	  in	  my	  world.’”95	  ACC’s	  initial	  refusal	  to	  adopt	  RSO	  in	  the	  late	  1990s	  provides	  a	  striking	  example.	  ACC	  initially	  rejected	  RSO	  because	  it	  clashed	  with	  existing	  USAF	  doctrine	  and	  long-­‐established	  procedures,	  both	  built	  around	  manned	  aircraft	  operations.	  A	  central	  tenet	  of	  USAF	  doctrine	  is	  the	  concept	  of	  “centralized	  control	  and	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decentralized	  execution.”	  Manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  typically	  take	  orders	  from	  a	  CAOC,	  but	  they	  make	  their	  own	  minute-­‐to-­‐minute	  decisions.	  RSO	  moved	  Predator	  pilots	  close	  to	  centers	  of	  power,	  where	  generals	  could	  easily	  intervene	  in	  a	  Predator	  pilot’s	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  decision-­‐making.	  In	  this	  way,	  RSO	  challenged	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	  independent	  pilot	  in	  USAF	  doctrine.	  It	  also	  threatened	  to	  generate	  a	  major	  bureaucratic	  overhaul,	  hardly	  appealing	  given	  ACC’s	  cautious	  approach	  to	  change.	  	  	   	  “What	  bothered	  [ACC]	  was	  they	  would	  have	  to	  make	  significant	  changes	  to	  their	  whole	  operational	  doctrine.	  All	  of	  the	  wheels	  were	  greased	  for	  sending	  people	  forward	  and	  putting	  people	  in	  airplanes,	  and	  the	  entire	  structure	  was	  set	  up	  that	  way,	  their	  paperwork,	  their	  concepts	  of	  operations,	  their	  orders,”	  said	  the	  Big	  Safari	  scientist	  who	  invented	  RSO.	  But,	  he	  noted,	  even	  more	  unpalatable	  to	  ACC	  was	  the	  prospect	  of	  making	  all	  these	  changes	  to	  accommodate	  a	  UAV	  that	  fundamentally	  threatened	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  around	  which	  USAF	  doctrine	  was	  built.	  “Basically	  the	  Predator	  UAV	  threatened	  the	  Air	  Force	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  aircraft	  carriers	  threatened	  the	  old	  time	  admirals	  who	  were	  all	  raised	  and	  made	  their	  marks	  in	  battleships,”	  he	  said.96	  	  On	  the	  operational	  side,	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  continued	  to	  see	  the	  Predator	  as	  a	  sideshow	  that	  could	  hurt	  their	  career	  prospects	  if	  they	  got	  close	  to	  it.	  “I	  think	  they	  just	  thought	  of	  it	  as	  a	  niche	  capability,	  and	  they	  just	  didn’t	  want	  to	  have	  anything	  to	  do	  with	  it,”	  said	  retired	  Col.	  Cooter.97	  Retired	  Maj.	  Gen.	  Kevin	  Sullivan,	  who	  had	  been	  Maj.	  Gen.	  Kostelnik’s	  deputy	  at	  the	  Air	  Armaments	  Center,	  said	  his	  experience	  briefing	  USAF	  officials	  on	  UAVs	  also	  led	  him	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  pilot	  community	  was	  highly	  suspicious	  of	  the	  Predator.	  “	  I	  think	  it	  was	  perceived	  more	  as	  a	  threat	  –	  this	  nasty	  little	  airplane	  is	  here,	  and	  now	  it’s	  going	  to	  stay,”	  he	  recalled.98	  	  	  	   Then-­‐Brig.	  Gen.	  Moseley	  had	  hoped	  that	  making	  the	  Predator	  assignment	  a	  temporary	  ALFA	  tour	  would	  offer	  a	  light	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  tunnel	  and	  improve	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morale.99	  The	  USAF	  personnel	  office	  increased	  the	  percentage	  of	  fighter	  pilots	  in	  Predator	  assignments	  from	  50	  percent	  to	  75	  percent	  after	  weaponization,	  hoping	  they	  would	  capitalize	  on	  their	  expertise	  to	  employ	  the	  strike	  UAV.100	  But	  pilots	  of	  all	  stripes	  continued	  to	  resist	  assignments	  to	  the	  Predator	  as	  the	  stigma	  surrounding	  the	  UAV	  continued	  to	  grow.	  “Keep	  in	  mind,	  we	  were	  taking	  guys	  out	  of	  F-­‐16	  cockpits	  and	  putting	  them	  in	  Predators,”	  said	  retired	  Maj.	  Gen.	  Sullivan.	  “You	  can’t	  blame	  a	  guy,	  really.	  He	  thought	  he	  was	  coming	  into	  the	  Air	  Force	  to	  fly	  an	  airplane	  and	  now	  he’s	  going	  to	  be	  sitting	  in	  a	  box.”101	  	  	  	   The	  degree	  of	  the	  stigma	  surrounding	  a	  Predator	  assignment	  became	  even	  more	  apparent	  when	  then-­‐	  Brig.	  Gen.	  Moseley,	  still	  the	  57th	  Wing	  Commander	  at	  Nellis	  AFB,	  awarded	  an	  Aerial	  Achievement	  medal	  to	  a	  UAV	  pilot,	  Captain	  Harbin.	  It	  was	  an	  effort	  to	  elevate	  the	  status	  of	  UAV	  pilots,	  but	  it	  was	  met	  with	  derision	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  service.	  He	  received	  numerous	  phone	  calls,	  emails,	  and	  media	  criticism	  for	  his	  decision.	  “The	  entire	  world	  came	  down	  on	  me,”	  he	  recalled.102	  	   The	  stigma	  surrounding	  a	  Predator	  assignment	  only	  increased	  as	  Predator	  pilots	  were	  forced	  to	  train	  on	  an	  old	  Predator	  system.	  ACC	  insisted	  that	  GA-­‐ASI	  update	  its	  technical	  manuals	  before	  allowing	  Predator	  pilots	  to	  train	  on	  a	  newer	  system103	  But	  GA-­‐ASI	  took	  over	  a	  year	  to	  produce	  the	  manuals,	  which	  by	  then	  were	  out	  of	  date	  because	  the	  Predator	  system	  was	  constantly	  undergoing	  modification.	  Without	  the	  manuals,	  the	  informal,	  word-­‐of-­‐mouth	  approach	  to	  training	  continued,	  which	  detracted	  from	  a	  professional	  atmosphere.	  In	  his	  2009	  dissertation,	  then-­‐Lt.	  Col.	  Cullen	  explained	  how	  poor	  training	  damaged	  the	  Predator	  pilots’	  reputations:	  “The	  ignorance	  of	  Predator	  operators	  negatively	  affected	  individual	  and	  group	  performance,	  and	  it	  exacerbated	  isolation	  of	  Predator	  crews	  and	  the	  resignation	  of	  Predator	  pilots,	  who	  were	  the	  human	  component	  of	  Predator	  with	  the	  highest	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power	  and	  status	  to	  restructure	  the	  system	  and	  to	  distribute	  knowledge	  among	  the	  community.”104	  Manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  drafted	  to	  a	  Predator	  assignments	  worried	  about	  their	  promotion	  prospects,	  given	  the	  stigma.	  “Some	  of	  the	  guys	  in	  the	  unit	  at	  Creech	  –	  Indian	  Springs	  at	  the	  time	  –	  were	  definitely	  fighting	  to	  get	  promoted	  because	  they	  were	  a	  Predator	  pilot	  and	  not	  an	  F-­‐16	  pilot,”	  said	  the	  Big	  Safari	  Predator	  program	  manager.105	  	  	  Predator	  draftees	  also	  worried	  about	  the	  lack	  of	  flight	  pay,	  which	  they	  saw	  as	  fundamentally	  unjust.	  After	  visiting	  the	  11th	  RS	  in	  September	  2001,	  then-­‐	  Lt.	  Col.	  Cantwell	  said	  that	  frustrations	  were	  at	  an	  all-­‐time	  high.	  ”Many	  wondered	  how	  the	  USAF	  could	  require	  Predator	  pilots	  to	  take	  Form	  8	  checkrides	  with	  the	  threat	  of	  going	  to	  a	  flight-­‐evaluation	  board	  (FEB)	  and	  not	  award	  gate	  credit.”106	  	  Given	  these	  concerns,	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  recruited	  to	  the	  Predator	  program	  started	  dropping	  out.	  	  Pilots	  chosen	  for	  Predator	  duty	  could	  “7-­‐day	  opt,”	  refusing	  the	  assignment	  and	  leaving	  the	  USAF	  if	  their	  service	  commitments	  were	  shorter	  than	  the	  length	  of	  the	  assignment.	  “They	  lose	  a	  lot	  of	  pilots	  like	  that,”	  one	  Predator	  pilot,	  Tom	  Reagan,	  told	  the	  Smithsonian	  Air	  &	  Space	  Magazine	  in	  2001.	  “I	  volunteered,	  but	  after	  three	  other	  pilots	  had	  seven-­‐day	  opted	  out.	  We	  counted	  up	  in	  my	  training	  class,	  and	  we	  think	  17	  or	  18	  pilots	  left	  the	  Air	  Force.”107	  	  	  
	  
Weaponization:	  A	  Threat	  to	  the	  Intelligence	  Community	  	  Interestingly,	  another	  community	  that	  saw	  the	  armed	  Predator	  as	  a	  potential	  threat	  was	  the	  USAF’s	  intelligence	  officers.	  Once	  the	  service’s	  intelligence	  analysts	  became	  aware	  of	  the	  increased	  situational	  awareness	  the	  Predator	  could	  provide,	  they	  were	  keen	  to	  maintain	  control	  of	  it.	  The	  decision	  to	  arm	  the	  Predator	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  Cullen	  (2011)	  222	  105	  Big	  Safari	  Predator	  program	  manager	  interview	  	  (July	  24,	  2013)	  106	  Cantwell	  (June	  2007)	  88.	  Form	  8	  checkride	  failure	  can	  mean	  loss	  of	  flight	  status.	  107	  Shiner	  (May	  2001).	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threatened	  to	  break	  their	  monopoly	  on	  what	  up	  until	  now	  had	  been	  strictly	  a	  reconnaissance	  asset.	  	  Intelligence	  personnel	  at	  ACC’s	  AC2ISRC,	  which	  had	  balked	  at	  spending	  for	  Predator	  weaponization,	  had	  both	  rational	  and	  cultural	  reasons	  to	  resist	  arming	  the	  Predator	  UAV.	  On	  a	  rational	  level,	  weaponization	  would	  create	  new	  training	  and	  qualification	  requirements	  that	  would	  drive	  up	  cost.	  From	  a	  cultural	  perspective,	  arming	  the	  Predator	  UAV	  posed	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  USAF	  intelligence	  community’s	  monopoly	  over	  the	  Predator	  UAV	  for	  reconnaissance	  missions.	  “The	  intelligence	  community	  was	  just	  beginning	  to	  rail	  against	  the	  whole	  notion	  that	  these	  things	  were	  armed	  and	  it	  took	  away	  from	  the	  intelligence	  priority	  of	  surveillance,”	  recalled	  Gen.	  Jumper.108	  Echoed	  the	  Big	  Safari	  Predator	  program	  manager:	  “Reconnaissance	  was	  being	  usurped	  by	  weaponization….	  When	  we	  went	  the	  way	  of	  weapons	  and	  such,	  the	  core	  mission	  of	  the	  renamed	  MQ-­‐1	  was	  targeting.	  At	  the	  time,	  folks	  believed	  (rightly	  so)	  they	  wouldn’t	  be	  able	  to	  perform	  their	  primary	  task	  of	  reconnaissance	  and	  surveillance	  anymore.”109	  	  
	  	   The	  tension	  was	  apparent	  at	  the	  CAOC	  at	  al	  Udeid	  during	  operations	  for	  Iraq’s	  no-­‐fly	  zone.	  Col.Gary	  Fabricius,	  former	  commander	  of	  the	  15	  RS,	  recalled	  several	  times	  when	  a	  senior	  intelligence	  director	  within	  the	  ISR	  cell	  at	  the	  CAOC	  restricted	  weapons	  employment	  because	  it	  would	  detract	  from	  ISR	  collection	  efforts.110	  In	  keeping	  with	  the	  findings	  of	  Chapter	  4,	  biases	  against	  UAVs	  within	  the	  USAF	  among	  the	  pilot	  community	  and	  the	  intelligence	  community	  persisted	  even	  as	  innovations	  in	  the	  Predator	  program	  progressed.	  Bias	  continued	  to	  be	  strongest	  among	  rank-­‐and-­‐file	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots,	  although	  it	  lessened	  to	  a	  degree	  as	  a	  result	  of	  weaponization,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Question	  2.	  Conversely,	  intelligence	  officers’	  own	  biases	  became	  stronger	  once	  the	  Predator	  was	  armed.	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  Jumper	  interview	  (July	  30,	  2013)	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  Big	  Safari	  predator	  program	  manager	  interview	  (March	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2. To	  what	  extent	  were	  judgments	  about	  the	  potential	  and	  cost	  	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  Predator	  based	  on	  the	  USAF’s	  enthusiasm	  for	  
employing	  new	  technology	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  was	  the	  enthusiasm	  
outside	  the	  service?	  	  	  The	  USAF’s	  most	  senior	  leaders	  continued	  to	  support	  Predator	  integration	  between	  1998	  and	  September	  11,	  2001.	  Gen.	  Ryan,	  the	  USAF	  Chief,	  gave	  Gen.	  Jumper	  free	  rein	  to	  pursue	  the	  laser	  designator	  and	  Predator	  weaponization.	  As	  the	  former	  commander	  of	  NATO	  Southern	  Forces	  during	  the	  Bosnia	  campaign,	  Gen.	  Ryan	  understood	  as	  well	  as	  anyone	  the	  potential	  for	  Predator	  innovation	  to	  fill	  major	  gaps	  in	  the	  USAF’s	  targeting	  accuracy.111	  In	  a	  show	  of	  support	  to	  Gen.	  Jumper,	  Gen.	  Ryan	  continued	  to	  allow	  Col.	  Clark,	  the	  bureaucratic	  fixer	  who	  had	  assisted	  Gen.	  Fogleman’s	  efforts	  to	  develop	  the	  Predator,	  to	  help	  Gen.	  Jumper	  expedite	  Predator	  innovation.112	  “From	  the	  most	  senior	  levels	  —	  and	  I	  had	  more	  than	  my	  share	  of	  opportunities	  to	  be	  in	  front	  of	  a	  bunch	  of	  them	  —	  they	  were	  fully	  onboard	  with	  doing	  it	  and	  getting	  as	  much	  capability	  as	  they	  could,”	  recalled	  the	  Big	  Safari	  Predator	  program	  manager.113	  	  	  	   Big	  Safari	  and	  the	  32nd	  EAIS	  were	  also	  important	  sources	  of	  internal	  enthusiasm	  for	  the	  Predator	  program.	  The	  acquisition	  culture	  in	  Big	  Safari	  was	  predisposed	  to	  develop	  the	  UAV	  quickly.	  “Big	  Safari	  is	  the	  fastest	  way	  to	  do	  innovation	  anywhere,”	  summed	  up	  retired	  Col.	  Ed	  Boyle,	  who	  was	  the	  commander	  of	  the	  32nd	  EAIS	  during	  Afghan	  Eyes.	  That	  squadron	  was	  staffed	  with	  highly	  driven	  people	  who	  either	  had	  enough	  experience	  with	  the	  Predator	  to	  see	  its	  value	  or	  were	  very	  open	  to	  learning	  about	  it.	  “They	  were	  innovators,	  type	  ‘A’	  personalities,	  people	  who	  did	  not	  know	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  word	  ‘no,’”	  recalled	  retired	  Col.	  Boyle.114	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Outside	  these	  USAF	  organizations,	  pessimism	  about	  the	  Predator	  still	  permeated	  the	  USAF.	  Brian	  Raduenz,	  now	  a	  retired	  USAF	  Lt.	  Colonel,	  recalled	  a	  story	  that	  highlighted	  the	  lingering	  bias	  beneath	  the	  level	  of	  senior	  leadership.	  As	  a	  USAF	  captain	  working	  for	  Big	  Safari,	  Raduenz	  attended	  a	  USAFE	  headquarters	  briefing	  about	  the	  laser	  designator	  prior	  to	  the	  Kosovo	  air	  war.	  USAFE	  generals	  were	  dismissive,	  doubting	  a	  UAV	  would	  be	  ready	  to	  make	  a	  meaningful	  contribution	  in	  Kosovo.	  One	  gave	  a	  ”speech	  about	  how	  dumb	  this	  was	  and	  about	  how	  UAVs	  are	  not	  ready	  for	  prime	  time.”115	  But	  those	  same	  generals	  reversed	  their	  position	  the	  next	  day	  when	  they	  received	  the	  same	  brief	  in	  front	  of	  their	  boss,	  Gen.	  Jumper.	  “You	  could	  tell	  they	  were	  just	  appeasing	  the	  general,	  they	  didn’t	  believe	  it	  at	  all,”	  recalled	  retired	  Lt.	  Col.	  Raduenz.	  “That	  was	  my	  first	  taste	  of	  the	  inter-­‐Air	  Force	  battle.	  The	  majority	  view	  was	  it	  was	  just	  a	  toy	  and	  had	  no	  use	  to	  them.”116	  USAF	  enthusiasm	  for	  the	  Predator	  program	  seemed	  to	  increase	  somewhat	  after	  Kosovo.	  “I	  went	  into	  this	  with	  a	  lukewarm	  approach	  to	  UAVs…and	  I	  came	  out	  of	  this	  conflict	  an	  enormous	  fan,”	  said	  Lt.	  Gen.	  Michael	  C.	  Short,	  the	  commander	  of	  allied	  air	  forces	  in	  Kosovo.117	  Outside	  the	  USAF,	  already	  strong	  Predator	  support	  grew	  stronger.	  	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  William	  Cohen	  issued	  a	  memo	  in	  August	  1999	  calling	  for	  a	  “strong,	  renewed	  commitment”	  to	  UAV	  development.	  Although	  UAVs	  had	  experienced	  technological	  growing	  pains,	  their	  contributions	  to	  “information	  superiority	  and	  risk	  reduction	  for	  our	  pilot	  force	  demanded	  continued	  investments	  in	  UAV	  spending,	  force	  structure,	  plans	  and	  exercises,”	  he	  said.118	  Government	  civilians	  also	  were	  optimistic	  about	  cost.	  Jane	  Alexander,	  the	  acting	  director	  of	  DARPA	  in	  2000,	  said	  she	  expected	  the	  unit	  cost	  of	  a	  new	  UCAV	  to	  be	  “one	  third	  that	  of	  the	  Joint	  Strike	  Fighter,”	  the	  USAF’s	  newest	  manned	  stealth	  fighter,	  and	  that	  “operations	  and	  support	  costs,	  compared	  to	  a	  current	  manned	  fighter	  squadron,	  will	  be	  reduced	  by	  75	  percent.”119	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  interview	  (Sept.	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  2013)	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  in	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Acquisition	  Culture:	  Tension	  Between	  ACC	  and	  Big	  Safari	  Over	  Technological	  
Maturity	  
	  Despite	  the	  Predator’s	  perceived	  success	  in	  Kosovo,	  there	  was	  continued	  skepticism	  in	  the	  USAF	  regarding	  the	  Predator’s	  technological	  maturity,	  particularly	  at	  ACC.	  The	  transition	  of	  the	  Predator	  program	  from	  traditional	  acquisition	  procedures	  to	  Big	  Safari	  in	  1998	  exacerbated	  tensions	  between	  the	  two	  organizations.	  Big	  Safari	  actively	  lobbied	  the	  US	  Congress	  to	  gain	  control	  of	  Predator	  program	  development	  in	  1998	  because	  the	  director,	  Grimes,	  worried	  that	  the	  regular	  USAF	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  fully	  appreciate	  or	  exploit	  the	  Predator’s	  potential.120	  For	  its	  part,	  ACC	  fought	  to	  retain	  a	  tight	  grip	  on	  management,	  seeking	  to	  control	  the	  pace	  of	  Predator	  development	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  USAF’s	  traditional	  acquisition	  culture.	  	  	  The	  prime	  example	  of	  the	  tension	  between	  ACC	  and	  Big	  Safari	  was	  the	  innovation	  process	  that	  led	  to	  the	  installation	  of	  the	  laser	  designator.	  The	  WILD	  Predator	  deployed	  with	  Big	  Safari,	  but	  ACC	  refused	  to	  fly	  it	  in	  combat	  because	  technical	  orders	  were	  not	  yet	  available	  for	  the	  laser	  designator.	  On	  a	  practical	  level,	  ACC	  personnel	  worried	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  technical	  orders	  would	  jeopardize	  safety.	  The	  commander	  of	  the	  11th	  RS	  was	  concerned	  because	  the	  WILD	  Predator	  software	  had	  to	  be	  flown	  in	  “maintenance	  mode”	  because	  the	  aircraft	  was	  still	  in	  testing.	  It	  was	  unclear	  how	  this	  mode	  might	  affect	  in-­‐flight	  programming.	  The	  11th	  RS	  commander	  also	  worried	  about	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  method	  to	  see	  and	  verify	  where	  the	  laser	  designator	  was	  pointed,	  as	  a	  small	  pointing	  error	  could	  increase	  collateral	  damage.121	   	  Aside	  from	  the	  technical	  risks,	  the	  ACC	  officials	  saw	  the	  laser	  designator	  as	  an	  unfunded	  project	  for	  an	  airplane	  that	  was	  not	  yet	  an	  official	  Air	  Force	  program	  with	  an	  official	  budget.	  This	  concern	  explains	  why	  ACC	  officials	  were	  so	  quick	  to	  remove	  the	  laser	  designator	  after	  Kosovo,	  according	  to	  Gen.	  Jumper,	  who	  had	  championed	  its	  integration.	  “It’s	  not	  that	  you	  hated	  the	  Predator	  for	  the	  mission,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120	  Whittle	  (2014)	  123-­‐125	  
121	  Anonymous	  interview	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  Jumper	  interview	  (July	  30,	  2013)	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  interview	  (Nov.	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  2013)	  124	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Weaponization:	  Gen.	  Jumper	  Molds	  the	  Predator	  to	  Fit	  USAF	  Culture	  	  	  While	  pessimism	  regarding	  the	  Predator’s	  technological	  maturity	  remained	  prevalent	  within	  the	  USAF,	  Predator	  weaponization	  helped	  to	  shift	  cultural	  attitudes	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  UAV.	  Gen.	  Jumper,	  in	  his	  positions	  as	  commander	  at	  USAFE	  and	  ACC,	  played	  a	  central	  role	  in	  this	  cultural	  shift.	  Like	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  and	  Gen.	  McPeak,	  Gen.	  Jumper	  grew	  up	  in	  the	  Vietnam	  era	  as	  a	  Fast	  FAC,	  flying	  a	  successor	  to	  the	  F-­‐100,	  the	  F-­‐4D.	  But	  he	  shared	  Gen.	  Fogleman’s	  commitment	  to	  a	  broader	  vision	  of	  airpower	  not	  principally	  wedded	  to	  fighter	  aircraft.	  Reflecting	  on	  his	  time	  as	  a	  cadet	  at	  the	  Virginia	  Military	  Institute,	  he	  said	  he	  would	  have	  still	  joined	  the	  military	  even	  if	  he	  could	  not	  be	  a	  pilot	  like	  his	  father	  had	  been.126	  He	  was	  also	  an	  enthusiastic	  technologist.	  As	  a	  USAF	  captain,	  he	  developed	  a	  method	  to	  increase	  the	  range	  of	  the	  “dive	  toss”	  bombing	  tactic	  to	  reduce	  risk	  to	  aircrew,	  and	  published	  frequently	  in	  Fighter	  Weapons	  Review,	  the	  fighter	  pilot’s	  tactics	  bible.127	  His	  open-­‐minded	  approach	  put	  him	  in	  a	  position	  to	  be	  receptive	  to	  the	  Predator	  program.	  	  Following	  his	  experience	  as	  USAFE	  commander	  in	  Kosovo,	  Gen.	  Jumper	  knew	  that	  the	  Predator	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  play	  an	  important	  doctrinal	  role.	  He	  had	  become	  increasingly	  frustrated	  with	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  USAF	  to	  target	  and	  engage	  transient	  targets,	  from	  mobile	  Scud	  missile	  launchers	  in	  Desert	  Storm128	  to	  tanks	  in	  Kosovo.	  As	  ACC	  commander	  in	  2000,	  he	  called	  on	  the	  USAF	  to	  develop	  capabilities	  for	  the	  destruction	  of	  targets	  in	  “single-­‐digit	  minutes.”129	  He	  saw	  the	  installation	  of	  the	  laser	  designator	  and	  the	  Hellfire	  missile	  on	  the	  Predator	  as	  a	  means	  to	  achieve	  this	  doctrinal	  goal.	  	  	  	   Compared	  to	  Gen.	  Fogleman,	  Gen.	  Jumper	  enjoyed	  greater	  success	  selling	  Predator	  innovation	  to	  the	  manned	  pilot	  community.	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  acted	  as	  a	  norm	  entrepreneur,	  embracing	  the	  Predator	  program	  to	  shift	  USAF	  culture	  toward	  a	  broader	  focus	  on	  the	  ISR	  mission.	  But	  Gen.	  Jumper	  went	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126	  Loring	  (Oct.	  5,	  2010)	  3	  127	  Anderegg	  (2001)	  63-­‐65;	  Loring	  (2010)	  15	  128	  For	  more	  on	  Scud	  hunt,	  see	  Rosenau	  (31	  Dec.	  2001)	  29-­‐44	  129	  Hebert	  (March	  2003)	  50	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molding	  the	  Predator	  to	  fit	  the	  existing	  cultural	  norms	  within	  the	  USAF,	  which	  placed	  a	  high	  value	  on	  strike	  assets	  as	  opposed	  to	  reconnaissance.	  While	  biases	  against	  UAVs	  persisted,	  the	  prospect	  of	  weaponization	  as	  a	  means	  to	  advance	  the	  cause	  of	  time-­‐sensitive	  targeting	  broadened	  the	  Predator’s	  support	  base.	  	  Arming	  the	  Predator	  “clearly	  shifted	  this	  technological	  system	  towards	  the	  Air	  Force’s	  cultural	  core,”	  John	  Davis	  argued	  in	  his	  2007	  dissertation	  on	  the	  USAF’s	  airborne	  reconnaissance	  systems.	  “These	  efforts	  also	  altered	  the	  service’s	  perception	  of	  the	  value	  of	  this	  system	  developed	  to	  conduct	  military	  missions	  it	  considered	  peripheral.”130	  
	   Far	  from	  seeing	  weaponization	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  manned	  strike	  aircraft,	  the	  manned	  pilot	  community	  largely	  viewed	  it	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  expand	  the	  USAF’s	  war-­‐winning	  capacity	  to	  strike	  targets	  anytime	  and	  anyplace.	  “Was	  there	  anybody	  who	  sort	  of	  bristled	  when	  they	  saw	  the	  Predator	  shoot	  the	  bad	  guy?	  Sure,	  you	  could	  bristle,	  except	  we	  couldn’t	  get	  the	  	  [manned]	  airplane	  to	  where	  that	  Predator	  was,	  and	  that	  was	  the	  whole	  idea,”	  said	  Gen.	  Jumper.131	  Gen.	  Moseley,	  who	  left	  his	  post	  as	  57th	  wing	  commander	  to	  work	  at	  the	  USAF’s	  legislative	  liaison	  office	  during	  this	  time	  period,	  confirmed	  Gen.	  Jumper’s	  view.	  “Watching	  something	  is	  good,	  it	  may	  lead	  to	  something,”	  he	  said.	  “But	  wacking	  something	  	  —	  and	  that’	  s	  a	  policy	  term	  for	  creating	  kinetic	  effects	  from	  the	  domain	  —	  	  now	  that	  gets	  people	  excited.	  It’s	  our	  job.”132	  Even	  at	  ACC,	  weaponization	  led	  to	  a	  softening	  of	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  Predator	  program.	  “It	  wasn’t	  really	  until	  the	  Predator	  was	  armed	  and	  could	  strike	  on	  its	  own	  that	  the	  establishment	  in	  ACC	  could	  see	  the	  value	  in	  it,”	  said	  retired	  Col.	  Grimes.”133	  	  Predator	  weaponization	  also	  appealed	  to	  the	  USAF’s	  pilot	  community	  because	  weapons	  employment	  required	  the	  special	  skills	  of	  a	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  —	  or	  at	  least	  someone	  with	  training	  to	  make	  life-­‐or-­‐death	  decisions.	  Then-­‐Lt.	  Col.	  Cullen,	  an	  F-­‐16	  pilot,	  explained	  the	  logic	  in	  his	  dissertation:	  “Predator	  pilots	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  Davis	  (2007)	  231	  131	  Jumper	  interview	  (July	  30,	  2013)	  132	  Moseley	  interview	  	  (April	  1,	  2014	  133	  Grimes	  interview	  (Nov.	  5,	  2013)	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became	  decision-­‐makers,	  and	  Predator’s	  weapons	  transformed	  Predator	  pilots	  and	  sensor	  operators	  into	  war	  fighters—Predator	  crews	  could	  create	  effects	  on	  the	  battlefield	  they	  could	  observe,	  evaluate,	  and	  adjust.”134	  Gen.	  Jumper	  shared	  a	  similar	  view	  with	  Adam	  Rosenwasser	  in	  his	  2004	  dissertation	  on	  UAVs	  and	  governance	  structure,	  noting	  that	  weaponization	  meant	  Predator	  operators	  would	  need	  training	  that	  gave	  them	  warrior	  status:	  	  	  “…We	  had	  to	  stop	  considering	  this	  a	  thing	  that	  could	  be	  flown	  by	  sort	  of	  anybody,	  that’s	  going	  to	  sort	  of	  passively	  surveil,	  into	  a	   system	   that	   is	   going	   to	   carry	   all	   the	   burden	   and	   weight	   of	  being	  able	  to	  put	  bombs	  on	  target	  and	  all	  the	  responsibility	  that	  comes	  with	  that.	  And	  in	  the	  Air	  Force,	  the	  people	  who	  hold	  that	  responsibility	   are	   credentialed	   warriors,	   who	   have	   to	   go	  through	  training….”135	  	  
Outsider	  Support	  for	  Weaponization	  	  
	  Outside	  the	  USAF,	  there	  was	  also	  considerable	  support	  for	  weaponization.	  GA-­‐ASI	  had	  long	  been	  interested	  in	  the	  possibility,	  and	  lawmakers	  also	  were	  aware	  of	  the	  prospect	  based	  on	  a	  1996	  Air	  Force	  Scientific	  Advisory	  Board	  study	  commissioned	  by	  Gen.	  Fogleman,	  which	  suggested	  that	  an	  advanced,	  armed,	  Unmanned	  Combat	  Aerial	  Vehicle	  would	  be	  able	  to	  perform	  like	  a	  fighter	  at	  half	  the	  cost.136	  The	  House	  Armed	  Services	  Committee	  sponsored	  legislation	  in	  1996	  calling	  for	  the	  arming	  of	  the	  Predator	  and	  the	  Army’s	  Hunter	  UAVs,	  but	  the	  Pentagon	  viewed	  the	  Predator	  strictly	  as	  a	  reconnaissance	  asset	  and	  opposed	  the	  initiative.137	  	  Congressional	  support	  for	  weaponization	  continued	  as	  the	  fall	  of	  2001	  approached.	  The	  House	  Armed	  Services	  Committee	  asked	  the	  USAF	  to	  investigate	  purchasing	  a	  fleet	  of	  GA-­‐ASI’s	  hunter-­‐killer	  Predator	  B	  UAVs	  in	  a	  report	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  Cullen	  (2011)	  245	  135	  Rosenwasser	  (2004)	  356	  136	  Rosenwasser	  (2004)	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  137	  Geer	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  Bolckom	  (2005)	  CRS-­‐3	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accompanying	  the	  fiscal	  year	  2001	  Defense	  Authorization	  Bill.138	  Rep.	  Randy	  “Duke”	  Cunningham,	  an	  F-­‐4	  pilot	  in	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  wrote	  a	  private	  letter	  to	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Donald	  Rumsfeld	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2001	  urging	  him	  to	  buy	  the	  Predator	  B	  immediately.139	  GA-­‐ASI	  served	  as	  a	  major	  influence	  on	  lawmakers’	  support	  for	  UAV	  spending.	  Cunningham	  received	  at	  least	  $35,000	  in	  political	  contributions	  from	  GA-­‐ASI	  between	  1998	  and	  2006.140	  From	  2000	  to	  2006,	  GA-­‐ASI	  	  spent	  $600,000	  —more	  than	  any	  US	  company	  —	  to	  pay	  for	  86	  congressional	  junkets	  to	  company	  facilities	  and	  overseas	  locations.141	  	   In	  the	  CIA	  and	  White	  House,	  there	  was	  mixed	  support	  for	  an	  armed	  Predator.	  	  The	  USAF	  was	  clearly	  feeling	  CIA	  pressure	  to	  move	  quickly	  on	  weaponization	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  2000.	  That	  pressure	  mounted	  after	  the	  Afghan	  Eyes	  deployment.	  Clarke,	  the	  White	  House	  Counterterrorism	  advisor,	  along	  with	  CIA	  officials	  including	  Charles	  Allen,	  the	  assistant	  director	  of	  central	  intelligence	  for	  collection,	  Cofer	  Black,	  head	  of	  the	  CIA’s	  Counterterrorism	  Center,	  and	  his	  deputy,	  Edward	  Crumpton,	  were	  eager	  to	  arm	  the	  Predator	  after	  the	  UAV	  located	  bin	  Laden	  but	  was	  powerless	  to	  take	  direct	  action.142	  	  Conversely,	  others	  in	  the	  CIA,	  including	  the	  director,	  George	  Tenet,	  and	  James	  Pavitt,	  the	  Deputy	  Director	  of	  Operations,	  worried	  about	  the	  legal	  consequences	  of	  the	  CIA	  covertly	  arming	  a	  UAV	  to	  assassinate	  a	  foreign	  national.143	  The	  Pentagon	  had	  similar	  concerns,	  hesitating	  to	  launch	  a	  Hellfire	  strike	  on	  bin	  Laden	  in	  a	  non-­‐wartime	  scenario.144	  This	  conflict	  within	  the	  CIA	  and	  between	  the	  CIA	  and	  the	  Pentagon	  led	  to	  conflicting	  outcomes.	  Although	  advocates	  in	  the	  CIA	  were	  a	  source	  of	  pressure	  on	  the	  USAF	  to	  weaponize	  quickly,	  the	  CIA	  and	  Pentagon’s	  indecision	  about	  weapons	  release	  contributed	  to	  delays	  in	  the	  deployment	  of	  a	  weaponized	  Predator	  to	  Afghanistan.	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  Wolfe	  (May	  16,	  2000)	  139	  Selinger	  (July	  17,	  2001)	  140	  Hennigan	  (Sept.	  12,	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  142Crumpton	  (2012)	  156	  	  143	  Crumpton	  (2012)	  159	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  Campbell	  Interview	  (April	  11,	  2014)	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Strategic	  Motivations	  for	  Pursuing	  Predator	  Development	  	  	  While	  weaponization	  broadened	  USAF	  support	  for	  the	  Predator,	  it	  by	  no	  means	  eliminated	  resistance	  at	  ACC.	  Already	  predisposed	  to	  balk	  at	  Predator	  innovation	  because	  of	  its	  preference	  for	  manned	  aircraft	  and	  regimented	  acquisition	  procedures,	  ACC	  seemed	  almost	  willfully	  ignorant	  of	  the	  connection	  between	  Predator	  innovation	  and	  the	  manhunt	  for	  bin	  Laden.	  	  	  	  	  In	  the	  summer	  of	  2000,	  Gen.	  Jumper	  began	  to	  grasp	  the	  strategic	  implications	  of	  using	  the	  Predator	  to	  hunt	  bin	  Laden.	  But	  his	  own	  command,	  ACC,	  continued	  to	  take	  a	  cautious,	  bureaucratic,	  obstructionist	  approach	  to	  weaponization.	  Before	  Afghan	  Eyes	  began,	  Grimes,	  the	  Big	  Safari	  director,	  briefed	  a	  group	  of	  ISR	  staff	  at	  ACC	  on	  the	  upcoming	  Predator	  deployment.	  He	  went	  in	  to	  the	  meeting	  “foolishly	  thinking”	  that	  ACC	  would	  support	  the	  effort	  once	  they	  understood	  the	  national	  security	  stakes,	  “but	  they	  scoffed	  at	  it.”145	  After	  the	  deployment	  was	  underway,	  retired	  Col.	  Cooter	  said	  he	  prodded	  ACC	  to	  send	  some	  officials	  to	  the	  CIA’s	  Predator	  ground	  control	  stations	  in	  Germany	  to	  see	  how	  “split	  operations”	  worked.	  He	  also	  constantly	  encouraged	  ACC	  to	  ask	  Big	  Safari	  for	  updated	  technical	  data	  so	  that	  acquisition	  hurdles	  to	  weaponization	  could	  be	  quickly	  surmounted.	  But	  “none	  of	  the	  ACC	  staff	  guys	  embraced	  it,”	  he	  recalled.	  “Hell,	  they	  probably	  still	  don’t	  embrace	  it	  today.”146	  Even	  when	  Afghan	  Eyes	  ended	  as	  the	  winter	  approached,	  ACC	  continued	  to	  take	  a	  pessimistic	  view	  of	  the	  Predator’s	  strategic	  potential.	  	  At	  that	  time,	  then-­‐Major	  Cooter,	  the	  32nd	  EAIS	  director	  of	  operations,	  was	  so	  frustrated	  with	  the	  failure	  to	  strike	  bin	  Laden	  that	  he	  wrote	  a	  letter	  to	  his	  superiors	  warning	  that	  it	  would	  be	  pointless	  to	  continue	  Predator	  operations	  if	  it	  were	  not	  armed.147	  But	  his	  sense	  of	  urgency	  was	  not	  matched	  at	  ACC.	  That	  fall,	  he	  debriefed	  several	  USAF	  officials	  on	  Afghan	  Eyes,	  including	  the	  Air	  Warfare	  Center	  commander,	  the	  wing	  commander	  and	  squadron	  leadership	  at	  Nellis	  AFB,	  as	  well	  as	  ACC’s	  directors	  of	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  Grimes	  interview	  (March	  18,	  2014)	  146	  	  Cooter	  interview	  (May	  26,	  2014)	  147	  Cooter	  interview	  (May	  26,	  2014);	  Whittle	  (2014)	  180	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intelligence	  and	  operations.	  General	  officers	  on	  the	  Air	  Staff	  prepped	  him	  for	  the	  ACC	  brief,	  warning	  him	  to	  expect	  questions	  about	  why	  ACC	  was	  not	  directly	  involved	  in	  the	  hunt	  for	  bin	  Laden	  and	  how	  they	  could	  be	  more	  involved	  in	  the	  future.148	  But	  those	  questions	  never	  came.	  After	  learning	  about	  the	  bin	  Laden	  sightings,	  ACC’s	  operations	  director	  was	  only	  interested	  in	  how	  to	  reduce	  Predator	  accident	  rates.	  “I	  thought	  ACC	  was	  going	  to	  say	  ‘this	  is	  our	  mission,	  and	  we	  are	  going	  to	  take	  it,”	  recalled	  retired	  Col.	  Cooter.	  “They	  did	  not.”149	  	   In	  closing,	  there	  was	  clearly	  growing	  support	  for	  the	  Predator	  program	  within	  the	  USAF	  between	  1998	  and	  September	  11,	  2001.	  Gen.	  Jumper’s	  effort	  to	  weaponize	  the	  Predator	  meshed	  with	  existing	  USAF	  culture,	  helping	  to	  broaden	  the	  base	  of	  support	  for	  the	  UAV.	  Big	  Safari	  and	  the	  32nd	  EAIS	  also	  were	  important	  sources	  of	  enthusiasm.	  However,	  pessimism	  about	  the	  potential	  of	  the	  Predator	  persisted,	  manifesting	  itself	  most	  obviously	  in	  ACC’s	  extremely	  cautious	  approach	  to	  Predator	  innovation	  and	  failure	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  broader	  national	  imperative	  of	  weaponization	  as	  a	  means	  to	  target	  bin	  Laden.	  The	  tension	  between	  ACC	  versus	  Big	  Safari	  and	  the	  32nd	  EAIS	  over	  acquisition	  procedures	  and	  the	  strategic	  motivation	  for	  Predator	  innovation	  represented	  a	  major	  divide	  within	  the	  USAF	  between	  those	  who	  saw	  the	  Predator	  as	  a	  means	  for	  airpower	  to	  make	  an	  important	  strategic	  contribution	  and	  those	  who	  were	  far	  more	  pessimistic	  about	  its	  military	  potential.	  	  	  
3. To	  what	  extent	  were	  USAF	  judgments	  about	  the	  employment	  of	  
the	  Predator	  driven	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	  to	  friendly	  
personnel,	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  was	  that	  push	  from	  outside	  the	  
service?	  	  	  As	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  four,	  Gen.	  Ryan,	  now	  the	  USAF	  chief,	  felt	  that	  reducing	  risk	  should	  be	  a	  top	  priority	  for	  any	  commander	  as	  a	  means	  to	  minimize	  loss	  of	  life	  and	  political	  fallout	  arising	  from	  aircrew	  capture	  of	  death.	  But	  by	  and	  large,	  that	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sentiment	  was	  not	  a	  motivating	  factor	  behind	  Predator	  innovation	  in	  the	  USAF	  during	  this	  time	  period.	  If	  anything,	  USAF	  officers	  tended	  to	  view	  reducing	  aircrew	  risk	  as	  a	  threat.	  These	  attitudes	  were	  evident	  in	  the	  service’s	  initial	  reaction	  in	  1999	  to	  the	  Big	  Safari	  scientist’s	  proposal	  for	  RSO.	  	  The	  USAF	  rejected	  the	  idea	  partly	  based	  on	  a	  concern	  for	  preserving	  a	  doctrine	  built	  around	  manned	  aircraft,	  but	  also	  because	  it	  threatened	  the	  warrior	  ethos.	  As	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  four,	  the	  Predator	  system	  was	  already	  raising	  complex	  questions	  about	  manned	  pilot	  identity	  because	  it	  minimized	  physical	  risk	  by	  taking	  pilots	  out	  of	  the	  cockpit.	  The	  idea	  of	  moving	  the	  control	  station	  outside	  the	  combat	  zone	  put	  an	  even	  finer	  point	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  Predator	  operators	  deserved	  the	  title	  of	  “pilot,”	  given	  the	  further	  removal	  of	  any	  risk.	  Consequently,	  there	  was	  a	  reluctance	  to	  do	  it.	  As	  the	  Big	  Safari	  scientist	  explained:	  	  “People	  don’t	  wear	  silk	  scarves	  in	  ground	  stations.	  They	  don’t	  wear	  flight	  goggles	  either.”150	  The	  tensions	  that	  RSO	  raised	  over	  pilot	  identity	  would	  only	  grow	  sharper	  as	  it	  became	  standard	  practice	  in	  the	  USAF,	  as	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  six.	  	  
	  
Outsider	  Attitudes	  Toward	  Reducing	  Aircrew	  Risk	  	  Outside	  the	  USAF,	  attitudes	  toward	  reducing	  risk	  were	  very	  mixed.	  The	  USAF’s	  perennial	  concern	  with	  preserving	  the	  warrior	  ethos	  was	  under	  threat	  from	  some	  retired,	  but	  highly	  influential,	  members	  of	  the	  military.	  During	  his	  bid	  for	  president	  in	  2000,	  Senator	  John	  McCain	  complained	  that	  the	  Clinton	  administration	  “wins	  ugly”	  because	  it	  kept	  the	  altitude	  floor	  at	  15,000	  feet,	  too	  high,	  in	  his	  opinion,	  to	  drop	  bombs	  accurately,	  therefore	  risking	  civilian	  casualties.151	  (Airpower	  historian	  Phillip	  Meilinger	  has	  countered	  that	  bomb	  accuracy	  was	  actually	  improved	  at	  higher	  altitudes152).	  Retired	  US	  Marine	  Corps	  Lt.	  Gen.	  Bernard	  Trainor	  claimed	  the	  USAF	  lacked	  honor	  for	  conducting	  an	  “immaculate”	  air	  campaign.	  “High-­‐tech	  weaponry	  permits	  pilots	  to	  fly	  high	  out	  of	  harm’s	  way	  while	  visiting	  destruction	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  Big	  Safari	  scientist	  interview	  (July	  24,	  2013)	  	  151	  Dudney	  (May	  2000);	  Klein	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below,”	  he	  wrote,	  adding	  that	  he	  found	  it	  “troubling”	  that	  the	  USAF	  had	  demonstrated	  in	  Kosovo	  “the	  ability	  to	  drive	  an	  enemy	  to	  his	  knees	  without	  shedding	  a	  drop	  of	  the	  bomber’s	  blood.”153	  However,	  other	  outsiders	  saw	  the	  capacity	  for	  airpower	  to	  reduce	  both	  physical	  and	  political	  risk	  as	  an	  important	  asset	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  Operation	  Allied	  Force.	  In	  terms	  of	  political	  risk,	  casualty	  aversion	  reached	  an	  unprecedented	  level	  by	  the	  late	  1990s,	  as	  the	  public	  came	  to	  assume	  that	  precision-­‐guided	  and	  standoff	  munitions	  would	  minimize	  both	  aircrew	  risk	  and	  civilian	  casualties.	  In	  his	  book	  on	  Allied	  Force,	  Benjamin	  Lambeth	  refers	  to	  this	  time	  period	  as	  an	  era	  of	  “cruise	  missile	  diplomacy”	  because	  the	  Clinton	  administration	  often	  opted	  for	  the	  use	  of	  TLAMs	  over	  risking	  aircrew.154	  US	  lawmakers,	  already	  supportive	  of	  UAVs,	  ramped	  up	  their	  advocacy	  in	  1999	  and	  2000	  because	  of	  the	  political	  risks	  of	  downed	  aircrew.	  Senator	  John	  Warner	  sponsored	  statutory	  language	  requiring	  that	  one	  third	  of	  deep	  strike	  aircraft	  be	  unmanned	  within	  10	  years	  and	  one	  third	  of	  ground	  combat	  vehicles	  be	  unmanned	  within	  15	  years.155	  He	  was	  concerned	  that	  the	  death	  of	  friendly	  forces	  in	  Bosnia	  or	  Iraq	  could	  expose	  the	  country’s	  inability	  to	  tolerate	  casualties.	  “When	  you	  look	  at	  the	  history	  of	  casualties…in	  my	  judgment	  this	  country	  will	  never	  again	  permit	  the	  armed	  forces	  to	  be	  engaged	  in	  conflicts	  which	  inflict	  the	  level	  of	  casualties	  we	  have	  seen	  historically.”156	  In	  terms	  of	  reducing	  physical	  risk,	  senior	  Pentagon	  officials	  were	  now	  heavily	  weighing	  the	  potential	  loss	  of	  friendly	  forces	  in	  their	  operational	  planning.	  The	  Pentagon	  released	  an	  “after	  action”	  statement	  on	  the	  Kosovo	  air	  war	  lauding	  the	  capability	  of	  UAVs	  to	  reduce	  risk	  to	  friendly	  forces,	  noting	  that	  the	  loss	  of	  15	  UAVs	  in	  the	  conflict	  had	  been	  well	  worth	  it.157	  When	  it	  came	  time	  for	  Henry	  H.	  “Hugh”	  Shelton,	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff,	  to	  evaluate	  an	  option	  to	  use	  Special	  Operations	  Forces	  to	  track	  bin	  Laden	  in	  the	  late	  1990s,	  he	  rejected	  options	  to	  use	  ground	  forces	  because	  the	  risk	  of	  US	  casualties	  was	  too	  great.	  The	  9/11	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  153	  Dudney	  (May	  2000)	  154	  Benjamin	  Lambeth	  (	  2001)179	  155	  US	  Senate	  Armed	  Services	  Committee	  (March	  12,	  2000)	  	  	  156	  Wilson	  (4	  Dec	  2001)	  157	  	  	  Cohen	  and	  	  	  Shelton	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Commission	  report	  noted:	  “Shelton	  told	  us	  that	  such	  operations	  are	  not	  risk-­‐free,	  invoking	  the	  memory	  of	  the	  1993	  ‘Black	  Hawk	  Down’	  fiasco	  in	  Mogadishu.’”158	  	   Given	  these	  concerns	  about	  physical	  risk	  to	  ground	  forces	  in	  the	  bin	  Laden	  hunt,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  the	  White	  House	  and	  CIA	  turned	  to	  the	  Predator	  as	  a	  potential	  solution.	  While	  physical	  risk	  was	  an	  issue,	  however,	  the	  main	  concern	  once	  the	  Afghan	  Eyes	  deployment	  began	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  2000	  was	  political	  risk.	  The	  CIA	  had	  become	  increasingly	  risk	  averse	  because	  of	  congressional	  scrutiny	  of	  its	  covert	  activities,	  including	  a	  plan	  to	  assassinate	  Fidel	  Castro	  and	  the	  Bay	  of	  Pigs,	  a	  failed	  attempt	  to	  assist	  Cuban	  rebels	  in	  the	  dictator’s	  overthrow.159	  CIA	  officials	  told	  the	  Big	  Safari	  scientist	  there	  “was	  just	  too	  much	  high	  risk	  involved”	  in	  basing	  the	  ground	  control	  stations	  in	  Uzbekistan,	  given	  the	  political	  explosion	  that	  might	  occur	  in	  the	  host	  country	  if	  people	  realized	  that	  the	  CIA	  was	  there.160	  Split	  operations	  allowed	  the	  CIA	  to	  reduce	  its	  footprint	  during	  Afghan	  Eyes	  to	  ground	  control	  stations	  and	  take	  off	  and	  landing	  elements,	  while	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  operation	  could	  be	  stationed	  in	  Germany.	  	  	   As	  the	  CIA	  geared	  up	  for	  Predator	  weaponization,	  reducing	  political	  risk	  became	  even	  more	  important.	  RSO	  was	  the	  only	  way	  to	  avoid	  the	  political	  fallout	  that	  might	  result	  if	  a	  host	  nation,	  such	  as	  Germany,	  discovered	  that	  the	  Predator’s	  so-­‐called	  “monkey	  switch”	  was	  flipped	  within	  its	  borders.	  The	  US	  needed	  to	  either	  explicitly	  alter	  its	  status	  of	  forces	  agreement	  with	  Germany	  to	  allow	  for	  Hellfire	  strikes	  from	  its	  territory,	  or	  the	  ground	  control	  station	  had	  to	  be	  based	  elsewhere.	  RSO	  provided	  a	  means	  to	  base	  the	  stations	  in	  the	  US,	  where	  diplomatic	  problems	  could	  be	  minimized	  and	  the	  operation	  had	  a	  better	  chance	  of	  staying	  covert.	  	  	   In	  conclusion,	  the	  USAF	  continued	  to	  worry	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  Predator	  program	  on	  the	  warrior	  ethos	  of	  its	  pilot	  community.	  Manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  assigned	  to	  the	  Predator	  were	  informally	  referred	  to	  as	  “pilots,”	  but	  people	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  USAF	  had	  begun	  to	  question	  whether	  advancements	  in	  aviation	  technology	  had	  begun	  to	  diminish	  aircrews’	  warrior	  role.	  The	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introduction	  of	  split	  operations	  and	  RSO	  only	  intensified	  the	  USAF’s	  fear	  that	  the	  Predator	  program	  was	  diminishing	  the	  warrior	  ethos,	  and,	  ultimately,	  reinforcing	  outsiders’	  claims	  that	  the	  service	  was	  making	  war	  too	  “immaculate,”	  as	  retired	  Lt.	  Gen.	  Trainor	  warned.	  	  Despite	  the	  CIA’s	  growing	  interest	  in	  using	  the	  Predator	  to	  reduce	  political	  risk,	  the	  USAF	  remained	  hesitant	  to	  embrace	  this	  benefit	  through	  the	  use	  of	  RSO,	  preferring	  to	  focus	  on	  a	  doctrine	  that	  put	  the	  aircraft	  and	  aircrews	  in	  one	  place,	  as	  it	  had	  done	  with	  manned	  aircraft	  for	  decades.	  	  	  
4. To	  what	  extent	  were	  judgments	  about	  the	  Predator	  based	  on	  a	  
concern	  about	  maintaining	  the	  USAF’s	  primary	  control	  over	  air	  
assets	  in	  response	  to	  competition	  from	  civilian	  and	  military	  
institutions?	  
	  The	  USAF	  initially	  pursued	  innovation	  in	  the	  Predator	  program	  during	  this	  time	  period	  without	  any	  outside	  prodding.	  Initially	  Gen.	  Jumper	  had	  a	  relatively	  parochial	  interest	  in	  weaponizing	  the	  Predator	  as	  a	  means	  to	  fill	  the	  USAF’s	  gap	  in	  time	  sensitive	  targeting	  capability.	  He	  told	  Jon	  Rosenwasser	  in	  an	  interview	  for	  his	  2004	  dissertation	  on	  UAV	  innovation:	  “We	  were	  doing	  this	  for	  the	  Air	  Force,	  not	  for	  anybody	  else.”161	  His	  rationale	  resonated	  fairly	  well	  with	  the	  USAF’s	  pilot	  community,	  which	  began	  to	  see	  the	  laser	  designator	  and	  weaponization	  as	  operationally	  useful	  and	  highly	  compatible	  with	  USAF	  culture.	  	  	   But	  Gen.	  Jumper	  adopted	  an	  even	  more	  broadly-­‐conceived	  rationale	  for	  pursuing	  Predator	  innovation	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2000.	  During	  this	  time,	  he	  sped	  up	  the	  timeline	  for	  weaponization	  and	  worked	  to	  overcome	  various	  bureaucratic	  obstacles	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  support	  the	  national	  objective	  of	  hunting	  down	  bin	  Laden.	  	  Working	  with	  the	  White	  House	  and	  the	  CIA,	  he	  played	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  overcoming	  arms	  treaty	  restrictions	  blocking	  Predator	  weaponization	  late	  2000.162	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  recognizing	  the	  Predator’s	  strategic	  potential	  in	  the	  emerging	  threat	  environment,	  Gen.	  Jumper	  was	  additionally	  motivated	  to	  pursue	  Predator	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weaponization	  to	  stake	  the	  USAF’s	  claim	  on	  the	  UAV.	  He	  was	  not	  about	  to	  let	  another	  agency	  take	  credit	  for	  a	  successful	  Predator	  strike	  against	  bin	  Laden,	  given	  the	  potentially	  strategic	  implications	  of	  the	  strike	  and	  the	  central	  role	  airpower	  would	  play.	  He	  became	  worried	  when	  he	  heard	  that	  the	  CIA	  was	  going	  to	  insist	  on	  “owning”	  weaponized	  Predator	  operations	  and	  did	  not	  intend	  to	  share	  operational	  details	  with	  the	  DoD,	  even	  though	  the	  USAF-­‐operated	  32nd	  EAIS	  would	  be	  flying	  the	  missions,	  at	  least	  initially.	  “I	  remember	  Gen.	  Jumper	  being	  very	  annoyed	  at	  a	  meeting	  in	  which	  I	  told	  him	  I	  didn’t	  think	  CIA	  was	  going	  to	  allow	  the	  CAOC	  to	  control,	  or	  even	  be	  cognizant	  of,	  Predator	  missions,”	  recalled	  retired	  Lt.	  Gen.	  John	  Campbell,	  who	  at	  the	  time	  was	  the	  senior	  USAF	  officer	  on	  the	  CIA	  staff.163	  Still	  in	  his	  position	  as	  ACC	  commander,	  Gen.	  Jumper	  also	  had	  some	  serious	  doctrinal	  concerns	  about	  a	  CIA-­‐led	  deployment	  of	  an	  armed	  Predator.	  	  Although	  the	  US	  was	  not	  yet	  at	  war,	  Gen.	  Jumper	  was	  “wary	  of	  establishing	  a	  precedent”	  of	  the	  CIA	  managing	  an	  airborne	  weapon	  system,	  recalled	  Lt.	  Gen.	  Campbell.164	  The	  USAF’s	  doctrine	  of	  centralized	  control	  and	  decentralized	  execution	  dictated	  that	  the	  Joint	  Forces	  Air	  Component	  Commander	  (JFACC)	  —	  responsible	  for	  running	  a	  national	  wartime	  campaign	  —	  should	  have	  command	  and	  control	  of	  any	  air	  assets	  in	  the	  theatre	  of	  operations.	  Gen.	  Jumper	  argued	  that	  the	  JFACC,	  not	  CIA	  headquarters,	  was	  in	  the	  best	  position	  to	  assume	  command	  and	  control	  of	  a	  weaponized	  system	  in	  an	  area	  where	  US	  ground	  forces	  could	  potentially	  be	  engaged.	  	  	  	   In	  closing,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  Gen.	  Jumper	  recognized	  that	  a	  weaponized	  Predator	  might	  become	  a	  symbol	  of	  the	  strategic	  potential	  of	  airpower.	  As	  a	  result,	  he	  took	  a	  series	  of	  steps	  to	  ensure	  the	  USAF	  would	  be	  at	  the	  center	  of	  armed	  Predator	  operations.	  But	  his	  views	  of	  the	  potentially	  strategic	  importance	  of	  the	  Predator	  still	  were	  not	  widely	  shared	  in	  the	  USAF,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Questions	  1,	  2,	  and	  3.	  	  Many	  who	  were	  aware	  of	  the	  weaponized	  Predator	  program	  seemed	  content	  to	  let	  the	  CIA	  control	  it.	  	  “You	  can	  talk	  all	  day	  about	  General	  Jumper	  wanting	  to	  do	  the	  Hellfire,	  but	  I	  think	  you	  will	  find	  that	  in	  all	  the	  layers	  between	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  2014)	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  Campbell	  interview	  (June	  4,	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the	  guys	  doing	  the	  testing	  and	  bringing	  it	  online	  and	  Jumper,	  in	  those	  layers	  in	  between	  they	  just	  didn’t	  want	  to	  do	  it.	  They	  just	  didn’t	  want	  to	  arm	  the	  Predator,”	  said	  retired	  Col.	  Cooter,	  the	  director	  of	  operations	  of	  the	  32nd	  EAIS	  during	  Afghan	  Eyes.	  “At	  least	  all	  the	  colonels	  I	  ran	  into.”165	  	  
Conclusion	  	  
	  Changes	  in	  material	  factors	  helped	  to	  spur	  innovations	  in	  the	  Predator	  program	  between	  1998	  and	  September	  11,	  2001.	  The	  Predator’s	  performance	  in	  the	  air	  wars	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  Kosovo	  began	  to	  represent	  a	  significant	  combat	  record	  demonstrating	  that	  UAVs	  could	  contribute	  to	  the	  USAF’s	  military	  capability.	  The	  White	  House’s	  and	  CIA’s	  growing	  involvement	  in	  Predator	  weaponization	  also	  provided	  an	  external	  source	  of	  pressure	  on	  the	  USAF	  to	  pursue	  UAV	  innovation.	  	  Gen.	  Jumper,	  who	  had	  a	  reputation	  for	  taking	  a	  comprehensive	  view	  of	  airpower	  theory,	  recognized	  the	  Predator’s	  strategic	  potential	  in	  the	  changing	  threat	  environment.	  The	  USAF	  was	  no	  longer	  running	  an	  air	  campaign	  in	  Kosovo,	  but	  Gen.	  Jumper	  nevertheless	  continued	  to	  focus	  on	  improving	  the	  USAF’s	  ability	  to	  operate	  in	  “gray”	  conflict	  zones.	  	  The	  Predator	  provided	  a	  time-­‐sensitive	  targeting	  capability	  that	  Gen.	  Jumper	  saw	  as	  having	  major	  strategic	  potential	  as	  the	  lines	  between	  war	  and	  peace	  blurred	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  such	  as	  al	  Qaeda	  and	  bin	  Laden.	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  Gen.	  Jumper’s	  advocacy,	  cracks	  in	  the	  USAF’s	  walls	  of	  cultural	  resistance	  to	  the	  Predator	  program	  started	  to	  emerge.	  Gen	  Jumper’s	  support	  for	  the	  laser	  designator	  and	  weaponization	  increased	  the	  USAF’s	  base	  of	  support	  because	  these	  innovations	  were	  compatible	  with	  existing	  USAF	  culture,	  which	  highly	  prized	  the	  warrior	  ethos.	  That	  the	  USAF	  initially	  rejected	  RSO	  —	  a	  concept	  that	  moved	  Predator	  pilots	  even	  further	  from	  conflict	  —	  further	  underscores	  the	  central	  importance	  of	  molding	  the	  Predator	  to	  conform	  to	  the	  USAF’s	  existing	  cultural	  norms.	  	  Gen.	  Jumper	  was	  able	  to	  turn	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	  warrior	  ethos	  in	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USAF	  culture	  into	  an	  asset	  to	  support	  Predator	  innovation.	  	  	  	  	  Although	  the	  USAF’s	  resistance	  to	  UAV	  innovation	  appeared	  to	  lessen,	  however,	  there	  was	  still	  substantial	  cultural	  resistance	  within	  various	  USAF	  communities.	  The	  USAF’s	  reluctance	  to	  support	  Predator	  innovation	  was	  fueled	  by	  	  	  by	  the	  pilot	  community’s	  preference	  for	  manned	  aircraft	  and,	  in	  the	  intelligence	  community,	  a	  preference	  for	  reconnaissance	  versus	  weaponization.	  Other	  sources	  of	  cultural	  reluctance	  included	  ACC’s	  doubts	  about	  the	  Predator’s	  technological	  maturity	  and	  long-­‐term	  strategic	  potential,	  and	  the	  pilot	  community’s	  concern	  for	  preserving	  the	  warrior	  ethos.	  Taken	  together,	  these	  biases	  fueled	  the	  USAF’s	  view	  of	  the	  Predator	  as	  a	  niche	  capability,	  leading	  many	  USAF	  officials	  to	  largely	  ignore	  its	  strategic	  potential	  in	  the	  hunt	  for	  bin	  Laden	  —	  even	  when	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  CIA	  was	  seeking	  control	  of	  a	  weaponized	  Predator	  for	  that	  very	  purpose.	  The	  patterns	  of	  military	  innovation	  in	  this	  chapter	  reflect	  both	  Farrell’s	  model	  of	  cultural	  change	  and	  Posen’s	  civil-­‐military	  model.	  In	  terms	  of	  Farrell’s	  model,	  Gen.	  Jumper’s	  support	  for	  the	  laser	  designator	  and	  weaponization	  is	  an	  inverted	  example	  of	  the	  “norm	  entrepreneur”	  concept.	  Instead	  of	  trying	  to	  change	  USAF	  culture	  to	  accommodate	  the	  Predator	  program	  as	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  had	  done,	  Gen.	  Jumper	  acted	  as	  what	  one	  might	  call	  a	  “norm	  exploiter,”	  promoting	  innovations	  that	  matched	  up	  with	  existing	  cultural	  norms	  in	  the	  USAF.	  The	  fact	  that	  Gen.	  Jumper	  was	  able	  to	  broaden	  support	  for	  the	  Predator	  program	  suggests	  that	  it	  might	  be	  easier	  to	  increase	  cultural	  acceptance	  of	  innovation	  by	  molding	  the	  innovation	  to	  fit	  with	  the	  existing	  culture,	  rather	  than	  trying	  to	  change	  that	  culture.	  	  Yet	  despite	  Gen.	  Jumper’s	  success,	  his	  support	  for	  Predator	  innovation	  was	  insufficient	  to	  change	  cultural	  attitudes	  across	  the	  board.	  As	  Posen’s	  model	  predicts,	  the	  White	  House	  and	  CIA’s	  growing	  interest	  in	  the	  Predator	  program	  spurred	  Gen.	  Jumper	  to	  take	  steps	  to	  ensure	  the	  USAF	  stayed	  involved	  in	  the	  Predator	  program.	  But	  even	  outsider	  pressure	  and	  Gen.	  Jumper’s	  support	  for	  Predator	  innovation	  failed	  to	  spark	  a	  widespread	  shift	  away	  from	  the	  cultural	  biases	  against	  the	  UAV	  that	  still	  lingered	  within	  the	  service.	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Ultimately,	  the	  USAF	  can	  take	  credit	  for	  taking	  the	  technical	  steps	  to	  weaponize	  the	  Predator.	  But	  the	  service’s	  existing	  cultural	  preferences	  for	  manned	  aircraft,	  relatively	  pessimistic	  views	  of	  its	  potential,	  and	  concerns	  about	  preserving	  the	  warrior	  ethos	  prevented	  it	  from	  immediately	  embracing	  the	  Predator	  program	  full-­‐speed	  in	  response	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  threat	  environment.	  On	  the	  eve	  of	  September	  11,	  2001,	  USAF	  culture	  remained	  very	  much	  divided	  regarding	  the	  strategic	  potential	  of	  the	  Predator	  program.	  	  
	   223	  
CHAPTER	  SIX,	  Wartime	  Predator:	  	  
A	  Short-­‐Term	  Innovation	  Focus	  	  Before	  the	  September	  11	  attacks,	  the	  USAF’s	  uniformed	  leadership	  pursued	  innovation	  in	  the	  Predator	  program	  with	  limited	  support	  from	  various	  officer	  communities.	  Many	  continued	  to	  see	  the	  Predator	  program	  as	  a	  niche	  capability.	  A	  cross-­‐cutting	  theme	  in	  chapters	  three,	  four,	  and	  five	  has	  been	  that	  cultural	  biases	  among	  ACC	  staff,	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  and	  intelligence	  officers	  led	  many	  in	  these	  communities	  to	  take	  a	  pessimistic	  view	  of	  the	  Predator’s	  potential	  in	  the	  emerging	  strategic	  context.	  	  But	  the	  invasions	  of	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq	  forced	  even	  the	  most	  critical	  Predator	  skeptics	  to	  revisit	  their	  assumptions.	  Demand	  for	  the	  UAV,	  which	  had	  deployed	  continuously	  starting	  in	  1996,	  exploded	  in	  2001.	  “All	  the	  CINCS	  [commanders	  in	  chief]	  are	  begging	  for	  more	  Predators,”	  a	  senior	  defense	  official	  remarked	  during	  an	  October	  2001	  press	  conference.1	  This	  chapter	  explores	  how	  the	  shock	  of	  the	  September	  11	  attacks	  and	  the	  subsequent	  US-­‐led	  invasions	  of	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan	  influenced	  the	  relationship	  between	  USAF	  culture	  and	  the	  Predator	  program.	  The	  first	  half	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  approach	  to	  technological	  and	  operational	  changes	  in	  the	  Predator	  program	  during	  wartime.	  The	  second	  half	  explores	  how	  USAF	  culture	  influenced	  the	  service’s	  response	  to	  the	  wartime	  demand,	  and	  how	  the	  Predator	  program’s	  success	  in	  combat,	  in	  turn,	  shaped	  USAF	  culture.	  	  	   	  
	  Wartime	  Predator	  	  	  Confirmed	  as	  the	  new	  USAF	  chief	  less	  than	  a	  week	  before	  the	  September	  11	  attacks,	  Gen.	  Jumper	  continued	  to	  advocate	  for	  the	  Predator	  program.	  He	  immediately	  ordered	  the	  32nd	  EAIS	  to	  deploy,	  recognizing	  the	  weaponized	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  DoD	  (Nov.	  1,	  2001)	  
	   224	  
Predator	  presented	  a	  unique	  opportunity	  to	  employ	  time-­‐sensitive	  targeting	  in	  a	  wartime	  setting.2	  	  	  Col.	  Boyle,	  now	  ACC’s	  chief	  of	  intelligence,	  had	  spent	  the	  summer	  of	  2001	  building	  an	  expanded	  squadron,	  which	  became	  known	  as	  the	  ACC	  EAIS	  but	  retained	  the	  mandate	  to	  conduct	  missions	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  CIA	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  weaponized	  Predator	  deployment.3	  The	  squadron	  also	  retained	  its	  flexibility	  to	  adjust	  to	  dynamic	  operations	  quickly;	  ACC	  was	  in	  its	  chain	  of	  command,	  but	  the	  squadron	  was	  still	  part	  of	  a	  Big	  Safari	  test	  program,	  which	  helped	  to	  minimize	  red	  tape.	   By	  September	  15,	  the	  ACC	  EAIS	  launch	  and	  recovery	  element	  and	  three	  weaponized	  Predators	  —	  tail	  numbers	  3034,	  3037,	  and	  3038	  	  —	  arrived	  in	  Uzbekistan	  in	  a	  USAF	  C-­‐17	  Globemaster	  III,	  thanks	  in	  part	  to	  Col.	  Clark,	  who	  retired	  from	  active	  duty	  on	  May	  1,	  2001	  but	  stayed	  on	  as	  a	  Pentagon	  civilian	  and	  the	  Predator	  program’s	  main	  bureaucratic	  fixer.4	  Meanwhile,	  the	  ACC	  EAIS	  Predator	  pilots,	  including	  then-­‐Maj.	  Cooter,	  still	  the	  squadron’s	  director	  of	  operations,	  were	  positioned	  in	  ground	  control	  stations	  at	  CIA	  headquarters.	  5	  President	  Bush	  quickly	  cleared	  up	  legal	  ambiguity	  about	  using	  the	  Predator	  for	  targeted	  killings	  in	  a	  Sept.	  17	  Memorandum	  of	  Notification	  that	  authorized	  the	  CIA	  to	  kill	  any	  members	  of	  al	  Qaeda	  or	  other	  terrorists,	  including	  Americans,	  on	  a	  “high	  value	  target	  list.”6	  He	  signed	  legislation	  granting	  the	  Authorization	  for	  the	  Use	  of	  Military	  Force	  against	  those	  responsible	  for	  the	  Sept.	  11	  attacks	  the	  next	  day.7	  	  
The	  First	  Hellfire	  Launch	  in	  Combat	  	  The	  first	  flight	  of	  a	  weaponized	  Predator	  over	  Afghanistan	  took	  place	  on	  September	  18.8	  Ten	  days	  later,	  the	  NSC	  established	  rules	  of	  engagement	  that	  gave	  a	  central	  role	  to	  CENTCOM	  and	  the	  CIA	  in	  Predator	  operations.	  However,	  there	  was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Whittle	  (2014)	  233	  3	  Boyle	  interview	  (Feb.	  11,	  2014)	  	  4	  Whittle	  (2014)	  240	  5	  Whittle	  (2014)	  240	  6	  Wood	  (2015)	  49	  	  7	  107th	  Congress	  (Sept.	  18,	  2001)	  	  8	  Cooter	  interview	  (May	  26,	  2014):	  Whittle	  (2014)	  244;	  Runkle	  (2011)	  2-­‐3	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no	  formal	  role	  at	  all	  for	  the	  USAF’s	  CAOC,	  which	  was	  supposed	  to	  be	  running	  the	  air	  war	  from	  Saudi	  Arabia.9	  As	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  five,	  Gen.	  Jumper	  saw	  the	  USAF	  playing	  a	  central	  role	  in	  armed	  Predator	  operations	  and	  worried	  about	  encroachment	  from	  the	  CIA	  and	  White	  House.	  To	  assuage	  his	  concerns	  in	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  air	  campaign	  over	  Afghanistan,	  Lt.	  Gen.	  John	  Campbell,	  the	  USAF’s	  top	  officer	  at	  the	  CIA,	  had	  called	  a	  meeting	  between	  the	  CIA,	  the	  Pentagon,	  and	  the	  USAF.	  Based	  on	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  meeting,	  the	  USAF	  expected	  the	  Joint	  Forces	  Air	  Component	  Commander	  (JFACC),	  the	  USAF	  officer	  responsible	  for	  the	  air	  war,	  to	  be	  briefed	  on	  Predator	  strikes.	  10	  Despite	  these	  assurances,	  however,	  Gen.	  Jumper’s	  fears	  were	  realized	  on	  October	  7,	  the	  first	  night	  of	  the	  air	  campaign.	  Then-­‐Lt.	  Gen.	  General	  Charles	  Wald,	  the	  JFACC,	  was	  left	  in	  the	  dark	  as	  the	  ACC	  EAIS,	  acting	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  CIA,	  fired	  the	  first	  Hellfire	  in	  combat	  from	  Predator	  3034	  at	  Mullah	  Omar,	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Taliban	  —	  and	  missed.11	  	  	  Command	  and	  control	  relationships	  became	  smoother	  as	  Operation	  Enduring	  Freedom	  (OEF)	  progressed.	  The	  ACC	  EAIS	  Predators,	  conducting	  missions	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  CIA,	  were	  added	  to	  the	  CAOC’s	  daily	  Air	  Tasking	  Order,	  a	  document	  that	  coordinates	  air	  operations	  over	  a	  24-­‐hour	  period,	  including	  information	  about	  call-­‐signs,	  aircraft	  types,	  mission	  types,	  and	  deconfliction.12	  When	  Gen.	  Moseley	  replaced	  Gen.	  Wald	  as	  the	  JFACC	  in	  November	  2001,	  he	  received	  authority	  to	  approve	  air	  strikes	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  CIA,	  provided	  that	  he	  minimalized	  collateral	  damage.13	  	  But	  the	  most	  important	  way	  the	  USAF	  ensured	  its	  central	  role	  was	  to	  stand	  up	  its	  own	  Predator	  operations,	  initially	  consisting	  of	  un-­‐armed	  air	  vehicles,	  some	  of	  which	  were	  still	  lacking	  a	  laser	  designator.14	  Then-­‐Maj.	  Peter	  Gersten,	  Gen.	  Wald’s	  aide-­‐de-­‐camp,	  mapped	  out	  the	  plan	  for	  USAF	  Predator	  operations	  on	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Whittle	  (2014)	  245;	  Woodward	  (2002)	  166	  10	  Campbell	  interview	  (June	  4,	  2014)	  	  11	  For	  a	  detailed	  narrative	  description	  of	  strike,	  see	  Whittle	  (2014)	  247-­‐264.	  	  	  	  12	  Wald	  (Feb.	  13,	  2015)	  	  13	  Whittle	  (2014)	  283	  14	  Wood	  (2015)	  41	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whiteboard	  at	  the	  CAOC.	  Since	  the	  USAF	  had	  not	  yet	  adopted	  RS0,	  the	  scheme	  was	  modeled	  after	  the	  “split	  operations”	  concept	  that	  the	  CIA	  used	  before	  9/11.	  Within	  days,	  Predator	  crews	  from	  the	  11th	  RS	  and	  15th	  RS	  deployed	  to	  Predator	  ground	  control	  stations	  in	  Pakistan	  and	  Kuwait	  and	  to	  Afghanistan	  to	  launch	  and	  recover	  the	  USAF's	  Predators.15	  	  The	  USAF	  also	  increased	  Predator	  production,	  doubling	  the	  number	  of	  Predators	  they	  would	  buy	  in	  2002	  to	  two	  per	  month.	  The	  service	  also	  began	  to	  retrofit	  all	  Predators	  with	  laser	  designators	  and	  Hellfire	  missiles	  in	  December	  2001	  in	  response	  to	  a	  US	  Central	  Command	  request.	  Also	  that	  month,	  the	  USAF	  designated	  the	  new	  weaponized	  Predators	  “MQ-­‐1”	  rather	  than	  “RQ-­‐1,	  reflecting	  their	  multi-­‐mission	  role.16	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Predator	  Innovation	  Efforts	  	  As	  the	  USAF	  streamlined	  Predator	  operations	  in	  Afghanistan,	  changes	  were	  also	  afoot	  in	  the	  United	  States	  to	  expand	  and	  evolve	  the	  Predator’s	  capabilities.	  But	  on	  this	  front,	  progress	  was	  much	  slower.	  Short-­‐term	  adaptations	  for	  wartime,	  as	  well	  as	  longer-­‐term	  innovations,	  fell	  by	  the	  wayside	  or	  moved	  forward	  incrementally	  because	  the	  Air	  Staff	  and	  ACC	  did	  not	  take	  initiative,	  leaving	  innovation	  to	  other	  organizations	  within	  the	  Air	  Force	  and	  to	  GA-­‐ASI.	  	  	  The	  main	  example	  of	  the	  USAFs’	  struggle	  to	  push	  Predator	  innovation	  was	  the	  Predator	  B,	  the	  bigger,	  faster,	  and	  more	  heavily-­‐armed	  successor	  to	  the	  Predator.	  In	  early	  2001,	  Cassidy,	  still	  president	  of	  GA-­‐ASI,	  showed	  a	  video	  of	  a	  Predator	  B	  to	  Gen.	  Jumper,	  still	  at	  ACC,	  who	  agreed	  to	  buy	  two	  demonstrator	  aircraft.17	  Following	  the	  September	  11	  attacks,	  Big	  Safari	  purchased	  three	  Predator	  B	  aircraft	  and	  completed	  prototype	  testing	  in	  2003.18	  But	  just	  as	  the	  USAF	  allowed	  the	  CIA	  to	  deploy	  the	  Predator	  to	  Afghanistan	  first,	  it	  once	  again	  stood	  on	  the	  sidelines	  while	  the	  agency,	  with	  help	  from	  Big	  Safari	  and	  GA-­‐ASI,	  conducted	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Wald	  (Feb.	  13,	  2015)	  ;	  Wood	  (2015)	  41;	  	  16	  Whittle	  (2014)	  292	  17	  Anselmo	  (May	  30,	  2005)	  50	  	  18	  Cullen	  (2011)	  261	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first	  Predator	  B	  missions	  over	  the	  war-­‐torn	  nation.19	  The	  USAF	  did	  not	  begin	  flying	  the	  Predator	  B	  —	  which	  was	  designated	  the	  MQ-­‐9	  Reaper	  in	  September	  200620	  	  —	  in	  Afghanistan	  until	  the	  new	  42nd	  Attack	  Squadron	  at	  Creech	  AFB	  (formerly	  known	  as	  Indian	  Springs	  )	  began	  operations	  on	  September	  25,	  2007.21	  	  	  	   Another	  Predator	  innovation	  that	  was	  pioneered	  by	  actors	  other	  than	  the	  Air	  Staff	  or	  ACC	  was	  the	  Remote	  Operational	  Video	  Enhanced	  Receiver	  (ROVER).	  In	  response	  to	  a	  wartime	  request	  from	  USAF	  gunship	  crews	  in	  October	  2001,	  the	  ACC	  EAIS	  worked	  with	  Big	  Safari	  to	  develop	  a	  mechanism	  to	  enable	  Predator	  FMV	  to	  be	  streamed	  to	  gunships	  in	  real-­‐time.22	  Big	  Safari	  worked	  with	  US	  Special	  Operations	  Forces	  (SOF)	  to	  develop	  ROVER	  II,	  which	  delivered	  the	  Predator’s	  FMV	  feeds	  directly	  to	  hand-­‐held	  devices	  for	  ground	  forces	  clearing	  hostile	  and	  remote	  areas	  in	  the	  mountainous	  regions	  of	  Afghanistan.23	  	   Finally,	  between	  2003	  and	  2006,	  Predator	  crews	  themselves	  began	  to	  undertake	  minor	  modifications	  to	  improve	  Predator	  ground	  control	  stations.	  GA-­‐ASI	  used	  proprietary	  software,	  but	  the	  crews	  added	  new	  displays	  and	  mounted	  equipment	  on	  racks	  to	  accommodate	  the	  improvements.	  One	  major	  change	  involved	  the	  addition	  of	  classified	  computers	  with	  access	  to	  programs	  such	  as	  Falconview,	  a	  program	  developed	  by	  fighter	  pilots	  to	  plan	  and	  track	  their	  missions.	  Another	  innovation	  consisted	  of	  the	  addition	  of	  mIRC-­‐chat,	  open	  source	  software	  to	  enable	  text-­‐based	  chatting	  with	  intelligence	  analysts	  and	  ground	  forces.24	  	  	  
Predator	  Normalization:	  2001-­‐2005	  	  During	  his	  tenure	  as	  chief,	  between	  2001	  and	  September	  2005,	  Gen.	  Jumper	  continued	  to	  support	  ACC’s	  focus	  on	  “normalization”	  of	  the	  Predator	  program.	  The	  idea	  was	  to	  integrate	  the	  existing	  Predator	  system	  into	  the	  USAF	  force	  structure,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  GA-­‐ASI	  senior	  executive	  	  20	  LaFranchi	  (Sept.	  15,	  2006)	  	  21	  Defense	  Daily	  International	  (Oct.	  19,	  2007);	  Dumboski	  (Nov.	  17,	  2006)	  22	  Boyle	  interview	  (Nov.	  20,	  2015)	  	  23	  Manuel	  interview	  (Oct.	  11,	  2013);	  for	  narrative	  details	  of	  ROVER	  II	  see	  Grimes	  (2014)	  336-­‐337	  and	  Whittle	  (August	  2011)	  25-­‐28	  24	  Mindell	  (2015)	  144	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rather	  than	  forcing	  the	  USAF	  to	  make	  ad	  hoc,	  disruptive	  adjustments	  in	  a	  chaotic	  wartime	  context.	  	   In	  March	  2002,	  Gen.	  Jumper	  ordered	  the	  transition	  of	  the	  ACC	  EAIS	  from	  Big	  Safari	  test	  program	  status	  to	  ACC-­‐regulated	  combat-­‐coded	  operations.25	  Until	  this	  point,	  ACC	  nominally	  controlled	  the	  squadron,	  but	  it	  flew	  missions	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  CIA	  from	  the	  agency’s	  headquarters,	  using	  hand-­‐picked	  Big	  Safari	  crews	  and	  test-­‐coded	  aircraft.	  With	  the	  squadron’s	  operations	  tempo	  so	  high,	  however,	  the	  USAF	  decided	  to	  formalize	  the	  squadron’s	  ad	  hoc	  structure	  to	  improve	  efficiency.26	  In	  response,	  the	  CIA	  began	  to	  acquire	  its	  own	  UAVs	  because	  it	  wanted	  to	  maintain	  flexibility	  at	  the	  tactical	  and	  operational	  level.	  27	  But	  it	  continued	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  ACC	  EAIS,	  renamed	  the	  17th	  RS,	  to	  fly	  and	  maintain	  the	  aircraft.28	  	   The	  USAF	  staffed	  the	  17th	  RS	  with	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  who	  had	  been	  flying	  Predators	  with	  the	  11th	  and	  15th	  squadrons,	  already	  under	  full	  ACC	  control.29	  Former	  ACC	  EAIS	  squadron	  aircraft	  became	  “combat	  coded”	  instead	  of	  “test	  coded.”30	  The	  only	  vestige	  of	  the	  old	  organizational	  structure	  was	  its	  continued	  support	  to	  the	  CIA	  and	  its	  ongoing	  dependence	  on	  the	  Predator	  Special	  Program	  Office	  (SPO)	  at	  Big	  Safari,	  which	  remained	  responsible	  for	  Predator	  program	  acquisition	  until	  2006.31	  	  	   The	  USAF	  undertook	  a	  second	  normalization	  effort	  in	  early	  2002	  when	  it	  adopted	  the	  RSO	  concept	  in	  preparation	  for	  Operation	  Iraqi	  Freedom	  (OIF),	  which	  began	  in	  March	  2003.32	  Although	  this	  concept	  clashed	  sharply	  with	  existing	  USAF	  doctrine,	  practical	  reasons	  overruled	  cultural	  concerns.	  In	  the	  opening	  days	  of	  the	  war	  in	  Iraq,	  RSO	  allowed	  the	  Predator	  to	  play	  a	  role	  immediately,	  at	  potentially	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Swanson	  interview	  (Feb	  2,	  2015)	  Boyle	  interview	  (Nov.	  20,	  2015);	  Grimes	  interview	  (Nov.	  14,	  2013)	  	  	  26	  Swanson	  interview	  (Feb.	  2,	  2015);	  Boyle	  interview	  (Dec.	  4,	  2014);	  Grimes	  interview	  (Nov.	  5,	  2013)	  27	  Boyle	  interview	  (Nov.	  20,	  2015);	  	  28	  Woods	  (April	  14,	  2014)	  29	  Air	  Force	  Research	  Historical	  Agency	  (Apr.	  15,	  2012);	  	  Swanson	  interview	  (Nov.	  17,	  2014)	  	  	  	  30	  Boyle	  interview	  (Dec.	  4,	  2014)	  	  31	  Boyle	  interview	  (Nov.	  20,	  2015);	  Robotham,(Aug.	  6,	  	  2012)	  10.	  32	  Cooter	  (Jan.	  27,	  2015)	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less	  expense,	  because	  the	  burgeoning	  requirements	  for	  infrastructure,	  logistics,	  and	  manpower	  would	  be	  met	  in	  the	  continental	  United	  States.33	   	  The	  USAF’s	  first	  RSO	  site	  was	  the	  Predator	  Operations	  Cell	  at	  Nellis	  AFB	  in	  Nevada.	  At	  the	  time,	  Indian	  Springs,	  the	  pre-­‐9/11	  home	  of	  the	  11th	  RS	  and	  15th	  RS,	  lacked	  the	  communications	  infrastructure	  to	  support	  RSO.34	  The	  15th	  and	  new	  17th	  reconnaissance	  squadrons	  flew	  a	  small	  number	  of	  operational	  Predator	  combat	  air	  patrols	  (CAPs),	  each	  consisting	  of	  four	  air	  vehicles	  providing	  24-­‐	  hour	  coverage,	  from	  Nellis.	  As	  of	  the	  spring	  of	  2003,	  the	  11th	  RS	  was	  relieved	  of	  its	  warfighting	  responsibilities	  to	  focus	  on	  Formal	  Training	  Unit	  duties	  at	  Indian	  Springs.35	  	  These	  early	  OIF	  missions	  marked	  the	  first	  time	  that	  Predator	  pilots	  operated	  from	  the	  continental	  United	  States	  on	  behalf	  of	  USAF	  missions	  rather	  than	  CIA	  ones.	  	  	  	  Investigative	  journalist	  Chris	  Wood	  asserts	  that	  USAF-­‐owned	  Predators	  were	  not	  armed	  until	  2004,36	  but	  further	  research	  indicates	  they	  had	  limited	  strike	  capability	  from	  the	  start.37	  Initially,	  the	  most	  common	  Predator	  missions	  involved	  identifying	  and	  striking	  mobile	  Scud	  missiles	  targeted	  at	  Israel,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  mobile	  targets	  from	  anti-­‐aircraft	  guns	  to	  SAMs.38	  
	   The	  USAF’s	  third	  normalization	  effort	  involved	  adjustments	  to	  USAF	  personnel	  policies	  to	  make	  Predator	  assignments	  more	  attractive.	  First,	  in	  2002,	  USAF	  Secretary	  James	  Roche	  re-­‐interpreted	  a	  USAF	  legal	  ruling	  on	  gate	  credit	  to	  allow	  UAV	  pilots	  to	  receive	  flight	  pay.39	  That	  adjustment	  came	  on	  the	  heels	  of	  a	  1999	  decision	  to	  shorten	  the	  length	  of	  Predator	  ALFA	  tours	  to	  two	  years	  and	  promise	  pilots	  a	  follow-­‐on	  assignment	  in	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  of	  their	  choice.40	  Second,	  senior	  USAF	  leaders	  began	  to	  debate	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  separate	  career	  field	  for	  Predator	  pilots.	  Gen.	  Jumper,	  still	  the	  chief,	  proposed	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  “Combat	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Swanson	  interview	  (Oct.	  28,	  2015);	  predator	  pilot	  #	  1interview;	  Big	  Safari	  Scientist	  interview	  	  34	  	  ibid	  35	  ACC	  History	  (2011)	  188.	  36	  Wood	  (2015)	  75	  37	  Boyle	  interview	  (Nov.	  20,	  2015);	  Fulghum	  (Apr.	  7,	  2003)	  38	  	  ibid	  	  39	  Cantwell	  (2007)	  88;	  Aviation	  Week	  (Oct.	  21,	  2002)	  21.	  	  40	  Cantwell	  (2007)	  95	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Systems	  Officer”	  (CSO)	  career	  field	  for	  Predator	  pilots	  in	  2003.	  He	  wanted	  to	  introduce	  Predator	  training	  as	  a	  separate	  career	  track	  for	  navigators,	  who	  had	  been	  relatively	  enthusiastic	  about	  Predator	  assignments,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Question	  2.41	  	   Other	  USAF	  leaders	  called	  for	  more	  manned	  aircraft	  flight	  training.	  They	  proposed	  a	  17XX	  career	  field,	  which	  would	  require	  students	  to	  pass	  the	  USAF’s	  Initial	  Flight	  Screening	  (IFS)	  and	  the	  first	  half	  of	  Undergraduate	  Pilot	  Training	  (UPT),	  including	  both	  academics	  and	  flying	  the	  T-­‐6	  Texan	  trainer	  aircraft,	  before	  completing	  UAV	  training.	  Some	  debate	  remained	  about	  how	  much	  flight	  instruction	  the	  17XX	  students	  should	  receive,	  however,	  so	  in	  2005	  an	  MQ-­‐1	  Training	  Test	  program	  was	  initiated	  with	  three	  student	  volunteers.42	  Finally,	  before	  leaving	  office,	  Gen.	  Jumper	  approved	  the	  stand-­‐up	  of	  the	  3rd	  Special	  Operations	  Squadron	  (SoS),	  which	  would	  be	  managed	  by	  AFSOC	  and	  would	  exempt	  from	  standard	  USAF	  procedures.	  Originally	  based	  at	  Nellis	  AFB,	  the	  squadron	  later	  subsumed	  the	  USAF’s	  15th	  RS	  at	  Creech	  AFB	  and	  moved	  to	  Cannon	  AFB	  in	  New	  Mexico.43	  It	  was	  stood	  up	  in	  response	  to	  a	  request	  from	  then-­‐Maj.	  Gen.	  Stanley	  McChrystal,	  head	  of	  Joint	  Special	  Operations	  Command	  (JSOC),	  a	  military	  unit	  that	  operates	  outside	  the	  normal	  chain	  of	  command,	  reporting	  only	  to	  the	  president	  and	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense.44	  	  	  	  
The	  Army’s	  Response	  to	  UAVs	  in	  the	  Battlespace	  
	  As	  the	  USAF	  focused	  on	  normalization	  at	  home,	  the	  Army	  ramped	  up	  two	  ground	  wars	  that	  demanded	  more	  Predator	  ISR	  support.	  	  By	  2004,	  the	  USAF	  had	  five	  operational	  CAPs.45	  Each	  CAP	  provided	  22	  hours	  of	  continuous	  coverage	  but	  required	  significant	  resources,	  including	  four	  air	  vehicles	  and	  186	  personnel,	  ranging	  from	  aircrews	  at	  ground	  control	  stations	  and	  launch	  and	  recovery	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Cantwell	  (2007)	  97-­‐98	  42	  ibid	  43	  Allison	  (Oct.	  9,	  2008)	  44	  Woods	  (2015)	  72	  45	  Stein	  (March	  10,	  2015)	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elements	  to	  intelligence	  analysts	  at	  the	  USAF’S	  Distributed	  Common	  Ground	  Stations.46	  Almost	  immediately	  after	  OEF	  began,	  the	  Army	  wanted	  to	  buy	  its	  own	  version	  of	  the	  Predator	  known	  as	  the	  Warrior	  Extended	  Range/Multipurpose	  (ER/MP).47	  In	  2004,	  Army	  officials	  formally	  pitched	  requirements	  for	  a	  new	  UAV	  to	  the	  Pentagon	  through	  the	  Joint	  Capabilities	  Integration	  Development	  System	  (JCIDS)	  process,	  an	  acquisition	  procedure	  meant	  to	  eliminate	  redundant	  weapons	  development.	  Given	  the	  Army’s	  demand	  for	  more	  USAF	  Predator	  support,	  the	  obvious	  candidate	  for	  the	  ER/MP	  acquisition	  was	  some	  version	  of	  the	  GA-­‐ASI	  Predator,	  although	  the	  Army	  did	  consider	  a	  Northrop	  Grumman	  offering.48	  Despite	  its	  similarities	  with	  the	  Predator,	  the	  ER/MP	  successfully	  navigated	  the	  JROC	  process.	  In	  the	  summer	  of	  2005,	  the	  Army	  awarded	  GA-­‐ASI	  a	  contract	  for	  the	  ER/MP,	  known	  in	  the	  prototype	  stage	  as	  the	  “Warrior	  Alpha”	  and	  later,	  the	  MQ-­‐1C	  Gray	  Eagle.49	  The	  USAF	  opposed	  the	  Army’s	  encroachment	  into	  the	  world	  of	  Predator-­‐class	  UAV	  acquisition.	  The	  service	  began	  to	  lobby	  the	  Pentagon	  to	  become	  the	  “executive	  agent”	  for	  UAVs	  in	  the	  winter	  of	  2005.50	  Gen.	  Moseley,	  the	  vice	  chief,	  was	  the	  driving	  force	  behind	  the	  effort.	  In	  a	  March	  2005	  memo	  to	  the	  Vice	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff,	  Admiral	  Edmund	  Giambastiani,	  Gen.	  Moseley	  suggested	  that	  the	  USAF	  wanted	  some	  degree	  of	  control	  over	  all	  the	  military’s	  UAV	  programs.51	  	  The	  JROC	  ultimately	  rejected	  the	  USAF’s	  executive	  agency	  proposal	  after	  the	  Army,	  Navy,	  and	  Marines	  opposed	  it	  as	  a	  power	  grab	  that	  might	  diminish	  their	  ability	  to	  establish	  their	  own	  UAV	  programs,	  including	  the	  Army’s	  ER/MP.52	  But	  the	  matter	  was	  far	  from	  closed.	  Gen.	  Moseley	  would	  continue	  his	  push	  for	  executive	  agency	  in	  his	  role	  as	  USAF	  chief	  from	  September	  2005	  to	  July	  2008.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  ACC	  History	  Office,	  (2011)	  184	  	  	  47	  Jane’s	  Defence	  Weekly	  (Apr.	  12,	  2002)	  48	  Jane’s	  Defence	  Weekly	  (Jan.	  6,	  2005)	  	  49	  Jane’s	  Defence	  Weekly(Aug.	  11,	  2005.	  50	  Butler	  and	  Fulghum	  (March	  7,	  2005)	  	  51	  Moseley	  (March	  11,	  2005)	  	  52	  Butler	  and	  Fulghum	  (March	  7,	  2005)	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The	  Moseley	  Era	  	  Gen.	  Moseley	  undertook	  some	  efforts	  to	  continue	  the	  “normalization”	  process,	  started	  during	  Gen.	  Fogelman’s	  tenure.	  In	  July	  2006,	  the	  USAF	  transitioned	  Predator	  acquisition	  management	  from	  Big	  Safari	  to	  a	  new	  658th	  Aeronautical	  Systems	  Squadron	  (AESS).53	  The	  USAF	  also	  stood	  up	  its	  first	  UAV	  Wing,	  the	  432nd	  Wing	  at	  Creech	  AFB.54	  	   But	  Gen.	  Moseley’s	  biggest	  policy	  change,	  related	  to	  UAV	  manning,	  directly	  undermined	  the	  normalization	  concept,	  which	  aimed	  to	  methodically	  integrate	  the	  UAV	  into	  the	  USAF.	  In	  December	  2006,	  the	  USAF’s	  plans	  to	  create	  a	  separate	  17XX	  training	  pipeline	  were	  abruptly	  cancelled.55	  Instead,	  the	  USAF	  continued	  to	  insist	  on	  sending	  fully	  trained	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  to	  ALFA	  tours	  for	  Predator	  assignments.	  The	  tension	  between	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  community	  and	  the	  wartime	  demands	  for	  the	  Predator	  became	  sharper	  as	  a	  result.	  	  A	  new	  Predator	  pilot	  career	  field	  might	  have	  relieved	  some	  pressure	  on	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  community.	  Instead,	  ALFA	  tours	  were	  lengthened	  to	  three	  or	  four	  years	  and	  assignment	  freezes	  were	  enacted,	  voiding	  the	  USAF’s	  promise	  to	  put	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  back	  in	  their	  manned	  aircraft	  of	  choice	  after	  a	  Predator	  assignment.	  The	  non-­‐volunteer	  Predator	  pilots	  were	  asked	  to	  work	  12-­‐hour	  shifts,	  six	  days	  a	  week	  and	  to	  sacrifice	  annual	  leave.56	  	  The	  service’s	  struggle	  to	  keep	  pilot	  training	  in	  pace	  with	  demand	  headed	  toward	  a	  crisis	  point.	  The	  2006	  Quadrennial	  Defense	  Review	  called	  for	  21	  Predator	  CAPs	  by	  2010,	  but	  ground	  commanders	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq	  wanted	  a	  faster	  increase.57	  On	  January	  10,	  2007,	  President	  Bush	  announced	  the	  US	  would	  deploy	  30,000	  additional	  troops	  to	  Iraq.58	  Shortly	  after	  US	  Army	  General	  David	  Petraeus	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Robotham	  (2012)	  14	  and	  59	  54	  Air	  Force	  (undated)	  Fact	  Sheet:	  432nd	  Wing	  Air	  Expeditionary	  Wing	  	  55	  Cantwell	  (2007)	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  2014)	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assumed	  command	  of	  military	  forces	  in	  Iraq	  in	  February	  2007,	  he	  began	  lobbying	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Robert	  Gates	  for	  an	  emergency	  increase	  in	  Predator	  orbits	  to	  support	  the	  surge.59	  US	  Navy	  Admiral	  Eric	  Olson,	  head	  of	  Special	  Operations	  Command,	  told	  the	  US	  Congress	  in	  2008	  that	  US	  Central	  Command	  and	  SOCOM	  needed	  30	  Predator	  CAPs.	  60	  	  	  Between	  July	  2007	  and	  February	  2008,	  Secretary	  Gates	  ordered	  the	  USAF	  to	  surge	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  capacity	  three	  times.61	  In	  his	  autobiography,	  he	  claimed	  that	  by	  mid-­‐2007	  the	  USAF	  only	  had	  eight	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  CAPs	  in	  the	  air,	  although	  the	  USAF’s	  own	  records	  show	  there	  were	  over	  15	  at	  this	  time.62	  Secretary	  Gates’	  underlying	  assumption	  was	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  programs	  should	  be	  expanding	  far	  more	  quickly	  than	  the	  Army’s	  nascent	  ER/MP	  program.	  In	  April	  2007,	  there	  were	  only	  10	  Warrior	  Alpha	  prototypes	  flying	  in	  Iraq.63	  	  	  The	  USAF	  responded	  to	  Secretary	  Gates’	  orders	  with	  several	  steps	  to	  boost	  CAPs	  quickly.	  First,	  the	  service	  asked	  GA-­‐ASI	  to	  build	  more	  aircraft	  in	  2007	  and	  2008,	  prompting	  the	  company	  to	  expand	  its	  production	  facilities.64	  Second,	  the	  USAF	  took	  draconian	  steps	  to	  shore	  up	  the	  Predator	  pilot	  pool.	  It	  extended	  existing	  Predator	  assignments,	  mobilized	  pilots	  from	  the	  ANG	  and	  Air	  Force	  Reserve,	  and,	  in	  October	  2007,	  started	  Transformation	  Aircrew	  Management	  Initiatives	  for	  the	  21st	  Century	  (TAMI-­‐21).65	  That	  effort	  required	  commanders	  of	  over-­‐manned	  traditional	  aircraft	  units	  to	  select	  less-­‐experienced	  pilots	  with	  limited	  flying	  hours	  to	  be	  re-­‐assigned	  to	  UAVs	  with	  no	  promise	  of	  returning	  to	  the	  cockpit.66	  	  	  As	  Secretary	  Gates’	  pressure	  mounted,	  Gen.	  Moseley	  went	  on	  the	  offensive.	  He	  renewed	  the	  USAF’s	  bid	  for	  executive	  agency	  in	  a	  March	  5,	  2007	  memo	  to	  the	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  (2009)	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  Moseley	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service	  chiefs	  and	  US	  lawmakers.67	  He	  called	  for	  the	  CAOC	  to	  control	  UAVs	  flying	  above	  3,500	  feet,	  which	  included	  the	  Army’s	  ER/MP,	  in	  any	  warfighting	  theater.68	  The	  other	  service	  chiefs	  again	  rejected	  the	  plan,	  but	  the	  Army	  was	  most	  vocal	  because	  it	  would	  lose	  command	  of	  its	  own	  UAV	  asset,	  the	  ER/MP,	  in	  combat.69	  Secretary	  Gates	  ultimately	  overruled	  the	  USAF	  proposal	  and	  continued	  to	  berate	  the	  service	  for	  failing	  to	  produce	  more	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  orbits.	  	  Gen.	  Moseley	  responded	  with	  brinkmanship,	  offering	  to	  break	  the	  training	  pipeline	  to	  meet	  Secretary	  Gates’	  requirements.	  In	  December	  2007,	  he	  proposed	  closing	  Creech’s	  Predator	  schoolhouse	  to	  free	  up	  almost	  100	  percent	  of	  aircraft	  and	  pilots	  for	  deployment,	  thereby	  increasing	  the	  number	  of	  CAPs	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  to	  36	  by	  August.70	  The	  432nd	  Wing	  Commander,	  Col.	  Chris	  Chambliss,	  publicly	  warned	  that	  the	  concept	  would	  put	  the	  USAF’s	  UAV	  fleet	  on	  the	  same	  ruinous	  path	  as	  the	  German	  Luftwaffe,	  which	  cut	  back	  training	  in	  World	  War	  II	  to	  get	  more	  pilots	  in	  the	  air	  and	  suffered	  increased	  losses	  as	  a	  result.71	  Not	  surprisingly,	  Secretary	  Gates	  rejected	  the	  offer,	  but	  he	  continued	  to	  press	  for	  CAP	  increases.72	  	  The	  tension	  between	  Secretary	  Gates	  and	  Gen.	  Moseley	  over	  the	  rate	  of	  UAV	  orbit	  increases	  was	  emblematic	  of	  a	  much	  larger	  philosophical	  divide	  over	  strategy,	  discussed	  in	  Question	  2	  below.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  divide,	  the	  two	  men	  clashed	  over	  a	  variety	  of	  issues	  ranging	  from	  UAVs	  to	  the	  USAF’s	  management	  of	  the	  nuclear	  arsenal.	  Gates	  fired	  Gen.	  Moseley	  and	  Secretary	  Michael	  Wynne	  on	  June	  5,	  2008,	  shortly	  after	  nuclear	  missile	  fuses	  were	  accidentally	  shipped	  to	  Taiwan.73	  Reflecting	  on	  this	  early	  post-­‐9/11	  period,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  there	  was	  finally	  a	  widespread	  perception	  in	  the	  USAF	  of	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  strategic	  context	  toward	  conflict	  in	  the	  “gray	  zone.”	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  service	  pursued	  several	  innovations	  related	  to	  the	  Predator	  program,	  including	  the	  Rover	  and	  the	  Reaper,	  and	  also	  dramatically	  boosted	  UAV	  orbits	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq.	  Between	  2007	  and	  2008	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the	  number	  of	  CAPs	  exploded	  from	  19	  to	  34.74	  Outside	  the	  USAF,	  however	  the	  perception	  of	  a	  USAF	  failure	  to	  aggressively	  pursue	  UAV	  innovation	  despite	  combatant	  commanders’	  demands	  remained	  widespread.	  The	  four	  questions	  below	  will	  explore	  how	  USAF	  culture	  influenced	  the	  service’s	  capacity	  to	  respond	  to	  wartime	  demands,	  and	  how	  the	  Predator	  program’s	  success	  in	  combat	  in	  turn	  shaped	  USAF	  culture.	  	  
	  
1. To	  what	  extent	  did	  individuals	  or	  groups	  within	  the	  USAF	  resist	  	  
the	  Predator	  out	  of	  a	  concern	  that	  their	  jobs	  or	  status	  might	  be	  
threatened	  by	  it?	  	  	  After	  the	  September	  11	  attacks,	  external	  pressure	  forced	  the	  USAF	  to	  aggressively	  pursue	  innovation	  in	  the	  Predator	  program.	  In	  their	  positions	  as	  USAF	  chiefs,	  both	  Gen.	  Jumper	  and	  Gen.	  Moseley	  encouraged	  a	  cultural	  shift	  to	  support	  the	  wartime	  demand	  for	  UAVs.	  But	  it	  was	  difficult	  for	  USAF	  leaders	  to	  reconcile	  two	  competing	  imperatives:	  first,	  to	  rapidly	  field	  Predator	  CAPs	  and	  second,	  to	  foster	  cultural	  acceptance	  of	  the	  Predator	  through	  a	  gradual	  process	  of	  “normalization.”	  The	  service’s	  failure	  to	  manage	  these	  competing	  priorities	  fostered	  a	  growing	  antipathy	  toward	  the	  Predator	  at	  ACC	  and	  in	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  community.	  	  	  	  
Manned	  Pilot	  Community	  Attitudes	  Toward	  the	  Predator	  Program	  	  
	  The	  USAF’s	  personnel	  policy	  choices,	  influenced	  by	  wartime	  pressures,	  worsened	  Predator	  pilot	  morale.	  Predator	  assignments	  continued	  to	  be	  filled	  with	  disgruntled	  non-­‐volunteer	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots,	  still	  frequently	  recruited	  from	  the	  bottom	  of	  their	  class.	  Then-­‐	  Brig.	  Gen.	  Charles	  Lyon	  recalled	  that	  about	  22	  out	  of	  100	  of	  his	  Predator	  pilots	  were	  “passed	  over”	  for	  promotion	  while	  he	  was	  commander	  of	  the	  57th	  Operations	  Group	  at	  Nellis	  AFB	  from	  2002	  to	  2004.75	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Personnel	  policy	  changes,	  including	  the	  decision	  to	  give	  flight	  pay	  to	  Predator	  pilots,	  reduce	  the	  ALFA	  tour	  length,	  and	  promise	  a	  follow-­‐on	  assignment,	  did	  not	  increase	  volunteer	  rates.	  The	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  community’s	  continued	  distaste	  for	  a	  Predator	  assignment	  was	  apparent	  in	  a	  2006	  survey	  of	  nearly	  400	  military	  officers	  in	  aviation	  specialties:	  34	  percent	  of	  USAF	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  said	  they	  would	  leave	  the	  service	  rather	  than	  accept	  a	  UAV	  assignment.76	  	  Morale	  worsened	  in	  the	  Predator	  pilot	  community	  in	  the	  mid-­‐2000’s	  as	  Predator	  demand	  increased.	  The	  USAF	  reneged	  on	  its	  promises	  to	  Predator	  pilots.	  “The	  snowball	  kept	  getting	  bigger	  so	  that	  we	  couldn’t	  let	  people	  go	  because	  we	  couldn’t	  grow	  fast	  enough.	  That	  three-­‐to-­‐four	  year	  ALFA	  tour	  turned	  into	  an	  assignment	  freeze,”	  said	  one	  Predator	  commander.	  “Now	  we	  had	  people	  in	  this	  weapon	  system	  that	  had	  been	  in	  here	  for	  six	  or	  seven	  years	  with	  no	  end	  in	  sight	  and	  we	  kept	  giving	  them	  false	  promises.”77	  Morale	  was	  so	  “awful,”	  according	  to	  one	  Predator	  flight	  commander	  in	  the	  15th	  RS	  from	  2005	  to	  2006,	  that	  “I	  was	  actually	  booed	  by	  my	  flight.	  I	  was	  trying	  to	  do	  something	  to	  create	  morale,	  but	  they	  were	  just	  so	  bitter	  and	  angry.”78	  	  Morale	  approached	  the	  meltdown	  stage	  during	  Gen.	  Moseley’s	  tenure,	  as	  he	  continued	  to	  insist	  on	  using	  fully	  trained	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  to	  meet	  Secretary	  Gates’	  surge	  requirements	  for	  UAVs.	  Most	  notably,	  Gen.	  Moseley’s	  TAMI-­‐21	  initiative	  posed	  a	  direct	  threat	  to	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  community.	  TAMI-­‐21	  candidates	  were	  newly	  minted	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots,	  mostly	  from	  the	  fighter	  community,	  who	  were	  forced	  into	  a	  UAV	  with	  poor	  prospects	  of	  returning	  to	  a	  cockpit.	  The	  idea	  was	  to	  infuse	  the	  UAV	  community	  with	  young,	  highly	  skilled	  pilots,	  but	  some	  were	  bitter	  about	  losing	  the	  chance	  to	  fly.	  USAF	  commanders,	  even	  UAV	  advocates,	  were	  sympathetic.	  	  “Morale	  was	  crushed,”	  recalled	  Col.	  James	  Cluff,	  432nd	  Wing	  commander	  from	  May	  2013	  to	  June	  2015.	  “It’s	  the	  Hotel	  California	  analogy.	  You	  check	  in	  and	  you’re	  never	  going	  to	  check	  out.”79	  Other	  commanders	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agreed	  that	  the	  morale-­‐crushing	  impact	  of	  TAMI-­‐21	  was	  not	  worth	  it.	  “When	  I	  first	  heard	  about	  the	  program	  I	  thought	  it	  was	  complete	  bullshit,”	  said	  Col.	  Cantwell,	  served	  as	  a	  UAV	  commander	  at	  Creech	  AFB	  from	  2012	  to	  2014.80	  Retired	  Lt.	  Gen.	  David	  Deptula,	  the	  former	  USAF	  ISR	  chief	  and	  a	  major	  UAV	  advocate	  during	  Gen.	  Moseley’s	  tenure,	  agreed	  that	  TAMI-­‐21	  was	  a	  “horrible	  mistake,”	  because	  it	  precluded	  pilots	  from	  returning	  to	  the	  cockpit.81	  	  	  	  
The	  Demand	  for	  More	  UAV	  Orbits:	  Foot-­‐Dragging	  at	  ACC	  	  Although	  the	  USAF	  pursued	  drastic	  measures	  such	  as	  TAMI-­‐21	  to	  field	  more	  UAV	  capability,	  there	  was	  still	  an	  external	  perception	  of	  USAF	  obstructionism.	  	  In	  his	  autobiography,	  Secretary	  Gates	  accused	  the	  USAF	  of	  failing	  to	  embrace	  UAVs	  because	  it	  was	  mired	  in	  the	  pro-­‐pilot	  bias	  of	  the	  Gen.	  McPeak	  era.82	  In	  April	  2008	  he	  gave	  an	  infamous	  speech	  at	  Maxwell	  AFB	  in	  Alabama,	  the	  USAF’s	  intellectual	  home,	  saying	  it	  had	  been	  “like	  pulling	  teeth”	  to	  get	  the	  military	  services	  to	  deploy	  more	  ISR	  assets.83	  Gen.	  Moseley	  said	  the	  remark	  was	  aimed	  personally	  at	  him	  and	  Secretary	  Wynne.84	  As	  discussed	  in	  Question	  2,	  however,	  Gen.	  Moseley	  was	  not	  personally	  opposed	  to	  increasing	  UAV	  capability	  and	  he	  even	  cautioned	  his	  senior	  officers	  to	  squelch	  any	  pro-­‐pilot	  bias	  that	  Secretary	  Gates	  described.	  In	  a	  Feb.	  28,	  2008	  email,	  he	  warned	  combatant	  commanders	  and	  the	  Air	  Staff	  not	  to	  foster	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  USAF	  as	  a	  culturally	  hidebound	  institution.	  “Despite	  our	  continued	  efforts	  to	  deliver	  more	  combat	  capability,	  there	  is	  a	  perception	  the	  Air	  Force	  is	  withholding	  capability,”	  he	  wrote.	  “That	  is	  not	  the	  way	  we	  do	  business	  and	  it	  is	  not	  part	  of	  our	  culture.”85	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  Cantwell	  interview	  (March	  6,	  2014)	  81	  Deptula,	  (June	  2,	  2014)	  82	  Gates	  (2014)	  128	  83	  Gates	  (Apr.	  21,	  2008)	  84	  Moseley	  interview	  (April	  1,	  2014)	  85	  Moseley	  (Feb.	  28,	  2008)	  	  
	   238	  
Despite	  Gen.	  Moseley’s	  admonition,	  ACC	  continued	  to	  serve	  as	  the	  center	  of	  gravity	  for	  Predator	  resistance.	  	  ACC	  staff	  saw	  the	  Predator	  as	  a	  niche	  capability	  that	  was	  starting	  to	  threaten	  support	  for	  manned	  aircraft	  programs.	  “I	  can	  absolutely	  and	  adamantly	  tell	  you	  that	  there	  were	  a	  lot	  of	  general	  officers	  between	  him	  [Gen.	  Moseley]	  and	  lowly	  Creech	  AFB	  that	  had	  a	  huge	  vested	  interest	  in	  not	  having	  anything	  to	  do	  with	  a	  little	  rubber	  band	  propeller-­‐driven	  airplane	  that	  doesn’t	  have	  anybody	  sitting	  in	  it,”	  said	  one	  former	  UAV	  commander	  involved	  in	  communications	  between	  ACC	  and	  Creech	  AFB	  at	  the	  time.86	  Pace,	  then	  vice	  president	  of	  GA-­‐ASI,	  said	  ACC	  staff	  officers	  slow-­‐rolled	  the	  Predator	  program,	  hoping	  it	  would	  go	  away	  so	  they	  could	  focus	  on	  manned	  aircraft.	  “The	  Air	  Force	  didn’t	  want	  this	  as	  their	  priority,”	  he	  told	  me.	  “Even	  today,	  they	  don’t	  want	  it	  as	  their	  priority.	  Now,	  the	  Big	  Air	  Force,	  ACC,	  would	  rather	  it	  just	  went	  away;	  send	  it	  off	  to	  special	  ops.”87	  	  	  	  	   ACC’s	  bias	  manifested	  itself	  in	  the	  command’s	  management	  of	  the	  Predator	  pilot	  training	  pipeline.	  At	  the	  direction	  of	  Gen.	  Moseley,	  Lt.	  Gen.	  Deptula,	  the	  chief	  of	  USAF	  intelligence,	  was	  doing	  “everything	  I	  could	  to	  increase	  the	  number	  of	  orbits.”	  	  But	  ACC	  undermined	  those	  efforts.	  The	  former	  ISR	  chief	  said	  he	  relied	  on	  ACC	  to	  produce	  accurate	  data	  on	  how	  quickly	  UAV	  orbits	  could	  be	  made	  available	  without	  breaking	  the	  training	  pipeline	  by	  pulling	  instructor	  pilots	  back	  into	  operations.	  	  But	  when	  Lt.	  Gen.	  Deptula	  showed	  that	  data	  to	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  analysts	  in	  that	  office	  would	  tell	  him	  that	  more	  orbits	  were	  available	  than	  ACC	  was	  reporting.	  “I	  got	  burned	  twice	  by	  using	  ACC	  data,”	  said	  the	  retired	  three-­‐star.	  “I	  trusted	  them,”	  he	  said,	  but	  “they	  were	  dragging	  their	  feet.”88	  	  	   If	  anything,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  biases	  against	  UAVs	  in	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  community	  and	  at	  ACC	  grew	  stronger	  in	  response	  to	  wartime	  pressures.	  Gen.	  Moseley’s	  insistence	  on	  continuing	  to	  use	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  to	  fill	  Predator	  assignments	  worsened	  the	  problem.	  Manned	  aircraft	  pilots’	  morale	  sank	  into	  a	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morass	  as	  they	  were	  assigned	  to	  the	  Predator,	  and	  ACC	  actively	  stalled	  Predator	  combat	  operations	  when	  they	  were	  pressured	  to	  increase	  capability.	  	  
2. To	  what	  extent	  were	  judgments	  about	  the	  potential	  and	  cost	  	  
effectiveness	  of	  the	  Predator	  based	  on	  the	  USAF’s	  enthusiasm	  for	  
employing	  new	  technology	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  was	  the	  enthusiasm	  
outside	  the	  service?	  	  The	  USAF’s	  most	  senior	  leaders,	  including	  Gen.	  Jumper	  and	  Gen.	  Moseley,	  continued	  to	  show	  support	  for	  boosting	  UAV	  CAPs	  after	  the	  September	  11	  attacks.	  Across	  the	  USAF,	  however,	  judgments	  about	  the	  cost	  and	  potential	  of	  the	  Predator	  program	  were	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  diverging	  perceptions	  of	  the	  Predator’s	  potential	  combat	  capability	  in	  current	  and	  future	  conflicts.	  	  	  
Diverging	  Views	  of	  the	  Predator’s	  Potential	  in	  Ongoing	  Conflicts	  	  	  ACC’s	  cautious	  and	  regimented	  acquisition	  culture	  fed	  into	  continued	  skepticism	  of	  the	  Predator’s	  technological	  maturity.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  command	  took	  a	  passive	  approach	  to	  UAV	  innovation	  in	  wartime.	  One	  example	  of	  ACC’s	  reservations	  about	  the	  technological	  maturity	  of	  UAVs	  was	  evident	  in	  its	  decision	  to	  wait	  until	  March	  2006	  to	  field	  the	  Predator	  B.89	  The	  command	  had	  to	  see	  the	  Reaper	  in	  action	  with	  the	  CIA	  before	  it	  could	  believe	  that	  the	  weapon	  system	  was	  worth	  the	  cost.	  “When	  they	  saw	  what	  the	  airplane	  can	  do	  in	  a	  combat	  situation,	  they	  kind	  of	  melted	  and	  embraced	  it,”	  explained	  Cassidy,	  GA-­‐ASI’s	  president	  until	  2010.90	  The	  pessimistic	  view	  of	  the	  Reaper	  among	  staff	  officers	  contrasted	  with	  the	  attitudes	  of	  Reaper	  pilots	  in	  the	  42nd	  Attack	  Squadron.	  While	  ACC	  had	  the	  luxury	  of	  watching	  the	  CIA’s	  Reaper	  operations	  evolve,	  the	  Reaper	  pilots	  that	  started	  flying	  the	  UAV	  in	  2007	  had	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  exploit	  its	  full	  potential	  in	  a	  combat	  setting.	  	  To	  do	  so,	  they	  approached	  the	  UAV	  with	  the	  same	  “tactical”	  mindset	  they	  used	  to	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fly	  fighters.	  The	  Reaper	  pilots	  sought	  to	  transform	  operations	  from	  “low	  status	  missions	  of	  gathering	  and	  disseminating	  data	  to	  higher	  status	  tasks	  of	  creating	  information	  and	  participating	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  used	  to	  locate,	  observe,	  and	  kill	  insurgents	  and	  other	  threats.”91	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  pilots	  developed	  not	  only	  new	  tactics,	  but	  also	  on-­‐the-­‐fly	  innovations	  such	  as	  the	  addition	  of	  Falconview	  and	  mIRC	  chat	  to	  improve	  battlespace	  effectiveness.	  	  ACC’s	  lack	  of	  involvement	  in	  ROVER	  development	  is	  another	  example	  of	  how	  its	  acquisition	  culture	  prevented	  it	  from	  assuming	  risks	  to	  pursue	  wartime	  UAV	  innovation.	  The	  command	  stood	  by	  while	  the	  ACC	  EAIS,	  Big	  Safari	  and	  SOF	  perfected	  ROVER	  capability	  in	  combat.	  In	  contrast	  to	  ACC,	  these	  organizations	  were	  focused	  exclusively	  on	  delivering	  wartime	  capabilities	  rather	  than	  developing	  a	  perfect	  technological	  solution.	  If	  the	  Predator	  was	  not	  working,	  these	  organizations	  were	  inclined	  to	  make	  it	  work	  rather	  than	  to	  debate	  the	  merits	  of	  continuing	  on.92	  Given	  this	  mindset,	  the	  ACC	  EAIS	  was	  quick	  to	  oblige	  when	  USAF	  AC-­‐130U	  “Spooky”	  gunship	  crews	  asked	  for	  a	  way	  to	  see	  hostile	  actors	  in	  a	  target	  area	  before	  the	  gunships	  arrived	  on	  site.	  Col.	  Boyle	  called	  the	  Big	  Safari	  scientist,	  who	  was	  able	  to	  attach	  a	  new	  antenna	  to	  the	  gunship	  that	  could	  pick	  up	  Predator	  FMV.93	  	   Big	  Safari	  also	  played	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  the	  development	  of	  ROVER	  II,	  a	  hand-­‐held	  version	  for	  ground	  forces.	  Chris	  Manuel,	  an	  Army	  Chief	  Warrant	  Officer	  -­‐2	  (CW02)	  with	  Special	  Operations	  Forces,	  asked	  Grimes,	  the	  director	  of	  Big	  Safari,	  to	  help	  him	  find	  a	  way	  to	  give	  his	  fellow	  green	  berets	  access	  to	  Predator	  FMV	  while	  hunting	  Taliban	  and	  al	  Qaeda	  fighters	  in	  Afghanistan.94	  Grimes	  turned	  to	  the	  Big	  Safari	  scientist,	  who	  came	  up	  with	  ROVER	  II,	  a	  system	  that	  would	  allow	  SOF-­‐embedded	  JTACs	  to	  see	  a	  target	  area	  up	  to	  100	  miles	  away	  via	  Predator	  video	  feeds	  displayed	  on	  a	  handheld	  device.	  95	  	   The	  ROVER	  II	  did	  not	  become	  available	  to	  conventional	  forces	  until	  another	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  Cullen	  (2011)	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innovative	  organization	  within	  the	  USAF	  sprung	  to	  action.	  After	  his	  retirement,	  Col.	  Clark	  became	  director	  of	  the	  Office	  of	  Simulation	  and	  Integration.	  In	  this	  role,	  he	  remained	  the	  invisible	  hand	  moving	  Predator	  innovation	  forward.	  Shortly	  after	  taking	  office	  in	  2005,	  Secretary	  Wynne	  became	  a	  champion	  of	  ROVER	  II	  after	  receiving	  briefings	  from	  Clark’s	  office.96	  At	  the	  time	  there	  were	  less	  than	  200	  ROVER	  kits	  in	  the	  field,	  but	  today	  over	  10,000	  have	  been	  fielded.97	  	  	  One	  last	  example	  of	  ACC’s	  slow	  approach	  to	  UAV	  innovation	  in	  wartime	  was	  the	  command’s	  handling	  of	  the	  transition	  of	  the	  ACC	  EAIS	  from	  a	  Big	  Safari	  test	  program	  to	  an	  ACC	  combat-­‐coded	  program.98	  As	  a	  test	  squadron	  under	  Big	  Safari,	  the	  ACC	  EAIS	  had	  been	  able	  to	  quickly	  accommodate	  rapid	  innovation.	  	  For	  example,	  if	  the	  CIA	  asked	  the	  squadron	  to	  operate	  a	  Predator	  below	  10,000	  feet	  to	  ensure	  a	  100	  percent	  success	  in	  an	  air	  strike,	  the	  squadron	  could	  just	  say	  yes.	  But	  once	  the	  squadron	  became	  combat-­‐coded	  under	  ACC,	  the	  request	  to	  fly	  at	  such	  a	  low	  altitude	  had	  to	  be	  run	  through	  the	  chain	  of	  command,	  a	  process	  that	  took	  too	  much	  time.99	  It	  was	  this	  red	  tape	  that	  led	  the	  CIA	  to	  start	  buying	  its	  own	  organic	  UAV	  assets,	  which	  could	  be	  flown	  by	  the	  USAF	  but	  controlled	  at	  the	  tactical	  and	  operational	  level	  by	  the	  agency.100	  ACC’s	  continued	  skepticism	  of	  UAV	  innovation	  was	  particularly	  remarkable	  because	  of	  the	  growing	  support	  for	  the	  Predator	  that	  had	  begun	  to	  emerge	  across	  the	  USAF	  as	  early	  as	  2001.	  Gen.	  Jumper	  remained	  a	  Predator	  advocate,	  although	  his	  attention	  was	  more	  divided	  as	  USAF	  chief.101	  The	  Predator	  also	  gained	  support	  from	  the	  USAF’s	  test	  community	  based	  on	  its	  lengthening	  combat	  record.	  The	  Air	  Force	  Operational	  Test	  and	  Evaluation	  Center	  (AFOTEC)	  conducted	  a	  favorable	  review	  of	  the	  Predator	  program	  in	  2001,	  noting	  that	  the	  system	  was	  effective	  despite	  some	  reliability	  and	  maintainability	  problems.	  “I	  think	  that	  the	  Predator	  proved	  its	  case	  in	  Kosovo,	  and	  I	  think	  if	  you	  spoke	  to	  the	  [regional	  commanders]	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they	  [would	  tell	  you	  that	  they]	  thought	  it	  was	  a	  useful	  capability,”	  a	  senior	  USAF	  official	  said	  during	  a	  2001	  press	  briefing	  on	  the	  AFOTEC	  report.102	  	   USAF	  navigators	  were	  also	  enthusiastic	  about	  the	  Predator’s	  wartime	  potential,	  seeking	  out	  opportunities	  to	  fly	  the	  aircraft	  in	  wartime.	  The	  target	  group	  for	  Gen.	  Jumper’s	  new	  CSO	  career	  field,	  navigators	  tended	  to	  seek	  out	  Predator	  assignments	  because	  it	  gave	  them	  more	  responsibility,	  with	  the	  potential	  to	  become	  an	  aircraft	  commander	  in	  wartime	  rather	  than	  serving	  an	  aircrew	  support	  function.	  Navigators	  jumped	  through	  hoops	  to	  win	  Predator	  assignments,	  personally	  paying	  for	  training	  to	  acquire	  an	  FAA	  commercial/instrument	  license	  to	  qualify.	  Between	  1995	  and	  2006	  five	  of	  the	  first	  18	  Predator	  squadron	  commanders	  came	  from	  navigator	  or	  weapon	  systems	  operator	  backgrounds.103	  	  	  Outside	  the	  USAF,	  the	  Predator’s	  early	  performance	  in	  OEF	  fueled	  robust	  support	  for	  the	  UAV	  among	  ground	  commanders	  who	  agreed	  that	  UAVs	  were	  emerging	  as	  a	  critical	  capability	  for	  counterinsurgency.	  	  The	  seminal	  moment	  came	  in	  2002	  at	  the	  Battle	  of	  Takur	  Ghar,	  a	  mountain	  in	  Afghanistan	  sometimes	  known	  as	  Roberts	  Ridge.	  During	  the	  battle,	  the	  ACC	  EAIS	  kept	  an	  armed	  airborne	  Predator	  on	  station	  over	  eleven	  hours	  as	  a	  downed	  CH-­‐47	  Chinook	  aircrew	  faced	  Taliban	  and	  al	  Qaeda	  fighters.104	  The	  squadron’s	  Predator	  provided	  laser	  designation	  for	  Navy	  fighters	  to	  drop	  bombs	  on	  the	  enemy	  forces,	  and	  also	  fired	  a	  Hellfire	  on	  a	  Taliban	  bunker,	  destroying	  it.105	  	  “We	  were	  a	  sideshow	  up	  until	  that	  point	  in	  time,”	  said	  retired	  Col.	  Boyle,	  the	  ACC	  EAIS	  squadron	  commander.	  “After	  that,	  Predator	  became	  what	  is	  today.	  Nobody	  ever	  doubted	  us	  again.”106	  	  
Diverging	  Perceptions	  of	  the	  Predator’s	  Potential	  in	  Future	  Conflicts	  	  
	  While	  the	  USAF	  remained	  divided	  over	  the	  Predator’s	  potential	  in	  ongoing	  conflicts,	  the	  question	  of	  the	  Predator’s	  role	  in	  future	  conflicts	  proved	  even	  more	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divisive.	  	  In	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq,	  relatively	  defenseless	  UAVs	  operated	  free	  from	  the	  risks	  posed	  by	  enemy	  SAMS	  and	  fighters.	  But	  a	  prevalent	  perception	  inside	  the	  USAF	  was	  that	  the	  service	  needed	  to	  prepare	  to	  deter	  and	  fight	  a	  future	  high-­‐intensity	  conflict	  for	  which	  the	  Predator	  would	  be	  ill-­‐equipped.	  Ehrhard	  questioned	  whether	  the	  Predator	  program	  had	  enough	  military	  utility	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  USAF’s	  force	  structure,	  in	  part	  because	  it	  was	  vulnerable	  to	  radar-­‐guided	  air	  defense	  systems.	  “This	  $600	  million	  program	  has	  so	  many	  combat	  limitations	  that	  its	  long-­‐term	  viability	  remains	  in	  question,”	  he	  wrote.107	  	  An	  October	  2001	  report	  from	  the	  Pentagon’s	  Office	  of	  Test	  and	  Evaluation	  (OT&E)	  found	  that	  the	  Predator	  was	  not	  “operationally	  effective	  or	  suitable	  ”	  based	  on	  the	  USAF’s	  own	  criteria,	  which	  included	  a	  requirement	  for	  “operations	  in	  areas	  where	  enemy	  defenses	  have	  not	  been	  adequately	  suppressed.”108	  	  	  The	  heart	  of	  the	  pessimism	  about	  the	  strategic	  potential	  of	  UAVS	  was	  ACC,	  which	  continued	  to	  view	  the	  UAV	  as	  a	  niche	  capability.	  The	  command	  focused	  much	  of	  its	  energy	  on	  the	  next	  war	  with	  a	  “near-­‐peer”	  such	  as	  Russia	  or	  China,	  which	  would	  require	  sophisticated	  weapon	  systems	  to	  operate	  in	  contested	  air	  environments.	  Counterinsurgency,	  for	  which	  the	  slow-­‐moving,	  comparatively	  simplistic	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  were	  well-­‐suited,	  was	  not	  seen	  as	  a	  lasting	  priority.	  “I	  think	  the	  Air	  Force	  wanted	  to	  have	  business	  as	  usual,”	  said	  Pace,	  who	  became	  president	  of	  GA-­‐ASI	  in	  2010.	  “They	  wanted	  to	  build	  fast-­‐moving	  jets	  and	  they	  wanted	  the	  world	  to	  be	  like	  it	  used	  to	  be.”109	  ACC’s	  pessimistic	  view	  of	  the	  Predator’s	  long-­‐term	  potential	  was	  reflected	  in	  its	  attitude	  toward	  the	  conversion	  of	  the	  test-­‐coded	  ACC	  EAIS	  to	  the	  17th	  RS	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  2002.	  ACC	  officials	  were	  hesitant	  to	  add	  another	  squadron	  to	  the	  combat	  air	  force,	  since	  it	  threatened	  funding	  for	  their	  top	  priority:	  manned	  fighters	  to	  confront	  a	  near-­‐peer	  adversary.	  “This	  didn’t	  come	  naturally	  for	  ACC,”	  said	  retired	  Maj.	  Swanson,	  who	  was	  on	  the	  squadron	  during	  the	  transition.	  “It	  wasn’t	  an	  F-­‐22	  or	  an	  F-­‐35.	  It	  was	  a	  huge	  cultural	  change.	  	  The	  leadership	  in	  the	  Pentagon	  was	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getting	  it,	  but	  the	  middle	  manager	  types	  and	  the	  folks	  at	  ACC	  headquarters	  were	  kicking	  and	  screaming.”110	  	  	   The	  tension	  between	  ACC	  and	  the	  former	  ACC	  EAIS	  over	  the	  role	  of	  UAVs	  in	  the	  emerging	  strategic	  environment	  reached	  a	  boiling	  point	  when	  it	  came	  time	  to	  choose	  the	  first	  17th	  RS	  commander.	  Col.	  Boyle,	  who	  retired	  in	  April	  2002,	  recommended	  his	  former	  ACC	  EAIS	  deputy,	  then-­‐Lt.	  Col.	  Mark	  Cooter,	  for	  the	  position.111	  But	  senior	  USAF	  leaders,	  including	  Gen.	  Hal	  Hornberg,	  the	  head	  of	  ACC	  from	  Nov.	  2001	  to	  2004,	  felt	  that	  the	  USAF	  was	  not	  culturally	  prepared	  for	  an	  intelligence	  officer	  with	  significant	  UAV	  counterterrorism	  experience	  to	  run	  a	  combat-­‐coded	  ACC	  squadron.112	  ACC	  instead	  selected	  a	  former	  fighter	  pilot	  who	  was	  initially	  unfamiliar	  with	  counterterrorism	  or	  UAV	  operations	  “He	  rolls	  into	  town	  with	  three	  or	  four	  guys	  that	  are	  ex	  fighter	  guys,	  and	  sat	  down	  in	  a	  room	  and	  briefed	  us,”	  recalled	  retired	  Maj.	  Swanson.	  “His	  opening	  remark	  was:	  ‘the	  pros	  are	  here.’	  At	  that	  point,	  the	  attitude	  of	  the	  whole	  team	  was:	  ‘well	  fuck	  you	  too.’”113	  	  	   ACC’s	  reluctance	  to	  embrace	  the	  role	  of	  UAVs	  in	  a	  long-­‐term	  counterterrorism	  mission	  also	  created	  problems	  with	  other	  Predator	  customers.	  JSOC’s	  frustration	  with	  the	  ACC	  mindset	  of	  many	  Predator	  pilots	  led	  to	  Maj.	  Gen.	  McChrystal’s	  2005	  request	  to	  create	  the	  new	  3rd	  SOS	  under	  AFSOC.	  The	  USAF’s	  ACC-­‐owned	  Predator	  pilots	  were	  focused	  on	  racking	  up	  kills	  in	  support	  of	  ground	  forces.	  	  While	  this	  mission	  was	  critical	  —	  especially	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  Army	  infantry	  units	  —	  SOF	  forces	  were	  more	  interested	  in	  typical	  counterinsurgency	  operations:	  long-­‐loiter	  surveillance	  missions	  to	  establish	  patterns	  of	  life,	  which	  after	  weeks	  might	  lead	  to	  a	  single	  strike	  against	  a	  specific	  terrorist.114	  	  	   In	  contrast	  to	  ACC,	  outsiders	  were	  enthusiastic	  about	  the	  long-­‐term	  potential	  of	  UAVs.	  Bush	  administration	  officials	  showed	  enthusiasm	  for	  UAV	  innovation	  even	  before	  the	  September	  11	  attacks.	  James	  Roche,	  who	  became	  the	  USAF	  secretary	  in	  January	  2001,	  and	  Dick	  Cheney,	  the	  Vice	  President	  and	  a	  former	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  Swanson	  interview	  (Feb	  2,	  2015)	  111	  Boyle	  interview	  (Nov.	  20,	  2015)	  Cooter	  interview	  (Jan.	  27,	  2015)	  	  112	  Boyle	  interview	  (Nov.	  11	  2015	  and	  	  113	  Swanson	  interview	  (Nov.	  17,	  2014)	  	  114	  Wood	  (2015)	  76-­‐80	  
	   245	  
Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  both	  backed	  Gen.	  Jumper	  for	  the	  chief	  position	  in	  part	  because	  he	  was	  seen	  as	  “the	  warfighter	  guy	  who	  was	  known	  to	  have	  embraced	  the	  UAV	  dimension.”115	  	  Soon	  after	  the	  September	  11	  attacks,	  President	  Bush	  praised	  the	  Predator’s	  capacity	  to	  find,	  fix,	  and	  track	  targets	  in	  dynamic	  counterinsurgency	  environments,	  and	  he	  predicted	  a	  lasting	  change	  in	  the	  strategic	  context	  that	  would	  require	  more	  UAVs	  in	  the	  future.	  “We’re	  entering	  an	  era	  in	  which	  unmanned	  vehicles	  of	  all	  kinds	  will	  take	  on	  greater	  importance	  —	  in	  space,	  on	  land,	  in	  the	  air	  and	  at	  sea,”	  he	  told	  cadets	  at	  the	  Citadel	  in	  December	  2001.116	  	   These	  diverging	  views	  of	  the	  long-­‐term	  relevance	  of	  UAVs	  were	  a	  major	  source	  of	  tension	  between	  Secretary	  Gates	  and	  the	  USAF	  under	  Gen.	  Moseley	  and	  Secretary	  Wynne.	  Gen.	  Moseley	  became	  chief	  in	  2005	  in	  part	  because	  his	  view	  of	  the	  emerging	  strategic	  context	  matched	  the	  vision	  of	  Donald	  Rumsfeld,	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  from	  2001	  to	  2005.	  Both	  men	  saw	  the	  need	  for	  “transformation”	  —	  the	  pursuit	  of	  high-­‐tech	  force	  modernization	  to	  hedge	  against	  a	  range	  of	  threats	  across	  the	  spectrum	  of	  conflict,	  to	  include	  high-­‐intensity	  clashes.117	  Gen.	  Moseley	  agreed	  to	  accept	  the	  nomination	  to	  be	  chief	  based	  on	  Secretary	  Rumsfeld’s	  support	  for	  modernization	  plans,	  which	  included	  continue	  F-­‐22	  Raptor	  stealth	  fighter	  production	  and	  a	  range	  of	  other	  priorities.118	  UAVs	  were	  not	  a	  centerpiece	  of	  transformation,	  but	  Gen.	  Moseley	  showed	  an	  interest	  in	  them	  to	  the	  extent	  they	  supported	  that	  vision.	  In	  2009,	  for	  example,	  he	  offered	  to	  consider	  an	  “optionally	  manned”	  configuration	  for	  the	  USAF’s	  next-­‐generation	  bomber.	  119	  When	  Secretary	  Rumsfeld	  left	  office	  in	  2005,	  however,	  Gen.	  Moseley	  found	  that	  his	  strategic	  outlook	  clashed	  sharply	  with	  Rumsfeld’s	  successor.	  Secretary	  Gates	  felt	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  focus	  on	  high-­‐end	  force	  modernization,	  particularly	  F-­‐22	  production,	  led	  to	  extravagant	  spending	  on	  weapons	  optimized	  for	  high-­‐intensity	  force-­‐on-­‐force	  conflicts	  that	  were	  unlikely	  to	  occur.	  In	  2009,	  he	  wrote	  an	  article	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predicting	  “hybrid	  and	  more	  complex	  forms	  of	  warfare.”120	  The	  US	  was	  far	  less	  likely	  to	  fight	  a	  war	  with	  China	  or	  Russia	  than	  it	  was	  to	  encounter	  low-­‐intensity,	  asymmetric	  conflicts	  involving	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  he	  argued.	  As	  such,	  there	  was	  no	  need	  to	  pursue	  sophisticated,	  multi-­‐billion	  dollar	  weapon	  systems	  when	  low-­‐tech,	  inexpensive	  ones,	  like	  the	  current	  generation	  of	  UAVs,	  would	  do.	  121	  	  	  These	  competing	  perceptions	  regarding	  the	  long-­‐term	  strategic	  relevance	  of	  UAVs	  may	  have	  influenced	  Secretary	  Gates’	  decision	  to	  fire	  Gen.	  Moseley	  and	  Secretary	  Wynne.	  In	  his	  autobiography,	  Secretary	  Gates	  claimed	  he	  dismissed	  the	  two	  strictly	  over	  lapses	  in	  the	  USAF’s	  nuclear	  safety	  protocols.	  But	  Secretary	  Wynne	  felt	  that	  the	  nuclear	  incidents	  were	  only	  a	  catalyst.	  “He	  really	  disagreed	  with	  our	  push	  for	  continued	  investment	  in	  future	  conventional	  war	  capability,"	  Secretary	  Wynne	  told	  me	  in	  2009.	  "He	  saw	  this	  investment	  as	  coming	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  irregular	  warfare,	  but	  we	  didn't."122	  In	  closing,	  the	  USAF’s	  perceptions	  of	  the	  Predator	  and	  Reaper’s	  wartime	  potential	  varied.	  ACC	  remained	  skeptical	  of	  the	  Predator’s	  technological	  maturity,	  but	  supporters	  including	  Big	  Safari,	  the	  UAV	  pilots	  themselves,	  were	  able	  to	  steer	  innovation	  forward	  to	  meet	  combat	  requirements.	  The	  USAF’s	  perceptions	  of	  the	  long-­‐term	  strategic	  potential	  of	  UAVs	  were	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  USAF	  leaders	  who	  took	  a	  longer	  view	  of	  force	  planning	  that	  emphasized	  preparation	  for	  a	  range	  of	  threats	  to	  include	  a	  high-­‐end	  clash	  against	  a	  near-­‐peer	  adversary.	  As	  a	  result,	  they	  tended	  to	  view	  UAV	  innovation	  cautiously.	  ACC	  saw	  UAVs	  as	  a	  niche	  capability	  without	  long-­‐term	  relevance,	  while	  Gen.	  Moseley	  saw	  UAVs	  as	  having	  strategic	  impact	  in	  future	  conflicts	  only	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  could	  operate	  in	  high-­‐threat	  environments.	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3. To	  what	  extent	  were	  USAF	  judgments	  about	  the	  employment	  of	  the	  
Predator	  driven	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	  to	  friendly	  personnel,	  
and	  to	  what	  extent	  was	  that	  push	  from	  outside	  the	  service?	  
	  Although	  the	  USAF	  abruptly	  embraced	  RSO	  after	  the	  September	  11	  attacks,	  there	  are	  no	  indications	  that	  it	  did	  so	  to	  reduce	  aircrew	  risk.	  If	  anything,	  the	  service	  continued	  to	  prefer	  options	  that	  put	  aircrew	  in	  harm’s	  way	  as	  a	  means	  of	  promoting	  the	  warrior	  mentality.	  Consequently,	  Predator	  pilots	  were	  in	  a	  difficult	  position.	  Within	  their	  own	  ranks,	  there	  was	  a	  morale-­‐shattering	  sense	  that	  they	  were	  disconnected	  from	  the	  battlespace.	  Other	  communities	  in	  the	  USAF	  shared	  this	  perception,	  showing	  disdain	  for	  Predator	  pilots	  because	  their	  lack	  of	  presence	  in	  the	  battlespace	  diminished	  their	  warrior	  mentality.	  	  	  	  Between	  2001	  and	  2008,	  the	  USAF’s	  senior	  leadership	  recognized	  that	  this	  perception	  was	  potentially	  corrosive	  to	  the	  combat	  effectiveness	  of	  Predator	  units.	  In	  response,	  they	  looked	  for	  ways	  to	  enhance	  the	  warrior	  reputation	  of	  the	  Predator	  pilot	  community.	  However,	  there	  were	  sharp	  disagreements	  over	  what	  approach	  to	  take.	  Some	  argued	  that	  only	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  should	  fly	  the	  Predator	  because	  they	  were	  uniquely	  qualified	  to	  infuse	  the	  warrior	  ethos	  in	  the	  Predator	  community	  based	  on	  their	  experiences	  in	  the	  cockpit.	  	  Others	  argued	  that	  the	  very	  concept	  of	  the	  “warrior	  ethos”	  needed	  to	  expand	  to	  include	  officers	  who	  did	  not	  receive	  manned	  aircraft	  flight	  training	  but	  employed	  the	  Predator	  remotely	  to	  generate	  significant	  combat	  effects.	  	  	  	  	  
Perceptions	  Inside	  the	  Predator	  Pilot	  Community:	  A	  Struggle	  to	  Relate	  to	  the	  
Warrior	  Ethos	  	  The	  introduction	  of	  RSO	  further	  eroded	  the	  warrior	  mentality	  of	  the	  Predator	  mission.	  Predator	  pilots	  stationed	  in	  the	  United	  States	  complained	  that	  it	  was	  often	  difficult	  to	  associate	  a	  sense	  of	  urgency	  or	  risk	  with	  the	  job	  because	  they	  were	  physically	  disconnected	  from	  the	  fight.	  Without	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  stakes	  involved	  in	  their	  work,	  the	  Predator	  pilots	  at	  home	  had	  trouble	  relating	  to	  the	  forward-­‐
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deployed	  launch-­‐and-­‐recovery	  elements	  and	  ground	  forces	  in	  combat.	  	  As	  Rosenwasser	  explained,	  RSO	  created	  a	  “two-­‐culture	  society	  within	  Predator	  squadrons	  that	  eroded	  unit	  cohesiveness	  and	  thus	  ultimately	  combat	  effectiveness.”123	  The	  Predator	  pilots’	  involvement	  in	  targeting	  provides	  a	  specific	  example	  of	  the	  corrosive	  impact	  of	  their	  physical	  dislocation	  from	  the	  battlespace.	  Forces	  downrange	  often	  did	  not	  give	  the	  Predator	  pilots	  any	  context	  for	  the	  targets	  they	  were	  observing,	  so	  they	  had	  trouble	  perceiving	  the	  stakes.	  “Spending	  three	  hours	  staring	  at	  a	  house	  with	  no	  context	  was	  a	  morale	  dump,”	  one	  UAV	  commander	  said.	  As	  the	  problem	  became	  endemic,	  Predator	  squadron	  commanders	  began	  to	  “fight	  for	  context.”	  Explained	  the	  squadron	  commander:	  “Context	  increases	  the	  aircrew’s	  desire	  to	  be	  there;	  three	  hours	  doesn’t’	  seem	  that	  boring	  when	  you	  know	  you’re	  looking	  for	  the	  key	  IED	  maker	  in	  Baghdad.”124	  Predator	  squadron	  commanders	  in	  the	  US	  also	  began	  to	  adopt	  gestures	  that	  reminded	  the	  Predator	  pilots	  of	  their	  warrior	  role,	  such	  as	  the	  adoption	  of	  routine	  targeting	  training	  to	  raise	  the	  Hellfire	  hit	  rate,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  introduction	  of	  morale	  patches.	  125	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Creating	  a	  New	  Career	  Field:	  Can	  a	  Separate	  Class	  of	  Predator	  Pilots	  Be	  Warriors?	  	  
	  As	  Predator	  pilots	  themselves	  struggled	  with	  their	  lack	  of	  connection	  to	  the	  warrior	  mentality,	  senior	  USAF	  officers	  debated	  how	  best	  to	  improve	  the	  situation.	  There	  were	  differing	  views	  inside	  the	  USAF	  about	  the	  best	  way	  to	  inculcate	  a	  warrior	  ethos	  in	  the	  Predator	  pilot	  community.	  Some	  senior	  USAF	  leaders	  warned	  against	  proposals	  to	  create	  a	  separate	  Predator	  pilot	  career	  field,	  which	  potentially	  involved	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  separate	  training	  pipeline	  that	  would	  reduce	  or	  eliminate	  manned	  aircraft	  flight	  experience.	  These	  leaders	  worried	  that	  the	  reduction	  or	  elimination	  of	  manned	  aircraft	  flight	  training	  would	  highlight	  the	  Predator	  community’s	  lack	  of	  exposure	  to	  physical	  risk	  —	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the	  sine	  qua	  non	  for	  warrior	  credentials	  in	  the	  USAF,	  in	  their	  view.	  Then-­‐Brig.	  Gen.	  Frank	  Gorenc,	  an	  F-­‐15	  pilot	  who	  has	  flown	  the	  Predator,	  warned	  in	  2007	  that	  recruiting	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  to	  fly	  the	  Predator	  was	  the	  only	  way	  to	  save	  the	  Predator	  community	  from	  being	  perceived	  as	  	  “a	  second	  class	  of	  citizens	  that	  never	  take	  any	  risks.”126	  Colonel	  Gary	  Fabricius,	  a	  15th	  RS	  commander	  from	  2002	  to	  2004,	  agreed	  that	  a	  separate	  career	  field	  would	  sharpen	  the	  division	  between	  manned	  and	  unmanned	  pilots	  and	  create	  a	  culture	  of	  the	  “haves	  and	  have-­‐nots.”127	  It	  would	  be	  better,	  Col.	  Fabricius	  argued,	  to	  continue	  the	  ALFA	  tour	  system	  because	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  had	  instant	  warrior	  credibility.128	  In	  his	  position	  as	  USAF	  chief,	  Gen.	  Moseley	  pursued	  policies	  that	  indicated	  he	  saw	  exposure	  to	  risk	  as	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  warrior	  status.	  Himself	  an	  F-­‐15C	  weapons	  officer,	  Gen.	  Moseley	  proposed	  opening	  a	  UAV	  Weapons	  school,	  which	  would	  emphasize	  the	  connection	  between	  Predator	  missions	  and	  combat	  action	  by	  attempting	  to	  “legitimize	  the	  UAV	  world	  the	  same	  as	  the	  B-­‐52,	  F-­‐16,	  and	  A-­‐10.”129	  His	  view	  of	  the	  warrior	  ethos	  as	  tightly	  linked	  to	  physical	  risk	  also	  was	  apparent	  in	  several	  policy	  changes	  he	  made,	  including	  the	  widespread	  deployment	  of	  personnel	  in	  support	  functions	  ranging	  from	  the	  USAF	  band	  to	  finance,	  and	  the	  decision	  to	  issue	  an	  M-­‐16	  rifle	  to	  every	  airmen	  on	  the	  first	  day	  of	  basic	  training.130	  	  	  But	  other	  USAF	  leaders	  argued	  that	  that	  physical	  exposure	  to	  risk	  was	  not	  the	  key	  ingredient	  for	  raising	  the	  warrior	  status	  of	  Predator	  pilots.	  Instead,	  the	  solution	  was	  to	  make	  a	  cultural	  shift	  toward	  a	  broader	  conception	  of	  the	  warrior	  ethos	  that	  looked	  beyond	  physical	  risk	  to	  take	  into	  account	  Predator	  pilots’	  potential	  to	  influence	  the	  battlespace.	  Gen.	  Jumper	  argued	  that	  Predator	  pilots	  were	  still	  “credentialed	  warriors”	  because	  they	  made	  the	  “same	  life	  and	  death	  decisions	  made	  in	  manned	  platforms.”131	  “This	  stuff	  is	  real.	  I’m	  taking	  real	  lives.	  I’m	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shooting	  real	  weapons.	  And	  I	  have	  to	  be	  really	  responsible	  for	  my	  actions,”	  he	  told	  then-­‐Lt.	  Col.	  Cantwell	  in	  2007.132	  As	  the	  demand	  for	  Predator	  pilots	  continued	  to	  grow	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  September	  11	  attacks,	  the	  USAF	  was	  forced	  to	  reconsider	  its	  continued	  reliance	  on	  its	  limited	  pool	  of	  highly	  trained	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots.	  The	  debate	  over	  Predator	  pilot	  qualifications	  fueled	  a	  larger	  internal	  discussion	  about	  their	  warrior	  status,	  which	  was	  even	  more	  sharply	  called	  into	  question	  when	  the	  USAF	  adopted	  RSO.	  	  As	  the	  USAF	  struggled	  with	  the	  fundamental	  question	  of	  what	  makes	  a	  warrior,	  it	  also	  began	  to	  worry	  that	  external	  challengers	  might	  seize	  on	  this	  moment	  of	  identity	  crisis	  to	  attack	  the	  USAF’s	  special	  claim	  to	  the	  Predator	  program,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Question	  4.	  	  
	  
Views	  of	  Aircrew	  Risk	  Outside	  the	  USAF	  
	  Outside	  the	  USAF,	  there	  is	  some	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  ground	  forces	  were	  unimpressed	  with	  the	  Predator’s	  potential	  to	  reduce	  aircrew	  risk.	  Some	  troops	  doubted	  that	  Predator	  pilots,	  flying	  thousands	  of	  miles	  away,	  could	  act	  decisively	  and	  effectively	  in	  combat	  when	  they	  had	  no	  “skin	  in	  the	  game.”	  USMC	  Sergeant	  Matthew	  Mardan,	  who	  witnessed	  Predator	  strikes	  in	  Iraq	  in	  2004,	  explained:	  “Everything	  happened	  so	  fast	  on	  the	  battlefield	  that	  I	  think	  we	  would	  have	  not	  trusted	  the	  idiot,	  especially	  if	  he	  is	  Air	  Force,	  sitting	  somewhere	  in	  an	  office	  running	  this.	  So	  much	  easier	  for	  us	  to	  just	  call	  in	  exactly	  what	  we	  need	  from	  a	  pilot	  or	  a	  gunship	  or	  an	  Apache	  or	  Cobra.	  That’s	  what	  we	  were	  used	  to	  doing.”133	  	  Yet	  while	  Mardan	  described	  manned	  aircraft	  as	  a	  safer	  alternative	  to	  the	  Predator,	  US	  government	  officials	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  opposite	  is	  true:	  Predator	  missions	  are	  potentially	  more	  reliable	  and	  effective	  than	  manned	  aircraft	  precisely	  because	  of	  the	  pilot’s	  physical	  separation	  from	  the	  battlespace.	  Facing	  no	  immediate	  threats	  to	  their	  safety,	  Predator	  pilots	  are	  free	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  mission,	  loitering	  in	  close	  proximity	  to	  a	  target	  for	  long	  periods	  of	  time	  to	  exercise	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discrimination	  and	  maximize	  combat	  effectiveness.134	  Consequently,	  negative	  perceptions	  of	  the	  Predator	  among	  ground	  forces	  may	  have	  had	  less	  to	  do	  with	  their	  lack	  of	  appreciation	  for	  the	  risks	  of	  a	  combat	  mission	  than	  with	  the	  distrust	  created	  by	  their	  geographical	  separation	  from	  ground	  forces.	  Ground	  units	  have	  the	  potential	  for	  regular	  interaction	  with	  Cobra	  or	  Apache	  pilots	  because	  they	  forward	  deploy	  to	  the	  battlespace.	  But	  they	  have	  far	  fewer	  opportunities	  for	  such	  trust-­‐building	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  encounters	  with	  Predator	  pilots	  who	  are	  mostly	  stationed	  in	  the	  continental	  United	  States,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  a	  few	  launch	  and	  recovery	  elements.	  	  Turning	  to	  the	  US	  government,	  there	  is	  little	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that,	  beyond	  the	  potential	  to	  target	  more	  discriminately,	  reduced	  aircrew	  risk	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  particularly	  important	  benefit	  of	  Predator	  operations	  at	  least	  until	  the	  mid-­‐2000s.	  Physical	  protection	  of	  aircrews	  was	  less	  meaningful	  during	  a	  time	  when	  the	  great	  majority	  of	  UAV	  missions	  were	  conducted	  over	  nations	  with	  brittle	  air	  defenses	  that	  were	  swiftly	  destroyed.	  The	  opportunity	  to	  reduce	  political	  risks	  was	  also	  a	  less	  important	  benefit	  of	  UAVS	  during	  this	  time	  because	  the	  US	  was	  mostly	  employing	  UAVs	  over	  nations	  with	  it	  was	  already	  at	  war.	  It	  was	  only	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  conducting	  UAV	  strikes	  outside	  war	  zones,	  where	  the	  risk	  of	  a	  manned	  aircraft	  being	  killed	  or	  captured	  could	  have	  major	  diplomatic	  implications	  (as	  was	  the	  case	  with	  the	  Gary	  Powers	  and	  Scott	  O’Grady	  incidents).	  	  	   However,	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  2008,	  the	  opportunity	  to	  reduce	  political	  risks	  started	  to	  become	  more	  attractive	  as	  the	  US	  bolstered	  its	  anti-­‐terrorism	  efforts	  in	  countries	  with	  which	  it	  was	  not	  at	  war.	  The	  Bush	  administration	  was	  increasingly	  concerned	  about	  Pakistan’s	  Federally	  Administered	  Tribal	  Area	  (FATA),	  a	  lawless	  region	  and	  al	  Qaeda	  haven.	  After	  US	  SOF	  unexpectedly	  took	  fire	  from	  the	  Pakistan	  military	  while	  conducting	  a	  raid	  in	  the	  FATA,	  President	  Bush	  said	  he	  started	  to	  rely	  on	  CIA	  UAV	  strikes	  to	  avoid	  incurring	  the	  political	  fallout	  that	  occurred	  when	  the	  firefight	  “made	  international	  news.”135	  The	  political	  risk	  calculus	  would	  continue	  to	  shift	  in	  favor	  UAVs	  in	  the	  coming	  years,	  as	  the	  Obama	  administration	  dramatically	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  134	  Brennan	  (Apr.	  30,	  2012)	  135	  Wood	  (2015)	  116;	  Bush	  (2010)	  217	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expanded	  the	  hunt	  for	  al	  Qaeda	  and	  other	  terrorist	  organizations	  beyond	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq.	  	  	  
4. To	  what	  extent	  were	  judgments	  about	  the	  Predator	  based	  on	  a	  	  
concern	  about	  maintaining	  the	  USAF’s	  primary	  control	  over	  those	  
air	  assets	  in	  response	  to	  competition	  from	  government	  agencies	  or	  
other	  military	  institutions?	  	  	  Once	  the	  wars	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq	  began,	  Gen.	  Jumper’s	  instincts	  to	  protect	  the	  central	  role	  of	  the	  USAF	  in	  Predator	  combat	  operations	  gradually	  spread	  to	  other	  commanders.	  The	  USAF’s	  increased	  interest	  in	  maintaining	  primary	  control	  of	  Predator	  assets	  manifested	  itself	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  fronts.	  While	  no	  one	  in	  the	  USAF	  was	  content	  to	  let	  the	  Predator	  program	  fall	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  another	  service,	  there	  were	  debates	  about	  how	  best	  to	  shore	  up	  the	  USAF’s	  unique	  claim	  to	  managing	  the	  Predator	  program	  most	  effectively.	  As	  had	  been	  the	  case	  in	  the	  past,	  there	  also	  continued	  to	  be	  competing	  rationales	  for	  maintaining	  dominance	  over	  Predator	  operations.	  While	  some	  genuinely	  sought	  to	  integrate	  the	  Predator	  to	  enhance	  the	  USAF’s	  warfighting	  potential,	  others	  sought	  to	  control	  the	  Predators’	  rate	  of	  growth	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  limit	  its	  strategic	  relevance.	  	  	  
Command	  and	  Control	  During	  the	  Omar	  Strike	  	  The	  first	  and	  biggest	  example	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  increasingly	  territorial	  stance	  toward	  the	  Predator	  was	  its	  reaction	  to	  being	  excluded	  from	  mission	  planning	  and	  execution	  of	  the	  failed	  strike	  against	  Mullah	  Omar.	  Then-­‐Lt.	  Gen.	  Wald,	  the	  JFACC	  responsible	  for	  air	  campaign	  over	  Afghanistan,	  saw	  his	  involvement	  limited	  to	  watching	  the	  FMV	  screen	  as	  Gen.	  Franks	  ordered	  the	  ACC	  EAIS	  to	  launch	  the	  Predator’s	  Hellfire	  missiles	  at	  a	  convoy	  vehicle	  outside	  a	  building	  where	  Omar	  was	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thought	  to	  be.	  The	  idea	  was	  to	  draw	  Omar	  outside,	  but	  instead	  it	  created	  an	  opportunity	  for	  him	  to	  escape.136	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  failed	  Omar	  strike	  reinforced	  air	  commanders’	  views	  that,	  from	  a	  doctrinal	  perspective,	  the	  JFACC	  was	  in	  the	  strongest	  position	  to	  command	  and	  control	  air	  assets,	  including	  the	  Predator,	  during	  military	  operations.137	  “As	  retired	  Gen.	  Wald	  explained,	  it	  would	  have	  been	  better	  for	  the	  USAF	  to	  take	  the	  lead	  on	  the	  Omar	  strike	  because	  the	  CAOC	  was	  established	  specifically	  to	  manage	  dynamic	  and	  complex	  air	  taskings	  in	  a	  wartime	  environment.	  In	  contrast,	  CENTCOM	  only	  knew	  how	  to	  handle	  highly	  controlled	  bombing	  events	  based	  on	  its	  1990’s	  experience	  with	  no-­‐fly	  zones	  over	  Iraq.138	  The	  command	  and	  control	  relationships	  were	  completely	  dysfunctional	  here,”	  said	  retired	  Lt.	  Gen.	  Deptula,	  who	  was	  Gen.	  Wald’s	  CAOC	  director	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  incident.139	  	  	  
The	  ROVER	  and	  ROVER	  II	  	  
	   The	  USAF’s	  territorial	  approach	  to	  the	  management	  of	  Predator	  combat	  operations	  also	  colored	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	  Army.	  The	  ROVER	  II	  allowed	  for	  the	  “democratization”	  of	  the	  battlefield,	  giving	  ground	  forces	  access	  to	  Predator	  video	  feeds	  so	  valuable	  that	  the	  military’s	  most	  high-­‐ranking	  generals	  —	  including	  Gen.	  Franks	  and	  then-­‐Lt.	  Gen.	  Wald	  —	  had	  argued	  over	  who	  should	  use	  them	  to	  make	  command	  and	  control	  decisions.	  As	  a	  result,	  ROVER	  II	  raised	  concerns	  in	  the	  USAF	  on	  two	  levels.	  	  First,	  on	  a	  rational	  level,	  Big	  Safari	  had	  given	  the	  first	  ROVER	  systems	  to	  Army	  SOF	  units	  free	  of	  charge,	  and	  the	  USAF	  was	  reluctant	  to	  continue	  that	  practice.140	  In	  the	  late	  1990s,	  the	  service	  had	  refused	  to	  fund	  TCS	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  it	  would	  directly	  benefit	  other	  services	  that	  were	  not	  paying	  for	  its	  use.	  But	  now	  Big	  Safari	  was	  giving	  away	  Predator	  FMV	  access	  for	  free	  via	  the	  ROVER.	  Grimes,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  136	  Franks	  (2004	  )	  293:	  Deptula	  interview	  (June	  2,	  2014)	  137	  Campbell	  interview	  (June	  5,	  2014)	  138	  Wald	  interview	  (Feb.	  13,	  2015)	  	  139	  Deptula	  interview	  (June	  2,	  2014)	  140	  Manuel	  interview	  (Oct.	  11,	  2013)	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the	  Big	  Safari	  director	  “was	  taking	  a	  lot	  of	  heat	  for	  spending	  Air	  Force	  money	  to	  give	  something	  to	  the	  Army,”	  recalled	  retired	  CW02	  Manuel.141	  	  	  Second,	  the	  USAF	  fundamentally	  believed	  that	  commanding	  USAF	  officers	  were	  best	  positioned	  to	  control	  the	  flow	  of	  information	  available	  through	  Predator	  FMV	  feeds;	  the	  average	  ground	  unit	  did	  have	  the	  training	  to	  accurately	  digest	  the	  information	  for	  immediate	  use	  on	  the	  battlefield.	  After	  returning	  from	  an	  Afghanistan	  deployment	  with	  the	  ROVER	  II,	  CW02	  Manuel	  began	  briefing	  officers	  on	  new	  ROVER	  innovations,	  including	  the	  idea	  of	  allowing	  ground	  forces	  to	  take	  control	  of	  Predator	  sensors.	  But	  he	  ultimately	  stopped	  briefing	  the	  concept,	  he	  said,	  because	  USAF	  officers	  were	  so	  opposed	  to	  it.	  “Air	  Force	  guys	  would	  literally	  get	  up	  and	  walk	  out	  of	  my	  briefing	  when	  I	  would	  talk	  about	  the	  guy	  on	  the	  ground	  taking	  control	  of	  the	  sensor,”	  said	  the	  retired	  green	  beret.	  “Air	  Force	  guys	  felt	  that	  if	  you	  wanted	  to	  do	  that,	  you	  needed	  to	  go	  to	  Air	  Force	  school.	  You	  have	  to	  be	  trained…I	  was	  looked	  at	  as:	  ‘You	  are	  naïve,	  this	  is	  not	  how	  this	  works.’”142	  	  
Protecting	  the	  USAF’s	  War-­‐Winning	  Edge:	  Debates	  about	  Predator	  Pilot	  Training	  
and	  Skills	  	  
	  Just	  as	  the	  ROVER	  raised	  concerns	  about	  the	  USAF’s	  control	  of	  the	  Predator	  program,	  so	  did	  proposals	  to	  change	  Predator	  pilot	  training.	  As	  discussed	  in	  Question	  3,	  calls	  for	  new	  UAV	  career	  fields	  raised	  an	  internal	  debate	  within	  the	  USAF	  about	  warrior	  credentials.	  But	  it	  also	  raised	  a	  second	  internal	  debate	  about	  the	  types	  of	  skills	  required	  to	  fly	  a	  UAV.	  Both	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  and	  Gen.	  Jumper	  believed	  that	  good	  UAV	  airmanship	  did	  not	  necessarily	  require	  the	  same	  level	  of	  training	  undertaken	  by	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots.	  In	  their	  view,	  training	  needed	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  ability	  to	  maintain	  situational	  awareness	  in	  three	  dimensions	  while	  making	  decisions	  to	  effectively	  complete	  a	  mission	  —	  not	  stick	  and	  rudder	  skills.143	  In	  contrast,	  Gen.	  Moseley	  wanted	  to	  preserve	  the	  special	  role	  of	  manned	  aircraft	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  141	  ibid	  142	  ibid	  	  143	  Cantwell	  (2007)	  98	  and	  105	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pilot	  skills	  in	  Predator	  operations,	  continuing	  to	  insist	  on	  the	  ALFA	  tour	  because	  only	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  “have	  the	  third	  dimensional	  sense”	  and	  “a	  notion	  that	  this	  business	  is	  dangerous	  and	  you’ll	  bust	  your	  ass	  if	  you’re	  not	  careful.”144	  	  	   The	  USAF’s	  internal	  debate	  about	  a	  new	  Predator	  career	  field	  fueled	  a	  larger	  external	  debate	  about	  whether	  the	  USAF	  contributed	  anything	  unique	  to	  Predator	  operations.	  In	  his	  2008	  speech	  at	  Maxwell	  AFB,	  Secretary	  Gates	  suggested	  enlisted	  airmen	  could	  fly	  Predator	  because	  enlisted	  troops	  were	  already	  flying	  the	  Army’s	  ER/MP.	  He	  asked	  the	  USAF	  to	  question	  “long-­‐standing	  service	  assumptions	  and	  priorities	  about	  which	  missions	  require	  certified	  pilots	  and	  which	  do	  not.”145	  USAF	  leaders	  roundly	  rejected	  the	  proposal,	  insisting	  the	  USAF’s	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  skills	  were	  required	  to	  operate	  the	  Predator	  effectively.	  	  Gen.	  Moseley	  said	  using	  enlisted	  airmen	  would	  require	  training	  them	  up	  to	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots’	  standards,	  which	  would	  just	  take	  too	  long.146	  	  Innovations	  in	  UAV	  technology	  also	  fueled	  the	  external	  debate	  about	  whether	  the	  USAF’s	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  were	  needed	  to	  fly	  the	  Predator.	  For	  example,	  RSO	  created	  an	  opportunity	  to	  save	  money	  and	  time	  by	  limiting	  launch	  and	  recovery	  training	  to	  Predator	  pilots	  scheduled	  to	  deploy.147	  But	  some	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  worried	  that	  limiting	  launch	  and	  recovery	  training	  would	  detract	  from	  the	  rationale	  for	  the	  pilot-­‐dominated	  USAF	  to	  run	  the	  Predator	  program.	  Many	  thought	  that	  launch	  and	  recovery	  training	  was	  critical	  because	  it	  demanded	  stick-­‐and-­‐rudder	  skills	  that	  only	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  possess.148	  Similar	  concerns	  were	  raised	  when	  GA-­‐ASI	  introduced	  a	  new	  automated	  takeoff	  and	  landing	  (ATLS)	  system	  for	  the	  Army’s	  ER/MP.	  From	  the	  beginning,	  the	  USAF	  expressed	  little	  interest	  in	  adopting	  ATLS,	  even	  though	  launch	  and	  recovery	  represented	  the	  most	  challenging	  part	  of	  the	  flight	  envelope.149	  Several	  sources	  claim	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  community	  worried	  that	  ATLS	  would	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detract	  from	  their	  special	  claim	  to	  employing	  the	  Predator	  effectively.	  “As	  soon	  as	  you	  start	  breaking	  out	  unmanned	  components	  with	  automation,	  making	  it	  simpler	  and	  easier	  so	  that	  the	  ‘sub-­‐human’	  enlisted	  race,	  as	  they	  view	  it,	  can	  operate	  it,	  you	  have	  basically	  culturally	  ripped	  apart	  the	  center	  of	  what	  they	  are	  trying	  to	  do,”	  said	  Tim	  Owings,	  the	  top	  civilian	  in	  charge	  of	  Army	  UAV	  programs	  from	  November	  2004	  to	  October	  2011.150	  Pace,	  the	  president	  of	  GA-­‐ASI	  since	  2010,	  said	  he	  agreed	  that	  the	  sole	  reason	  the	  USAF	  to	  this	  day	  has	  not	  yet	  adopted	  ATLS	  is	  “100	  percent	  cultural.”	  He	  added:	  “It	  just	  dramatically,	  dramatically	  reduces	  accidents.	  It’s	  only	  the	  culture	  that	  keeps	  the	  Air	  Force	  from	  wanting	  to	  do	  automatic	  takeoff	  and	  landing.”151	  There	  was	  more	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  external	  debate	  than	  simply	  the	  question	  of	  how	  much	  training	  a	  Predator	  pilot	  needed.	  If	  Predator	  pilots	  did	  not	  need	  traditional	  manned	  aircraft	  piloting	  skills,	  was	  there	  any	  reason	  for	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots,	  or,	  indeed,	  for	  the	  USAF	  itself,	  to	  continue	  its	  monopoly	  on	  Predator	  operations?	  As	  then-­‐Brig.	  Gen.	  Lyon	  told	  then-­‐Lt.	  Col.	  Cantwell	  in	  2007,	  if	  anyone	  can	  fly	  the	  Predator,	  than	  anyone	  can	  fly	  UAVs	  —	  any	  rank,	  any	  service	  —	  and	  if	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  then	  the	  USAF	  “cedes	  our	  authority	  over	  managing,	  commanding	  and	  controlling	  the	  effects	  that	  take	  place	  from	  the	  air	  to	  anybody	  that	  wants	  to	  do	  it.”152	  The	  internal	  debate	  about	  the	  lack	  of	  warrior	  mentality	  among	  Predator	  pilots,	  discussed	  in	  Question	  3,	  combined	  with	  the	  disagreements	  over	  Predator	  pilot	  skills,	  created	  a	  cultural	  upheaval	  in	  the	  USAF	  that	  left	  it	  vulnerable	  to	  external	  attacks	  on	  its	  claim	  to	  ownership	  of	  the	  Predator	  program.	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  Army’s	  Decision	  to	  Buy	  its	  Own	  Version	  of	  the	  Predator	  	  	  The	  USAF’s	  fears	  of	  losing	  control	  of	  Predator	  operations	  grew	  deeper	  after	  the	  Army	  started	  buying	  its	  own	  version	  of	  the	  Predator.	  	  Army	  leaders	  complained	  they	  lacked	  Predator	  support	  not	  only	  because	  there	  were	  too	  few	  Predators,	  but	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also	  because	  the	  USAF’s	  doctrinal	  emphasis	  on	  centralized	  control	  of	  Predator	  operations	  short-­‐changed	  ground	  forces.	  Rather	  than	  focusing	  on	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  Army’s	  troops	  in	  contact,	  Army	  officials	  complained,	  the	  Predators	  were	  focused	  on	  strategic	  intelligence	  collection	  on	  targets	  across	  Afghanistan.153	  The	  USAF’s	  approach	  was	  costing	  lives,	  according	  to	  Army	  officials.	  Lt.	  Gen.	  Robert	  Noonan,	  the	  Army’s	  chief	  intelligence	  officer,	  said	  in	  April	  2002	  that	  better	  command	  and	  control	  of	  Predators	  during	  Operation	  Anaconda	  —	  the	  first	  OEF	  battle	  to	  involve	  large	  numbers	  of	  conventional	  forces	  —	  might	  have	  prevented	  tactical	  intelligence	  failures	  that	  led	  US	  troops	  to	  drop	  into	  landing	  zones	  under	  heavy	  fire.	  If	  Army	  commanders	  in	  theater	  controlled	  Predator	  operations,	  he	  argued,	  they	  could	  have	  ensured	  that	  Predators	  supported	  the	  operation	  effectively.	  “When	  you	  have	  a	  scarcity	  of	  assets,	  if	  you	  only	  have	  one	  or	  two	  Predators,	  somebody	  has	  to	  make	  the	  call,	  where’s	  that	  thing	  flying,	  what	  it’s	  looking	  at,”	  said	  Lt.	  Gen.	  Noonan.	  “So	  that’s	  why	  we	  feel	  very	  strongly	  that	  all	  of	  our	  brigades	  have	  got	  to	  have	  the	  UAVs.”154	  Of	  course,	  the	  Army	  was	  developing	  its	  own	  fleet	  of	  smaller	  tactical	  surveillance	  UAVs	  in	  the	  early	  2000’s,	  including	  small,	  hand-­‐launched	  RQ-­‐11	  Ravens.155	  But	  these	  were	  not	  armed	  and	  could	  not	  provide	  close	  air	  support	  when	  Army	  lives	  were	  at	  stake.	  	  The	  USAF	  faced	  an	  uphill	  battle	  in	  challenging	  the	  Army’s	  compelling	  wartime	  argument	  for	  its	  own	  version	  of	  the	  Predator,	  the	  ER/MP.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  took	  on	  the	  fight	  during	  JCIDS	  meetings	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2004,	  arguing	  that	  the	  Army’s	  proposal	  to	  build	  the	  ER/MP	  was	  duplicative	  with	  the	  Predator	  program.156	  The	  USAF	  also	  argued	  that	  the	  Army’s	  ownership	  of	  the	  ER/MP	  would	  be	  inconsistent	  with	  “clearly	  defined	  service	  roles	  and	  missions.”157	  	  As	  ground	  forces	  fought	  and	  died	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq,	  however,	  the	  USAF’s	  doctrinal	  arguments	  failed	  to	  convince	  Pentagon	  bureaucrats.	  The	  first	  variant	  of	  the	  Army’s	  ER/MP,	  known	  as	  the	  Warrior	  Alpha,	  deployed	  to	  Iraq	  in	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October	  2006	  with	  the	  Army’s	  Task	  Force	  ODIN,	  responsible	  for	  the	  detection	  of	  one	  of	  the	  war’s	  biggest	  killers:	  improvised	  explosive	  devices.158	  In	  keeping	  with	  the	  Army’s	  view	  that	  the	  UAV	  should	  be	  highly	  responsive	  to	  ground	  forces,	  the	  Warrior	  and	  its	  successor,	  the	  MQ-­‐1C	  Gray	  Eagle,	  were	  designed	  to	  operate	  in	  theater	  with	  Army	  units.	  The	  Army	  One	  System	  Ground	  Control	  station	  automated	  much	  of	  the	  operator’s	  flying	  tasks,	  allowing	  for	  enlisted	  operators	  to	  fly	  the	  system,	  and	  it	  was	  designed	  to	  be	  forward-­‐deployed	  with	  Army	  ground	  forces,	  rather	  than	  employing	  RSO.159	  
	  
The	  USAF	  Fights	  Back:	  the	  Bid	  for	  Executive	  Agency	  	  	  Although	  the	  Army	  had	  a	  compelling	  life-­‐or-­‐death	  argument	  for	  buying	  their	  own	  UAVs,	  Gen.	  Moseley	  continued	  to	  make	  the	  doctrinal	  case	  for	  the	  USAF	  to	  manage	  the	  Predator,	  Reaper,	  and	  Gray	  Eagle.	  His	  2007	  bid	  for	  executive	  agency	  was	  rooted	  in	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  JFACC,	  a	  USAF	  officer,	  was	  in	  the	  strongest	  position	  to	  prioritize	  the	  use	  of	  these	  air	  assets	  in	  a	  way	  that	  fully	  recognized	  their	  strategic	  potential.	  	  In	  his	  2007	  executive	  agency	  memo,	  he	  argued	  that	  “A	  joint	  theater	  ISR	  strategy,	  with	  the	  [JFACC]	  controlling	  all	  medium	  and	  high-­‐altitude	  theater	  ISR	  assets,	  will	  better	  meet	  the	  ISR	  needs	  of	  the	  joint	  force	  commander.”160	  	  	  But	  Secretary	  Gates	  opposed	  executive	  agency.	  In	  his	  view,	  the	  service’s	  claim	  to	  masterfully	  managing	  the	  Predator	  program	  was	  hollow	  and	  insincere.	  As	  discussed	  in	  Question	  3,	  he	  felt	  that	  the	  USAF	  was	  culturally	  biased	  against	  UAV	  technology	  and	  he	  also	  believed	  the	  service	  was	  failing	  to	  adequately	  support	  the	  Army	  with	  UAV	  orbits.	  The	  decision	  of	  CIA	  and	  JSOC	  to	  buy	  their	  own	  Predator	  assets	  because	  ACC	  was	  not	  responsive	  enough	  further	  enforced	  the	  impression	  that	  the	  USAF	  was	  not	  genuinely	  committed	  to	  employing	  the	  Predator	  to	  achieve	  maximum	  effects	  in	  the	  battlespace.	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In	  his	  2014	  book,	  Secretary	  Gates	  explained	  “The	  Army	  resisted	  [executive	  agency],	  and	  I	  was	  on	  its	  side;	  the	  Air	  Force	  was	  grasping	  for	  absolute	  control	  over	  a	  capability	  for	  which	  it	  had	  little	  enthusiasm	  in	  the	  first	  place.”161	  Owings	  agreed	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  sudden	  interest	  in	  Predator-­‐class	  UAVs	  had	  less	  to	  do	  with	  doctrine	  than	  with	  trying	  to	  keep	  UAVs	  from	  achieving	  too	  much	  success	  outside	  the	  USAF’s	  control.	  “I	  think	  they	  felt	  that	  by	  doing	  [controlling	  the	  Predator]	  they	  would	  control	  the	  key	  part	  of	  the	  discussion	  and	  funding,”	  he	  said.162	  In	  closing,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  USAF	  officers	  almost	  universally	  believed	  that	  the	  service	  was	  in	  the	  strongest	  position	  to	  manage	  the	  UAV.	  However,	  there	  were	  disagreements	  over	  how	  this	  was	  best	  achieved.	  USAF	  officers	  did	  not	  agree	  on	  how	  best	  to	  infuse	  the	  warrior	  mentality	  in	  its	  Predator	  pilots,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Question	  3,	  nor	  did	  they	  agree	  on	  what	  skills	  were	  most	  important	  for	  Predator	  operations.	  These	  questions	  about	  USAF	  pilot	  identity	  made	  the	  USAF	  vulnerable	  to	  attacks	  on	  the	  service’s	  claim	  to	  the	  Predator	  program.	  The	  problem	  was	  only	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  reality	  that	  while	  many	  in	  the	  USAF	  genuinely	  believed	  unmanned	  technology	  had	  a	  future	  in	  the	  USAF,	  there	  was	  still	  a	  cultural	  strain	  	  —	  made	  worse	  by	  wartime	  pressures	  and	  Predator	  pilot	  personnel	  policies	  —	  that	  saw	  UAVs	  as	  a	  short-­‐term	  niche	  capability	  that	  ultimately	  needed	  to	  be	  crushed.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	  	  The	  wars	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq	  forced	  the	  USAF	  to	  temporarily	  overcome	  pervasive	  cultural	  biases	  against	  UAVs	  to	  deliver	  a	  high-­‐demand	  wartime	  capability.	  But	  the	  simmering	  tension	  between	  two	  major	  imperatives	  —	  systematic	  integration	  of	  the	  Predator	  into	  the	  USAF’s	  force	  structure	  versus	  meeting	  rapid	  innovation	  to	  meet	  wartime	  demand	  —	  was	  approaching	  a	  boiling	  point.	  The	  USAF	  was	  already	  in	  a	  state	  of	  cultural	  upheaval	  following	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Predator	  program,	  and	  wartime	  pressures	  made	  it	  worse.	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USAF	  leaders	  adopted	  two	  different	  approaches	  in	  response	  to	  these	  competing	  demands.	  As	  described	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  Gen.	  Jumper	  sometimes	  acted	  as	  a	  “norm	  exploiter”	  in	  his	  positions	  as	  ACC	  chief	  and	  USAF	  chief.	  He	  tried	  to	  identify	  elements	  of	  the	  UAV	  that	  complemented	  USAF	  culture,	  winning	  over	  the	  strike	  aircraft	  community	  through	  weaponization,	  and	  proposing	  a	  CSO	  career	  field	  designed	  for	  navigators,	  who	  tended	  to	  want	  to	  fly	  the	  Predator	  anyway.	  In	  contrast	  to	  this	  approach,	  however,	  Gen.	  Moseley	  continued	  the	  practice	  of	  forcing	  the	  Predator	  into	  existing	  USAF	  ways	  of	  doing	  business,	  thereby	  provoking	  a	  direct	  confrontation	  between	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  community	  and	  the	  Predator	  program.	  	  	  	  Gen.	  Moseley	  said	  he	  believed	  unmanned	  technology	  had	  long-­‐term	  strategic	  potential,	  but	  he	  also	  saw	  the	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  as	  very	  limited	  platforms	  only	  suitable	  for	  fighting	  counterinsurgencies.	  His	  approach	  to	  UAV	  manning	  further	  reinforced	  the	  idea	  that	  he	  saw	  Predator	  integration	  as	  a	  short-­‐term	  problem.	  This	  approach	  served	  to	  worsen	  cultural	  tensions	  and	  the	  long-­‐term	  prospects	  for	  UAV	  integration	  in	  the	  USAF.	  ALFA	  tours,	  which	  eventually	  required	  draconian	  personnel	  changes,	  shocked	  and	  angered	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  community.	  ACC,	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  community,	  was	  forced	  to	  manage	  the	  training	  and	  acquisition	  pipeline	  for	  a	  UAV	  that	  it	  saw	  as	  nothing	  but	  a	  niche	  capability.	  	  Ultimately,	  the	  USAF	  was	  able	  to	  dramatically	  increase	  the	  number	  of	  UAV	  orbits	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq	  by	  2008.	  But	  while	  the	  short-­‐term	  problem	  was	  solved,	  the	  long-­‐term	  prospects	  for	  integrating	  unmanned	  technologies	  in	  the	  USAF	  looked	  worse	  than	  ever.	  Senior	  leaders	  claimed	  to	  understand	  the	  need	  to	  dominate	  the	  strategic	  employment	  of	  UAVs	  in	  the	  future,	  but	  the	  short-­‐term	  approach	  to	  Predator	  integration	  was	  upending	  USAF	  pilot	  identity	  and	  raising	  questions	  about	  how	  much	  the	  USAF	  sincerely	  believed	  UAVs	  would	  be	  needed	  to	  fight	  the	  next	  war.	  	  The	  ongoing	  cultural	  upheaval	  created	  an	  opportunity	  for	  Secretary	  Gates	  and	  the	  Army	  to	  attack	  the	  USAF’s	  claim	  to	  being	  in	  the	  strongest	  position	  to	  employ	  Predator-­‐class	  UAVs	  effectively	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Chapter	  Seven,	  Shifting	  Battlespaces:	  Long-­‐Term	  
Predator	  Innovation	  	  The	  United	  States	  ended	  combat	  operations	  in	  Iraq	  in	  August	  2010,	  and	  all	  remaining	  forces	  were	  withdrawn	  by	  December	  2011.1	  By	  the	  time	  major	  combat	  operations	  in	  Afghanistan	  ended	  in	  December	  2014,	  the	  Obama	  administration’s	  strategic	  focus	  had	  shifted	  to	  a	  broader	  international	  counterterrorism	  campaign.	  The	  Predator	  and	  its	  successor,	  the	  Reaper,	  had	  played	  a	  central	  role	  in	  operations	  against	  al	  Qaeda	  and	  Taliban	  targets	  in	  the	  waning	  days	  of	  the	  Afghanistan	  war,	  and	  their	  centrality	  to	  counterterrorism	  operations	  only	  increased	  as	  the	  Obama	  administration	  shifted	  its	  attention	  to	  countering	  violent	  extremism	  outside	  “hot”	  combat	  zones.	  	  	   Inside	  the	  USAF,	  the	  long-­‐running	  debate	  about	  the	  role	  of	  UAVs	  in	  the	  emerging	  strategic	  context	  intensified.	  Although	  the	  wars	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq	  were	  “gray”	  conflicts”	  that	  fell	  short	  of	  a	  high-­‐intensity,	  full-­‐scale	  clash,	  they	  nevertheless	  offered	  some	  reprieve	  from	  the	  overwhelming	  sense	  of	  strategic	  ambiguity	  that	  had	  been	  building	  since	  the	  early	  1990s.	  USAF	  officials	  more	  or	  less	  agreed	  that	  these	  counterinsurgencies	  demanded	  short-­‐term	  investment	  in	  UAV	  innovation.	  As	  those	  wars	  ended	  and	  the	  Obama	  administration	  shifted	  its	  focus	  to	  UAV	  strikes	  against	  terrorist	  suspects	  in	  nations	  with	  which	  the	  US	  was	  not	  at	  war,	  however,	  strategic	  ambiguity	  returned.	  	  With	  the	  lines	  between	  war	  and	  peace	  so	  blurred,	  the	  strategic	  relevance	  of	  UAVs	  was	  a	  matter	  of	  perception.	  Some	  in	  the	  USAF	  saw	  UAVs	  as	  a	  niche	  capability	  unworthy	  of	  a	  sustained	  innovation	  focus	  given	  their	  far	  greater	  concern	  regarding	  the	  potential	  for	  a	  high-­‐intensity	  war	  that	  would	  demand	  employment	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  most	  survivable	  manned	  aircraft.	  Others	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  USAF,	  however,	  advocated	  continued	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  innovation	  based	  on	  their	  prediction	  of	  a	  protracted	  era	  of	  “gray”	  wars	  that	  would	  call	  for	  time-­‐sensitive,	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discriminate	  targeting	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  a	  relatively	  benign	  air	  environment.	  A	  third	  possibility	  was	  to	  develop	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  UAVs	  for	  contested	  airspace,	  but	  with	  the	  budget	  declining,	  that	  option	  was	  unlikely	  given	  that	  even	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  innovation	  was	  a	  source	  of	  controversy.	  The	  tension	  within	  the	  USAF	  over	  whether	  to	  focus	  on	  UAV	  innovation	  as	  a	  short-­‐term	  or	  long-­‐term	  pursuit	  played	  out	  in	  UAV	  policy	  decisions	  made	  during	  the	  tenures	  of	  Gen.	  Norton	  Schwartz,	  the	  USAF	  chief	  from	  August	  2008	  to	  August	  2012	  and	  his	  successor,	  the	  current	  chief,	  Gen.	  Mark	  Welsh.	  The	  first	  half	  of	  this	  chapter	  describes	  these	  policy	  decisions.	  The	  second	  half	  explores	  how	  USAF	  culture	  influenced	  the	  USAF’s	  approach	  to	  UAV	  innovation	  and	  how	  the	  continued	  operational	  success	  of	  UAVs,	  in	  turn,	  shaped	  USAF	  culture.	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  Predator,	  the	  Reaper,	  and	  the	  Future	  of	  UAV	  Innovation	  	  Secretary	  Gates	  quickly	  nominated	  a	  new	  USAF	  chief	  and	  secretary	  after	  Gen.	  Moseley’s	  dismissal	  in	  August	  2008.	  President	  Bush	  swiftly	  approved	  the	  nominations	  of	  Michael	  Donley,	  a	  career	  bureaucrat,	  to	  be	  secretary,	  and	  Gen.	  Schwartz,	  the	  head	  of	  US	  Transportation	  Command,	  to	  be	  chief.	  It	  was	  the	  first	  time	  a	  non-­‐fighter	  pilot	  was	  selected	  as	  chief	  since	  1982.2	  	  	  The	  USAF	  leadership	  change	  came	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  the	  election	  of	  President	  Barack	  Obama,	  who	  supported	  Secretary	  Gates’	  relentless	  push	  to	  increase	  UAV	  orbits,	  even	  as	  the	  Iraq	  war	  ended.	  Between	  2008	  and	  2012,	  CAPs	  nearly	  doubled	  from	  32	  to	  62.3	  Demand	  for	  Predators	  and	  Reapers	  exploded	  as	  President	  Obama	  launched	  a	  troop	  surge	  in	  Afghanistan	  in	  late	  2009.4	  Coalition	  UAVs	  —	  including	  USAF	  Predators	  and	  Reapers,	  and	  RAF	  Reapers	  —	  flew	  3,240	  UAV	  sorties	  in	  Afghanistan	  in	  2008,	  compared	  to	  7,612	  sorties	  before	  2012	  ended.5	  Most	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Air	  Force	  Fact	  Sheet	  (Apr.	  15,	  2015)	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  (Dec.	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sorties	  were	  ISR	  missions,	  but	  by	  2010	  the	  US	  and	  coalition	  forces	  used	  UAVs	  to	  conduct	  one	  out	  of	  every	  10	  air	  strikes.6	  	  	  	  Outside	  Afghanistan,	  the	  growth	  in	  UAV	  reconnaissance	  and	  strike	  missions	  was	  equally	  remarkable.	  President	  Obama	  entered	  office	  focused	  on	  eradicating	  Taliban	  and	  al	  Qaeda	  safe	  havens	  along	  the	  Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan	  border.7	  He	  authorized	  370	  CIA-­‐managed	  UAV	  strikes	  in	  Pakistan	  through	  January	  2015,	  compared	  to	  just	  51	  authorized	  by	  President	  Bush	  between	  2004	  and	  2009.8	  The	  Obama	  administration	  also	  expanded	  UAV	  strikes	  to	  Yemen	  and	  Somalia	  under	  a	  partnership	  between	  the	  CIA	  and	  JSOC.9	  In	  total,	  President	  Obama	  authorized	  491	  UAV	  strikes	  in	  Pakistan,	  Somalia	  and	  Yemen	  as	  of	  October	  2015.10	  This	  increased	  activity	  beyond	  official	  combat	  zones	  meant	  more	  work	  for	  the	  USAF’s	  Predator	  pilots,	  as	  the	  17th	  RS	  flew	  UAV	  reconnaissance	  and	  strike	  missions	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  CIA,	  while	  AFSOC’s	  UAV	  squadrons	  —	  including	  the	  3rd	  SOS,	  which	  was	  joined	  by	  the	  33rd	  SOS	  and	  2nd	  SOS	  in	  2009	  —	  did	  the	  same	  on	  behalf	  of	  JSOC.11	  	  
	  
The	  Schwartz	  Years:	  The	  USAF’s	  Approach	  to	  Personnel	  Policy	  and	  Force	  
Planning,	  2009-­‐2012	  	  	  The	  USAF’s	  preference	  for	  “normalization,”	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  gradual	  integration	  of	  the	  Predator	  program,	  proved	  impracticable	  with	  the	  arrival	  of	  Secretary	  Gates	  who	  wanted	  rapid	  CAP	  increases	  to	  support	  wartime	  demand.	  His	  nominee	  for	  USAF	  chief,	  Gen.	  Schwartz,	  oversaw	  an	  explosion	  in	  Predator	  flight	  hours	  that	  began	  shortly	  before	  he	  took	  office	  in	  August	  2008.	  By	  September	  2009,	  the	  USAF	  had	  been	  able	  to	  accrue	  250,000	  flight	  hours	  in	  less	  than	  two	  years;	  in	  comparison,	  it	  took	  12	  years	  from	  1995	  to	  2007,	  to	  fly	  the	  first	  250,000.12	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Woods	  (2015)	  218	  	  7	  Obama	  (July	  27,	  2008)	  	  8	  The	  Bureau	  of	  Investigative	  Journalism	  (Dec.	  2015)	  	  	  	  9	  Woods	  (2015)	  170	  10	  Serle	  and	  Fielding	  Smith	  (Oct.	  5,	  2015)	  11	  Woods	  (2015)	  16-­‐17;	  Woods	  (2015)	  11-­‐12;	  Air	  Force	  Public	  Affairs	  (July	  3,	  2014)	  	  12	  Schwartz	  (Sept.	  29,	  2009)	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Shortly	  after	  taking	  office,	  Gen.	  Schwartz	  announced	  his	  intention	  to	  chart	  “a	  path	  toward	  full	  institutional	  integration	  of	  RPAs,”	  the	  USAF’s	  newest	  preferred	  nomenclature	  for	  UAVs.13	  In	  part	  because	  of	  the	  tremendous	  pressure	  to	  boost	  UAV	  orbits	  quickly,	  however,	  the	  USAF	  often	  adopted	  infrastructure	  and	  personnel	  policies	  that	  were	  effective	  in	  wartime	  but	  fell	  short	  of	  permanent	  solutions.	  	  	  
Wartime	  Expediency:	  Schwartz’s	  Short-­‐term	  Fixes	  	  The	  USAF	  engaged	  in	  organizational	  reshuffling	  to	  accommodate	  the	  rapid	  growth	  in	  UAV	  units.	  A	  long-­‐term	  solution	  might	  have	  been	  to	  establish	  additional	  UAV	  wings	  beyond	  the	  432nd	  at	  Creech	  AFB,	  but	  instead	  the	  USAF	  took	  three	  steps	  to	  increase	  its	  short-­‐term	  capacity	  to	  support	  the	  growing	  demand	  for	  UAV	  CAPs.	  	  First,	  the	  USAF	  created	  a	  second	  operations	  group,	  the	  732nd,	  at	  Creech	  AFB.	  	  That	  unit	  took	  responsibility	  for	  the	  17th	  RS,	  the	  squadron	  tasked	  to	  support	  CIA-­‐led	  missions,	  from	  Creech’s	  original	  432nd	  operations	  group.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  17th	  RS	  had	  grown	  so	  big	  that	  it	  had	  to	  be	  split	  into	  additional	  squadrons,	  giving	  the	  732nd	  control	  over	  a	  total	  of	  four	  squadrons.14	  This	  change,	  however,	  did	  not	  reduce	  the	  overall	  size	  of	  Creech.	  In	  2013,	  the	  base	  had	  over	  570	  company	  grade	  officers	  —	  almost	  three	  times	  the	  number	  at	  Holloman	  AFB	  in	  New	  Mexico	  —	  creating	  stiff	  competition	  for	  leadership	  spots,	  high	  rankings	  on	  performance	  reports,	  and	  awards.15	  	  	  	  Second,	  the	  USAF	  stood	  up	  new	  UAV	  squadrons	  across	  the	  country,	  but	  they	  were	  tucked	  under	  existing	  USAF	  wings	  dominated	  by	  other	  aircraft	  types.	  In	  2009,	  the	  service	  established	  an	  MQ-­‐1	  and	  an	  MQ-­‐9	  Formal	  Training	  Unit	  under	  the	  49th	  Wing,	  an	  F-­‐22-­‐dominated	  unit,	  at	  Holloman	  AFB.	  (The	  F-­‐22s	  would	  later	  leave	  the	  base	  in	  2013,	  but	  two	  F-­‐16	  training	  squadrons	  would	  replace	  them).	  In	  2010,	  the	  USAF	  stationed	  a	  Reaper	  squadron	  at	  the	  28th	  Bomb	  Wing	  at	  Ellsworth	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  Schwartz	  (Sept.	  15,	  2009)	  	  14	  Woods	  (Apr.	  14,	  2014);	  	  	  	  15	  Byrnes	  (Sept-­‐Oct.	  2015)	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AFB	  in	  South	  Dakota	  and	  another	  in	  the	  509th	  Bomb	  Wing	  at	  Whiteman	  AFB,	  Missouri.16	  Third,	  the	  USAF	  shifted	  its	  focus	  to	  bolstering	  UAV	  capability	  in	  the	  ANG.	  By	  2012,	  there	  were	  six	  UAV	  units	  already	  established	  in	  the	  ANG	  and	  an	  additional	  five	  scheduled	  to	  stand	  up	  in	  fiscal	  year	  2013.17	  	  	  Gen.	  Schwartz	  also	  made	  interim	  personnel	  changes	  to	  accommodate	  the	  explosion	  in	  UAV	  orbits.	  In	  2011,	  the	  USAF	  briefly	  closed	  the	  UAV	  weapons	  school	  at	  Creech	  AFB	  to	  free	  up	  more	  instructors	  for	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  CAPs.18	  But	  the	  change	  with	  the	  biggest	  impact	  on	  Predator	  pilot	  careers	  was	  a	  decision	  to	  start	  a	  “UPT-­‐direct”	  program	  to	  quickly	  increase	  the	  number	  of	  UAV	  pilots,	  which	  stood	  at	  about	  450	  in	  2009.19	  Under	  this	  effort,	  which	  lasted	  from	  2009	  to	  2011,	  the	  USAF	  assigned	  100	  pilots	  per	  year	  to	  go	  directly	  from	  UPT	  to	  fly	  the	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  rather	  than	  a	  manned	  aircraft.20	  After	  UPT,	  the	  selected	  pilots	  went	  to	  a	  “UAS	  Fundamentals”	  course	  at	  Randolph	  AFB	  in	  San	  Antonio,	  Texas,	  followed	  by	  14	  weeks	  initial	  qualification	  training	  (IQT)	  at	  Creech	  AFB.21	  	  Because	  the	  UPT-­‐direct	  program	  drew	  from	  a	  pool	  of	  newly-­‐minted	  pilots	  fully	  expecting	  to	  fly	  manned	  aircraft,	  it	  was	  essentially	  a	  continuation	  of	  Gen.	  Moseley’s	  practice	  of	  forcing	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  into	  UAVs	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  expediency.	  However,	  there	  was	  one	  important	  difference.	  The	  total	  of	  244	  UPT-­‐direct	  pilots	  assigned	  to	  UAVs	  between	  2009	  and	  2011	  were	  promised	  that	  they	  would	  fly	  only	  one	  tour	  in	  the	  UAV	  before	  receiving	  the	  option	  to	  transition	  to	  a	  manned	  aircraft	  assignment	  between	  2013	  and	  2015.22	   	  While	  Gen.	  Schwartz	  focused	  on	  the	  ongoing	  wars,	  next-­‐generation	  UAV	  innovation	  efforts	  suffered.	  This	  was	  in	  part	  because	  the	  USAF,	  along	  with	  the	  other	  military	  services,	  was	  facing	  an	  increasingly	  austere	  budget	  environment	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Spinetta	  (July-­‐	  Aug	  2013)	  106	  17	  Harrington	  Lee	  (July	  26,	  2012)	  	  18	  Strategypage.com	  (Dec.	  7,	  2011)	  	  19	  Mulrine	  (Jan.	  2009)	  34	  20	  Schultz	  (Oct.	  2009)	  11;	  Mulrine	  (Jan.	  2009)	  21	  Schultz	  	  (Oct.	  2009)	  11-­‐12	  22	  Air	  Force	  Headquarters	  CAF	  &	  ISR	  Branch,	  A3O-­‐AC	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after	  years	  of	  heavy	  wartime	  spending.23	  The	  financial	  pressure	  partly	  explains	  why	  the	  USAF	  cancelled	  MQ-­‐X,	  an	  attempt	  to	  build	  a	  more	  capable	  follow-­‐on	  to	  the	  Reaper.24	  The	  USAF	  also	  rejected	  a	  GA-­‐ASI	  design	  meant	  to	  serve	  as	  an	  interim	  solution	  until	  the	  MQ-­‐X	  was	  ready,	  known	  as	  the	  Predator	  C	  Avenger.25	  Finally,	  the	  USAF	  attempted	  to	  end	  procurement	  of	  Block	  30	  Global	  Hawk,	  a	  UAV	  designed	  for	  strategic	  reconnaissance,	  on	  the	  contested	  basis	  that	  the	  Cold	  War-­‐era	  U-­‐2	  Dragon	  Lady	  outperformed	  the	  UAV	  for	  less	  money.	  The	  program	  was	  only	  resuscitated	  due	  to	  congressional	  pressure.26	  	  
Long-­‐term	  Innovation:	  Schwartz’s	  UAV	  Institutionalization	  Efforts	  	  	  	  Although	  next-­‐generation	  UAV	  concepts	  received	  scant	  attention,	  Gen.	  Schwartz	  did	  take	  a	  crucial	  step	  to	  integrate	  the	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  programs	  overt	  he	  long	  term.	  He	  successfully	  launched	  a	  new	  UAV	  career	  field	  to	  to	  reduce	  the	  USAF’s	  reliance	  on	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  community.	  	  In	  January	  2009,	  Gen.	  Schwartz	  launched	  what	  was	  known	  as	  the	  “Beta	  Test”	  as	  a	  trial	  program	  to	  allow	  non-­‐rated	  officers	  to	  participate	  in	  unique	  UAV	  training	  in	  preparation	  to	  join	  a	  distinct	  UAV	  career	  field.27	  In	  the	  first	  class,	  10	  officers	  from	  non-­‐rated	  backgrounds	  completed	  33	  weeks	  of	  training.	  Candidates	  went	  to	  Pueblo,	  Colorado	  to	  complete	  IFS,	  consisting	  of	  15	  hours	  of	  flight	  time	  in	  a	  Diamond	  DA-­‐20	  trainer	  aircraft,	  culminating	  in	  a	  solo	  flight	  and	  a	  check	  ride	  to	  demonstrate	  proficiency	  in	  basic	  flight	  maneuvers	  and	  procedures.	  They	  then	  completed	  a	  short	  instrument	  qualification	  course	  using	  a	  T-­‐6	  Texan	  II	  simulator	  at	  Randolph,	  AFB	  in	  Texas,	  before	  joining	  UPT-­‐Direct	  pilots	  for	  the	  “UAS	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Fryer-­‐Biggs	  and	  Wasserbly	  (Jan.	  30,	  2015)	  24	  Harrington	  Lee	  (July	  26,	  2012)	  	  25	  Majumdar	  (Feb.	  15,	  2012);	  Axe	  (Nov.	  13,	  2014);	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  Spinetta	  and	  Cummings	  (Nov.	  2012)	  	  27	  Schultz	  (Oct.	  2009)	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fundamentals”	  Course	  and	  IQT.28	  When	  the	  first	  class	  of	  Beta	  test	  pilots	  finished	  training,	  they	  pinned	  on	  newly	  designed	  UAV	  pilot	  wings.29	  	  After	  the	  first	  class	  completed	  training,	  a	  consensus	  emerged	  in	  the	  USAF	  leadership	  community	  that	  the	  Beta	  test	  went	  too	  far	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  minimizing	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  skills.30	  After	  five	  classes	  of	  50	  students	  completed	  the	  Beta	  test	  between	  January	  2009	  and	  the	  fall	  of	  2010,	  31	  the	  USAF	  revised	  the	  training	  syllabus	  and	  announced	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  “UAV	  pilot	  career	  field,	  designated	  “18X,”	  for	  Predator,	  Reaper,	  and	  Global	  Hawk	  pilots	  in	  June	  2010.32	  The	  18X	  training,	  known	  as	  Undergraduate	  RPA	  Training	  (URT),	  increased	  IFS	  from	  15	  hours	  to	  39	  hours,	  the	  equivalent	  of	  flight	  requirements	  for	  a	  private	  pilot’s	  license.	  Flight	  time	  included	  27	  hours	  with	  a	  pilot	  instructor	  and	  another	  seven	  to	  10	  hours	  of	  solo	  time,	  including	  a	  five-­‐hour	  cross-­‐country	  solo	  flight.33	  The	  URT	  training	  culminated	  with	  an	  RPA	  Fundamentals	  Course	  at	  Randolph	  AFB	  instructing	  18X	  pilots	  on	  radio	  communications	  and	  mIRC	  chat.34	  	  	  	  	  	  On	  top	  of	  these	  efforts	  to	  cultivate	  a	  new	  career	  field,	  Gen.	  Schwartz	  also	  developed	  a	  mentorship	  program.	  In	  March	  2011,	  the	  USAF	  “recategorized”	  about	  477	  UAV	  pilots	  in	  the	  ranks	  of	  major	  and	  lieutenant	  colonel	  to	  serve	  indefinitely	  as	  UAV	  pilots.	  Most	  of	  them	  (412	  of	  the	  477)	  made	  the	  switch	  voluntarily,	  according	  to	  USAF	  headquarters.35	  This	  program	  provided	  a	  core	  of	  more	  senior	  pilots	  for	  the	  new	  UAV	  pilot	  career	  field.	  As	  of	  2014,	  a	  total	  of	  545	  UAV	  pilots	  had	  been	  recategorized.36	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  Schultz	  (Oct.	  2009)	  11-­‐12;	  Black	  (Oct.	  29,	  2009)	  	  29	  Janes	  (Oct.	  1,	  2009)	  	  30	  Gersten	  interview	  (March	  4,	  2013);	  Schultz	  (Oct.	  2009)	  53	  31	  Air	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  CAF	  &	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The	  Welsh	  Years:	  Relentless	  Pressure	  to	  Increase	  UAV	  Orbits	  	  	  	  Gen.	  Schwartz’s	  efforts	  had	  the	  cumulative	  effect	  of	  dramatically	  increasing	  the	  USAF’s	  capacity	  to	  support	  the	  ongoing	  wars	  with	  UAV	  orbits.	  Shortly	  before	  he	  retired	  in	  June	  2011,	  Secretary	  Gates	  praised	  the	  USAF	  for	  boosting	  UAV	  orbits	  from	  18	  in	  2007	  to	  48.37	  When	  Gen.	  Mark	  Welsh	  replaced	  Gen.	  Schwartz	  in	  August	  2012,	  the	  trend	  in	  CAP	  increases	  continued,	  as	  UAV	  strikes	  continued	  to	  expand	  outside	  “hot”	  battlespaces.	  	  	   The	  USAF	  reached	  65	  combat	  air	  patrols	  (CAPs)	  in	  May	  2014,	  a	  goal	  set	  by	  Secretary	  Gates	  in	  December	  2009.38	  The	  number	  of	  UAV	  pilots	  had	  grown	  from	  around	  460	  in	  fiscal	  year	  2008	  to	  1365	  in	  fiscal	  year	  2014.	  That	  total	  included	  about	  400	  18X	  and	  Beta-­‐test	  trained	  pilots,	  but	  the	  majority	  of	  pilots	  were	  still	  former	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  doing	  an	  ALFA	  tour,	  TAMI-­‐21	  pilots,	  and	  a	  handful	  of	  UPT-­‐direct	  pilots	  who	  opted	  to	  stay	  with	  UAVs	  rather	  than	  transition	  to	  a	  manned	  aircraft.	  39	  	  	  The	  continuing	  high	  demand	  for	  UAV	  orbits	  was	  matched	  by	  unrelenting	  budget	  pressure.	  The	  USAF	  had	  sought	  relief	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  request	  to	  reduce	  CAPs,	  which	  the	  Pentagon	  granted	  in	  the	  2014	  Quadrennial	  Defense	  Review,	  proposing	  a	  reduction	  to	  55	  CAPs.40	  The	  relief	  was	  only	  temporary,	  however,	  as	  the	  plan	  was	  scrapped	  later	  that	  year	  in	  favor	  of	  maintaining	  a	  65	  CAP	  goal	  after	  the	  US	  launched	  an	  air	  campaign	  against	  the	  Islamic	  State	  in	  Syria	  and	  Iraq.41	  	  By	  late	  2014,	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  demand	  for	  USAF	  UAV	  orbits	  was	  unlikely	  to	  abate.	  UAV	  strikes	  were	  confirmed	  in	  Pakistan,	  Yemen,	  Somalia,	  Libya,	  and	  Syria,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  suspected	  US	  UAV	  strike	  in	  the	  Philippines.42	  The	  US	  was	  also	  using	  UAVs	  to	  provide	  targeting	  data	  to	  the	  Turkish	  military’s	  anti-­‐Kurdish	  operations	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  Gates	  (March	  4,	  2011)	  	  38	  Kelsey	  (June	  9,	  2014)	  	  39	  Air	  Force	  Headquarters	  CAF	  &	  ISR	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  23,	  2014)	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  Schogol	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and	  to	  French	  armed	  forces	  in	  Mali.43	  The	  USAF	  conducted	  these	  UAV	  missions	  outside	  of	  “hot”	  battlespaces	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  CIA.	  USAF	  UAV	  aircrews	  were	  covering	  as	  many	  as	  22	  CAPs	  on	  a	  daily	  basis	  for	  the	  agency.44	  	  Strain	  on	  the	  UAV	  pilot	  community	  continued	  to	  mount,	  culminating	  with	  a	  December	  2014	  memo	  from	  the	  ACC	  commander	  to	  Gen.	  Welsh	  warning	  that	  the	  UAV	  pilot	  community	  was	  at	  a	  “breaking	  point.”	  Gen.	  Herbert	  Carlisle	  said	  ACC	  would	  “continue	  to	  non-­‐concur	  to	  increased	  tasking	  beyond	  our	  FY15	  force	  offering”	  of	  62	  CAPs.	  “This	  is	  simply	  not	  an	  option	  for	  ACC	  to	  source	  indeterminately,”	  he	  wrote.45	  	  In	  May	  2015,	  the	  USAF	  announced	  that	  the	  Pentagon	  had	  approved	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  service’s	  number	  of	  CAPs	  per	  day	  from	  65	  to	  60	  because	  the	  UAV	  community	  had	  been	  operating	  	  “at	  a	  pace	  that	  cannot	  be	  sustained	  without	  accepting	  risk.”46	  	  	  
Short	  Term	  Fixes	  in	  the	  Welsh	  Era	  
	  The	  USAF	  was	  struggling	  to	  meet	  the	  demand	  for	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  CAPs	  because	  it	  was	  losing	  pilots	  faster	  than	  it	  could	  recruit	  and	  train	  new	  ones.	  Experienced	  UAV	  pilots	  —	  mostly	  former	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  —	  were	  leaving	  the	  USAF	  at	  the	  rate	  of	  about	  230	  per	  year	  because	  of	  stress	  and	  overwork.47	  But	  the	  USAF	  was	  producing	  only	  about	  180	  pilots	  a	  year	  to	  replace	  them.48	  The	  main	  reason	  for	  low	  18X	  attrition	  was	  the	  limited	  capacity	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  18X	  training	  pipeline.	  Many	  qualified	  trainers	  had	  been	  diverted	  to	  combat	  roles.49	  	  	  To	  ameliorate	  the	  UAV	  pilot	  shortage,	  Gen.	  Welsh	  developed	  a	  series	  of	  short-­‐term	  fixes	  in	  2015,	  known	  as	  the	  “RPA	  Get	  Well	  Plan,”	  to	  free	  up	  more	  instructor	  pilots	  and	  improve	  retention	  among	  current	  UAV	  pilots.50	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  Woods	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  Lubold	  (Aug.	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  2015)	  45	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  (Jan.	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  46	  Losey	  (Dec.	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of	  the	  effort	  was	  increased	  reliance	  on	  the	  ANG.	  In	  July	  2015,	  the	  USAF	  asked	  the	  ANG	  to	  pick	  up	  three	  additional	  CAPs,	  freeing	  up	  more	  active	  duty	  UAV	  instructor	  pilots	  for	  UAV	  training	  units.51	  To	  accommodate	  the	  ANG’s	  growing	  role,	  its	  UAV	  infrastructure	  was	  expanded.	  The	  USAF	  planned	  to	  stand	  up	  almost	  as	  many	  ANG	  UAV	  squadrons	  as	  active	  duty	  ones.	  By	  early	  2015,	  there	  were	  seven	  operational	  ANG	  squadrons,	  and	  plans	  to	  stand	  up	  a	  total	  of	  12.	  There	  was	  also	  one	  MQ-­‐9	  reserve	  unit,	  as	  well	  as	  reservists	  supporting	  MQ-­‐9	  units	  at	  Creech	  AFB.	  In	  comparison,	  there	  were	  14	  active	  duty	  MQ-­‐1	  and	  MQ-­‐9	  units.52	  	  Another	  short-­‐term	  step,	  focused	  on	  improving	  retention	  rates,	  involved	  a	  January	  2015	  announcement	  that	  monthly	  bonuses	  for	  the	  small	  pool	  of	  existing	  18X	  pilots	  would	  be	  increased	  from	  $600	  to	  $1500.	  Then,	  in	  July	  2015,	  the	  USAF	  announced	  it	  would	  offer	  continuation	  pay	  to	  UAV	  pilots,	  proposing	  a	  retention	  bonus	  worth	  up	  to	  $135,000	  for	  pilots	  who	  reach	  the	  end	  of	  their	  six-­‐year	  commitment	  and	  agree	  to	  sign	  on	  for	  another	  five	  to	  nine	  years.	  The	  continuation	  pay	  may	  have	  made	  an	  18x	  assignment	  more	  attractive,	  but	  it	  was	  still	  far	  less	  than	  the	  $225,000	  Aviator	  Retention	  Pay	  bonus	  offered	  to	  some	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  in	  2015.53	  The	  USAF	  also	  announced	  a	  re-­‐start	  of	  the	  UPT-­‐direct	  program,	  even	  as	  the	  first	  batch	  of	  UPT-­‐direct	  pilots	  were	  getting	  the	  option	  to	  transition	  back	  into	  their	  manned	  aircraft	  after	  a	  three-­‐year	  UAV	  tour.	  In	  July	  2015,	  the	  service	  announced	  that	  80	  UPT	  graduates	  over	  the	  next	  twelve	  months	  would	  be	  assigned	  one	  UAV	  tour	  before	  transitioning	  to	  a	  manned	  aircraft.54	  	   Taken	  together,	  the	  USAF	  estimated	  that	  the	  steps	  to	  establish	  the	  18X	  career	  field	  and	  retain	  existing	  UAV	  pilots	  would	  allow	  the	  service	  to	  man	  its	  UAV	  training	  units	  at	  100	  percent	  by	  the	  end	  of	  fiscal	  year	  2016.	  In	  late	  2015,	  there	  were	  already	  enough	  UAV	  instructor	  pilots	  to	  reopen	  the	  UAV	  Weapons	  School.	  In	  terms	  of	  retention,	  the	  USAF	  expected	  its	  short-­‐term	  policies	  to	  make	  enough	  UAV	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pilots	  available	  to	  increase	  the	  UAV	  aircrew-­‐to-­‐CAP	  ratio	  from	  9.4:1	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2015	  to	  10:1	  —	  which	  was	  considered	  minimally	  acceptable	  —	  by	  the	  end	  of	  fiscal	  year	  2016.	  55	  	  
Gen.	  Welsh’s	  Long-­‐Term	  UAV	  Innovation	  Efforts	  	  	  By	  early	  2016,	  the	  demand	  for	  the	  USAF’s	  UAV	  force	  was	  at	  an	  “all	  time	  high.”56	  The	  Pentagon	  wanted	  to	  boost	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  CAPs	  to	  90	  by	  2019.57	  The	  increase	  was	  needed	  to	  broaden	  surveillance	  and	  intelligence	  collection	  in	  Ukraine,	  Iraq,	  Syria,	  the	  South	  China	  Sea	  and	  North	  Africa.58	  In	  recognition	  of	  the	  growing	  relevance	  of	  UAVs	  in	  the	  emerging	  strategic	  context,	  the	  USAF	  began	  to	  commit	  to	  some	  long-­‐term	  UAV	  innovations.	  These	  steps	  involved	  shifting	  capacity	  away	  from	  the	  overworked,	  low-­‐morale	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  community	  and	  building	  up	  a	  UAV	  community	  with	  other	  personnel.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  technology	  development,	  USAF	  Secretary	  Deborah	  James	  announced	  in	  July	  2015	  that	  the	  USAF	  would	  retrofit	  the	  GA-­‐ASI	  ATLS	  on	  the	  MQ-­‐9	  Reaper,	  allowing	  for	  automatic	  launch	  and	  recovery	  of	  the	  UAV	  without	  the	  need	  for	  stick	  and	  rudder	  skills.	  Initial	  fielding	  of	  the	  system,	  which	  would	  make	  it	  easier	  for	  personnel	  without	  traditional	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  training	  to	  fly	  UAVs,	  was	  scheduled	  for	  fiscal	  year	  2017.59	  	  	  	  	  The	  USAF	  also	  announced	  in	  December	  2015	  that	  enlisted	  airmen	  would	  fly	  the	  Global	  Hawk,	  and	  suggested	  they	  might	  eventually	  fly	  weaponized	  Predators	  and	  Reapers.60	  This	  announcement	  was	  part	  of	  a	  raft	  of	  policy	  changes	  proposed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  Gen.	  Welsh’s	  “Culture	  and	  Process	  Improvement	  Program”	  (CPIP),	  established	  in	  2015	  to	  address	  the	  morale	  problems	  resulting	  from	  forcing	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  to	  fly	  UAVs.	  In	  response	  to	  CPIP	  findings,	  Gen.	  Welsh	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announced	  the	  USAF	  would	  pursue	  a	  $3	  billion	  plan,	  subject	  to	  congressional	  approval,	  to	  relieve	  overworked	  UAV	  crews.	  The	  plan	  proposed	  adding	  75	  Reapers	  to	  the	  USAF’s	  current	  fleet	  of	  175	  Reapers	  and	  150	  Predators,	  but	  to	  spread	  out	  the	  workload	  by	  adding	  up	  to	  3,500	  new	  UAV	  pilots,	  sensor	  operators	  and	  other	  enlisted	  personnel.	  The	  USAF	  also	  proposed	  increasing	  the	  number	  of	  UAV	  flying	  squadrons	  to	  as	  many	  as	  17	  across	  the	  country,	  and	  possibly	  standing	  up	  a	  new	  UAV	  wing.61	  	  In	  recognition	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  measures	  to	  relieve	  stress	  on	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  were	  insufficient	  to	  meet	  the	  demand,	  the	  Pentagon	  also	  announced	  in	  2015	  that	  contractors	  would	  fly	  UAVs	  as	  part	  of	  a	  long-­‐term	  strategy	  to	  boost	  USAF	  capacity.62	  In	  December	  2015,	  the	  USAF	  confirmed	  that	  civilian	  contractors	  were	  already	  controlling	  two	  Reaper	  CAPs	  a	  day,	  with	  plans	  to	  expand	  that	  to	  10	  a	  day	  by	  2019.63	  Another	  long-­‐term	  innovation	  effort	  that	  took	  place	  during	  Gen.	  Welsh’s	  tenure	  concerned	  recognition	  for	  UAV	  pilots’	  service.	  In	  2013,	  Leon	  Panetta,	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  from	  2011	  to	  2013,	  had	  proposed	  a	  new	  Distinguished	  Warfare	  Medal	  to	  recognize	  UAV	  pilots	  and	  others	  who	  performed	  “extraordinary	  actions”	  in	  combat	  from	  a	  remote	  location.64	  But	  Secretary	  Panetta’s	  replacement,	  Chuck	  Hagel,	  who	  served	  as	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  from	  2013	  to	  2015,	  immediately	  cancelled	  the	  medal	  upon	  taking	  office.	  65	  In	  early	  2016,	  the	  Pentagon	  announced	  that	  UAV	  pilots	  would	  receive	  an	  “R”	  device	  to	  be	  attached	  to	  existing	  medals.	  Overall,	  the	  policy	  changes	  enacted	  by	  both	  Gen.	  Schwartz	  and	  Gen.	  Welsh	  reflected	  an	  acknowledgement	  that	  the	  demand	  for	  UAVs	  was	  increasing.	  The	  two	  chiefs	  faced	  the	  task	  of	  balancing	  policies	  designed	  to	  quickly	  meet	  the	  growing	  demand	  for	  UAV	  CAPs	  against	  long-­‐term	  efforts	  to	  institutionalize	  UAV	  capability	  as	  a	  strategic	  capability	  within	  the	  active	  duty	  USAF.	  The	  four	  questions	  below	  will	  examine	  how	  USAF	  culture	  shaped	  the	  service’s	  approach	  to	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	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innovation	  as	  the	  USAF	  began	  to	  look	  beyond	  the	  wars	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq,	  and	  how	  the	  continued	  operational	  successes	  of	  these	  UAVs,	  in	  turn,	  shaped	  the	  USAF’s	  cultural	  attitudes	  about	  the	  role	  of	  UAVs	  in	  future	  conflicts.	  	  	  	  	  	  
1. To	  what	  extent	  did	  individuals	  or	  groups	  within	  the	  USAF	  resist	  the	  
Predator	  out	  of	  a	  concern	  that	  their	  jobs	  or	  status	  might	  be	  
threatened	  by	  it?	  	  	  	  Some	  in	  the	  fighter	  community	  felt	  increasingly	  threatened	  by	  the	  Pentagon’s	  continuing	  emphasis	  on	  asymmetric	  conflict	  and	  the	  USAF’s	  growing	  emphasis	  on	  enhancing	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  capabilities.	  “Once	  you’re	  big	  enough	  to	  have	  a	  training	  line,	  and	  you’re	  kicking	  everybody’s	  ass,	  killing	  3000	  bad	  guys	  a	  year,	  it’s	  like	  –	  ‘whoa,	  you	  are	  coming	  up	  on	  us	  fast’,’”	  explained	  Col.	  William	  Tart,	  the	  432nd	  Operations	  Group	  commander	  from	  2010	  to	  2012.66	  	  Some	  also	  saw	  the	  arrival	  of	  Gen.	  Schwartz,	  a	  non-­‐fighter	  pilot	  chief,	  as	  a	  symbol	  of	  the	  further	  decline	  of	  fighter	  pilot	  dominance	  of	  the	  USAF.	  His	  arrival	  came	  as	  the	  fighter	  pilot	  community’s	  grip	  on	  leadership	  positions	  loosened	  with	  the	  Pentagon’s	  continued	  shift	  in	  focus	  from	  conventional	  conflict	  to	  counterinsurgency.	  Fighter	  pilots	  held	  just	  33	  percent	  of	  three	  and	  four-­‐star	  billets	  in	  2010,	  compared	  to	  more	  than	  50	  percent	  in	  2001.67	  	  In	  his	  2012	  autobiography,	  one	  retired	  F-­‐16	  pilot,	  Dan	  Hampton,	  attacked	  Gen.	  Schwartz	  for	  not	  being	  one	  of	  his	  own	  kind.	  “We	  went	  over	  into	  the	  abyss	  when	  the	  Air	  Force	  made	  a	  noncombatant	  officer	  chief	  of	  staff,”	  he	  wrote.68	  But	  in	  fact,	  Gen.	  Schwartz	  was	  very	  much	  a	  combatant,	  flying	  airlift	  missions	  in	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  and	  later	  flying	  and	  commanding	  special	  operations	  aircraft.69	  In	  any	  event,	  the	  fact	  that	  his	  successor,	  Gen.	  Welsh,	  an	  F-­‐16	  and	  A-­‐10	  pilot,	  continued	  to	  increase	  UAV	  capability	  in	  the	  USAF	  suggests	  that	  the	  service’s	  growing	  focus	  on	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UAV	  innovation	  had	  less	  to	  do	  with	  the	  chief’s	  platform	  preferences	  than	  a	  broader	  concern	  with	  focusing	  on	  the	  capabilities	  required	  for	  the	  emerging	  strategic	  context.	  	  	  	  Nevertheless,	  as	  the	  USAF’s	  most	  senior	  leaders	  sought	  to	  increase	  UAV	  capability	  between	  2008	  and	  2015,	  they	  faced	  resistance	  from	  the	  USAF’s	  fighter	  community,	  which	  sought	  to	  reassert	  its	  dominance.	  In	  January	  2014,	  USAF	  headquarters	  issued	  a	  memo	  requiring	  that	  fighter	  pilots	  populate	  at	  least	  50	  percent	  of	  combatant	  command	  and	  staff	  positions,	  where	  policy	  decisions	  were	  made.70	  The	  move	  seemed	  to	  reflect	  the	  fighter	  community’s	  determination	  to	  maintain	  its	  grip	  on	  power,	  even	  as	  the	  growing	  strategic	  relevance	  of	  other	  air	  force	  platforms,	  particularly	  UAVs,	  suggested	  the	  need	  for	  greater	  representation	  of	  officers	  from	  those	  communities	  in	  USAF	  leadership.	  	  Also	  during	  this	  time	  period,	  ACC	  continued	  its	  practice	  of	  resisting	  CAP	  increases,	  a	  move	  perceived	  by	  the	  UAV	  community	  at	  Creech	  AFB	  as	  an	  intentional	  effort	  to	  stymie	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  UAV	  operations.	  As	  late	  as	  2010,	  the	  command	  continued	  to	  report	  to	  the	  Pentagon	  that	  fewer	  CAPs	  were	  available	  because	  the	  UAV	  pilot	  training	  pipeline	  needed	  to	  remain	  open,	  even	  as	  Creech	  commanders	  showed	  a	  willingness	  to	  break	  the	  training	  pipeline	  to	  deliver	  more	  wartime	  capability.	  “I	  really	  think	  that	  the	  bigger	  we	  got,	  the	  more	  successful	  we	  were,	  that,	  instead	  of	  taking	  credit	  for	  it,	  he	  [ACC	  commander,	  Maj.	  Gen.	  Charlie	  Lyon]	  felt	  that	  it	  was	  coming	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  other	  things,”	  said	  Col.	  Tart.71	  But	  perhaps	  the	  most	  damaging	  effort	  to	  undermine	  the	  UAV	  community	  between	  2008	  and	  2015	  was	  the	  systematic	  series	  of	  steps	  the	  USAF’s	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  leaders	  took	  to	  disadvantage	  UAV	  pilots	  in	  the	  promotion	  process.	  	  	  
UAV	  Pilot	  Promotion	  Prospects:	  2008-­‐2015	  	  The	  USAF’s	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  leadership	  made	  a	  series	  of	  policy	  decisions	  that	  limited	  the	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  community’s	  opportunities	  for	  leadership	  positions.	  Most	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  Air	  Force	  Headquarters	  (Jan.	  12,	  2014)	  	  71	  Tart	  interview	  (Feb.	  15,	  2013)	  	  
	   275	  
damaging	  was	  USAF	  leaders’	  continued	  reliance	  on	  low-­‐performing,	  non-­‐volunteer,	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  to	  fly	  the	  Predator	  and	  Reaper.	  Not	  surprisingly,	  promotion	  rates	  among	  these	  airmen	  were	  low.72	  A	  2014	  GAO	  report	  found	  that	  UAV	  pilots	  were	  promoted	  below	  the	  average	  rate	  of	  active-­‐duty	  line	  officers	  on	  20	  of	  24	  officer	  promotion	  boards	  between	  2006	  and	  2014.	  Rather	  than	  seeking	  to	  increase	  the	  quality	  of	  UAV	  candidates,	  the	  USAF	  justified	  the	  practice	  of	  recruiting	  underperformers	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  lower-­‐performing	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  candidates	  needed	  to	  go	  somewhere,	  implying	  it	  was	  better	  to	  stick	  them	  in	  UAVs	  than	  manned	  aircraft.	  “It	  doesn’t	  mean	  they	  were	  bad	  officers,	  it	  just	  meant	  you	  got	  to	  have	  some	  at	  the	  top	  and	  some	  at	  the	  bottom,”	  USAF	  spokeswoman	  Jennifer	  Cassidy	  explained	  in	  2014.	  73	  	  	  The	  USAF’s	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  leadership	  also	  engaged	  in	  what	  then-­‐Lt.	  Col.	  Lawrence	  Spinetta	  referred	  to	  as	  	  “the	  organizational	  equivalent	  of	  gerrymandering”	  to	  limit	  UAV	  pilots’	  promotion	  prospects.74	  The	  main	  way	  to	  short-­‐change	  UAV	  pilots	  through	  organizational	  moves	  was	  to	  limit	  the	  number	  of	  UAV	  wings,	  and	  hence	  the	  number	  of	  opportunities	  for	  wing	  command.	  The	  detrimental	  impact	  of	  this	  organizational	  decision	  becomes	  clear	  when	  one	  considers	  that	  every	  USAF	  chief	  over	  the	  last	  50	  years,	  as	  well	  as	  every	  ACC	  commander	  since	  1992,	  commanded	  a	  wing	  during	  his	  rise	  to	  the	  top	  of	  the	  USAF.	  Wing	  commanders	  typically	  come	  from	  the	  community	  that	  supplies	  the	  majority	  of	  forces.	  The	  USAF’s	  26	  fighter	  wings	  provided	  26	  opportunities	  for	  fighter	  pilots	  to	  take	  command	  of	  a	  wing.	  Because	  there	  was	  only	  one	  UAV	  wing,	  the	  432nd	  at	  Creech,	  the	  odds	  of	  a	  UAV	  pilot	  taking	  wing	  command	  were	  much	  smaller.	  Without	  a	  wing	  commander	  position	  on	  their	  record,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  UAV	  pilot	  rising	  to	  the	  most	  senior	  ranks	  of	  the	  USAF	  was	  miniscule.75	  	  	  	  The	  USAF	  avoided	  creating	  new	  UAV	  wings	  by	  assigning	  UAV	  squadrons	  to	  wings	  dominated	  by	  other	  aircraft.	  Consequently,	  UAV	  pilots	  frequently	  found	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themselves	  under	  the	  command	  of	  fighter	  pilots	  who	  systematically	  undermined	  their	  promotion	  prospects.	  While	  F-­‐22	  pilots	  controlled	  Holloman	  AFB,	  for	  example,	  UAV	  pilots	  complained	  that	  language	  in	  their	  performance	  reports	  included	  code	  words	  that	  suggested	  they	  were	  “second	  class”	  citizens.	  For	  example,	  commanders	  would	  give	  a	  UAV	  pilot	  a	  high	  stratification	  among	  his	  peers	  —	  one	  of	  28	  RPA	  majors,	  for	  example	  	  —	  but	  that	  would	  carry	  far	  less	  weight	  with	  the	  promotion	  board	  than	  a	  stratification	  of,	  say,	  all	  majors.76	  A	  2015	  survey	  of	  MQ-­‐1,	  MQ-­‐9	  and	  RQ-­‐4	  pilots	  and	  sensor	  operators	  indicated	  that	  Holloman	  AFB’s	  reputation	  as	  a	  dead	  end	  for	  UAV	  pilots	  had	  not	  recovered:	  26	  percent	  said	  they	  would	  leave	  the	  USAF	  rather	  than	  take	  an	  assignment	  there.77	  Another	  organizational	  decision	  that	  limited	  UAV	  pilot	  promotion	  prospects	  was	  the	  USAF’s	  transfer	  of	  UAV	  capacity	  to	  the	  ANG.	  As	  this	  shift	  occurred,	  UAV	  pilots	  lost	  the	  chance	  to	  compete	  for	  command	  of	  ACC,	  the	  largest	  USAF	  command	  and	  the	  one	  responsible	  for	  the	  development	  and	  acquisition	  of	  UAVs.78	  There	  was	  also	  a	  sense	  in	  the	  USAF	  and	  the	  ANG	  that	  Guard	  members	  did	  not	  have	  an	  equal	  say	  in	  force	  planning	  decisions;	  this	  sentiment	  was	  reinforced	  in	  2012	  when	  the	  ANG	  vociferously	  complained	  about	  not	  having	  sufficient	  input	  into	  a	  USAF	  proposal	  for	  major	  ANG	  budget	  cuts.79	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  detrimental	  organizational	  changes,	  the	  USAF’s	  failure	  to	  effectively	  manage	  major	  UAV	  manning	  shortages	  also	  hurt	  UAV	  pilots’	  promotion	  prospects.	  In	  2014,	  the	  GAO	  found	  that	  UAV	  pilots	  were	  overworked	  to	  the	  point	  that	  they	  did	  not	  have	  time	  for	  in-­‐residence	  professional	  military	  education	  and	  advanced	  degrees,	  which	  were	  frequently	  correlated	  with	  promotion	  according	  to	  an	  AFPC	  analysis.	  80	  Finally,	  the	  decision	  to	  prohibit	  UAV	  pilots	  from	  receiving	  certain	  medals	  also	  potentially	  limited	  their	  promotion	  prospects.	  Because	  the	  USAF	  considered	  UAV	  pilots	  to	  be	  flying	  “combat	  support	  missions,”	  rather	  than	  combat	  missions,	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they	  were	  not	  eligible	  for	  joint	  decorations	  such	  as	  the	  Air	  Medal	  or	  the	  Distinguished	  Flying	  Cross.81	  The	  decision	  to	  attach	  an	  “R”	  device	  to	  existing	  medals	  in	  early	  2016	  suggested	  a	  compromise,	  but	  in	  fact	  the	  device	  was	  awarded	  for	  exceptional	  administrative	  work,	  for	  which	  all	  airmen,	  including	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  pilots,	  were	  already	  eligible.82	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  was	  unclear	  that	  the	  medal	  would	  substantively	  improve	  UAV	  pilots’	  promotion	  prospects	  because	  it	  was	  not	  on	  par	  with	  medals	  of	  a	  distinguished	  grade	  or	  medals	  awarded	  for	  combat	  action.83	  
	  
Predator	  Pilot	  Morale:	  2008-­‐2015	  	  The	  systematic	  biases	  against	  UAV	  pilots	  within	  the	  USAF	  continued	  to	  hamper	  retention	  of	  highly	  qualified	  UAV	  candidates	  through	  2015.	  With	  the	  18X	  career	  field	  still	  in	  its	  infancy,	  the	  USAF	  did	  not	  expect	  the	  18X	  community	  to	  constitute	  even	  half	  the	  USAF’s	  UAV	  pilot	  community	  until	  2017.84	  Even	  with	  plans	  to	  increasingly	  rely	  on	  enlisted	  personnel	  and	  contractors,	  the	  USAF	  would	  still	  be	  relying	  on	  a	  majority	  of	  non-­‐volunteer	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  in	  the	  short-­‐term	  to	  meet	  the	  demand	  for	  more	  UAV	  CAPs.	  	  The	  bulk	  of	  the	  UAV	  community	  was	  still	  comprised	  of	  the	  477	  former	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  who	  were	  “recategorized”	  as	  UAV	  pilots	  in	  March	  2011	  as	  permanent	  members	  of	  the	  UAV	  community.	  Pitched	  as	  a	  way	  to	  promote	  mentorship	  from	  experienced	  pilots,	  the	  program	  was	  actually	  detrimental	  to	  morale.	  Although	  412	  out	  of	  477	  pilots	  volunteered	  to	  recategorize,	  many	  did	  so	  fearing	  their	  promotion	  prospects	  in	  manned	  aircraft	  would	  be	  poor	  after	  spending	  time	  away	  in	  the	  UAV	  career	  field.	  “Yes,	  I	  voluntarily	  recatted	  to	  stay	  with	  RPA’s,	  but	  some	  choices	  aren’t	  really	  choices,”	  one	  UAV	  pilot	  told	  me.85	  One	  UPT-­‐direct	  UAV	  pilot	  said	  that	  he	  felt	  he	  really	  had	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  stay	  in	  the	  UAV	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career	  field,	  now	  that	  he	  had	  missed	  the	  beginning	  of	  his	  manned	  aircraft	  career	  and	  would	  have	  to	  start	  from	  the	  bottom	  if	  he	  declined	  to	  “recat	  “	  into	  UAVs.86	  	  	  Indeed,	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  UPT-­‐Direct	  program	  in	  2009	  bludgeoned	  morale.	  UPT	  candidates	  signed	  up	  to	  win	  an	  assignment	  flying	  a	  manned	  aircraft	  for	  the	  USAF.	  Being	  relegated	  to	  a	  UAV	  was	  largely	  perceived	  as	  a	  failure.	  The	  USAF-­‐wide	  perception	  of	  the	  UPT-­‐direct	  pilots	  was	  that	  they	  were	  low	  performers	  relative	  to	  their	  peers,	  just	  like	  the	  more	  experienced	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  forced	  to	  fly	  UAVs.	  The	  UPT	  assignment	  process	  fueled	  that	  perception.	  On	  assignment	  night,	  UPT	  candidates	  picked	  their	  aircraft	  based	  on	  rank	  in	  the	  UPT	  class,	  with	  the	  top	  performers	  choosing	  their	  assignment	  first.	  “Very	  few”	  of	  those	  top	  performers	  “stood	  up	  with	  every	  airplane	  in	  the	  Air	  Force	  inventory	  at	  their	  disposal	  and	  picked	  RPAs,”	  said	  Col.	  Cantwell,	  the	  732nd	  Operations	  Group	  commander	  at	  Creech	  AFB	  from	  2012	  to	  2014.	  “The	  UPT	  grads	  were	  scared	  to	  death	  of	  the	  RPA,”	  confirmed	  then-­‐Brig.	  Gen.	  Gersten,	  the	  432nd	  Wing	  Commander	  from	  June	  2009	  to	  June	  2011.87	  	  But	  UPT	  candidates	  in	  the	  bottom	  third	  of	  their	  class	  had	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  pick	  a	  UAV	  assignment,	  because	  it	  was	  all	  that	  was	  left.88	  	  Despite	  the	  damage	  to	  morale,	  Gen.	  Welsh	  restarted	  the	  program	  in	  2015	  as	  part	  of	  his	  short-­‐term	  “RPA	  Get	  Well”	  plan.	  	  	   As	  early	  as	  2008,	  the	  stigma	  surrounding	  the	  UAV	  community	  was	  widely	  recognized	  because	  of	  the	  relatively	  low	  performance	  of	  the	  non-­‐volunteers	  and	  the	  resulting	  low	  morale.	  Gen.	  Schwartz	  acknowledged	  the	  outcast	  status	  of	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  forced	  to	  fly	  UAVs	  in	  a	  September	  16,	  2008	  speech.	  “The	  Air	  Force	  culture	  must	  promote	  a	  strong	  and	  healthy	  UAS	  community—not	  a	  ‘leper	  colony’	  or	  an	  agency	  of	  expedience,”	  he	  said.89	  But	  years	  later,	  in	  2014,	  the	  USAF	  was	  still	  relying	  on	  a	  majority	  of	  non-­‐volunteered	  former	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  to	  fly	  UAV	  missions.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  stigma	  associated	  with	  UAVs	  was	  worse	  than	  ever;	  many	  of	  these	  pilots	  signed	  up	  to	  fly	  in	  an	  airplane,	  and	  therefore	  saw	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  Predator	  pilot	  #2	  interview	  (Nov.	  29,	  2014)	  	  87	  Gersten	  interview	  	  (March	  4,	  2013)	  	  	  88	  Cantwell	  interview	  (March	  6,	  2014)	  	  89	  Schwartz	  (Sept.	  16,	  2008)	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confinement	  to	  a	  ground	  control	  station	  as	  a	  punishment.	  "Headquarters	  Air	  Force	  officials,	  RPA	  pilots	  in	  some	  of	  our	  focus	  groups,	  and	  one	  unit	  commander	  stated	  that	  some	  in	  the	  Air	  Force	  view	  flying	  RPAs	  negatively,	  resulting	  in	  a	  stigma,”	  wrote	  the	  GAO	  in	  a	  2014	  report.	  “According	  to	  these	  officials,	  one	  reason	  some	  view	  flying	  an	  RPA	  negatively	  is	  because	  flying	  an	  RPA	  does	  not	  require	  pilots	  to	  operate	  an	  aircraft	  while	  on	  board	  an	  aircraft	  in-­‐flight.”90	  	  In	  2015,	  UAV	  pilots	  were	  still	  unsure	  that	  the	  USAF	  was	  committed	  to	  removing	  the	  stigma.	  Gen.	  Welsh	  established	  the	  CPIP	  that	  year	  to	  explore	  ways	  to	  alleviate	  morale	  problems,	  but	  there	  was	  skepticism	  in	  the	  USAF	  about	  whether	  the	  effort	  was	  genuine,	  given	  that	  the	  USAF	  was	  still	  relying	  on	  short-­‐term	  fixes	  that	  led	  to	  overwork,	  low	  promotion	  rates,	  and	  poor	  morale.	  One	  Predator	  pilot	  described	  the	  CPIP	  a	  	  “dog	  and	  pony	  show”	  that	  would	  give	  UAV	  pilots	  a	  chance	  to	  vent	  but	  would	  provide	  little	  actual	  improvement	  in	  the	  grating	  pressures	  of	  flying	  combat	  missions	  six	  days	  a	  week.91	  Tony	  Carr,	  a	  retired	  USAF	  colonel	  who	  manages	  a	  web	  site	  devoted	  to	  USAF	  culture	  issues,	  argued	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  continued	  reliance	  on	  stopgap	  measures,	  such	  as	  recruiting	  UPT-­‐direct	  pilots	  to	  RPAs,	  confirmed	  “there	  is	  no	  master	  plan.	  There	  is	  no	  strategy	  for	  contending	  with	  a	  chronic	  issue	  that	  has	  plagued	  the	  service	  for	  years.”92	  The	  USAF’s	  $3	  billion	  proposal	  to	  dramatically	  grow	  the	  size	  of	  the	  UAV	  community	  and	  open	  new	  UAV	  units	  was	  a	  sign	  of	  hope,	  particularly	  because	  it	  came	  from	  ACC,	  historically	  a	  bastion	  of	  resistance	  to	  UAV	  innovation.	  But	  the	  USAF	  still	  had	  a	  long	  way	  to	  go	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2015	  before	  the	  stigma	  surrounding	  the	  UAV	  mission	  could	  be	  resolved.	  To	  date,	  the	  demand	  for	  CAPs	  has	  led	  the	  USAF’s	  pilot	  leadership	  community	  to	  take	  steps	  to	  systematically	  disadvantage	  the	  UAV	  pilot	  community.	  Rather	  than	  taking	  seriously	  the	  notion	  of	  building	  up	  a	  new	  career	  field	  by	  improving	  promotion	  prospects,	  the	  USAF’s	  leaders	  continued	  to	  prop	  up	  a	  system	  of	  short-­‐term	  fixes	  that	  institutionalized	  the	  stigma	  surrounding	  the	  UAV	  pilots.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  GAO	  (2014)	  18	  91	  Predator	  pilot	  #1	  interview	  (Dec.	  2,	  2014)	  	  92	  Carr	  (June	  12,	  2015)	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2. To	  what	  extent	  were	  judgments	  about	  the	  potential	  and	  cost	  
effectiveness	  of	  the	  Predator	  based	  on	  the	  USAF’s	  enthusiasm	  for	  
employing	  new	  technology	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  was	  the	  enthusiasm	  
outside	  the	  service?	  	  
	  The	  USAF’s	  senior	  leaders,	  including	  Gen.	  Schwartz	  and	  Gen.	  Welsh,	  continued	  to	  show	  support	  for	  boosting	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  CAPS	  as	  the	  US	  military	  shifted	  its	  focus	  to	  Afghanistan,	  and,	  eventually,	  other	  nations	  with	  which	  the	  US	  was	  not	  at	  war.	  There	  were	  still	  strong	  undercurrents	  of	  pessimism	  regarding	  the	  Predator	  and	  Reaper’s	  cost	  and	  potential,	  however.	  According	  to	  2010	  survey	  data,	  the	  USAF’s	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  community	  increasingly	  acknowledged	  asymmetric	  warfare	  as	  a	  long-­‐term	  challenge,	  but	  it	  nevertheless	  saw	  survivable	  manned	  aircraft	  as	  the	  main	  solution	  to	  confronting	  challenges	  across	  the	  conflict	  spectrum.93	  In	  other	  words,	  while	  UAVs	  might	  be	  appropriate	  for	  asymmetric	  warfare,	  they	  were	  seen	  as	  useless	  in	  a	  high-­‐end	  conflict	  because	  of	  their	  vulnerability	  to	  SAMs	  and	  fighters.	  This	  short-­‐sighted	  view	  of	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  Predator	  and	  the	  Reaper,	  combined	  with	  wartime	  pressure	  from	  Secretary	  Gates	  to	  build	  up	  UAV	  capacity	  quickly,	  meant	  that	  the	  USAF	  often	  adopted	  short-­‐term	  fixes	  to	  build	  up	  its	  UAV	  inventory	  rather	  than	  a	  long-­‐term	  approach	  to	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  innovation.	  	  	  
The	  Schwartz	  Years:	  	  Growing	  Appreciation	  for	  the	  Strategic	  Relevance	  of	  UAVs	  in	  
Asymmetric	  Conflict	  	  	  Among	  some	  in	  the	  USAF’s	  manned	  aircraft	  community,	  pessimism	  regarding	  the	  potential	  of	  UAVs	  remained,	  despite	  their	  increasingly	  apparent	  relevance	  in	  the	  current	  strategic	  context.	  	  In	  the	  fighter	  community,	  the	  pessimism	  sometimes	  bordered	  on	  disdain.	  In	  his	  autobiography,	  retired	  Lt.	  Col.	  Hampton	  complained	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  See	  Smith	  (2014)	  Ch.	  12	  for	  survey	  of	  fighter	  pilots’	  views	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that	  while	  Predators	  might	  have	  value	  in	  asymmetric	  conflicts,	  they	  would	  be	  useless	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  high	  intensity	  conflict,	  what	  he	  would	  consider	  a	  “real”	  war.	  “These	  little	  things,	  called	  Predators	  (which	  was	  also	  funny)	  were	  singularly	  useless	  in	  any	  kind	  of	  environment	  with	  SAMs,	  MIGs	  and	  anti-­‐aircraft	  artillery.	  In	  other	  words	  —	  a	  war.”94	  Col.	  Eric	  Mathewson,	  the	  head	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  Unmanned	  Systems	  Task	  Force	  said	  that	  “inflexible	  attitudes”	  regarding	  the	  strategic	  potential	  of	  UAV	  technology	  were	  a	  major	  “roadblock”	  to	  implementing	  long-­‐term	  UAV	  innovation	  plans.	  “You	  see	  a	  cultural	  resistance,”	  he	  said.	  ”It’s	  the	  same	  thing	  with	  the	  horse	  cavalry	  during	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  tank.”95	  Under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Gen.	  Schwartz,	  however,	  views	  of	  the	  Predator	  and	  Reaper’s	  strategic	  potential	  started	  to	  change.	  He	  argued	  that	  the	  emerging	  strategic	  context	  would	  require	  the	  USAF	  to	  operate	  across	  the	  spectrum	  of	  conflict,	  and	  he	  predicted	  that	  a	  mix	  of	  manned	  and	  unmanned	  systems	  would	  maximize	  the	  USAF’s	  capability	  to	  meet	  the	  challenges,	  ranging	  from	  non-­‐state	  actors	  to	  near-­‐peer	  adversaries,	  or	  some	  combination	  of	  these	  threats	  in	  a	  “hybrid”	  war.96	  In	  his	  interview	  with	  me,	  he	  explained	  that	  the	  current	  generation	  of	  UAVs	  would	  remain	  relevant	  in	  low-­‐intensity	  conflicts	  and	  might	  also	  have	  relevance	  in	  a	  high-­‐intensity	  war	  after	  the	  airspace	  is	  cleared.	  “The	  high	  threat	  scenario	  isn’t	  a	  permanent	  condition,”	  he	  explained.	  “As	  you	  attrit	  the	  threat,	  the	  range	  of	  assets	  increases,	  and	  its	  clear	  that	  persistent	  surveillance	  of	  the	  battlefield	  is	  of	  great	  value	  to	  the	  operators.”97	  In	  line	  with	  this	  view,	  Gen.	  Schwartz	  created	  the	  18X	  career	  field	  to	  institutionalize	  UAV	  innovation	  in	  the	  USAF	  over	  the	  long	  term.	  Because	  18X	  pilots	  were	  volunteers,	  they	  had	  a	  positive	  attitude	  about	  the	  future	  of	  UAVs	  in	  the	  USAF,	  suggesting	  they	  would	  be	  good	  advocates	  for	  UAVs	  moving	  forward.	  Then-­‐Brig.	  Gen.	  Gersten	  told	  me	  in	  2013	  that	  when	  he	  was	  the	  432nd	  Wing	  commander	  from	  June	  2009	  to	  June	  2011,	  he	  observed	  that	  the	  first	  18X	  pilots	  were	  “starving”	  to	  fly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  Hampton	  (2012)	  304	  	  95	  Pappalardo	  (Feb.	  25,	  2010)	  96	  Schwartz	  (Jan	  .20,	  2010)	  97	  Schwartz	  (Oct.	  18,	  2012)	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UAVs	  in	  combat.	  “They	  would	  give	  anything”	  to	  earn	  their	  position	  on	  the	  UAV	  flight	  line,	  he	  said.98	  	  	  The	  pilots	  in	  the	  UAV	  community	  saw	  great	  strategic	  potential	  for	  the	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  in	  what	  they	  saw	  as	  an	  emerging	  era	  dominated	  by	  asymmetric	  conflict.	  Starting	  in	  2011,	  the	  ballooning	  number	  of	  UAV	  missions	  beyond	  Afghanistan	  fueled	  the	  enthusiasm	  of	  the	  18X	  pilots.	  “New	  opportunities	  have	  opened	  up	  with	  the	  hot	  pockets	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  ISIS,”	  said	  one	  UAV	  pilot	  who	  returned	  to	  flying	  manned	  aircraft	  in	  2015.	  “When	  I	  left,	  the	  morale	  was	  the	  highest	  I’d	  seen	  and	  people	  were	  excited	  to	  come	  to	  work	  since	  we	  were	  operating	  in	  a	  more	  dynamic/kinetic	  environment,”	  he	  said.99	  Echoed	  another	  18x	  pilot:	  “One	  of	  the	  cornerstones	  of	  morale	  continues	  to	  be	  the	  mission.	  Options	  have	  opened	  up	  to	  continue	  operations	  and	  morale	  in	  this	  area	  continues	  to	  be	  high.”	  100	  	  USAF	  UAV	  commanders	  agreed	  that	  the	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  were	  likely	  to	  remain	  highly	  relevant	  in	  an	  era	  of	  seemingly	  endless	  asymmetric	  conflict.	  “We	  are	  going	  to	  keep	  flying	  these	  things	  and	  we	  are	  going	  to	  be	  the	  only	  game	  in	  town	  for	  a	  number	  of	  regions,”	  said	  Col.	  Spinetta,	  who	  commanded	  the	  69th	  Reconnaissance	  Group,	  a	  Global	  Hawk	  unit,	  from	  August	  2013	  to	  July	  2015,101	  	  	  Col.	  Tart	  took	  the	  argument	  a	  step	  further,	  arguing	  that,	  contrary	  to	  the	  predictions	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  leadership,	  the	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  also	  had	  strategic	  potential	  in	  a	  high-­‐intensity	  conflict.	  “The	  fact	  is	  that	  ACC	  has	  not	  paid	  for	  any	  testing	  of	  the	  MQ-­‐1	  or	  MQ-­‐9	  in	  contested	  airspace,”	  said	  Col.	  Tart.	  “When	  people	  say	  it’s	  not	  good	  in	  contested	  airspace,	  I	  say:	  show	  me.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day,	  in	  a	  contested	  environment,	  if	  this	  little	  thing	  goes	  out	  there	  and	  gets	  shot	  down,	  that’s	  four	  million	  dollars,”	  compared	  to	  the	  fiscal	  and	  political	  costs	  of	  a	  manned	  aircraft	  shoot-­‐down.102“	  	  Outside	  the	  USAF,	  Secretary	  Gates	  shared	  the	  view	  that	  UAVs	  had	  strategic	  potential	  in	  the	  future,	  which	  he	  saw	  as	  being	  characterized	  primarily	  by	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asymmetric	  conflicts	  similar	  to	  the	  wars	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq.	  As	  a	  result,	  he	  called	  for	  a	  long-­‐term	  shift	  toward	  low-­‐tech	  innovations	  optimized	  for	  counterinsurgencies,	  including	  UAVs	  for	  ISR	  and	  strike	  missions.103	  To	  be	  fair,	  Secretary	  Gates’	  predictions	  about	  the	  future	  threat	  environment	  did	  not	  include	  much	  discussion	  of	  the	  highest	  end	  of	  the	  threat	  spectrum,	  to	  include	  nuclear	  threats.	  In	  those	  instances,	  even	  Gen.	  Schwartz	  was	  dubious	  about	  the	  potential	  of	  UAVs.	  “I	  would	  ask	  you	  candidly,	  would	  you	  be	  comfortable	  with	  a	  nuclear-­‐laden	  remotely	  piloted	  aircraft?	  I	  wouldn’t	  be,”	  he	  told	  an	  audience	  at	  the	  Center	  for	  Strategic	  and	  International	  Studies	  in	  February	  2012.104	  	  In	  fact,	  Secretary	  Gates’	  focus	  on	  delivering	  UAV	  capability	  for	  the	  ongoing	  low-­‐intensity	  conflicts	  often	  came	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  long-­‐term	  innovation	  for	  both	  manned	  and	  unmanned	  platforms	  designed	  to	  operate	  in	  high-­‐end	  conflicts.	  While	  he	  was	  secretary,	  the	  USAF	  cancelled	  production	  of	  its	  F-­‐22	  Raptor,	  but	  it	  also	  dropped	  the	  MQ-­‐X	  and	  the	  Predator	  C	  Avenger,	  both	  UAVs	  designed	  to	  operate	  in	  contested	  airspace.	  More	  importantly,	  the	  USAF	  faced	  enormous	  pressure	  to	  deliver	  UAV	  capability	  quickly,	  lacking	  the	  time	  and	  resources	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  long-­‐term	  integration	  of	  the	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  into	  its	  force	  structure.	  In	  this	  way,	  Secretary	  Gates	  ironically	  contributed	  to	  the	  USAF’s	  tendency,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  18X	  program,	  to	  focus	  on	  short-­‐term	  plans	  to	  meet	  the	  demand	  for	  CAPs.	  	  	  	  
The	  Welsh	  Years:	  Initial	  Pessimism	  Runs	  into	  the	  Ongoing	  Strategic	  Reality	  
	  The	  creation	  of	  the	  18X	  career	  field	  came	  shortly	  before	  the	  end	  of	  combat	  operations	  in	  Afghanistan	  in	  2011,	  providing	  an	  opening	  for	  the	  new	  USAF	  chief,	  Gen.	  Welsh,	  to	  reflect	  on	  force	  structure	  priorities.	  Despite	  budget	  pressure,	  Gen.	  Welsh	  prioritized	  force	  modernization,	  emphasizing	  the	  importance	  of	  innovation	  as	  a	  means	  to	  improve	  military	  effectiveness	  without	  overspending.	  105	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Initially,	  his	  tenure	  seemed	  to	  mark	  a	  return	  to	  a	  pessimistic	  view	  of	  UAVs’	  cost	  and	  potential.	  In	  September	  2012,	  he	  was	  so	  unsure	  of	  the	  future	  relevance	  of	  Predators	  and	  Reapers	  beyond	  Afghanistan	  that	  his	  central	  concern	  was	  where	  to	  put	  them	  when	  they	  returned.	  “I	  don’t	  know	  what	  we’re	  going	  to	  do	  with	  them	  when	  they	  come	  back	  from	  Afghanistan,”	  he	  said.	  “Buying	  more	  right	  now	  might	  not	  make	  any	  sense.”106	  The	  next	  year,	  in	  November	  2013,	  Gen.	  Welsh	  proposed	  reducing	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  CAPs	  over	  Afghanistan	  in	  favor	  of	  investments	  in	  ISR	  alternatives,	  such	  as	  manned	  aircraft	  and	  satellites.	  “We	  need	  to	  trade	  some	  of	  that	  [RPA	  force	  structure]	  for	  investment	  in	  other	  platforms,”	  he	  said,	  noting	  that	  combatant	  commanders	  in	  other	  theaters,	  such	  as	  US	  Pacific	  Air	  Forces,	  were	  not	  well-­‐served	  by	  65	  CAPs.	  “You	  need	  something	  that	  looks	  at	  a	  broader	  area	  and	  cues	  those	  platforms	  to	  provide	  direct	  support	  to	  small	  units	  on	  the	  ground,”	  he	  said.	  107	  	  	   Although	  he	  had	  previously	  expressed	  interest	  in	  developing	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  UAVs	  for	  high-­‐intensity	  clashes,	  he	  said	  in	  November	  2013	  that	  it	  would	  probably	  be	  too	  expensive	  to	  do	  so.	  “I’m	  a	  big	  fan	  of	  RPAs	  where	  they	  make	  sense,”	  he	  said,	  “but	  we	  should	  not	  rush	  into	  a	  bunch	  of	  RPAs	  just	  because	  we	  can…there	  is	  nothing	  cheap	  about	  them.	  There	  is	  a	  lot	  of	  manpower	  behind	  them	  that	  isn’t	  cheap	  either.”108	  	  Gen.	  Welsh’s	  cautious	  view	  of	  the	  relevance	  of	  UAVs	  beyond	  Afghanistan	  was	  reinforced	  with	  much	  deeper	  skepticism	  at	  ACC.	  The	  commander,	  Gen.	  Michael	  Hostage,	  declared	  the	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  to	  be	  “useless”	  in	  conflicts	  outside	  Afghanistan	  because	  of	  their	  small	  chance	  of	  surviving	  against	  even	  basic	  enemy	  air	  defenses.	  “We’re	  not	  talking	  deep	  over	  mainland	  China;	  we’re	  talking	  contested	  airspace,”	  said	  Gen.	  Hostage.	  “Pick	  the	  smallest,	  weakest	  country	  with	  the	  most	  minimal	  air	  force	  —	  [it]	  can	  deal	  with	  Predator.”	  Given	  his	  reservations	  about	  the	  Predator	  and	  Reaper’s	  future	  relevance,	  he	  lobbied	  for	  a	  reduction	  in	  CAPs.	  “We’re	  trying	  to	  convince	  [the	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense]	  that	  the	  65	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[CAPs]	  challenge	  —	  while	  it	  made	  sense	  to	  the	  people	  who	  gave	  it	  to	  us	  when	  it	  was	  given,	  and	  we	  dutifully	  went	  after	  it	  —	  is	  not	  the	  force	  structure	  the	  nation	  needs	  or	  can	  afford	  in	  the	  anti-­‐access,	  area-­‐denial	  environment,”	  he	  said.	  109	  There	  seemed	  to	  be	  an	  agreement	  within	  the	  USAF,	  even	  among	  potential	  UAV	  advocates	  that	  “the	  place	  to	  take	  risk	  is	  in	  the	  permissive	  environment,”	  as	  Lt.	  Gen.	  Robert	  Otto,	  the	  USAF’s	  intelligence	  chief,	  explained	  in	  September	  2013.	  Gen.	  Otto	  advocated	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  survivable	  UAVs	  to	  replace	  the	  Predator	  and	  Reaper,	  but	  in	  an	  era	  of	  tight	  spending	  the	  prospects	  of	  next-­‐generation	  UAV	  innovation	  was	  mixed	  at	  best.	  The	  USAF	  had	  covertly	  developed	  the	  unmanned,	  stealthy	  RQ-­‐170	  Sentinel	  for	  ISR	  operations	  in	  denied	  air	  environments,	  but	  little	  was	  known	  about	  the	  UAV’s	  capabilities	  or	  inventory,	  and	  Gen.	  Welsh	  had	  already	  declared	  his	  skepticism	  about	  the	  costs	  of	  a	  next-­‐generation	  UAV	  fleet.110	  These	  pessimistic	  views	  of	  the	  strategic	  potential	  of	  UAVS	  began	  to	  shift	  somewhat,	  however,	  as	  the	  demand	  for	  the	  UAVs	  in	  conflicts	  short	  of	  war	  continued	  to	  grow	  despite	  the	  drawdown	  in	  Afghanistan.	  Previously	  a	  source	  of	  strong	  skepticism,	  ACC,	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Gen.	  Carlisle,	  who	  arrived	  in	  October	  2014,	  began	  to	  support	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  innovation.	  With	  the	  support	  of	  Gen.	  Welsh,	  he	  unveiled	  a	  $3	  billion	  plan	  in	  2015	  to	  build	  up	  the	  USAF’s	  UAV	  community	  based	  on	  an	  evolution	  of	  views	  in	  the	  USAF	  that	  now	  saw	  the	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  as	  sufficiently	  relevant	  in	  the	  emerging	  threat	  environment	  to	  warrant	  continued	  investment.	  Signaling	  a	  shift	  from	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  were	  a	  niche	  capability,	  Gen.	  Carlisle	  said	  the	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  were	  “in	  demand	  across	  the	  range	  of	  military	  operations,”	  adding	  that	  the	  UAVs	  have	  ”really	  changed	  the	  way	  of	  warfare	  in	  many	  ways	  —	  or	  certainly	  the	  way	  we	  conduct	  in-­‐theater	  airpower.”111	  	   Gen.	  Carlisle’s	  proposal	  came	  as	  enthusiasm	  for	  USAF	  UAV	  operations	  outside	  the	  service	  continued	  to	  grow.	  The	  Obama	  administration	  and	  the	  CIA	  saw	  the	  current	  generation	  of	  UAVs	  as	  effective	  strategic	  assets	  for	  high	  value	  targeting	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of	  terrorist	  suspects	  over	  the	  long	  term.112	  As	  early	  as	  2012,	  President	  Obama	  defended	  the	  growing	  use	  of	  UAVs	  outside	  hot	  battlespaces.“Our	  actions	  are	  effective…Dozens	  of	  highly	  skilled	  al	  Qaeda	  commanders,	  trainers,	  bomb	  makers,	  and	  operatives	  have	  been	  taken	  off	  the	  battlefield.	  Plots	  have	  been	  disrupted	  that	  would	  have	  targeted	  international	  aviation,	  US	  transit	  systems,	  European	  cities,	  and	  our	  troops	  in	  Afghanistan,”	  he	  said.	  “Simply	  put,	  these	  strikes	  have	  saved	  lives.”113	  Secretary	  Panetta,	  who	  served	  as	  CIA	  director	  from	  2009	  to	  2011	  before	  replacing	  Secretary	  Gates	  in	  the	  Pentagon,	  confirmed	  before	  his	  retirement	  in	  2013	  that	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  strikes	  outside	  war	  zones	  would	  be	  a	  “continuing	  tool	  of	  national	  defense	  in	  the	  future.”114	  	  	   In	  addition	  to	  their	  effectiveness,	  UAV	  strikes	  became	  attractive	  as	  a	  means	  to	  reduce	  the	  political	  risks	  of	  downed	  aircrew	  during	  high	  value	  targeting	  operations	  outside	  war	  zones,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Question	  3.	  The	  use	  of	  UAV	  strikes	  in	  nations	  with	  which	  the	  US	  was	  not	  at	  war	  also	  had	  the	  added	  advantage	  of	  minimizing	  collateral	  damage	  during	  a	  time	  when	  the	  international	  community	  expressed	  mounting	  outrage	  over	  suspected	  civilian	  deaths.	  “Conventional	  airpower	  or	  missiles	  are	  far	  less	  precise	  than	  drones,	  and	  likely	  to	  cause	  more	  civilian	  casualties	  and	  local	  outrage,”	  President	  Obama	  said	  in	  a	  2013	  speech	  clarifying	  his	  administration’s	  policy	  on	  UAV	  use.115	  John	  Brennan,	  the	  CIA	  director,	  confirmed	  the	  view	  that	  UAV	  strikes	  continued	  to	  provide	  a	  means	  to	  reduce	  collateral	  damage	  and	  minimize	  the	  US	  military’s	  footprint	  abroad.116	  	  
	   Interestingly,	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  Gen.	  Welsh’s	  appointment	  as	  chief	  was	  his	  first-­‐hand	  experience	  with	  the	  important	  role	  that	  covert	  UAV	  missions	  had	  come	  to	  play	  in	  the	  White	  House’s	  counterterrorism	  strategy.	  From	  2008	  to	  2010,	  he	  served	  as	  a	  senior	  USAF	  representative	  at	  the	  CIA.	  “He	  understood	  the	  intelligence	  community	  better	  than	  most”	  as	  a	  result	  of	  that	  tour,	  recalled	  Gen.	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  2009)	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Schwartz,	  his	  predecessor.117	  During	  the	  first	  part	  of	  his	  tenure,	  however,	  Gen.	  Welsh	  shared	  Gen.	  Hostage’s	  pessimistic	  view	  of	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  current	  generation	  of	  UAVs	  in	  the	  future	  threat	  environment.	  As	  the	  continuing	  value	  of	  the	  UAVs	  became	  more	  apparent	  with	  time,	  however,	  his	  views	  seemed	  to	  shift	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  long-­‐term	  approach	  to	  integrating	  the	  Predator	  and	  Reaper,	  which	  was	  reflected	  in	  the	  2015	  announcement	  to	  dramatically	  expand	  the	  USAF’s	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  operations.	  	  
	  
3. To	  what	  extent	  were	  USAF	  judgments	  about	  the	  employment	  of	  the	  
Predator	  driven	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	  to	  friendly	  personnel,	  
and	  to	  what	  extent	  was	  that	  push	  from	  outside	  the	  service?	  	  
	  Even	  as	  the	  operational	  success	  of	  the	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  expanded	  beyond	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq,	  there	  was	  still	  a	  view	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  USAF	  that	  UAV	  pilots’	  reduced	  exposure	  to	  risk	  was	  a	  liability	  rather	  than	  an	  asset.	  UAV	  pilots	  continued	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  filling	  a	  “combat	  support”	  role	  and	  therefore	  lacking	  the	  warrior	  credentials	  of	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots.	  That	  said,	  there	  was	  also	  a	  growing	  recognition	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  USAF	  that	  the	  UAV	  pilots’	  reduced	  exposure	  to	  risk	  had	  some	  benefit,	  allowing	  them	  to	  achieve	  strategic	  impacts	  that	  would	  be	  difficult	  or	  impossible	  in	  a	  manned	  aircraft.	  	  	  	  	   	  
Views	  Inside	  the	  Predator	  Pilot	  Community:	  An	  Expanded	  Perception	  of	  the	  Warrior	  
Ethos	  	  	  Gen.	  Schwartz	  achieved	  an	  important	  victory	  for	  those	  who	  saw	  reduced	  exposure	  to	  risk	  as	  an	  asset	  when	  he	  created	  the	  18X	  career	  field.	  That	  decision	  helped	  to	  quiet	  critics	  who	  said	  that	  only	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  had	  the	  warrior	  credentials	  to	  bring	  credibility	  to	  the	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  programs.	  Gen.	  Schwartz,	  was,	  in	  effect,	  declaring	  that	  a	  new	  class	  of	  USAF	  officers	  were	  credentialed	  warriors	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specifically	  because	  they	  could	  achieve	  combat	  effects	  remotely.	  “No	  Airmen	  measures	  his	  or	  her	  worth	  by	  their	  proximity	  to	  the	  fight,”	  he	  said	  during	  a	  March	  2009	  speech.	  “Everyone	  counts,	  everyone	  contributes.	  No	  job	  or	  specialty	  is	  more	  worthy	  than	  another	  because	  it	  takes	  all	  of	  us	  playing	  our	  respective	  positions	  to	  be	  successful.”118	  	   The	  UAV	  community’s	  confidence	  in	  its	  warrior	  status	  continued	  to	  grow	  as	  its	  physical	  dislocation	  from	  the	  battlespace	  became	  an	  increasingly	  obvious	  asset.	  When	  I	  asked	  13	  UAV	  pilots	  at	  Creech	  AFB	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  backgrounds	  whether	  they	  considered	  themselves	  warfighters	  in	  2014,	  all	  of	  them	  said	  yes.	  “Warfighter	  is	  a	  state	  of	  mind	  and	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  war	  effort,”	  said	  one	  UAV	  pilot.119	  Echoed	  another:	  “I	  provide	  support	  every	  day	  to	  the	  war	  effort…i.e.	  fight	  the	  war.	  To	  me	  that	  is	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  warfighter.”120	  Embracing	  an	  expanded	  definition	  of	  the	  warrior	  ethos,	  UAV	  pilots	  increasingly	  stood	  up	  to	  detractors	  who	  judged	  warrior	  credentials	  strictly	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  proximity	  to	  combat.	  “You	  would	  have	  guys	  at	  the	  officer’s	  club	  giving	  your	  lieutenants	  and	  your	  captains	  shit	  because	  they	  are	  RPA	  drivers	  at	  Creech.	  They	  were	  looking	  down	  their	  noses	  at	  them,”	  recalled	  Col.	  Tart.	  “This	  was	  hysterical	  because	  they	  would	  reply:	  ‘who	  did	  you	  go	  kill	  in	  the	  war	  this	  week?’”121	  	   Outside	  the	  UAV	  community,	  however,	  there	  continued	  to	  be	  a	  sense	  among	  some	  in	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  community	  that	  reduced	  exposure	  to	  risk	  was	  a	  strike	  against	  UAV	  pilots,	  regardless	  of	  their	  combat	  effects.	  In	  his	  autobiography,	  Hampton,	  the	  retired	  F-­‐16	  pilot,	  scoffed	  at	  one	  UAV	  pilot	  applying	  for	  an	  air	  medal,	  awarded	  for	  “single	  acts	  of	  heroism	  or	  meritorious	  achievements	  while	  participating	  in	  aerial	  flight”	  in	  non-­‐peacetime	  operations.	  “Not	  too	  long	  ago,	  a	  Predator	  ‘pilot’	  tried	  to	  write	  himself	  up	  for	  an	  air	  medal	  –	  it	  didn’t	  happen,	  but	  a	  lot	  of	  fine	  fighter	  pilots	  threw	  up	  at	  the	  thought,”	  he	  wrote.	  “What	  next?	  	  A	  Purple	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Heart	  for	  carpal	  tunnel	  syndrome?”122	  When	  Capt.	  Dave	  Blair,	  a	  UAV	  pilot,	  wrote	  an	  article	  in	  the	  Air	  &	  Space	  Power	  Journal	  questioning	  why	  UAV	  missions	  were	  considered	  “combat	  support,”	  and	  therefore	  ineligible	  for	  air	  medals,	  he	  received	  some	  angry	  responses,	  many	  from	  retired	  USAF	  personnel	  but	  also	  from	  some	  active	  duty	  officers	  who	  said	  UAV	  pilots	  were	  combat	  support	  personnel	  because	  they	  have	  no	  “skin	  in	  the	  game.”123	  	  	   Obviously	  there	  was	  still	  a	  debate	  within	  the	  USAF	  about	  proximity	  to	  combat	  as	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  warrior	  credentials.	  The	  UAV	  community	  was	  becoming	  more	  comfortable	  with	  its	  role,	  advocating	  for	  an	  expanded	  definition	  of	  the	  warrior	  ethos	  that	  took	  into	  account	  effects	  on	  the	  battlefield.	  But	  there	  also	  remained	  a	  cultural	  tendency	  in	  the	  USAF	  to	  see	  UAV	  missions	  as	  secondary	  combat	  support	  operations	  that	  did	  not	  meet	  a	  traditional	  definition	  of	  the	  warrior	  ethos.	  	  	  	  	  Views	  of	  Aircrew	  Risk	  Outside	  the	  USAF	  	  
	  Outside	  the	  USAF,	  ground	  forces	  continued	  to	  dismiss	  the	  potential	  of	  Predators	  and	  Reapers	  to	  reduce	  aircrew	  risk.	  A	  2015	  survey	  of	  460	  military	  personnel	  authorized	  to	  call	  in	  air	  strikes	  —	  including	  JTACs	  from	  all	  the	  services	  as	  well	  as	  Army	  Joint	  Fires	  Observers	  —	  found	  that	  respondents	  preferred	  manned	  aircraft	  when	  there	  was	  a	  high	  risk	  to	  ground	  forces	  because	  they	  distrusted	  the	  remote	  nature	  of	  UAV	  operations.	  Survey	  respondents	  said	  they	  got	  the	  impression	  that	  UAV	  pilots	  treated	  their	  calls	  for	  close	  air	  support	  in	  “danger	  close”	  situations	  with	  less	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  urgency	  than	  their	  manned	  counterparts.	  In	  contrast,	  they	  perceived	  that	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  would	  be	  quicker	  to	  respond	  due	  to	  their	  “intuition	  and	  experience,”	  increased	  situational	  awareness,	  and	  sense	  of	  urgency	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  had	  “skin	  in	  the	  game”	  as	  a	  physical	  presence	  in	  the	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battlespace.124	  “On-­‐site	  judgment	  from	  a	  live	  person	  makes	  me	  feel	  safer	  than	  someone	  controlling	  a	  computer	  screen,”	  remarked	  one	  survey	  respondent.125	  At	  the	  national	  level,	  however,	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Predator	  and	  the	  Reaper	  as	  a	  means	  to	  reduce	  aircrew	  risk	  increased	  considerably.	  President	  Obama	  aggressively	  expanded	  the	  use	  of	  UAVs	  for	  air	  strikes	  in	  countries	  where	  the	  US	  was	  striving	  to	  minimize	  its	  military	  footprint	  for	  both	  political	  and	  security	  reasons.	  In	  a	  speech	  to	  announce	  that	  weaponized	  UAVs	  would	  be	  returning	  to	  Iraq	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2014	  to	  counter	  ISIS,	  the	  president	  alluded	  to	  UAV	  strikes	  in	  Yemen	  as	  evidence	  of	  what	  could	  be	  achieved	  “without	  putting	  large	  numbers	  of	  US	  troops	  on	  the	  ground.”	  He	  said	  that	  the	  US	  would	  look	  to	  expand	  that	  concept	  to	  Syria	  and	  Iraq.126	  The	  American	  public	  also	  increasingly	  supported	  the	  use	  of	  UAVs	  as	  a	  means	  to	  reduce	  aircrew	  risk	  in	  air	  strikes	  against	  ISIS,	  with	  20	  percent	  of	  respondents	  in	  a	  2014	  Quinnipiac	  University	  poll	  saying	  they	  preferred	  to	  use	  drones	  or	  cruise	  missiles	  “where	  American	  pilots	  are	  not	  at	  risk,”	  and	  only	  two	  percent	  saying	  they	  would	  prefer	  to	  use	  manned	  aircraft.127	  While	  President	  Obama	  was	  relatively	  comfortable	  with	  using	  UAV	  strikes	  outside	  war	  zones,	  there	  were	  also	  vocal	  critics	  in	  the	  US	  and	  the	  international	  community.	  In	  2013,	  he	  gave	  a	  speech	  at	  the	  National	  Defense	  University	  defending	  his	  policy	  of	  flying	  UAVs	  over	  nations	  with	  which	  the	  US	  was	  not	  at	  war.128	  The	  speech	  followed	  a	  groundswell	  of	  criticism	  regarding	  the	  moral	  and	  legal	  issues	  of	  UAV	  use,	  particularly	  outside	  the	  “hot”	  battlespaces	  of	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan.	  In	  the	  US,	  there	  was	  a	  view	  among	  some	  veterans’	  groups	  that	  UAV	  strikes	  were	  unsporting	  or	  dishonorable	  because	  of	  the	  remoteness	  of	  UAV	  aircrews	  from	  combat.	  	  “Just	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  a	  pilotless	  aircraft	  is	  dishonorable,”	  complained	  J.D.	  Wyneken,	  the	  	  director	  of	  the	  American	  Fighter	  Aces	  Association.129	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  and	  Macdonald	  (2015)	  24	  125	  Schneider	  and	  Macdonald	  (2015)	  25	  126	  Obama	  (June	  19,	  2014)	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  University	  (July	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  (May	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These	  opinions	  were	  expressed	  even	  more	  openly	  after	  February	  2013,	  when	  outgoing	  Secretary	  Panetta	  announced	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Distinguished	  Warfare	  Medal.	  On	  behalf	  of	  US	  veterans,	  a	  bipartisan	  group	  of	  lawmakers	  criticized	  the	  medal’s	  order	  of	  merit	  relative	  to	  other	  medals	  awarded	  for	  combat	  action,	  such	  as	  the	  Bronze	  Star,	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  Secretary	  Hagel,	  who	  replaced	  Secretary	  Panetta	  in	  February	  2013.130	  Many	  UAV	  pilots	  themselves	  felt	  that	  while	  a	  medal	  was	  appropriate,	  its	  order	  of	  precedence	  was,	  in	  fact,	  too	  high.131	  Secretary	  Hagel	  cancelled	  the	  medal	  in	  April	  2013	  in	  response	  to	  the	  uproar.132	  The	  Pentagon	  announced	  in	  early	  2016	  that	  UAV	  pilots	  would	  be	  eligible	  for	  an	  “R”	  device.	  This	  time,	  however,	  many	  UAV	  pilots	  felt	  the	  device	  went	  too	  far	  in	  the	  other	  direction	  of	  failing	  to	  recognize	  their	  ability	  to	  achieve	  combat	  effects.	  	  An	  informal	  poll	  of	  USAF	  combat	  wings	  revealed	  that	  officers	  found	  the	  “R”	  device	  “detrimental	  and	  demotivating.”133	  	  	   In	  the	  US	  and	  abroad,	  the	  USAF’s	  own	  reservations	  about	  the	  warrior	  credentials	  of	  its	  UAV	  pilots	  fueled	  a	  larger	  debate	  about	  the	  morality	  and	  legality	  of	  US	  UAV	  operations.	  One	  retired	  USAF	  fighter	  pilot	  argued	  that	  UAVs	  were	  unethical	  because	  they	  undermined	  “the	  foundations	  of	  the	  laws	  of	  war	  by	  removing	  moral	  equity	  of	  combatants.”	  He	  and	  some	  former	  USAF	  enlisted	  personnel	  argued	  that	  UAV	  strikes	  violated	  the	  principles	  of	  just	  war	  theory	  by	  giving	  an	  unfair	  advantage	  to	  remotely	  based	  US	  aircrews	  over	  the	  adversaries	  they	  were	  targeting.134	  	  Some	  US	  and	  international	  scholars	  argued	  that	  this	  unfair	  advantage,	  when	  applied	  outside	  existing	  war	  zones,	  created	  a	  moral	  hazard	  by	  lowering	  the	  threshold	  for	  the	  US	  to	  go	  to	  war.	  Because	  UAV	  pilots	  were	  kept	  away	  from	  the	  dangers	  of	  the	  battlespace,	  civilians	  were	  more	  willing	  to	  authorize	  UAV	  strikes	  knowing	  there	  was	  minimal	  risk	  to	  their	  own	  forces.135	  Along	  these	  same	  lines,	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three	  former	  USAF	  UAV	  sensor	  operators	  and	  one	  UAV	  technician	  made	  public	  statements	  in	  late	  2015	  claiming	  that	  the	  work	  of	  UAV	  aircrews	  at	  Creech	  AFB	  was	  “morally	  outrageous”	  because	  it	  had	  become	  too	  easy	  to	  authorize	  strikes	  without	  hard	  evidence	  of	  a	  target’s	  involvement	  in	  terrorist	  activity.136	  	   The	  USAF’s	  UAV	  pilot	  community	  remained	  vulnerable	  to	  this	  legal	  and	  moral	  criticism	  because	  USAF	  itself	  was	  still	  struggling	  to	  reconceive	  its	  own	  definition	  of	  the	  warrior	  ethos.	  UAV	  pilots	  still	  faced	  scorn	  from	  some	  inside	  the	  USAF	  who	  felt	  they	  were	  not	  proper	  warriors	  because	  they	  were	  not	  at	  risk.	  Outside	  the	  USAF,	  the	  warrior	  credentials	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  UAV	  pilot	  community	  were	  further	  called	  into	  question	  in	  2015	  when	  the	  USAF	  revealed	  it	  was	  already	  relying	  on	  civilian	  contractors	  to	  fly	  Reaper	  CAPs.137	  The	  blurring	  of	  the	  lines	  between	  a	  USAF	  UAV	  pilot	  and	  a	  civilian	  contractor	  further	  detracted	  from	  the	  warrior	  status	  of	  the	  former.	  	  Ultimately,	  the	  USAF’s	  own	  reservations	  about	  the	  warrior	  credentials	  of	  its	  UAV	  pilots	  exposed	  the	  entire	  service	  to	  external	  criticism	  that	  the	  USAF	  was	  gaining	  an	  unfair	  advantage	  in	  war	  by	  employing	  UAVs.	  A	  fundamental	  tenet	  of	  US	  airpower	  doctrine	  is	  that	  it	  provides	  an	  “asymmetric	  advantage”	  over	  adversaries.138	  To	  suggest	  that	  seeking	  to	  enhance	  this	  advantage	  through	  the	  use	  of	  UAVs	  was	  morally	  negligent	  was	  to	  call	  into	  question	  the	  very	  purpose	  for	  having	  an	  independent	  Air	  Force	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Although	  this	  was	  likely	  not	  the	  intention	  of	  those	  in	  the	  USAF	  who	  questioned	  UAV	  pilots’	  warrior	  credentials,	  the	  effect	  was	  to	  undermine	  the	  legal	  and	  moral	  basis	  on	  which	  the	  USAF	  employed	  airpower.	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4. To	  what	  extent	  were	  judgments	  about	  the	  Predator	  based	  on	  a	  
concern	  about	  maintaining	  the	  USAF’s	  primary	  control	  over	  those	  
air	  assets	  in	  response	  to	  competition	  from	  civilian	  and	  military	  
institutions?	  	  The	  USAF’s	  bid	  for	  executive	  agency,	  initiated	  by	  Gen.	  Moseley	  before	  he	  was	  fired,	  had	  invited	  criticism	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  UAV	  policies	  at	  a	  time	  of	  cultural	  upheaval.	  The	  USAF	  was	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  high-­‐stakes	  debate	  over	  the	  qualifications	  needed	  to	  fly	  UAVs.	  The	  outcome	  of	  the	  debate	  would	  have	  significant	  repercussions	  for	  USAF	  pilot	  identity	  and,	  by	  extension,	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  USAF	  itself.	  	  The	  USAF’s	  manned	  pilot	  leadership	  community	  had	  built	  their	  justification	  for	  dominance	  around	  the	  USAF’s	  capacity	  to	  independently	  achieve	  war-­‐winning	  effects	  through	  the	  expert	  employment	  of	  manned	  aircraft.	  Ongoing	  UAV	  operations	  raised	  questions	  not	  only	  about	  the	  centrality	  of	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  in	  USAF	  operations,	  but	  also	  about	  whether	  the	  USAF	  needed	  to	  act	  independently	  to	  achieve	  strategic	  effects,	  or	  whether	  it	  could	  play	  a	  supporting	  role.	  	  	   In	  terms	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  role	  relative	  to	  other	  services	  in	  wartime,	  Gen.	  Schwartz	  and	  Gen.	  Welsh	  seemed	  to	  side	  with	  those	  who	  believed	  it	  was	  possible	  for	  the	  USAF	  to	  make	  a	  strategic	  contribution	  without	  acting	  completely	  independently.	  To	  this	  end,	  Gen.	  Schwartz	  dropped	  all	  discussions	  of	  executive	  agency,	  and	  instead	  focused	  maximizing	  the	  USAF’s	  impact	  in	  a	  supporting	  role.	  “The	  larger	  imperative	  was	  to	  be	  ‘all	  in,’	  and	  I	  think	  there	  was	  a	  lingering	  perception	  that	  the	  USAF	  wasn’t	  all	  in	  to	  the	  fight,”	  Gen.	  Schwartz	  told	  me	  in	  October	  2015.139	  Similarly,	  Gen.	  Welsh	  emphasized	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  UAVs	  played	  a	  supporting	  role	  to	  ground	  forces	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  ISIS.	  In	  his	  view,	  the	  UAV	  strikes	  were	  meant	  to	  “inhibit	  ISIS,	  to	  attrit	  ISIS,	  to	  slow	  ISIS	  down,	  to	  give	  a	  ground	  force	  time	  to	  be	  trained	  because	  the	  ground	  force	  will	  be	  required.”	  140	  	  Both	  Gen.	  Schwartz	  and	  Gen.	  Welsh	  also	  seemed	  willing	  to	  adopt	  a	  broader	  conception	  of	  pilot	  identity,	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  possibility	  that	  airmen	  other	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  139	  Schwartz	  interview	  (Oct.	  20,	  2015)	  	  140	  Welsh	  and	  James	  (Jan.	  15,	  2015)	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than	  fully-­‐trained	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  could	  operate	  UAVs.	  Gen.	  Schwartz	  established	  the	  18X	  career	  field	  based	  on	  the	  belief	  that	  officers	  with	  less	  training	  than	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  could	  fly	  UAVs	  effectively.	  Gen.	  Welsh	  pushed	  the	  bounds	  of	  pilot	  identity	  further	  with	  his	  decision	  in	  late	  2015	  to	  allow	  enlisted	  personnel	  to	  fly	  the	  Global	  Hawk	  and	  to	  consider	  allowing	  enlisted	  personnel	  to	  fly	  armed	  UAVs.	  The	  latter	  possibility	  would	  become	  even	  more	  realistic	  if	  the	  USAF	  followed	  through	  with	  its	  plans	  to	  introduce	  ATLS	  for	  the	  Reaper,	  which	  would	  automate	  the	  part	  of	  the	  flight	  envelope	  where	  stick-­‐and-­‐rudder	  skills	  were	  most	  needed.	  	  All	  of	  these	  efforts	  contributed	  to	  the	  formulation	  of	  a	  more	  comprehensive,	  flexible	  view	  of	  airpower	  theory.	  The	  USAF	  did	  not	  need	  to	  operate	  independently,	  or	  rely	  on	  the	  unique	  contributions	  of	  USAF	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots,	  to	  make	  a	  strategic	  impact.	  This	  broader	  view	  of	  airpower	  theory	  buffered	  the	  USAF	  against	  critics	  who	  argued	  that	  the	  service	  was	  losing	  relevance	  as	  a	  warfighting	  institution	  because	  it	  was	  clinging	  to	  a	  doctrine	  built	  around	  manned	  aircraft	  even	  as	  UAVs	  proliferated.	  For	  example,	  the	  USAF’s	  decision	  to	  allow	  new	  categories	  of	  personnel	  to	  fly	  UAVs	  with	  less	  training	  than	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots,	  including	  18X	  pilots,	  enlisted	  personnel,	  and	  contractors,	  provided	  a	  counterpoint	  to	  Van	  Creveld’s	  argument	  that	  the	  USAF	  was	  losing	  its	  institutional	  relevance	  as	  automation	  was	  diminished	  the	  need	  for	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  to	  fly	  manned	  or	  unmanned	  systems.141	  While	  this	  broader	  view	  of	  airpower	  theory	  improved	  the	  USAF’s	  capacity	  to	  contribute	  to	  ongoing	  UAV	  operations,	  however,	  it	  also	  had	  a	  downside.	  	  Just	  as	  the	  USAF’s	  narrow	  view	  of	  airpower	  theory	  had	  led	  critics	  to	  question	  the	  service’s	  relevance	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq,	  an	  exceedingly	  broad	  view	  also	  risked	  provoking	  questions	  about	  the	  USAF’s	  institutional	  relevance	  in	  the	  future.	  For	  example,	  if	  the	  USAF	  completely	  shifted	  responsibility	  for	  UAV	  operations	  from	  officers	  to	  enlisted	  personnel	  and	  contractors,	  this	  could	  raise	  questions	  about	  why	  the	  USAF	  needed	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  UAV	  operations	  at	  all.	  The	  USAF	  recognized	  the	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  Van	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danger	  of	  completely	  removing	  its	  officer	  corps	  from	  UAV	  operations	  in	  a	  2009	  Air	  Force	  Research	  Institute	  Paper.	  Drawing	  on	  Rosen’s	  intraservice	  model	  of	  military	  innovation,	  the	  report	  argued	  that	  only	  officers	  have	  the	  authority	  and	  status	  to	  lend	  credibility	  to	  notion	  that	  the	  USAF	  considers	  UAV	  operations	  to	  be	  part	  of	  their	  core	  mission	  set.142	  Without	  an	  officer	  presence	  in	  the	  USAF’s	  UAV	  community,	  the	  USAF	  risked	  the	  charge	  that	  it	  was	  not	  taking	  the	  UAV	  mission	  seriously.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	  
	  Wartime	  expediency	  forced	  the	  USAF	  to	  expand	  its	  UAV	  capabilities	  during	  Gen.	  Schwartz	  and	  Gen.	  Welsh’s	  tenure.	  But	  the	  pressure	  on	  the	  USAF’s	  force	  structure	  —	  especially	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  community	  —	  was	  becoming	  unbearable.	  As	  had	  been	  the	  case	  during	  Gen.	  Moseley’s	  tenure,	  the	  USAF’s	  ongoing	  dependency	  on	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots,	  many	  of	  whom	  did	  not	  want	  to	  fly	  UAVs,	  aggravated	  cultural	  tensions	  and	  the	  long-­‐term	  prospects	  for	  UAV	  integration	  in	  the	  USAF.	  	  	  Gen.	  Schwartz	  partially	  addressed	  the	  stress	  on	  this	  community	  by	  creating	  an	  18X	  career	  field	  to	  help	  man	  current	  UAV	  operations	  and	  to	  build	  up	  a	  long-­‐term	  USAF	  UAV	  enterprise.	  In	  this	  way,	  he	  acted	  as	  a	  “norm	  exploiter,”	  seeking	  to	  find	  ways	  to	  accommodate	  UAVs	  within	  USAF	  culture	  by	  attracting	  candidates	  who	  actually	  wanted	  to	  fly	  UAVs.	  Gen.	  Welsh’s	  “RPA	  Get	  Well	  Plan”	  and	  Gen.	  Carlisle’s	  $3	  billion	  proposal	  to	  expand	  UAV	  operations	  also	  provided	  some	  hope	  for	  relieving	  the	  short-­‐term	  UAV	  manning	  problem	  and	  aligning	  the	  Predator	  with	  USAF	  culture.	  But	  the	  prospects	  for	  UAV	  innovation	  over	  the	  long	  term	  were	  still	  uncertain.	  Gen.	  Schwartz	  and	  Gen.	  Welsh	  took	  actions	  that	  reflected	  their	  awareness	  of	  the	  growing	  relevance	  of	  UAVs	  in	  a	  	  protracted	  era	  of	  asymmetric	  conflict.	  However,	  there	  were	  still	  powerful	  undercurrents	  of	  cultural	  bias	  in	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  community	  that	  emerged	  in	  discriminatory	  UAV	  promotion	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  142	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  Schultz	  (Oct.	  2009)	  36	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basing	  policies,	  pessimistic	  assessments	  of	  the	  strategic	  context	  and	  negative	  views	  of	  UAV	  pilots’	  warrior	  status.	  These	  powerful	  undercurrents	  were	  undermining	  the	  USAF’s	  capacity	  to	  meet	  the	  relentless	  demands	  for	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  capability,	  calling	  into	  question	  the	  service’s	  institutional	  relevance	  in	  ongoing	  conflicts.	  	  Recognizing	  that	  continued	  reliance	  on	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  community	  to	  fly	  UAVs	  was	  reinforcing	  these	  negative	  trends,	  USAF	  leaders	  sought	  to	  adopt	  broader	  conceptions	  of	  the	  warrior	  ethos	  and	  to	  expand	  UAV	  pilot	  qualifications	  to	  allow	  new	  groups	  of	  personnel	  to	  fly	  UAVs.	  While	  these	  efforts	  enabled	  the	  USAF	  to	  meet	  the	  relentless	  demand	  for	  more	  Predators	  and	  Reapers,	  however,	  they	  also	  risked	  raising	  questions	  about	  whether	  the	  USAF	  had	  anything	  unique	  to	  offer	  to	  UAV	  operations.	  	  	  	  As	  the	  year	  2016	  began,	  the	  USAF	  continued	  to	  walk	  a	  tight	  rope	  in	  regards	  to	  UAV	  innovation.	  On	  one	  hand,	  USAF	  leaders	  ought	  to	  overcome	  longstanding	  institutional	  preferences	  for	  manned	  aircraft	  and	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  over	  UAVs.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  USAF	  leaders	  had	  to	  guard	  against	  the	  potential	  for	  enacting	  cultural	  changes	  that	  improved	  the	  USAF’s	  capacity	  for	  UAV	  innovation	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  qualities	  that	  made	  the	  USAF	  unique,	  including	  its	  cadre	  of	  officers	  trained	  to	  employ	  airpower	  for	  strategic	  effects.	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CONCLUSIONS	  	  My	  concluding	  analysis	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  USAF	  culture	  and	  UAV	  innovation	  is	  divided	  into	  three	  parts.	  The	  first	  section	  draws	  on	  the	  four-­‐sub-­‐questions	  asked	  across	  the	  history	  of	  USAF	  UAV	  innovation	  to	  identify	  significant	  patterns	  and	  changes	  in	  USAF	  culture	  over	  time.	  The	  second	  section	  explores	  an	  overarching	  theme	  that	  emerges	  across	  the	  analysis	  of	  these	  four	  sub-­‐questions,	  which	  is	  that	  innovation	  in	  the	  Predator	  program	  was	  influenced	  by	  three	  factors:	  the	  strategic	  environment;	  USAF	  leadership	  behavior;	  and,	  most	  importantly,	  USAF	  identity,	  perhaps	  the	  main	  determinant	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  capacity	  for	  innovation.	  The	  third	  section	  discusses	  possibilities	  for	  further	  research.	  	  	  
USAF	  Culture	  and	  UAV	  Innovation:	  Significant	  Cultural	  Trends	  	  	  In	  his	  doctoral	  dissertation	  on	  UAV	  innovation,	  Col.	  Ehrhard	  argued	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  historic	  lack	  of	  sustained	  support	  for	  UAV	  innovation	  had	  far	  less	  to	  do	  with	  culture	  than	  with	  technological	  immaturity,	  cost,	  and	  performance	  problems.	  In	  his	  view,	  to	  the	  extent	  USAF	  culture	  mattered	  at	  all,	  it	  exerted	  a	  positive	  influence	  and	  even	  contributed	  to	  a	  “general	  enthusiasm	  for	  UAVs	  that	  in	  retrospect	  was	  not	  supported	  by	  technology	  at	  the	  time.”143	  Contrary	  to	  Ehrhard’s	  research,	  I	  found	  that	  while	  USAF	  culture	  has	  positively	  influenced	  UAV	  innovation,	  in	  some	  respects,	  there	  are	  also	  significant	  undercurrents	  of	  cultural	  bias	  that	  have	  obstructed	  UAV	  innovation.	  The	  four	  sub-­‐questions	  below	  explore	  the	  evidence	  I	  have	  gathered	  across	  the	  history	  of	  USAF	  UAV	  innovation	  to	  reach	  this	  conclusion.	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1. To	  what	  extent	  did	  individuals	  or	  groups	  within	  the	  USAF	  resist	  
UAV	  innovation	  out	  of	  a	  concern	  that	  their	  jobs	  or	  status	  might	  be	  
threatened	  by	  it?	  	  	  Some	  scholars	  argue	  that	  USAF	  has	  not	  reflexively	  welcomed	  alternatives	  to	  manned	  aircraft	  that	  might	  increase	  the	  service’s	  war-­‐winning	  potential.	  The	  USAF’s	  leadership	  community,	  first	  dominated	  by	  bomber	  pilots	  and,	  later,	  fighter	  pilots,	  has	  tended	  to	  focus	  on	  narrow	  conceptions	  of	  airpower	  theory	  built	  around	  manned	  aircraft	  as	  the	  central	  tools	  for	  winning	  wars.	  Therefore,	  if	  a	  new	  technology	  threatens	  to	  replace	  their	  preferred	  weapon	  system,	  they	  resist	  it.	  The	  most	  frequently	  cited	  example	  is	  the	  USAF	  bomber	  leaders’	  reluctance	  to	  embrace	  the	  ICBM	  because	  they	  perceived	  that	  it	  as	  a	  direct	  threat	  to	  the	  manned	  bombers	  around	  which	  they	  built	  their	  justification	  for	  an	  	  independent	  USAF	  and	  their	  future	  prospects	  for	  promotion.144	  Contrary	  to	  Ehrhard’s	  finding	  that	  there	  is	  no	  pro-­‐pilot	  bias	  stunting	  UAV	  innovation	  in	  the	  USAF,145	  I	  found	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  USAF	  culture	  and	  UAV	  innovation	  reflects	  a	  tendency	  to	  see	  alternatives	  to	  manned	  aircraft	  as	  a	  threat.	  Historically,	  the	  USAF’s	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  community	  has	  been	  most	  likely	  to	  indulge	  this	  tendency	  during	  peacetime,	  while	  in	  wartime	  it	  briefly	  embraced	  UAVs	  out	  of	  necessity.	  The	  prime	  example	  is	  TAC’s	  approach	  to	  UAVs	  during	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  After	  rejecting	  UAVs	  before	  the	  war	  because	  they	  threatened	  to	  diminish	  the	  role	  of	  manned	  reconnaissance	  aircraft,	  TAC	  aggressively	  employed	  UAVs	  to	  meet	  wartime	  demand.	  After	  the	  war,	  TAC	  abandoned	  UAVs	  to	  the	  chagrin	  of	  lawmakers	  and	  Pentagon	  civilians,	  even	  as	  other	  military	  services	  continued	  UAV	  development.	  	  The	  manned	  aircraft	  community’s	  tendency	  to	  see	  UAVs	  as	  a	  threat	  persisted	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Predator	  program	  in	  1993.	  But	  the	  clear	  pattern	  of	  wartime	  adoption	  and	  peacetime	  rejection	  dissolved	  with	  the	  shift	  in	  the	  strategic	  environment	  following	  the	  1991	  Gulf	  War.	  The	  USAF	  faced	  constant	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  144	  Builder	  (1989);	  Werrell	  (1985);	  Perry	  (Oct.	  1967)	  	  145	  Ehrhard	  (2000)	  492-­‐493	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pressure	  to	  field	  UAVs	  to	  the	  absolute	  limit	  in	  response	  to	  the	  challenges	  presented	  by	  growing	  US	  involvement	  in	  conflicts	  that	  fell	  short	  of	  full-­‐scale	  war.	  	  With	  no	  relief	  from	  combat	  operations	  in	  sight,	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  no	  longer	  had	  the	  option	  to	  ignore	  UAVs.	  To	  the	  contrary,	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  were	  forced	  to	  give	  up	  flying	  —	  and	  the	  career	  satisfaction	  and	  status	  that	  came	  with	  it	  —	  to	  operate	  UAVs	  in	  conflicts	  ranging	  from	  Bosnia	  to	  Kosovo	  and	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq.	  As	  more	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  were	  forced	  to	  fly	  UAVs,	  some	  came	  to	  see	  the	  growing	  relevance	  of	  UAVs	  as	  a	  direct,	  long-­‐term	  threat	  to	  their	  jobs	  and	  status	  in	  the	  USAF.	  	  Acting	  as	  a	  “norm	  exploiter,”	  Gen.	  Schwartz,	  chief	  from	  2008	  to	  2012,	  sought	  to	  mitigate	  the	  growing	  resentment	  toward	  UAVs	  by	  starting	  to	  shift	  the	  burden	  of	  flying	  them	  to	  a	  new	  18X	  community	  of	  volunteer	  UAV	  pilots.	  In	  line	  with	  Rosen’s	  model	  of	  military	  innovation,	  Gen.	  Schwartz	  hoped	  that	  this	  new	  career	  field	  would	  provide	  a	  pathway	  for	  a	  generation	  of	  UAV	  officers	  to	  rise	  to	  senior	  positions	  from	  which	  they	  could	  advocate	  a	  new	  way	  of	  warfare	  that	  saw	  UAVs	  as	  playing	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  emerging	  strategic	  context.	  	  Rather	  than	  seeing	  the	  18X	  career	  field	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  relieve	  the	  burden	  on	  them,	  however,	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  tended	  to	  see	  the	  move	  to	  foster	  UAV	  advocacy	  in	  a	  competing	  career	  field	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  their	  dominance.	  To	  protect	  their	  lock	  on	  leadership,	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  showed	  a	  tendency	  to	  adopt	  a	  narrow	  conception	  of	  airpower	  theory	  that	  emphasized	  the	  primacy	  of	  manned	  aircraft	  operations	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  everything	  else.	  In	  practice,	  this	  belief	  provided	  the	  justification	  for	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  community	  to	  monopolize	  leadership	  positions	  and	  to	  obstruct	  UAV	  innovation	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways,	  including	  systematic	  attempts	  to	  limit	  UAV	  pilots’	  promotion	  prospects.	  The	  USAF’s	  cultural	  tendency	  to	  obstruct	  UAV	  innovation	  is	  consistent	  with	  Posen’s	  civil-­‐military	  model,	  which	  predicts	  that	  military	  organizations,	  when	  left	  to	  their	  own	  devices,	  will	  resist	  innovation	  in	  favor	  of	  preserving	  old	  ways	  of	  doing	  business,	  or	  SOPs,	  that	  have	  become	  so	  culturally	  engrained	  that	  they	  tend	  to	  persist	  even	  after	  they	  have	  outlived	  their	  usefulness.	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2. To	  what	  extent	  were	  judgments	  about	  the	  potential	  and	  cost	  	  
effectiveness	  of	  UAVs	  based	  on	  the	  USAF’s	  enthusiasm	  for	  
employment	  of	  new	  technology	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  was	  the	  
enthusiasm	  outside	  the	  service?	  	  	  The	  authors	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  influential	  strategy	  document	  released	  in	  1990,	  Global	  
Reach-­‐Global	  Power,	  called	  on	  the	  USAF	  to	  embrace	  technological	  innovations	  of	  all	  types	  as	  a	  means	  to	  advance	  the	  USAF’s	  war-­‐winning	  edge.146	  The	  document	  declares:	  “our	  aerospace	  forces	  and	  technology	  are	  a	  national	  treasure	  and	  a	  competitive	  edge,	  militarily	  and	  commercially.”147	  Given	  technology’s	  central	  role	  in	  airpower,	  Builder	  argues	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  very	  existence	  depends	  on	  its	  continued	  enthusiasm	  for	  technological	  progress	  across	  a	  growing	  array	  of	  air	  and	  space	  power	  assets.148	  In	  his	  dissertation,	  Ehrhard	  argues	  that	  USAF	  culture	  supports	  this	  institutional	  imperative.	  The	  service’s	  senior	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  have	  historically	  “made	  rickety	  UAV	  programs	  fly	  efficiently,”	  he	  claims,	  because	  “their	  love	  of	  technology	  perhaps	  allowed	  more	  flexibility	  concerning	  non-­‐standard	  forms	  of	  aerospace	  power.”149	  	   In	  line	  with	  Ehrhard’s	  findings,	  I	  found	  that	  senior	  USAF	  leaders	  often	  adopted	  a	  broad	  conception	  of	  airpower	  that	  embraced	  UAV	  innovation.	  These	  leaders	  sought	  to	  enact	  a	  cultural	  shift	  in	  favor	  of	  UAV	  innovation	  despite	  pervasive	  pessimism	  in	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  community	  regarding	  the	  potential	  of	  UAV	  technology.	  Contrary	  to	  Ehrhard’s	  findings,	  however,	  I	  found	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  broader	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  community	  persistently	  expressed	  pessimistic	  views	  about	  the	  cost	  and	  potential	  of	  UAVs	  despite	  the	  efforts	  of	  USAF	  leaders	  to	  promote	  a	  culture	  that	  favored	  UAV	  innovation.	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  Rice	  (1990)	  4-­‐6	  147	  Rice	  (1990)	  14	  148	  Builder	  (1989)19	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  Ehrhard	  (2000)	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Turning	  to	  pre-­‐Predator	  history,	  I	  found	  that	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  community’s	  negative	  views	  of	  UAV	  innovation	  were	  more	  prevalent	  during	  peacetime	  than	  wartime.	  Following	  spikes	  of	  UAV	  enthusiasm	  among	  airmen	  during	  WWII	  and	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  pessimistic	  assessments	  of	  UAVs	  contributed	  to	  the	  rejection	  of	  UAV	  innovation	  once	  the	  wars	  ended.	  Even	  Gen.	  Arnold,	  a	  highly	  regarded	  USAF	  forefather,	  failed	  in	  his	  attempt	  to	  infuse	  enthusiasm	  for	  future	  UAV	  innovation	  at	  the	  end	  of	  WWII.	  	  	  In	  contrast,	  during	  the	  Predator	  program	  the	  USAF’s	  perceptions	  of	  UAVs	  were	  more	  consistently	  pessimistic	  because	  there	  was	  no	  clear	  wartime	  impetus	  to	  temper	  those	  reservations.	  The	  manned	  aircraft	  community,	  and	  particularly	  ACC,	  headquarters	  for	  combat	  aviation,	  shifted	  to	  their	  historic	  focus	  on	  high-­‐intensity	  conflict	  for	  which	  UAVs	  would	  be	  poorly	  suited	  because	  of	  their	  vulnerability	  to	  enemy	  air	  defenses	  and	  fighters.	  Highly	  survivable	  manned	  aircraft	  were	  a	  top	  priority	  because	  they	  were	  considered	  proven	  technology	  that	  could	  operate	  across	  the	  spectrum	  of	  conflict,	  while	  UAVs	  were	  viewed	  as	  relatively	  untested	  and	  totally	  useless	  in	  the	  kind	  of	  conflict	  that	  the	  USAF	  was	  most	  worried	  about	  fighting.	  	  USAF	  leaders	  tried	  to	  shift	  these	  perceptions	  starting	  in	  1995	  with	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Predator	  program.	  Acting	  as	  what	  Farrell	  calls	  a	  “norm	  entrepreneur,”	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  adopted	  the	  Predator	  as	  a	  symbol	  of	  what	  he	  saw	  as	  the	  growing	  importance	  of	  reconnaissance	  in	  the	  emerging	  asymmetric	  threat	  environment.	  His	  attempt	  was	  only	  somewhat	  successful,	  however,	  because	  his	  decision	  to	  force	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  to	  fly	  the	  Predator	  reinforced	  the	  view	  within	  that	  community	  that	  UAVs	  posed	  a	  threat	  to	  their	  jobs	  and	  status.	  In	  2000,	  Gen.	  Jumper,	  the	  commander	  of	  ACC,	  enjoyed	  slightly	  more	  success	  in	  trying	  to	  shift	  USAF	  culture	  by	  attempting	  to	  align	  Predator	  innovations	  with	  the	  cultural	  preferences	  of	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  community.	  Acting	  as	  a	  “norm	  exploiter,”	  Gen.	  Jumper	  weaponized	  the	  Predator,	  an	  act	  that	  molded	  the	  UAV	  to	  conform	  to	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  community’s	  preference	  for	  systems	  that	  deliver	  kinetic	  effects.	  	  	  	  These	  leadership	  attempts	  to	  shift	  USAF	  culture,	  combined	  with	  wartime	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necessity	  after	  the	  September	  11	  attacks,	  fueled	  a	  surge	  in	  support	  for	  UAV	  innovation.	  But	  as	  the	  wars	  wore	  on,	  views	  of	  UAV	  innovation	  diverged.	  Many	  in	  the	  service,	  including	  Gen.	  Moseley,	  USAF	  chief	  from	  2005	  to	  2008,	  and	  Gen.	  Hostage,	  the	  ACC	  commander	  from	  2011	  to	  2014,	  urged	  the	  USAF	  to	  shift	  its	  strategic	  emphasis	  to	  the	  risks	  of	  a	  high-­‐intensity	  conflict	  for	  which	  the	  current	  generation	  of	  UAVs	  was	  ill-­‐suited.	  But	  others	  in	  the	  USAF,	  including	  Gen.	  Schwartz,	  the	  USAF	  chief	  from	  2008	  to	  2012,	  and	  Gen.	  Welsh,	  the	  chief	  from	  2012	  to	  the	  present,	  viewed	  asymmetric	  war	  as	  an	  ongoing	  threat	  severe	  enough	  to	  warrant	  a	  continued	  emphasis	  on	  the	  Predator	  and	  its	  follow-­‐on	  system,	  the	  Reaper.	  Outside	  the	  USAF,	  many	  in	  the	  US	  government	  shared	  the	  view	  that	  the	  Predator	  and	  Reaper	  would	  continue	  to	  play	  central	  roles	  in	  a	  seemingly	  endless	  era	  of	  asymmetric	  conflict.	  Therefore,	  the	  USAF	  needed	  to	  focus	  its	  planning	  and	  resources	  on	  the	  current	  generation	  of	  UAVs,	  and	  there	  was	  less	  of	  an	  immediate	  need	  to	  focus	  on	  highly	  survivable	  aircraft,	  manned	  or	  unmanned,	  for	  high-­‐intensity	  clashes	  that	  were	  unlikely	  to	  occur.	  Secretary	  Gates	  championed	  this	  position,	  which	  became	  even	  more	  widespread	  in	  the	  government	  as	  the	  Obama	  administration	  expanded	  its	  counterterrorism	  campaign	  beyond	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq,	  which	  further	  increased	  the	  demand	  for	  the	  Predator	  and	  the	  Reaper.	  	  Despite	  this	  outside	  pressure	  and	  the	  encouragement	  of	  some	  USAF	  leaders,	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  community’s	  enduring	  pessimism	  about	  the	  Predator	  often	  obstructed	  UAV	  innovation	  between	  1993	  and	  2015.	  In	  an	  era	  of	  strategic	  ambiguity,	  the	  USAF’s	  manned	  aircraft	  community	  saw	  the	  Predator	  as	  a	  distraction	  from	  manned	  aircraft,	  a	  proven	  weapon	  system	  that	  they	  saw	  as	  having	  strategic	  potential	  across	  the	  spectrum	  of	  conflict.	  But	  this	  view	  was	  losing	  credibility	  as	  the	  strategic	  relevance	  of	  the	  Predator,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  current	  context,	  was	  becoming	  increasingly	  apparent.	  The	  dissonance	  between	  the	  USAF’s	  strategic	  planning	  and	  the	  realities	  of	  the	  strategic	  context	  suggests	  that,	  contrary	  to	  Ehrhard’s	  findings,	  the	  USAF	  was	  not	  willing	  to	  embrace	  a	  broad	  conception	  of	  airpower	  by	  accepting	  alternatives	  to	  manned	  aircraft	  to	  maximize	  its	  strategic	  relevance.	  	  	  	  	  
	   303	  
	  	  
3. To	  what	  extent	  were	  USAF	  judgments	  about	  the	  employment	  of	  	  
UAVs	  driven	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  reduce	  risk	  to	  friendly	  personnel	  and	  to	  
what	  extent	  was	  that	  push	  from	  outside	  the	  service?	  	  	  Over	  the	  history	  of	  airpower,	  technological	  innovation	  has	  allowed	  Western	  air	  forces	  to	  dramatically	  reduce	  air	  combat	  casualties,	  thereby	  fueling	  two	  emerging	  norms	  in	  Western	  culture:	  growing	  casualty	  sensitivity	  and	  an	  increasing	  disassociation	  between	  air	  forces	  and	  heroism.	  By	  even	  further	  reducing	  aircrew	  risk,	  the	  proliferation	  of	  UAVs	  in	  Western	  society	  has	  reinforced	  these	  norms.	  	  Historically,	  the	  USAF’s	  willingness	  to	  use	  UAVs	  to	  reduce	  aircrew	  risk	  in	  wartime	  varied	  according	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  casualty	  sensitivity	  among	  USAF	  commanders,	  US	  civilian	  leaders	  and	  the	  American	  public.	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  Gen.	  Arnold,	  USAF	  officers	  were	  not	  particularly	  interested	  in	  using	  UAVs	  to	  reduce	  aircrew	  risk	  in	  WWII.	  Casualty	  tolerance	  was	  high	  both	  because	  vital	  interests	  were	  perceived	  to	  be	  at	  stake	  and	  because	  the	  technology	  was	  not	  yet	  available	  to	  considerably	  reduce	  casualties.	  During	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  however,	  the	  USAF	  aggressively	  employed	  UAVs	  in	  response	  to	  growing	  casualty	  sensitivity,	  triggered	  by	  the	  perception	  that	  the	  conflict	  was	  not	  vital	  to	  US	  interests	  and	  by	  rising	  expectations	  about	  the	  potential	  for	  new	  technologies	  to	  reduce	  combat	  losses.	  	  	  	  	  	  During	  periods	  of	  peacetime,	  in	  contrast,	  the	  USAF	  found	  that	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  immediate	  concerns	  about	  combat	  losses,	  it	  could	  afford	  to	  greatly	  reduce	  its	  emphasis	  on	  UAVs	  as	  a	  means	  to	  reduce	  aircrew	  risk.	  This	  course	  suited	  the	  service	  because	  a	  secondary	  concern	  of	  airmen	  had	  been	  that	  a	  growing	  reliance	  on	  UAVs	  might	  fuel	  a	  disassociation	  between	  the	  USAF	  and	  heroism.	  After	  Vietnam,	  for	  example,	  the	  USAF	  worried	  about	  what	  it	  considered	  unacceptable	  aircraft	  loss	  rates.	  Yet	  it	  took	  steps	  to	  enhance	  the	  survivability	  of	  its	  fighters	  in	  contested	  airspace,	  rather	  than	  pursuing	  UAV	  innovations	  that	  would	  further	  remove	  its	  pilots	  from	  the	  valor	  of	  combat.	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Over	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Predator	  program,	  internal	  USAF	  perceptions	  of	  the	  value	  of	  UAVs	  as	  a	  means	  to	  reduce	  aircrew	  risk	  have	  begun	  to	  diverge	  from	  the	  perceptions	  of	  civilians	  and	  the	  American	  public.	  The	  rise	  of	  seemingly	  endless	  asymmetric	  conflicts	  following	  the	  1991	  Gulf	  War	  has	  created	  ambiguity	  about	  the	  emerging	  strategic	  context.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  value	  of	  using	  UAVs	  to	  reduce	  aircrew	  risk	  has	  become	  more	  open	  to	  interpretation.	  To	  be	  sure,	  some	  historical	  patterns	  have	  persisted.	  During	  the	  air	  wars	  over	  Bosnia	  and	  Kosovo	  in	  the	  1990s,	  USAF	  commanders,	  civilian	  leaders	  and	  the	  American	  public	  continued	  to	  prize	  UAVs	  as	  a	  way	  to	  reduce	  aircrew	  risk	  in	  these	  conflicts,	  in	  which	  vital	  interests	  were	  not	  perceived	  to	  be	  at	  stake.	  Also	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  historical	  precedent,	  the	  USAF,	  civilian	  leaders	  and	  the	  American	  public	  were	  less	  concerned	  with	  the	  employment	  of	  UAVs	  to	  reduce	  aircrew	  risk	  immediately	  after	  the	  September	  11	  attacks,	  when	  America’s	  vital	  interests	  were	  perceived	  to	  be	  at	  stake.	  	  	  As	  the	  wars	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq	  wore	  on,	  however,	  the	  USAF’s	  perceptions	  of	  UAVs	  as	  a	  means	  to	  reduce	  aircrew	  risk	  began	  to	  diverge	  with	  the	  perceptions	  of	  the	  White	  House	  and	  the	  American	  public.	  The	  Obama	  administration	  increasingly	  valued	  UAVs	  as	  a	  means	  to	  reduce	  risk	  to	  aircrew,	  particularly	  as	  it	  shifted	  its	  counterterrorism	  campaign	  beyond	  Afghanistan.	  Operating	  outside	  official	  combat	  zones,	  often	  in	  clandestine	  missions,	  the	  White	  House	  believed	  it	  was	  now	  more	  important	  than	  ever	  to	  minimize	  risks	  to	  aircrew	  because	  of	  the	  political	  risk	  associated	  with	  the	  capture	  of	  a	  downed	  pilot	  over	  a	  territory	  with	  which	  the	  US	  was	  not	  officially	  at	  war.	  The	  American	  public	  also	  increasingly	  supported	  the	  use	  of	  UAVs	  as	  a	  means	  to	  reduce	  aircrew	  risk.	  	  Inside	  the	  USAF,	  however,	  there	  was	  a	  growing	  sense	  that	  the	  US	  was	  now	  locked	  in	  a	  never-­‐ending	  asymmetric	  conflict	  that	  required	  the	  USAF	  to	  employ	  its	  UAV	  capability	  to	  the	  maximum.	  With	  no	  end	  to	  this	  demand	  in	  sight,	  the	  USAF	  returned	  to	  its	  longstanding	  peacetime	  concern	  with	  preserving	  the	  association	  between	  aircrews	  and	  heroism.	  As	  more	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  were	  pulled	  from	  the	  cockpit	  to	  fly	  Predators,	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  community	  became	  increasingly	  concerned	  about	  preserving	  its	  warrior	  identity.	  Some	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  felt	  that	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  UAV	  career	  field	  posed	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  pilot	  community’s	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warrior	  credentials,	  built	  around	  the	  demonstration	  of	  courage	  and	  skill	  in	  aerial	  combat.	  Others,	  including	  Gen.	  Schwartz,	  argued	  for	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  broader	  conception	  of	  the	  warrior	  ethos	  that	  took	  into	  account	  not	  only	  combat	  risk	  but	  also	  combat	  effects.	  The	  USAF’s	  conflicted	  views	  about	  the	  warrior	  credentials	  of	  its	  UAV	  pilots	  left	  it	  vulnerable	  to	  external	  scrutiny.	  As	  the	  Obama	  administration	  expanded	  UAV	  strikes	  against	  terrorist	  suspects	  operating	  outside	  official	  combat	  zones,	  the	  USAF’s	  internal	  debate	  about	  the	  warrior	  status	  of	  its	  UAV	  pilots	  fueled	  a	  broader	  international	  discussion	  about	  the	  morality	  and	  legality	  of	  UAV	  strikes	  conducted	  by	  pilots	  who	  were	  not	  physically	  at	  risk.	  Taken	  to	  its	  logical	  conclusion,	  the	  claim	  of	  some	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  that	  UAV	  pilots	  were	  not	  proper	  warriors	  exposed	  the	  entire	  USAF	  to	  external	  criticism	  by	  suggesting	  that	  the	  service	  was	  gaining	  an	  unfair	  advantage	  in	  warfare	  by	  reducing	  risk	  to	  aircrews.	  	  	  
4. To	  what	  extent	  were	  judgments	  about	  UAVs	  based	  on	  a	  concern	  	  
about	  maintaining	  primacy	  over	  air	  assets	  in	  response	  to	  
competition	  from	  other	  civilian	  and	  military	  institutions?	  	  Halperin’s	  theory	  of	  organizational	  essence	  predicts	  that,	  like	  any	  large	  institution,	  air	  forces	  will	  jealously	  guard	  their	  autonomy	  by	  seeking	  a	  monopoly	  over	  things	  they	  see	  as	  essential	  to	  their	  core	  missions.150	  Edgely	  argues	  that	  the	  USAF	  has	  been	  particularly	  protective	  of	  assets	  it	  perceives	  as	  close	  to	  its	  core	  functions	  because	  of	  a	  longstanding	  insecurity	  about	  its	  position	  as	  an	  independent	  service.	  Like	  air	  forces	  in	  other	  democratic	  cultures,	  the	  USAF	  was	  established	  much	  later	  than	  national	  navies	  and	  armies	  and	  therefore	  engaged	  in	  constant	  inter-­‐service	  rivalry	  as	  the	  Army	  and	  Navy	  sought	  to	  protect	  their	  own	  institutional	  power	  by	  seeking	  to	  maintain	  control	  of	  their	  own	  air	  arms.151	  	  Given	  its	  perennial	  insecurity	  over	  independence,	  the	  USAF	  and	  like-­‐minded	  air	  forces	  tend	  to	  see	  inter-­‐service	  competition	  for	  greater	  resources	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  150	  Halperin	  and	  Clapp,	  with	  Kanter	  (2006)	  27	  151	  Edgeley	  (June	  2010)	  19-­‐35	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prestige	  as	  a	  fundamental	  threat	  to	  their	  existence.152	  With	  the	  stakes	  so	  high,	  the	  USAF	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  jealously	  safeguard	  aerospace	  assets	  and	  missions	  that	  are	  viewed	  as	  essential	  to	  its	  continued	  independent	  functioning.	  In	  practice,	  this	  means	  that	  if	  the	  USAF	  takes	  an	  expansive	  view	  of	  airpower	  theory,	  it	  will	  fight	  for	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  aerospace	  assets,	  including	  UAVs,	  in	  response	  to	  external	  challengers.	  However,	  if	  it	  takes	  a	  more	  narrow	  view	  of	  its	  core	  functions	  as	  being	  tied	  only	  to	  manned	  aircraft,	  then	  it	  may	  either	  ignore	  an	  external	  challenge	  to	  UAV	  management	  or	  seek	  to	  control	  the	  UAV	  program	  only	  to	  slow	  development	  or	  kill	  it.	   Historically,	  the	  USAF	  has	  been	  most	  protective	  of	  UAVs	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  powerful	  leadership	  or	  in	  response	  to	  wartime	  pressure.	  The	  main	  historical	  leadership	  example	  is	  Gen.	  Arnold,	  who	  challenged	  the	  Army’s	  control	  of	  unmanned	  programs	  after	  WWII	  because	  he	  knew	  airmen	  needed	  all	  the	  war-­‐winning	  capability	  they	  could	  muster	  to	  establish	  an	  independent	  air	  force.	  The	  historical	  tendency	  for	  the	  USAF	  to	  protect	  its	  control	  of	  UAV	  assets	  in	  wartime	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  The	  success	  of	  UAVs	  for	  reconnaissance	  missions	  created	  a	  competition	  between	  SAC	  and	  TAC	  to	  control	  the	  technology.	  But	  once	  the	  war	  ended,	  those	  commands	  quickly	  returned	  to	  a	  narrow	  conception	  of	  airpower	  theory	  focused	  on	  manned	  aircraft.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Predator	  program,	  USAF	  leaders	  pursued	  the	  service’s	  protective	  instincts,	  but	  wartime	  demand	  was	  not	  an	  obvious	  source	  of	  pressure.	  	  The	  blurring	  of	  the	  line	  between	  war	  and	  peace	  following	  the	  first	  Gulf	  war	  led	  to	  diverging	  interpretations	  of	  the	  strategic	  environment.	  During	  the	  McPeak	  era,	  for	  example,	  the	  USAF	  ignored	  the	  Predator	  program	  based	  on	  the	  perception	  that	  the	  service’s	  main	  concerns	  were	  to	  deter	  and	  fight	  a	  high-­‐intensity	  conflict	  in	  which	  UAVs	  would	  have	  little	  relevance.	  But	  the	  USAF’s	  1995	  volte	  face	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  reflected	  the	  view	  that	  ISR	  would	  become	  a	  central	  USAF	  mission	  in	  future	  conflicts	  and	  therefore	  the	  Predator	  could	  not	  be	  ceded	  to	  another	  military	  service.	  Similarly,	  Gen.	  Jumper	  fought	  for	  the	  USAF	  to	  play	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  152	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central	  role	  in	  Predator	  operations	  prior	  to	  the	  invasion	  of	  Afghanistan	  because	  he	  wanted	  the	  USAF	  to	  be	  the	  service	  to	  capitalize	  on	  the	  Predator’s	  strategic	  potential	  in	  the	  emerging	  threat	  environment.	  The	  USAF’s	  protective	  tendencies	  emerged	  again	  when	  Gen.	  Moseley	  made	  a	  bid	  to	  win	  executive	  agency	  over	  medium	  and	  high-­‐altitude	  UAVs	  while	  he	  was	  chief.	  	  These	  bids	  to	  control	  the	  Predator	  program	  suggest	  that	  inter-­‐service	  rivalry	  was	  a	  powerful	  source	  of	  Predator	  innovation.	  In	  line	  with	  the	  inter-­‐service	  rivalry	  model	  of	  military	  innovation,	  the	  USAF	  scrambled	  to	  control	  a	  new	  capability	  to	  prevent	  another	  service	  from	  encroaching	  on	  an	  air	  asset	  that	  could	  contribute	  to	  the	  USAF’s	  strategic	  relevance.	  	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  however,	  another	  possibility	  is	  that	  the	  USAF	  sought	  control	  of	  the	  Predator	  program	  in	  some	  instances	  to	  slow	  its	  growth.	  Some	  outsiders	  suggested	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  bid	  to	  control	  the	  Predator	  program	  in	  1995	  reflected	  this	  tendency.	  Similarly,	  Secretary	  Gates	  suggested	  in	  his	  2014	  book	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  bid	  for	  UAV	  executive	  agency	  was	  a	  ploy	  meant	  to	  stifle	  the	  Predator-­‐class	  UAVs	  because	  the	  service	  had	  sought	  to	  obstruct	  UAV	  innovation	  in	  the	  past.	  	  In	  closing,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  USAF	  leadership	  has	  played	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  determining	  the	  USAF’s	  reaction	  to	  external	  interest	  in	  the	  Predator	  program.	  USAF	  leaders	  made	  judgments	  about	  whether	  to	  protect	  the	  Predator	  from	  outside	  meddling	  based	  on	  their	  views	  of	  airpower	  theory.	  Wedded	  to	  a	  narrow	  view	  of	  airpower	  theory,	  Gen.	  McPeak	  ignored	  the	  Predator	  in	  favor	  of	  focusing	  on	  proven	  manned	  aircraft	  for	  a	  high	  intensity	  conflict.	  In	  contrast,	  Gen.	  Fogleman	  pursued	  the	  Predator	  program	  based	  on	  a	  broad	  view	  of	  airpower	  theory	  that	  acknowledged	  the	  possibility	  that	  other	  airpower	  platforms,	  such	  as	  UAVs,	  might	  perform	  the	  same	  mission	  as	  well	  as,	  or	  better	  than,	  manned	  aircraft,	  at	  least	  in	  some	  strategic	  environments.	  In	  more	  recent	  history,	  the	  USAF	  has	  taken	  a	  less	  possessive	  stance,	  but	  it	  is	  too	  early	  to	  say	  whether	  this	  position	  marks	  a	  return	  to	  the	  McPeak	  era	  or	  an	  effort	  to	  embrace	  UAV	  innovation	  through	  a	  more	  flexible	  approach	  that	  does	  not	  require	  total	  USAF	  control.	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Key	  Determinants	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  Capacity	  for	  Innovation:	  Strategic	  
Context,	  Leadership,	  and	  USAF	  Identity	  	  	  Contrary	  to	  Ehrhard’s	  interpretation,	  the	  analysis	  above	  indicates	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  powerful	  undercurrents	  of	  cultural	  bias	  against	  UAV	  innovation	  shaped,	  and	  were	  shaped	  by,	  the	  Predator	  program.	  The	  USAF’s	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  community	  has	  often	  seen	  UAVs	  as	  a	  threat,	  taken	  a	  pessimistic	  view	  of	  UAV	  technology,	  downplayed	  the	  potential	  for	  UAVs	  to	  reduce	  aircrew	  risk,	  and	  either	  ignored	  the	  Predator	  program	  or	  sought	  to	  control	  its	  rate	  of	  growth.	  To	  overcome	  these	  biases,	  visionary	  leaders	  have	  sought	  to	  manipulate	  Predator	  innovation	  in	  a	  way	  that	  encouraged	  a	  cultural	  shift	  in	  favor	  of	  UAV	  technology.	  Their	  powerful	  moderating	  influence	  on	  USAF	  biases	  against	  UAV	  innovation	  helps	  to	  explain	  how	  the	  USAF	  was	  able	  to	  integrate	  the	  Predator	  program	  as	  far	  as	  it	  did.	  Despite	  periods	  of	  muted	  resistance,	  however,	  the	  USAF	  has	  not	  completely	  relinquished	  its	  undercurrents	  of	  bias	  against	  UAV	  innovation.	  While	  these	  biases	  did	  not	  prevent	  the	  USAF	  from	  ultimately	  adopting	  the	  Predator	  and	  the	  Reaper,	  they	  slowed	  the	  process	  and	  also	  raised	  troublesome	  questions	  about	  the	  USAF’s	  capacity	  to	  embrace	  new	  innovations	  to	  maintain	  its	  relevance	  in	  future	  conflicts.	  	  The	  analysis	  of	  the	  four	  questions	  above	  indicates	  that	  the	  USAF’s	  capacity	  to	  pursue	  innovation	  in	  the	  Predator	  program	  changed	  over	  time	  based	  on	  perceptions	  of	  three	  factors:	  the	  strategic	  context;	  USAF	  leadership	  behavior;	  and,	  USAF	  identity.	  By	  analyzing	  the	  influence	  of	  these	  factors	  on	  the	  USAF’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  Predator	  program,	  I	  aim	  to	  contribute	  to	  a	  broader	  understanding	  of	  how	  USAF	  culture	  influences	  the	  service’s	  capacity	  for	  military	  innovation	  in	  general	  —	  a	  critical	  determinant	  of	  its	  continued	  institutional	  relevance.	  	  
	  




The	  Strategic	  Environment	  	  
	  The	  impact	  of	  the	  strategic	  environment	  on	  the	  USAF’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  Predator	  program	  changed	  over	  time.	  Historically,	  airmen	  embraced	  UAV	  innovation	  during	  wartime	  out	  of	  necessity,	  but	  rejected	  UAV	  innovation	  when	  peacetime	  afforded	  the	  luxury	  of	  regressing	  into	  their	  longstanding	  cultural	  preferences	  for	  manned	  aircraft	  over	  any	  alternatives.	  But	  this	  pattern	  of	  UAV	  adoption	  and	  rejection	  became	  murky	  after	  the	  1991	  Gulf	  War	  as	  non-­‐state	  actors	  and	  violent	  extremist	  groups	  increasingly	  sought	  to	  uproot	  the	  existing	  international	  order	  by	  engaging	  in	  violence	  that	  fell	  short	  of	  all-­‐out	  war.153	  	  With	  the	  lines	  between	  war	  and	  peace	  increasingly	  fading,	  the	  strategic	  relevance	  of	  UAVs	  became	  far	  more	  open	  to	  interpretation.	  Many	  in	  the	  USAF’s	  manned	  aircraft	  community	  chose	  to	  interpret	  the	  rise	  of	  asymmetric	  conflict	  as	  a	  distracting	  adjunct	  to	  the	  more	  worrisome	  prospect	  of	  a	  high-­‐intensity	  clash	  in	  the	  future,	  which	  would	  require	  highly	  survivable	  aircraft	  that	  could	  operate	  across	  the	  spectrum	  of	  conflict.	  To	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots,	  the	  growing	  strategic	  ambiguity	  of	  the	  threat	  environment	  offered	  an	  opportunity	  to	  lapse	  into	  their	  historical	  peacetime	  preferences	  for	  doctrine	  built	  around	  the	  primacy	  of	  manned	  aircraft,	  around	  which	  their	  jobs	  and	  status	  in	  the	  USAF	  were	  built.	  	  USAF	  leaders	  enjoyed	  some	  success	  in	  mitigating	  these	  biases,	  and	  after	  the	  September	  11	  attacks,	  the	  invasions	  of	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq	  further	  diminished	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots’	  skepticism	  as	  the	  utility	  of	  the	  Predator	  in	  those	  conflicts	  became	  increasingly	  obvious.	  But	  as	  the	  wars	  dragged	  on	  and	  the	  Obama	  administration	  expanded	  its	  focus	  to	  UAV	  strikes	  outside	  “hot”	  conflict	  zones,	  strategic	  ambiguity	  returned.	  With	  it,	  a	  divergence	  in	  views	  regarding	  the	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  United	  States	  Special	  Operations	  Command	  (Sept.	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Predator’s	  utility	  also	  resurfaced,	  with	  many	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  retreating	  to	  their	  pessimistic	  views	  of	  UAV	  innovation.	  	  
	  	  
Leadership	  Behavior	  	  	  The	  actions	  of	  USAF	  leaders	  sometimes	  provided	  a	  powerful,	  but	  ultimately	  insufficient,	  counterbalance	  to	  the	  strong	  undercurrents	  of	  cultural	  bias	  against	  UAVs	  in	  the	  USAF.	  Although	  they	  were	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  themselves,	  Gen.	  Fogleman,	  Gen.	  Jumper	  and	  Gen.	  Schwartz	  nevertheless	  broke	  with	  the	  cultural	  norms	  of	  their	  community	  to	  promote	  processes	  of	  cultural	  change	  (norm	  entrepreneurship	  and	  norm	  exploitation,	  respectively)	  in	  favor	  of	  UAV	  innovation.	  Despite	  their	  limited	  ability	  to	  shift	  USAF	  culture	  over	  the	  long	  term,	  without	  them	  the	  USAF	  may	  have	  never	  adopted	  the	  Predator	  program	  or	  improved	  it	  to	  maximize	  its	  strategic	  potential.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  worth	  examining	  the	  chief	  selection	  process	  to	  determine	  how	  these	  individuals	  arrived	  at	  a	  position	  from	  which	  they	  could	  influence	  the	  USAF’s	  approach	  to	  UAV	  innovation.	  	  	  USAF	  chiefs	  come	  from	  a	  limited	  pool	  of	  candidates.	  Historically	  the	  USAF’s	  general	  officers	  have	  always	  been	  pilots,	  with	  fighter	  pilots	  dominating	  since	  the	  early	  1980s,	  although	  their	  percentage	  of	  general	  officer	  slots	  has	  declined	  with	  the	  shifting	  emphasis	  toward	  asymmetric	  conflict	  in	  recent	  years.154	  My	  research	  indicates	  that	  manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  tend	  to	  share	  a	  preference	  for	  their	  own	  platforms	  to	  achieve	  strategic	  effects,	  even	  in	  asymmetric	  contexts.	  Within	  this	  group,	  however,	  there	  is	  variation	  enough	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  selection	  of	  chiefs	  who	  are	  more	  or	  less	  willing	  to	  promote	  a	  broader	  conception	  of	  airpower.	  	  The	  personal	  preferences	  of	  senior	  leaders	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  USAF	  determine	  what	  kind	  of	  chief	  is	  selected.	  The	  sitting	  USAF	  chief	  and	  secretary	  pick	  their	  nominees	  (usually	  they	  agree,	  but	  not	  always),	  which	  are	  vetted	  by	  the	  other	  military	  services	  through	  the	  JCS	  before	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  makes	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  154	  Smith	  (2014)	  Fig.	  11.2	  and	  11.3	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recommendation	  to	  the	  White	  House,	  which	  ultimately	  nominates	  an	  individual	  who	  must	  then	  be	  approved	  by	  the	  US	  Congress.155	  	  Because	  the	  secretary	  of	  defense	  and,	  ultimately,	  the	  president,	  has	  considerable	  influence	  on	  chief	  selection,	  they	  have	  a	  powerful,	  if	  indirect,	  impact	  on	  the	  USAF’s	  approach	  to	  innovation.	  For	  example,	  Secretary	  Rumsfeld	  supported	  Gen.	  Moseley’s	  nomination	  as	  chief	  based	  on	  their	  similar	  views	  that	  USAF	  modernization	  to	  fight	  a	  high-­‐end	  conflict	  would	  be	  key	  to	  winning	  future	  wars,	  while	  the	  current	  generation	  of	  UAVs	  offered	  only	  a	  niche	  capability.	  In	  contrast,	  Secretary	  Gates	  fired	  Gen.	  Moseley	  and	  supported	  the	  nomination	  of	  Gen.	  Schwartz	  based	  on	  their	  shared	  view	  that	  the	  current	  generation	  of	  UAVs	  were	  essential	  capabilities	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future	  that	  demanded	  the	  USAF’s	  continued	  focus.	  	  	  
USAF	  Identity	  	  	  While	  USAF	  leaders	  enjoyed	  some	  success	  in	  shifting	  perceptions	  of	  UAV	  innovation	  within	  the	  USAF,	  in	  their	  absence	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  pilot	  community	  tended	  to	  interpret	  strategic	  ambiguity	  as	  a	  reason	  to	  retreat	  to	  a	  culturally	  engrained	  preference	  for	  war	  planning	  built	  around	  manned	  aircraft.	  The	  USAF’s	  diverging	  views	  regarding	  the	  strategic	  relevance	  of	  UAVs	  were	  emblematic	  of	  a	  larger,	  existential	  debate	  about	  USAF	  identity.	  Oftentimes,	  the	  manned	  aircraft	  community’s	  focus	  on	  platforms	  created	  the	  impression	  outside	  the	  USAF	  that	  the	  service	  narrowly	  limited	  its	  remit	  to	  the	  strategic	  employment	  of	  manned	  aircraft.	  The	  danger	  of	  this	  perception	  was	  that	  it	  exposed	  the	  service	  to	  external	  criticism	  regarding	  the	  USAF’s	  institutional	  relevance	  in	  regard	  to	  other	  platforms,	  roles,	  missions,	  and	  mediums	  including	  space	  and	  cyberspace.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  USAF	  leadership’s	  periodic	  efforts	  to	  establish	  the	  USAF	  as	  	  embracing	  a	  broad	  variety	  of	  aerospace	  power	  missions	  risked	  the	  perception	  that	  the	  USAF	  had	  expanded	  its	  remit	  so	  broadly	  that	  it	  lost	  its	  legitimate	  claim	  to	  mission	  specialist	  expertise.	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  The	  USAF’s	  internal	  debate	  about	  the	  warrior	  ethos	  is	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  the	  difficulty	  of	  balancing	  narrow	  and	  broad	  views	  of	  airpower	  theory.	  Manned	  aircraft	  pilots	  have	  tended	  to	  adopt	  a	  narrow	  view	  of	  the	  warrior	  ethos	  that	  includes	  only	  their	  small	  community	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  they	  are	  the	  only	  ones	  exposed	  to	  physical	  risk.	  But	  denying	  warrior	  credentials	  to	  UAV	  aircrews	  has	  inadvertently	  fueled	  an	  ongoing	  international	  debate	  about	  the	  ethics	  of	  drone	  warfare,	  centered	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  drone	  strikes	  may	  be	  immoral	  precisely	  because	  UAV	  pilots	  are	  at	  far	  less	  risk	  of	  dying	  than	  their	  adversaries.	  Providing	  fodder	  to	  this	  debate	  is	  likely	  not	  the	  intention	  of	  most	  airmen,	  given	  that	  every	  chief	  between	  1993	  and	  2015,	  every	  USAF	  chief	  has	  publicly	  touted	  the	  USAF’s	  employment	  of	  airpower	  as	  America’s	  own	  asymmetric	  edge	  in	  battle.156	  Equally	  damaging	  to	  the	  USAF’s	  reputation,	  however,	  is	  the	  risk	  of	  espousing	  an	  exceedingly	  broad	  view	  of	  the	  warrior	  ethos.	  To	  infuse	  a	  warrior	  mentality	  in	  the	  USAF’s	  UAV	  community,	  in	  2013	  the	  Pentagon	  created	  a	  new	  medal	  for	  UAV	  pilots	  to	  recognize	  their	  warfighting	  contributions.	  But	  there	  was	  a	  sense,	  even	  among	  many	  in	  the	  UAV	  pilot	  community,	  that	  the	  medal’s	  order	  of	  merit	  above	  medals	  awarded	  for	  combat	  action	  cheapened	  the	  warfighting	  contributions	  of	  those	  in	  combat.	  The	  Pentagon’s	  decision	  in	  early	  2016	  to	  pin	  an	  “R”	  device	  on	  UAV	  pilots’	  existing	  medals	  provided	  a	  compromise	  solution.	  But	  the	  risk	  of	  extending	  the	  definition	  of	  “warrior”	  so	  broadly	  that	  it	  becomes	  meaningless	  is	  still	  very	  much	  a	  live	  issue	  as	  the	  USAF	  considers	  how	  far	  to	  extend	  responsibilities	  for	  UAV	  operations	  to	  civilian	  contractors.	  If	  contractors	  are	  given	  the	  authority	  to	  fire	  weapons	  from	  a	  UAV,	  for	  example,	  then	  this	  potentially	  diminishes	  the	  USAF’s	  reputation	  as	  a	  warfighting	  institution	  because	  someone	  who	  is	  not	  even	  in	  the	  service	  can	  perform	  a	  critical	  mission	  that,	  according	  to	  the	  USAF,	  requires	  warrior	  credentials	  broadly	  defined.	  This	  thesis	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  USAF	  culture	  and	  the	  Predator	  program	  because	  the	  unmanned	  system’s	  growing	  operational	  relevance	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  Rhay	  (May	  29,	  2007);	  Fogleman	  (March	  5,	  1997);	  Johnson	  (Jan.	  12,	  2000);	  Jablonski	  (Feb.	  11,	  2005);	  Air	  Force	  Public	  Affairs	  (May	  17,	  2004);	  Schwartz	  (March	  2011);	  Eliason	  (3rd	  Quarter	  2014)	  9	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has	  thrown	  into	  sharp	  relief	  the	  need	  to	  recalibrate	  airpower	  theory.	  But	  the	  struggle	  to	  strike	  a	  balance	  between	  doing	  too	  little	  and	  doing	  too	  much	  extends	  far	  beyond	  UAVs	  to	  other	  platforms,	  roles,	  missions,	  and	  mediums.	  The	  USAF’s	  proposal	  to	  retire	  the	  A-­‐10	  Thunderbolt	  II	  has	  drawn	  fire	  from	  critics	  who	  argue	  the	  USAF	  must	  broaden	  its	  strategic	  portfolio	  to	  include	  close	  air	  support	  rather	  than	  diminish	  its	  relevance.	  Conversely,	  the	  USAF’s	  struggle	  to	  dominate	  space	  has	  drawn	  criticism	  from	  those	  who	  say	  the	  USAF	  is	  overreaching	  because	  it	  is	  poorly	  positioned	  to	  operate	  in	  that	  realm	  and	  lacks	  a	  genuine	  interest	  in	  honing	  mission	  specialist	  expertise	  in	  that	  medium.157	  The	  stakes	  could	  not	  be	  higher	  for	  the	  USAF	  as	  it	  seeks	  to	  balance	  its	  strategic	  portfolio.	  The	  gravest	  threat	  at	  present	  appears	  to	  come	  from	  those	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  USAF	  who	  believe	  the	  institution	  is	  inextricably	  wedded	  to	  a	  narrow	  conception	  of	  airpower	  built	  around	  manned	  aircraft.	  If	  the	  USAF’s	  tendency	  to	  obstruct	  UAV	  innovation	  based	  on	  its	  cultural	  preference	  for	  manned	  aircraft	  extends	  to	  its	  capacity	  to	  innovate	  across	  other	  roles,	  missions,	  and	  mediums,	  then	  the	  USAF	  is	  vulnerable	  to	  claims	  from	  authors	  such	  as	  Van	  Creveld	  and	  Farley	  that	  it	  is	  losing	  relevance	  as	  a	  warfighting	  institution.	  	  	  In	  closing,	  there	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  any	  easy	  way	  out	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  identity	  crisis.	  One	  potentially	  helpful	  endeavor	  is	  to	  return	  to	  my	  research,	  which	  found	  the	  USAF	  tends	  to	  adopt	  too	  narrow	  a	  view	  of	  airpower,	  but	  which	  also	  may	  offer	  some	  insight	  into	  how	  to	  shift	  USAF	  culture	  to	  expand	  the	  service’s	  capacity	  for	  innovation.	  	  Clearly,	  civilian	  leaders	  play	  a	  powerful	  role	  in	  shaping	  the	  USAF’s	  cultural	  attitudes	  toward	  innovation	  because	  they	  nominate	  USAF	  chiefs,	  who	  proved	  to	  be	  critical	  actors	  in	  shaping	  Predator	  innovation.	  Farrell’s	  model	  of	  cultural	  change,	  which	  centers	  on	  the	  role	  of	  norm	  entrepreneur,	  provides	  a	  helpful	  lens	  to	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  influence.	  Indeed,	  Gen.	  Fogleman’s	  act	  of	  norm	  entrepreneurship,	  calling	  on	  the	  USAF	  to	  embrace	  the	  Predator	  as	  a	  symbol	  of	  a	  broader	  commitment	  to	  ISR,	  is	  the	  very	  reason	  that	  the	  USAF	  controls	  the	  Predator	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  For	  more	  on	  space	  debates	  see	  Lambeth	  (2003)	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program	  today.	  Perhaps	  even	  more	  promising	  is	  the	  norm	  exploiter	  concept	  developed	  in	  this	  thesis,	  which	  depends	  on	  visionary	  leaders	  seeking	  to	  adopt	  innovations	  in	  a	  way	  that	  complements	  existing	  culture.	  Examples	  include	  Gen.	  Jumper’s	  successful	  efforts	  to	  weaponize	  the	  Predator	  and	  Gen.	  Schwartz’s	  decision	  to	  create	  a	  new	  18X	  career	  field	  manned	  with	  eager	  volunteers.	  	  As	  this	  research	  has	  shown,	  however,	  USAF	  leaders’	  attempts	  to	  shift	  USAF	  culture	  in	  favor	  of	  innovation	  are	  often	  undermined	  by	  powerful	  undercurrents	  of	  persistent	  cultural	  bias.	  Still,	  there	  is	  hope	  for	  overcoming	  the	  bias	  in	  the	  future.	  One	  possibility	  is	  that	  norm	  exploiters	  will	  establish	  new	  career	  fields	  that	  provide	  an	  avenue	  to	  promote	  innovation	  over	  the	  long	  term,	  as	  Rosen’s	  model	  of	  intraservice	  competition	  predicts.	  This	  solution	  would	  not	  only	  guard	  against	  too-­‐narrow	  views	  of	  airpower,	  but	  it	  also	  would	  also	  protect	  the	  service	  from	  charges	  of	  overextending	  itself	  by	  ensuring	  	  the	  service	  possesses	  the	  mission	  expertise	  required	  to	  credibly	  adopt	  new	  aerospace	  innovations.	  	  
	  
Further	  Research	  	  	  	  One	  fertile	  area	  for	  further	  research	  involves	  re-­‐visiting	  the	  relationship	  between	  USAF	  culture	  and	  UAV	  innovation	  in	  another	  15	  years.	  Aside	  from	  my	  different	  approach	  to	  methodology,	  a	  possible	  reason	  that	  I	  found	  pervasive	  cultural	  bias	  against	  UAVs	  where	  Ehrhard	  did	  not	  relates	  to	  timing.	  His	  research,	  like	  my	  own,	  was	  limited	  by	  his	  capacity	  to	  induce	  interviewees	  to	  speak	  truthfully	  beyond	  the	  prevailing	  politically	  correct	  sentiments	  of	  the	  time.	  During	  his	  research	  period,	  interviewees	  may	  have	  felt	  pressure	  to	  offer	  positive	  portrayals	  of	  USAF	  attitudes	  toward	  UAV	  innovation	  because	  of	  USAF	  leadership	  support	  for	  UAVs	  in	  the	  1990s,	  whereas	  during	  my	  research	  period,	  low	  morale	  in	  the	  UAV	  community	  may	  have	  created	  pressure	  to	  report	  negative	  portrayals.	  One	  mitigating	  factor	  for	  my	  research	  is	  that	  my	  early	  chapters	  benefit	  from	  the	  analytical	  detachment	  of	  hindsight,	  but	  my	  later	  chapters	  are	  vulnerable	  to	  this	  research	  limitation.	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   Noting	  in	  2000	  that	  UAV	  innovation	  was	  still	  in	  an	  “early,	  indeterminate	  stage,”	  Ehrhard	  called	  his	  dissertation	  a	  “companion	  piece	  to	  UAV	  research	  yet	  to	  be	  conducted.”158	  Although	  my	  research	  was	  conducted15	  years	  after	  his	  work,	  it	  would	  still	  be	  inaccurate	  to	  say	  that	  the	  process	  of	  UAV	  innovation	  in	  the	  USAF	  is	  complete.	  Without	  the	  benefit	  of	  hindsight,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  know	  whether	  more	  recent	  policies,	  such	  as	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  18X	  career	  field,	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  CPIP,	  and	  the	  plans	  to	  rely	  more	  heavily	  on	  civilians	  and	  enlisted	  personnel,	  mark	  a	  growing	  acceptance	  of	  UAV	  innovation	  in	  the	  USAF.	  Future	  analysis	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  cultural	  attitudes	  toward	  UAV	  innovation	  would	  help	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  USAF’s	  capacity	  for	  innovation	  has	  improved.	  Another	  area	  for	  further	  research	  concerns	  USAF	  leadership.	  Some	  of	  the	  most	  important	  leaders	  in	  Predator	  innovation	  came	  from	  the	  fighter	  community.	  Yet	  these	  leaders	  demonstrated	  a	  willingness	  to	  look	  beyond	  fighter	  operations	  to	  consider	  how	  USAF	  approaches	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  roles,	  missions,	  and	  mediums	  might	  advance	  the	  USAF’s	  war-­‐winning	  edge.	  It	  would	  be	  helpful	  to	  learn	  more	  about	  the	  inherent	  traits	  and	  training	  of	  these	  officers	  to	  develop	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  to	  recruit	  and	  promote	  officers	  who	  embrace	  a	  broad	  conception	  of	  airpower	  rather	  than	  a	  narrow	  view.	  	   Lastly,	  the	  USAF’s	  Reaper	  program	  is	  also	  ripe	  for	  further	  study.	  Cullen’s	  2011	  dissertation,	  and	  Mindell’s	  2015	  book	  drawing	  on	  that	  research,	  focused	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  UAV	  operators	  and	  Reaper	  technology,	  but	  no	  open-­‐source	  Reaper	  history	  has	  been	  written	  yet.	  Conducting	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  USAF’s	  cultural	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  Reaper,	  which	  is	  faster	  and	  more	  heavily	  armed	  than	  the	  Predator,	  would	  be	  an	  interesting	  avenue	  to	  pursue	  as	  the	  USAF	  considers	  the	  relevance	  of	  UAVs	  in	  future	  conflicts.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  158	  Ehrhard	  (2000)633	  
	   316	  
GLOSSARY	  
	  AB	   	   Air	  Base	  ACTD	  	   	   Advanced	  Concept	  Technology	  Demonstration	   	  ACC	   	   Air	  Combat	  Command	  AFB	   	   Air	  Force	  Base	  	  AFMC	   	   Air	  Force	  Materiel	  Command	  	  AFOTEC	   Air	  Force	  Operational	  Test	  and	  Evaluation	  Center	  AFPC	   	   Air	  Force	  Personnel	  Command	  	  AFSC	   	   Air	  Force	  Systems	  Command	  AFSOC	  	   Air	  Force	  Special	  Operations	  Command	  	  ALFA	   Air	  liaison	  -­‐	  forward	  air	  control	  -­‐	  Air	  Education	  and	  Training	  Command	   	  	  	  ANG	   	   Air	  National	  Guard	  	  CAIG	   	   Cost	  Analysis	  Improvement	  Group	  CAOC	   	   Combined	  Air	  Operations	  Center	  CAP	   	   Combat	  Air	  Patrol	  CAPE	   	   Cost	  Assessment	  and	  Program	  Evaluation	  CPIP	   	   Culture	  and	  Process	  Improvement	  Program	  	  DARO	   	   Defense	  Airborne	  Reconnaissance	  Office	  DARPA	   Defense	  Advanced	  Research	  Projects	  Agency	  DSB	   	   Defense	  Science	  Board	   	   	   	   	   	  	  DoD	   	   Department	  of	  Defense	  	  EAIS	   	   Expeditionary	  Air	  Intelligence	  Squadron	  EUCOM	   European	  Command	  	  ER/MP	   Extended	  Range/Multipurpose	  FMV	   	   Full	  Motion	  Video	  GA-­‐ASI	   General	  Atomics	  Aeronautical	  Systems	  IFS	   	   Initial	  Flight	  Screening	  	  ISR	  	   	   Intelligence,	  surveillance	  and	  reconnaissance	   	   	  	  JCIDS	   	   Joint	  Capabilities	  Integration	  Development	  System	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JFACC	   	   Joint	  Forces	  Air	  Component	  Commander	   	  JPO	   	   Joint	  Program	  Office	  JROC	  	   	   Joint	  Requirements	  Oversight	  Council	  JSOC	   	   Joint	  Special	  Operations	  Command	  JTAC	   	   Joint	  Tactical	  Air	  Controller	  JWICS	   	   Joint	  Worldwide	  Intelligence	  Communication	  System	  MARS	   	   Mid-­‐	  Air	  Recovery	  System	  mIRC	   	   Internet	  Relay	  Chat	  MRAP	   	   Mine	  Resistant	  Ambush	  Protected	  NSC	   	   National	  Security	  Council	  OEF	   	   Operation	  Enduring	  Freedom	  OIF	   	   Operation	  Iraqi	  Freedom	  OT	  &	  E	  	   Office	  of	  Test	  and	  Evaluation	  RMA	   	   Revolution	  in	  Military	  Affairs	  RPA	   	   Remotely	  Piloted	  Aircraft	  RPV	   	   Remotely	  Piloted	  Vehicle	  RS	   	   Reconnaissance	  Squadron	  RSO	   	   Remote	  Split	  Operations	  SAM	   	   Surface-­‐to-­‐Air	  Missile	  SIGINT	   Signals	  Intelligence	  SOF	   	   Special	  Operations	  Forces	  	  SOS	   	   Special	  Operations	  Squadron	  	  SOUTHCOM	   US	  Southern	  Command	  TRA	   	   Teledyne-­‐Ryan	  Aeronautical	  UAS	   	   Unmanned	  Aircraft	  System	  	  UAV	   	   Unmanned	  Aerial	  Vehicle	  UPT	   	   Undergraduate	  Pilot	  Training	  URT	   	   Undergraduate	  RPA	  Training	  	  USAFE	  	   US	  Air	  Forces	  Europe	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